104 KiB
ARM Trusted Firmware Design
Contents :
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Introduction
The ARM Trusted Firmware implements a subset of the Trusted Board Boot Requirements (TBBR) Platform Design Document (PDD) [1] for ARM reference platforms. The TBB sequence starts when the platform is powered on and runs up to the stage where it hands-off control to firmware running in the normal world in DRAM. This is the cold boot path.
The ARM Trusted Firmware also implements the Power State Coordination Interface (PSCI) PDD [2] as a runtime service. PSCI is the interface from normal world software to firmware implementing power management use-cases (for example, secondary CPU boot, hotplug and idle). Normal world software can access ARM Trusted Firmware runtime services via the ARM SMC (Secure Monitor Call) instruction. The SMC instruction must be used as mandated by the SMC Calling Convention PDD [3].
The ARM Trusted Firmware implements a framework for configuring and managing interrupts generated in either security state. The details of the interrupt management framework and its design can be found in ARM Trusted Firmware Interrupt Management Design guide [4].
The ARM Trusted Firmware can be built to support either AArch64 or AArch32 execution state.
- Cold boot
The cold boot path starts when the platform is physically turned on. If
COLD_BOOT_SINGLE_CPU=0, one of the CPUs released from reset is chosen as the
primary CPU, and the remaining CPUs are considered secondary CPUs. The primary
CPU is chosen through platform-specific means. The cold boot path is mainly
executed by the primary CPU, other than essential CPU initialization executed by
all CPUs. The secondary CPUs are kept in a safe platform-specific state until
the primary CPU has performed enough initialization to boot them.
Refer to the Reset Design for more information on the effect of the
COLD_BOOT_SINGLE_CPU platform build option.
The cold boot path in this implementation of the ARM Trusted Firmware, depends on the execution state. For AArch64, it is divided into five steps (in order of execution):
- Boot Loader stage 1 (BL1) AP Trusted ROM
- Boot Loader stage 2 (BL2) Trusted Boot Firmware
- Boot Loader stage 3-1 (BL31) EL3 Runtime Software
- Boot Loader stage 3-2 (BL32) Secure-EL1 Payload (optional)
- Boot Loader stage 3-3 (BL33) Non-trusted Firmware
For AArch32, it is divided into four steps (in order of execution):
- Boot Loader stage 1 (BL1) AP Trusted ROM
- Boot Loader stage 2 (BL2) Trusted Boot Firmware
- Boot Loader stage 3-2 (BL32) EL3 Runtime Software
- Boot Loader stage 3-3 (BL33) Non-trusted Firmware
ARM development platforms (Fixed Virtual Platforms (FVPs) and Juno) implement a combination of the following types of memory regions. Each bootloader stage uses one or more of these memory regions.
- Regions accessible from both non-secure and secure states. For example, non-trusted SRAM, ROM and DRAM.
- Regions accessible from only the secure state. For example, trusted SRAM and ROM. The FVPs also implement the trusted DRAM which is statically configured. Additionally, the Base FVPs and Juno development platform configure the TrustZone Controller (TZC) to create a region in the DRAM which is accessible only from the secure state.
The sections below provide the following details:
- initialization and execution of the first three stages during cold boot
- specification of the EL3 Runtime Software (BL31 for AArch64 and BL32 for AArch32) entrypoint requirements for use by alternative Trusted Boot Firmware in place of the provided BL1 and BL2
BL1
This stage begins execution from the platform's reset vector at EL3. The reset address is platform dependent but it is usually located in a Trusted ROM area. The BL1 data section is copied to trusted SRAM at runtime.
On the ARM development platforms, BL1 code starts execution from the reset
vector defined by the constant BL1_RO_BASE. The BL1 data section is copied
to the top of trusted SRAM as defined by the constant BL1_RW_BASE.
The functionality implemented by this stage is as follows.
Determination of boot path
Whenever a CPU is released from reset, BL1 needs to distinguish between a warm
boot and a cold boot. This is done using platform-specific mechanisms (see the
plat_get_my_entrypoint() function in the Porting Guide). In the case of a
warm boot, a CPU is expected to continue execution from a separate
entrypoint. In the case of a cold boot, the secondary CPUs are placed in a safe
platform-specific state (see the plat_secondary_cold_boot_setup() function in
the Porting Guide) while the primary CPU executes the remaining cold boot path
as described in the following sections.
This step only applies when PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS=0. Refer to the
Reset Design for more information on the effect of the
PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS platform build option.
Architectural initialization
BL1 performs minimal architectural initialization as follows.
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Exception vectors
BL1 sets up simple exception vectors for both synchronous and asynchronous exceptions. The default behavior upon receiving an exception is to populate a status code in the general purpose register
X0/R0and call theplat_report_exception()function (see the Porting Guide). The status code is one of:For AArch64: 0x0 : Synchronous exception from Current EL with SP_EL0 0x1 : IRQ exception from Current EL with SP_EL0 0x2 : FIQ exception from Current EL with SP_EL0 0x3 : System Error exception from Current EL with SP_EL0 0x4 : Synchronous exception from Current EL with SP_ELx 0x5 : IRQ exception from Current EL with SP_ELx 0x6 : FIQ exception from Current EL with SP_ELx 0x7 : System Error exception from Current EL with SP_ELx 0x8 : Synchronous exception from Lower EL using aarch64 0x9 : IRQ exception from Lower EL using aarch64 0xa : FIQ exception from Lower EL using aarch64 0xb : System Error exception from Lower EL using aarch64 0xc : Synchronous exception from Lower EL using aarch32 0xd : IRQ exception from Lower EL using aarch32 0xe : FIQ exception from Lower EL using aarch32 0xf : System Error exception from Lower EL using aarch32
For AArch32: 0x10 : User mode 0x11 : FIQ mode 0x12 : IRQ mode 0x13 : SVC mode 0x16 : Monitor mode 0x17 : Abort mode 0x1a : Hypervisor mode 0x1b : Undefined mode 0x1f : System mode
The
plat_report_exception()implementation on the ARM FVP port programs the Versatile Express System LED register in the following format to indicate the occurence of an unexpected exception:SYS_LED[0] - Security state (Secure=0/Non-Secure=1) SYS_LED[2:1] - Exception Level (EL3=0x3, EL2=0x2, EL1=0x1, EL0=0x0) For AArch32 it is always 0x0 SYS_LED[7:3] - Exception Class (Sync/Async & origin). This is the value of the status codeA write to the LED register reflects in the System LEDs (S6LED0..7) in the CLCD window of the FVP.
