mirror of
https://github.com/CTCaer/switch-l4t-atf.git
synced 2024-11-25 02:39:42 +00:00
doc: Format security advisory titles and headings
Required so that the advisory documents are all valid RST files (with a header) and that they all integrate into the document tree. Change-Id: I68ca2b0b9e648e24b460deb772c471a38518da26 Signed-off-by: Paul Beesley <paul.beesley@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
24dba2b39f
commit
267f8085f2
@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
|
||||
Advisory TFV-1 (CVE-2016-10319)
|
||||
===============================
|
||||
|
||||
+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+
|
||||
| Title | Malformed Firmware Update SMC can result in copy of |
|
||||
| | unexpectedly large data into secure memory |
|
||||
|
@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
|
||||
Advisory TFV-2 (CVE-2017-7564)
|
||||
==============================
|
||||
|
||||
+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+
|
||||
| Title | Enabled secure self-hosted invasive debug interface can |
|
||||
| | allow normal world to panic secure world |
|
||||
|
@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
|
||||
Advisory TFV-3 (CVE-2017-7563)
|
||||
==============================
|
||||
|
||||
+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+
|
||||
| Title | RO memory is always executable at AArch64 Secure EL1 |
|
||||
+================+=============================================================+
|
||||
|
@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
|
||||
Advisory TFV-4 (CVE-2017-9607)
|
||||
==============================
|
||||
|
||||
+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+
|
||||
| Title | Malformed Firmware Update SMC can result in copy or |
|
||||
| | authentication of unexpected data in secure memory in |
|
||||
|
@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
|
||||
Advisory TFV-5 (CVE-2017-15031)
|
||||
===============================
|
||||
|
||||
+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+
|
||||
| Title | Not initializing or saving/restoring ``PMCR_EL0`` can leak |
|
||||
| | secure world timing information |
|
||||
|
@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
|
||||
Advisory TFV-6 (CVE-2017-5753, CVE-2017-5715, CVE-2017-5754)
|
||||
============================================================
|
||||
|
||||
+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+
|
||||
| Title | Arm Trusted Firmware exposure to speculative processor |
|
||||
| | vulnerabilities using cache timing side-channels |
|
||||
@ -28,13 +31,13 @@ these vulnerabilities on Arm systems, please refer to the `Arm Processor
|
||||
Security Update`_.
|
||||
|
||||
Variant 1 (`CVE-2017-5753`_)
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
----------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
At the time of writing, no vulnerable patterns have been observed in upstream TF
|
||||
code, therefore no workarounds have been applied or are planned.
|
||||
|
||||
Variant 2 (`CVE-2017-5715`_)
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
----------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Where possible on vulnerable CPUs, Arm recommends invalidating the branch
|
||||
predictor as early as possible on entry into the secure world, before any branch
|
||||
@ -122,7 +125,7 @@ Cortex-A76, Cortex-A53, Cortex-A55, Cortex-A32, Cortex-A7 and Cortex-A5.
|
||||
For more information about non-Arm CPUs, please contact the CPU vendor.
|
||||
|
||||
Variant 3 (`CVE-2017-5754`_)
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
----------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
This variant is only exploitable between Exception Levels within the same
|
||||
translation regime, for example between EL0 and EL1, therefore this variant
|
||||
|
@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
|
||||
Advisory TFV-7 (CVE-2018-3639)
|
||||
==============================
|
||||
|
||||
+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+
|
||||
| Title | Trusted Firmware-A exposure to cache speculation |
|
||||
| | vulnerability Variant 4 |
|
||||
@ -46,7 +49,7 @@ for platforms that are unaffected or where the risk is deemed low enough.
|
||||
Arm CPUs not mentioned below are unaffected.
|
||||
|
||||
Static mitigation
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
-----------------
|
||||
|
||||
For affected CPUs, this approach enables the mitigation during EL3
|
||||
initialization, following every PE reset. No mechanism is provided to disable
|
||||
@ -67,7 +70,7 @@ TF-A implements this approach for the following affected CPUs:
|
||||
(``S3_0_C15_C1_0``).
|
||||
|
||||
Dynamic mitigation
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
------------------
|
||||
|
||||
For affected CPUs, this approach also enables the mitigation during EL3
|
||||
initialization, following every PE reset. In addition, this approach implements
|
||||
|
@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
|
||||
Advisory TFV-8 (CVE-2018-19440)
|
||||
===============================
|
||||
|
||||
+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+
|
||||
| Title | Not saving x0 to x3 registers can leak information from one |
|
||||
| | Normal World SMC client to another |
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user