BL1 does not expect to receive any exceptions other than the SMC exception. For the latter, BL1 installs a simple stub. The stub expects to receive a limited set of SMC types (determined by their function IDs in the general purpose register
X0/R0):BL1_SMC_RUN_IMAGE: This SMC is raised by BL2 to make BL1 pass control to EL3 Runtime Software.- All SMCs listed in section "BL1 SMC Interface" in the Firmware Update Design Guide are supported for AArch64 only. These SMCs are currently not supported when BL1 is built for AArch32.
Any other SMC leads to an assertion failure.
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CPU initialization
BL1 calls the
reset_handler()function which in turn calls the CPU specific reset handler function (see the section: "CPU specific operations framework"). -
Control register setup (for AArch64)
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SCTLR_EL3. Instruction cache is enabled by setting theSCTLR_EL3.Ibit. Alignment and stack alignment checking is enabled by setting theSCTLR_EL3.AandSCTLR_EL3.SAbits. Exception endianness is set to little-endian by clearing theSCTLR_EL3.EEbit. -
SCR_EL3. The register width of the next lower exception level is set to AArch64 by setting theSCR.RWbit. TheSCR.EAbit is set to trap both External Aborts and SError Interrupts in EL3. TheSCR.SIFbit is also set to disable instruction fetches from Non-secure memory when in secure state. -
CPTR_EL3. Accesses to theCPACR_EL1register from EL1 or EL2, or theCPTR_EL2register from EL2 are configured to not trap to EL3 by clearing theCPTR_EL3.TCPACbit. Access to the trace functionality is configured not to trap to EL3 by clearing theCPTR_EL3.TTAbit. Instructions that access the registers associated with Floating Point and Advanced SIMD execution are configured to not trap to EL3 by clearing theCPTR_EL3.TFPbit. -
DAIF. The SError interrupt is enabled by clearing the SError interrupt mask bit.
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Control register setup (for AArch32)
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SCTLR. Instruction cache is enabled by setting theSCTLR.Ibit. Alignment checking is enabled by setting theSCTLR.Abit. Exception endianness is set to little-endian by clearing theSCTLR.EEbit. -
SCR. TheSCR.SIFbit is set to disable instruction fetches from Non-secure memory when in secure state. -
CPACR. Allow execution of Advanced SIMD instructions at PL0 and PL1, by clearing theCPACR.ASEDISbit. Access to the trace functionality is configured not to trap to undefined mode by clearing theCPACR.TRCDISbit. -
NSACR. Enable non-secure access to Advanced SIMD functionality and system register access to implemented trace registers. -
FPEXC. Enable access to the Advanced SIMD and floating-point functionality from all Exception levels. -
CPSR.A. The Asynchronous data abort interrupt is enabled by clearing the Asynchronous data abort interrupt mask bit.
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Platform initialization
On ARM platforms, BL1 performs the following platform initializations:
- Enable the Trusted Watchdog.
- Initialize the console.
- Configure the Interconnect to enable hardware coherency.
- Enable the MMU and map the memory it needs to access.
- Configure any required platform storage to load the next bootloader image (BL2).
Firmware Update detection and execution
After performing platform setup, BL1 common code calls
bl1_plat_get_next_image_id() to determine if Firmware Update is required or
to proceed with the normal boot process. If the platform code returns
BL2_IMAGE_ID then the normal boot sequence is executed as described in the
next section, else BL1 assumes that Firmware Update is required and execution
passes to the first image in the Firmware Update process. In either case, BL1
retrieves a descriptor of the next image by calling bl1_plat_get_image_desc().
The image descriptor contains an entry_point_info_t structure, which BL1
uses to initialize the execution state of the next image.
BL2 image load and execution
In the normal boot flow, BL1 execution continues as follows:
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BL1 prints the following string from the primary CPU to indicate successful execution of the BL1 stage:
"Booting Trusted Firmware" -
BL1 determines the amount of free trusted SRAM memory available by calculating the extent of its own data section, which also resides in trusted SRAM. BL1 loads a BL2 raw binary image from platform storage, at a platform-specific base address. If the BL2 image file is not present or if there is not enough free trusted SRAM the following error message is printed:
"Failed to load BL2 firmware."BL1 calculates the amount of Trusted SRAM that can be used by the BL2 image. The exact load location of the image is provided as a base address in the platform header. Further description of the memory layout can be found later in this document.
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BL1 passes control to the BL2 image at Secure EL1 (for AArch64) or at Secure SVC mode (for AArch32), starting from its load address.
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BL1 also passes information about the amount of trusted SRAM used and available for use. This information is populated at a platform-specific memory address.
BL2
BL1 loads and passes control to BL2 at Secure-EL1 (for AArch64) or at Secure SVC mode (for AArch32) . BL2 is linked against and loaded at a platform-specific base address (more information can be found later in this document). The functionality implemented by BL2 is as follows.
Architectural initialization
For AArch64, BL2 performs the minimal architectural initialization required
for subsequent stages of the ARM Trusted Firmware and normal world software.
EL1 and EL0 are given access to Floating Point and Advanced SIMD registers
by clearing the CPACR.FPEN bits.
For AArch32, the minimal architectural initialization required for subsequent stages of the ARM Trusted Firmware and normal world software is taken care of in BL1 as both BL1 and BL2 execute at PL1.
Platform initialization
On ARM platforms, BL2 performs the following platform initializations:
- Initialize the console.
- Configure any required platform storage to allow loading further bootloader images.
- Enable the MMU and map the memory it needs to access.
- Perform platform security setup to allow access to controlled components.
- Reserve some memory for passing information to the next bootloader image EL3 Runtime Software and populate it.
- Define the extents of memory available for loading each subsequent bootloader image.
Image loading in BL2
Image loading scheme in BL2 depends on LOAD_IMAGE_V2 build option. If the
flag is disabled, the BLxx images are loaded, by calling the respective
load_blxx() function from BL2 generic code. If the flag is enabled, the BL2
generic code loads the images based on the list of loadable images provided
by the platform. BL2 passes the list of executable images provided by the
platform to the next handover BL image. By default, this flag is disabled for
AArch64 and the AArch32 build is supported only if this flag is enabled.
SCP_BL2 (System Control Processor Firmware) image load
Some systems have a separate System Control Processor (SCP) for power, clock, reset and system control. BL2 loads the optional SCP_BL2 image from platform storage into a platform-specific region of secure memory. The subsequent handling of SCP_BL2 is platform specific. For example, on the Juno ARM development platform port the image is transferred into SCP's internal memory using the Boot Over MHU (BOM) protocol after being loaded in the trusted SRAM memory. The SCP executes SCP_BL2 and signals to the Application Processor (AP) for BL2 execution to continue.
EL3 Runtime Software image load
BL2 loads the EL3 Runtime Software image from platform storage into a platform-
specific address in trusted SRAM. If there is not enough memory to load the
image or image is missing it leads to an assertion failure. If LOAD_IMAGE_V2
is disabled and if image loads successfully, BL2 updates the amount of trusted
SRAM used and available for use by EL3 Runtime Software. This information is
populated at a platform-specific memory address.
AArch64 BL32 (Secure-EL1 Payload) image load
BL2 loads the optional BL32 image from platform storage into a platform-
specific region of secure memory. The image executes in the secure world. BL2
relies on BL31 to pass control to the BL32 image, if present. Hence, BL2
populates a platform-specific area of memory with the entrypoint/load-address
of the BL32 image. The value of the Saved Processor Status Register (SPSR)
for entry into BL32 is not determined by BL2, it is initialized by the
Secure-EL1 Payload Dispatcher (see later) within BL31, which is responsible for
managing interaction with BL32. This information is passed to BL31.
BL33 (Non-trusted Firmware) image load
BL2 loads the BL33 image (e.g. UEFI or other test or boot software) from platform storage into non-secure memory as defined by the platform.
BL2 relies on EL3 Runtime Software to pass control to BL33 once secure state
initialization is complete. Hence, BL2 populates a platform-specific area of
memory with the entrypoint and Saved Program Status Register (SPSR) of the
normal world software image. The entrypoint is the load address of the BL33
image. The SPSR is determined as specified in Section 5.13 of the [PSCI PDD]
PSCI. This information is passed to the EL3 Runtime Software.
AArch64 BL31 (EL3 Runtime Software) execution
BL2 execution continues as follows:
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BL2 passes control back to BL1 by raising an SMC, providing BL1 with the BL31 entrypoint. The exception is handled by the SMC exception handler installed by BL1.
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BL1 turns off the MMU and flushes the caches. It clears the
SCTLR_EL3.M/I/Cbits, flushes the data cache to the point of coherency and invalidates the TLBs. -
BL1 passes control to BL31 at the specified entrypoint at EL3.
AArch64 BL31
The image for this stage is loaded by BL2 and BL1 passes control to BL31 at EL3. BL31 executes solely in trusted SRAM. BL31 is linked against and loaded at a platform-specific base address (more information can be found later in this document). The functionality implemented by BL31 is as follows.
Architectural initialization
Currently, BL31 performs a similar architectural initialization to BL1 as far as system register settings are concerned. Since BL1 code resides in ROM, architectural initialization in BL31 allows override of any previous initialization done by BL1.
BL31 initializes the per-CPU data framework, which provides a cache of frequently accessed per-CPU data optimised for fast, concurrent manipulation on different CPUs. This buffer includes pointers to per-CPU contexts, crash buffer, CPU reset and power down operations, PSCI data, platform data and so on.
It then replaces the exception vectors populated by BL1 with its own. BL31 exception vectors implement more elaborate support for handling SMCs since this is the only mechanism to access the runtime services implemented by BL31 (PSCI for example). BL31 checks each SMC for validity as specified by the SMC calling convention PDD before passing control to the required SMC handler routine.
BL31 programs the CNTFRQ_EL0 register with the clock frequency of the system
counter, which is provided by the platform.
Platform initialization
BL31 performs detailed platform initialization, which enables normal world software to function correctly.
On ARM platforms, this consists of the following:
- Initialize the console.
- Configure the Interconnect to enable hardware coherency.
- Enable the MMU and map the memory it needs to access.
- Initialize the generic interrupt controller.
- Initialize the power controller device.
- Detect the system topology.
Runtime services initialization
BL31 is responsible for initializing the runtime services. One of them is PSCI.
As part of the PSCI initializations, BL31 detects the system topology. It also
initializes the data structures that implement the state machine used to track
the state of power domain nodes. The state can be one of OFF, RUN or
RETENTION. All secondary CPUs are initially in the OFF state. The cluster
that the primary CPU belongs to is ON; any other cluster is OFF. It also
initializes the locks that protect them. BL31 accesses the state of a CPU or
cluster immediately after reset and before the data cache is enabled in the
warm boot path. It is not currently possible to use 'exclusive' based spinlocks,
therefore BL31 uses locks based on Lamport's Bakery algorithm instead.
The runtime service framework and its initialization is described in more detail in the "EL3 runtime services framework" section below.
Details about the status of the PSCI implementation are provided in the "Power State Coordination Interface" section below.
AArch64 BL32 (Secure-EL1 Payload) image initialization
If a BL32 image is present then there must be a matching Secure-EL1 Payload Dispatcher (SPD) service (see later for details). During initialization that service must register a function to carry out initialization of BL32 once the runtime services are fully initialized. BL31 invokes such a registered function to initialize BL32 before running BL33. This initialization is not necessary for AArch32 SPs.
Details on BL32 initialization and the SPD's role are described in the "Secure-EL1 Payloads and Dispatchers" section below.
BL33 (Non-trusted Firmware) execution
EL3 Runtime Software initializes the EL2 or EL1 processor context for normal- world cold boot, ensuring that no secure state information finds its way into the non-secure execution state. EL3 Runtime Software uses the entrypoint information provided by BL2 to jump to the Non-trusted firmware image (BL33) at the highest available Exception Level (EL2 if available, otherwise EL1).
Using alternative Trusted Boot Firmware in place of BL1 & BL2 (AArch64 only)
Some platforms have existing implementations of Trusted Boot Firmware that would like to use ARM Trusted Firmware BL31 for the EL3 Runtime Software. To enable this firmware architecture it is important to provide a fully documented and stable interface between the Trusted Boot Firmware and BL31.
Future changes to the BL31 interface will be done in a backwards compatible way, and this enables these firmware components to be independently enhanced/ updated to develop and exploit new functionality.
Required CPU state when calling bl31_entrypoint() during cold boot
This function must only be called by the primary CPU.
On entry to this function the calling primary CPU must be executing in AArch64 EL3, little-endian data access, and all interrupt sources masked:
PSTATE.EL = 3
PSTATE.RW = 1
PSTATE.DAIF = 0xf
SCTLR_EL3.EE = 0
X0 and X1 can be used to pass information from the Trusted Boot Firmware to the platform code in BL31:
X0 : Reserved for common Trusted Firmware information
X1 : Platform specific information
BL31 zero-init sections (e.g. .bss) should not contain valid data on entry,
these will be zero filled prior to invoking platform setup code.
Use of the X0 and X1 parameters
The parameters are platform specific and passed from bl31_entrypoint() to
bl31_early_platform_setup(). The value of these parameters is never directly
used by the common BL31 code.
The convention is that X0 conveys information regarding the BL31, BL32 and
BL33 images from the Trusted Boot firmware and X1 can be used for other
platform specific purpose. This convention allows platforms which use ARM
Trusted Firmware's BL1 and BL2 images to transfer additional platform specific
information from Secure Boot without conflicting with future evolution of the
Trusted Firmware using X0 to pass a bl31_params structure.
BL31 common and SPD initialization code depends on image and entrypoint information about BL33 and BL32, which is provided via BL31 platform APIs. This information is required until the start of execution of BL33. This information can be provided in a platform defined manner, e.g. compiled into the platform code in BL31, or provided in a platform defined memory location by the Trusted Boot firmware, or passed from the Trusted Boot Firmware via the Cold boot Initialization parameters. This data may need to be cleaned out of the CPU caches if it is provided by an earlier boot stage and then accessed by BL31 platform code before the caches are enabled.
ARM Trusted Firmware's BL2 implementation passes a bl31_params structure in
X0 and the ARM development platforms interpret this in the BL31 platform
code.
MMU, Data caches & Coherency
BL31 does not depend on the enabled state of the MMU, data caches or
interconnect coherency on entry to bl31_entrypoint(). If these are disabled
on entry, these should be enabled during bl31_plat_arch_setup().
Data structures used in the BL31 cold boot interface
These structures are designed to support compatibility and independent evolution of the structures and the firmware images. For example, a version of BL31 that can interpret the BL3x image information from different versions of BL2, a platform that uses an extended entry_point_info structure to convey additional register information to BL31, or a ELF image loader that can convey more details about the firmware images.
To support these scenarios the structures are versioned and sized, which enables
BL31 to detect which information is present and respond appropriately. The
param_header is defined to capture this information:
typedef struct param_header {
uint8_t type; /* type of the structure */
uint8_t version; /* version of this structure */
uint16_t size; /* size of this structure in bytes */
uint32_t attr; /* attributes: unused bits SBZ */
} param_header_t;
The structures using this format are entry_point_info, image_info and
bl31_params. The code that allocates and populates these structures must set
the header fields appropriately, and the SET_PARAM_HEAD() a macro is defined
to simplify this action.
Required CPU state for BL31 Warm boot initialization
When requesting a CPU power-on, or suspending a running CPU, ARM Trusted Firmware provides the platform power management code with a Warm boot initialization entry-point, to be invoked by the CPU immediately after the reset handler. On entry to the Warm boot initialization function the calling CPU must be in AArch64 EL3, little-endian data access and all interrupt sources masked:
PSTATE.EL = 3
PSTATE.RW = 1
PSTATE.DAIF = 0xf
SCTLR_EL3.EE = 0
The PSCI implementation will initialize the processor state and ensure that the platform power management code is then invoked as required to initialize all necessary system, cluster and CPU resources.
AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software entrypoint interface
To enable this firmware architecture it is important to provide a fully documented and stable interface between the Trusted Boot Firmware and the AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software.
Future changes to the entrypoint interface will be done in a backwards compatible way, and this enables these firmware components to be independently enhanced/updated to develop and exploit new functionality.
Required CPU state when entering during cold boot
This function must only be called by the primary CPU.
On entry to this function the calling primary CPU must be executing in AArch32 EL3, little-endian data access, and all interrupt sources masked:
PSTATE.AIF = 0x7
SCTLR.EE = 0
R0 and R1 are used to pass information from the Trusted Boot Firmware to the platform code in AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software:
R0 : Reserved for common Trusted Firmware information
R1 : Platform specific information
Use of the R0 and R1 parameters
The parameters are platform specific and the convention is that R0 conveys
information regarding the BL3x images from the Trusted Boot firmware and R1
can be used for other platform specific purpose. This convention allows
platforms which use ARM Trusted Firmware's BL1 and BL2 images to transfer
additional platform specific information from Secure Boot without conflicting
with future evolution of the Trusted Firmware using R0 to pass a bl_params
structure.
The AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software is responsible for entry into BL33. This information can be obtained in a platform defined manner, e.g. compiled into the AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software, or provided in a platform defined memory location by the Trusted Boot firmware, or passed from the Trusted Boot Firmware via the Cold boot Initialization parameters. This data may need to be cleaned out of the CPU caches if it is provided by an earlier boot stage and then accessed by AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software before the caches are enabled.
When using AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software, the ARM development platforms pass a
bl_params structure in R0 from BL2 to be interpreted by AArch32 EL3 Runtime
Software platform code.
MMU, Data caches & Coherency
AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software must not depend on the enabled state of the MMU, data caches or interconnect coherency in its entrypoint. They must be explicitly enabled if required.
Data structures used in cold boot interface
The AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software cold boot interface uses bl_params instead
of bl31_params. The bl_params structure is based on the convention
described in AArch64 BL31 cold boot interface section.
Required CPU state for warm boot initialization
When requesting a CPU power-on, or suspending a running CPU, AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software must ensure execution of a warm boot initialization entrypoint. If ARM Trusted Firmware BL1 is used and the PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS build flag is false, then AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software must ensure that BL1 branches to the warm boot entrypoint by arranging for the BL1 platform function, plat_get_my_entrypoint(), to return a non-zero value.
In this case, the warm boot entrypoint must be in AArch32 EL3, little-endian data access and all interrupt sources masked:
PSTATE.AIF = 0x7
SCTLR.EE = 0
The warm boot entrypoint may be implemented by using the ARM Trusted Firmware
psci_warmboot_entrypoint() function. In that case, the platform must fulfil
the pre-requisites mentioned in the [PSCI Library integration guide]
PSCI Lib guide.
- EL3 runtime services framework
Software executing in the non-secure state and in the secure state at exception levels lower than EL3 will request runtime services using the Secure Monitor Call (SMC) instruction. These requests will follow the convention described in the SMC Calling Convention PDD (SMCCC). The SMCCC assigns function identifiers to each SMC request and describes how arguments are passed and returned.
The EL3 runtime services framework enables the development of services by different providers that can be easily integrated into final product firmware. The following sections describe the framework which facilitates the registration, initialization and use of runtime services in EL3 Runtime Software (BL31).
The design of the runtime services depends heavily on the concepts and definitions described in the SMCCC, in particular SMC Function IDs, Owning Entity Numbers (OEN), Fast and Standard calls, and the SMC32 and SMC64 calling conventions. Please refer to that document for more detailed explanation of these terms.
The following runtime services are expected to be implemented first. They have not all been instantiated in the current implementation.
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Standard service calls
This service is for management of the entire system. The Power State Coordination Interface (PSCI) is the first set of standard service calls defined by ARM (see PSCI section later).
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Secure-EL1 Payload Dispatcher service
If a system runs a Trusted OS or other Secure-EL1 Payload (SP) then it also requires a Secure Monitor at EL3 to switch the EL1 processor context between the normal world (EL1/EL2) and trusted world (Secure-EL1). The Secure Monitor will make these world switches in response to SMCs. The SMCCC provides for such SMCs with the Trusted OS Call and Trusted Application Call OEN ranges.
The interface between the EL3 Runtime Software and the Secure-EL1 Payload is not defined by the SMCCC or any other standard. As a result, each Secure-EL1 Payload requires a specific Secure Monitor that runs as a runtime service - within ARM Trusted Firmware this service is referred to as the Secure-EL1 Payload Dispatcher (SPD).
ARM Trusted Firmware provides a Test Secure-EL1 Payload (TSP) and its associated Dispatcher (TSPD). Details of SPD design and TSP/TSPD operation are described in the "Secure-EL1 Payloads and Dispatchers" section below.
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CPU implementation service
This service will provide an interface to CPU implementation specific services for a given platform e.g. access to processor errata workarounds. This service is currently unimplemented.
Additional services for ARM Architecture, SiP and OEM calls can be implemented. Each implemented service handles a range of SMC function identifiers as described in the SMCCC.
Registration
A runtime service is registered using the DECLARE_RT_SVC() macro, specifying
the name of the service, the range of OENs covered, the type of service and
initialization and call handler functions. This macro instantiates a const struct rt_svc_desc for the service with these details (see runtime_svc.h).
This structure is allocated in a special ELF section rt_svc_descs, enabling
the framework to find all service descriptors included into BL31.
The specific service for a SMC Function is selected based on the OEN and call type of the Function ID, and the framework uses that information in the service descriptor to identify the handler for the SMC Call.
The service descriptors do not include information to identify the precise set of SMC function identifiers supported by this service implementation, the security state from which such calls are valid nor the capability to support 64-bit and/or 32-bit callers (using SMC32 or SMC64). Responding appropriately to these aspects of a SMC call is the responsibility of the service implementation, the framework is focused on integration of services from different providers and minimizing the time taken by the framework before the service handler is invoked.
Details of the parameters, requirements and behavior of the initialization and call handling functions are provided in the following sections.
Initialization
runtime_svc_init() in runtime_svc.c initializes the runtime services
framework running on the primary CPU during cold boot as part of the BL31
initialization. This happens prior to initializing a Trusted OS and running
Normal world boot firmware that might in turn use these services.
Initialization involves validating each of the declared runtime service
descriptors, calling the service initialization function and populating the
index used for runtime lookup of the service.
The BL31 linker script collects all of the declared service descriptors into a single array and defines symbols that allow the framework to locate and traverse the array, and determine its size.
The framework does basic validation of each descriptor to halt firmware initialization if service declaration errors are detected. The framework does not check descriptors for the following error conditions, and may behave in an unpredictable manner under such scenarios:
- Overlapping OEN ranges
- Multiple descriptors for the same range of OENs and
call_type - Incorrect range of owning entity numbers for a given
call_type
Once validated, the service init() callback is invoked. This function carries
out any essential EL3 initialization before servicing requests. The init()
function is only invoked on the primary CPU during cold boot. If the service
uses per-CPU data this must either be initialized for all CPUs during this call,
or be done lazily when a CPU first issues an SMC call to that service. If
init() returns anything other than 0, this is treated as an initialization
error and the service is ignored: this does not cause the firmware to halt.
The OEN and call type fields present in the SMC Function ID cover a total of
128 distinct services, but in practice a single descriptor can cover a range of
OENs, e.g. SMCs to call a Trusted OS function. To optimize the lookup of a
service handler, the framework uses an array of 128 indices that map every
distinct OEN/call-type combination either to one of the declared services or to
indicate the service is not handled. This rt_svc_descs_indices[] array is
populated for all of the OENs covered by a service after the service init()
function has reported success. So a service that fails to initialize will never
have it's handle() function invoked.
The following figure shows how the rt_svc_descs_indices[] index maps the SMC
Function ID call type and OEN onto a specific service handler in the
rt_svc_descs[] array.
Handling an SMC
When the EL3 runtime services framework receives a Secure Monitor Call, the SMC
Function ID is passed in W0 from the lower exception level (as per the
SMCCC). If the calling register width is AArch32, it is invalid to invoke an
SMC Function which indicates the SMC64 calling convention: such calls are
ignored and return the Unknown SMC Function Identifier result code 0xFFFFFFFF
in R0/X0.
Bit[31] (fast/standard call) and bits[29:24] (owning entity number) of the SMC
Function ID are combined to index into the rt_svc_descs_indices[] array. The
resulting value might indicate a service that has no handler, in this case the
framework will also report an Unknown SMC Function ID. Otherwise, the value is
used as a further index into the rt_svc_descs[] array to locate the required
service and handler.
The service's handle() callback is provided with five of the SMC parameters
directly, the others are saved into memory for retrieval (if needed) by the
handler. The handler is also provided with an opaque handle for use with the
supporting library for parameter retrieval, setting return values and context
manipulation; and with flags indicating the security state of the caller. The
framework finally sets up the execution stack for the handler, and invokes the
services handle() function.
On return from the handler the result registers are populated in X0-X3 before restoring the stack and CPU state and returning from the original SMC.
- Power State Coordination Interface
TODO: Provide design walkthrough of PSCI implementation.
The PSCI v1.0 specification categorizes APIs as optional and mandatory. All the mandatory APIs in PSCI v1.0 and all the APIs in PSCI v0.2 draft specification [Power State Coordination Interface PDD] PSCI are implemented. The table lists the PSCI v1.0 APIs and their support in generic code.
An API implementation might have a dependency on platform code e.g. CPU_SUSPEND requires the platform to export a part of the implementation. Hence the level of support of the mandatory APIs depends upon the support exported by the platform port as well. The Juno and FVP (all variants) platforms export all the required support.
| PSCI v1.0 API | Supported | Comments |
|---|---|---|
PSCI_VERSION |
Yes | The version returned is 1.0 |
CPU_SUSPEND |
Yes* | |
CPU_OFF |
Yes* | |
CPU_ON |
Yes* | |
AFFINITY_INFO |
Yes | |
MIGRATE |
Yes** | |
MIGRATE_INFO_TYPE |
Yes** | |
MIGRATE_INFO_CPU |
Yes** | |
SYSTEM_OFF |
Yes* | |
SYSTEM_RESET |
Yes* | |
PSCI_FEATURES |
Yes | |
CPU_FREEZE |
No | |
CPU_DEFAULT_SUSPEND |
No | |
NODE_HW_STATE |
Yes* | |
SYSTEM_SUSPEND |
Yes* | |
PSCI_SET_SUSPEND_MODE |
No | |
PSCI_STAT_RESIDENCY |
Yes* | |
PSCI_STAT_COUNT |
Yes* |
*Note : These PSCI APIs require platform power management hooks to be registered with the generic PSCI code to be supported.
**Note : These PSCI APIs require appropriate Secure Payload Dispatcher hooks to be registered with the generic PSCI code to be supported.
The PSCI implementation in ARM Trusted Firmware is a library which can be integrated with AArch64 or AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software for ARMv8-A systems. A guide to integrating PSCI library with AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software can be found here.
- Secure-EL1 Payloads and Dispatchers
On a production system that includes a Trusted OS running in Secure-EL1/EL0, the Trusted OS is coupled with a companion runtime service in the BL31 firmware. This service is responsible for the initialisation of the Trusted OS and all communications with it. The Trusted OS is the BL32 stage of the boot flow in ARM Trusted Firmware. The firmware will attempt to locate, load and execute a BL32 image.
ARM Trusted Firmware uses a more general term for the BL32 software that runs at Secure-EL1 - the Secure-EL1 Payload - as it is not always a Trusted OS.
The ARM Trusted Firmware provides a Test Secure-EL1 Payload (TSP) and a Test
Secure-EL1 Payload Dispatcher (TSPD) service as an example of how a Trusted OS
is supported on a production system using the Runtime Services Framework. On
such a system, the Test BL32 image and service are replaced by the Trusted OS
and its dispatcher service. The ARM Trusted Firmware build system expects that
the dispatcher will define the build flag NEED_BL32 to enable it to include
the BL32 in the build either as a binary or to compile from source depending
on whether the BL32 build option is specified or not.
The TSP runs in Secure-EL1. It is designed to demonstrate synchronous communication with the normal-world software running in EL1/EL2. Communication is initiated by the normal-world software
-
either directly through a Fast SMC (as defined in the SMCCC)
-
or indirectly through a PSCI SMC. The PSCI implementation in turn informs the TSPD about the requested power management operation. This allows the TSP to prepare for or respond to the power state change
The TSPD service is responsible for.
-
Initializing the TSP
-
Routing requests and responses between the secure and the non-secure states during the two types of communications just described
Initializing a BL32 Image
The Secure-EL1 Payload Dispatcher (SPD) service is responsible for initializing the BL32 image. It needs access to the information passed by BL2 to BL31 to do so. This is provided by:
entry_point_info_t *bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(uint32_t);
which returns a reference to the entry_point_info structure corresponding to
the image which will be run in the specified security state. The SPD uses this
API to get entry point information for the SECURE image, BL32.
In the absence of a BL32 image, BL31 passes control to the normal world bootloader image (BL33). When the BL32 image is present, it is typical that the SPD wants control to be passed to BL32 first and then later to BL33.
To do this the SPD has to register a BL32 initialization function during initialization of the SPD service. The BL32 initialization function has this prototype:
int32_t init(void);
and is registered using the bl31_register_bl32_init() function.
Trusted Firmware supports two approaches for the SPD to pass control to BL32 before returning through EL3 and running the non-trusted firmware (BL33):
-
In the BL32 setup function, use
bl31_set_next_image_type()to request that the exit frombl31_main()is to the BL32 entrypoint in Secure-EL1. BL31 will exit to BL32 using the asynchronous method by callingbl31_prepare_next_image_entry()andel3_exit().When the BL32 has completed initialization at Secure-EL1, it returns to BL31 by issuing an SMC, using a Function ID allocated to the SPD. On receipt of this SMC, the SPD service handler should switch the CPU context from trusted to normal world and use the
bl31_set_next_image_type()andbl31_prepare_next_image_entry()functions to set up the initial return to the normal world firmware BL33. On return from the handler the framework will exit to EL2 and run BL33. -
The BL32 setup function registers an initialization function using
bl31_register_bl32_init()which provides a SPD-defined mechanism to invoke a 'world-switch synchronous call' to Secure-EL1 to run the BL32 entrypoint. NOTE: The Test SPD service included with the Trusted Firmware provides one implementation of such a mechanism.On completion BL32 returns control to BL31 via a SMC, and on receipt the SPD service handler invokes the synchronous call return mechanism to return to the BL32 initialization function. On return from this function,
bl31_main()will set up the return to the normal world firmware BL33 and continue the boot process in the normal world. -
Crash Reporting in BL31
BL31 implements a scheme for reporting the processor state when an unhandled exception is encountered. The reporting mechanism attempts to preserve all the register contents and report it via a dedicated UART (PL011 console). BL31 reports the general purpose, EL3, Secure EL1 and some EL2 state registers.
A dedicated per-CPU crash stack is maintained by BL31 and this is retrieved via
the per-CPU pointer cache. The implementation attempts to minimise the memory
required for this feature. The file crash_reporting.S contains the
implementation for crash reporting.
The sample crash output is shown below.
x0 :0x000000004F00007C
x1 :0x0000000007FFFFFF
x2 :0x0000000004014D50
x3 :0x0000000000000000
x4 :0x0000000088007998
x5 :0x00000000001343AC
x6 :0x0000000000000016
x7 :0x00000000000B8A38
x8 :0x00000000001343AC
x9 :0x00000000000101A8
x10 :0x0000000000000002
x11 :0x000000000000011C
x12 :0x00000000FEFDC644
x13 :0x00000000FED93FFC
x14 :0x0000000000247950
x15 :0x00000000000007A2
x16 :0x00000000000007A4
x17 :0x0000000000247950
x18 :0x0000000000000000
x19 :0x00000000FFFFFFFF
x20 :0x0000000004014D50
x21 :0x000000000400A38C
x22 :0x0000000000247950
x23 :0x0000000000000010
x24 :0x0000000000000024
x25 :0x00000000FEFDC868
x26 :0x00000000FEFDC86A
x27 :0x00000000019EDEDC
x28 :0x000000000A7CFDAA
x29 :0x0000000004010780
x30 :0x000000000400F004
scr_el3 :0x0000000000000D3D
sctlr_el3 :0x0000000000C8181F
cptr_el3 :0x0000000000000000
tcr_el3 :0x0000000080803520
daif :0x00000000000003C0
mair_el3 :0x00000000000004FF
spsr_el3 :0x00000000800003CC
elr_el3 :0x000000000400C0CC
ttbr0_el3 :0x00000000040172A0
esr_el3 :0x0000000096000210
sp_el3 :0x0000000004014D50
far_el3 :0x000000004F00007C
spsr_el1 :0x0000000000000000
elr_el1 :0x0000000000000000
spsr_abt :0x0000000000000000
spsr_und :0x0000000000000000
spsr_irq :0x0000000000000000
spsr_fiq :0x0000000000000000
sctlr_el1 :0x0000000030C81807
actlr_el1 :0x0000000000000000
cpacr_el1 :0x0000000000300000
csselr_el1 :0x0000000000000002
sp_el1 :0x0000000004028800
esr_el1 :0x0000000000000000
ttbr0_el1 :0x000000000402C200
ttbr1_el1 :0x0000000000000000
mair_el1 :0x00000000000004FF
amair_el1 :0x0000000000000000
tcr_el1 :0x0000000000003520
tpidr_el1 :0x0000000000000000
tpidr_el0 :0x0000000000000000
tpidrro_el0 :0x0000000000000000
dacr32_el2 :0x0000000000000000
ifsr32_el2 :0x0000000000000000
par_el1 :0x0000000000000000
far_el1 :0x0000000000000000
afsr0_el1 :0x0000000000000000
afsr1_el1 :0x0000000000000000
contextidr_el1 :0x0000000000000000
vbar_el1 :0x0000000004027000
cntp_ctl_el0 :0x0000000000000000
cntp_cval_el0 :0x0000000000000000
cntv_ctl_el0 :0x0000000000000000
cntv_cval_el0 :0x0000000000000000
cntkctl_el1 :0x0000000000000000
fpexc32_el2 :0x0000000004000700
sp_el0 :0x0000000004010780
- Guidelines for Reset Handlers
Trusted Firmware implements a framework that allows CPU and platform ports to
perform actions very early after a CPU is released from reset in both the cold
and warm boot paths. This is done by calling the reset_handler() function in
both the BL1 and BL31 images. It in turn calls the platform and CPU specific
reset handling functions.
Details for implementing a CPU specific reset handler can be found in
Section 8. Details for implementing a platform specific reset handler can be
found in the Porting Guide (see the plat_reset_handler() function).
When adding functionality to a reset handler, keep in mind that if a different reset handling behavior is required between the first and the subsequent invocations of the reset handling code, this should be detected at runtime. In other words, the reset handler should be able to detect whether an action has already been performed and act as appropriate. Possible courses of actions are, e.g. skip the action the second time, or undo/redo it.
- CPU specific operations framework
Certain aspects of the ARMv8 architecture are implementation defined, that is, certain behaviours are not architecturally defined, but must be defined and documented by individual processor implementations. The ARM Trusted Firmware implements a framework which categorises the common implementation defined behaviours and allows a processor to export its implementation of that behaviour. The categories are:
-
Processor specific reset sequence.
-
Processor specific power down sequences.
-
Processor specific register dumping as a part of crash reporting.
-
Errata status reporting.
Each of the above categories fulfils a different requirement.
-
allows any processor specific initialization before the caches and MMU are turned on, like implementation of errata workarounds, entry into the intra-cluster coherency domain etc.
-
allows each processor to implement the power down sequence mandated in its Technical Reference Manual (TRM).
-
allows a processor to provide additional information to the developer in the event of a crash, for example Cortex-A53 has registers which can expose the data cache contents.
-
allows a processor to define a function that inspects and reports the status of all errata workarounds on that processor.
Please note that only 2. is mandated by the TRM.
The CPU specific operations framework scales to accommodate a large number of different CPUs during power down and reset handling. The platform can specify any CPU optimization it wants to enable for each CPU. It can also specify the CPU errata workarounds to be applied for each CPU type during reset handling by defining CPU errata compile time macros. Details on these macros can be found in the cpu-specific-build-macros.md file.
The CPU specific operations framework depends on the cpu_ops structure which
needs to be exported for each type of CPU in the platform. It is defined in
include/lib/cpus/aarch64/cpu_macros.S and has the following fields : midr,
reset_func(), cpu_pwr_down_ops (array of power down functions) and
cpu_reg_dump().
The CPU specific files in lib/cpus export a cpu_ops data structure with
suitable handlers for that CPU. For example, lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a53.S
exports the cpu_ops for Cortex-A53 CPU. According to the platform
configuration, these CPU specific files must be included in the build by
the platform makefile. The generic CPU specific operations framework code exists
in lib/cpus/aarch64/cpu_helpers.S.
CPU specific Reset Handling
After a reset, the state of the CPU when it calls generic reset handler is: MMU turned off, both instruction and data caches turned off and not part of any coherency domain.
The BL entrypoint code first invokes the plat_reset_handler() to allow
the platform to perform any system initialization required and any system
errata workarounds that needs to be applied. The get_cpu_ops_ptr() reads
the current CPU midr, finds the matching cpu_ops entry in the cpu_ops
array and returns it. Note that only the part number and implementer fields
in midr are used to find the matching cpu_ops entry. The reset_func() in
the returned cpu_ops is then invoked which executes the required reset
handling for that CPU and also any errata workarounds enabled by the platform.
This function must preserve the values of general purpose registers x20 to x29.
Refer to Section "Guidelines for Reset Handlers" for general guidelines regarding placement of code in a reset handler.
CPU specific power down sequence
During the BL31 initialization sequence, the pointer to the matching cpu_ops
entry is stored in per-CPU data by init_cpu_ops() so that it can be quickly
retrieved during power down sequences.
Various CPU drivers register handlers to perform power down at certain power
levels for that specific CPU. The PSCI service, upon receiving a power down
request, determines the highest power level at which to execute power down
sequence for a particular CPU. It uses the prepare_cpu_pwr_dwn() function to
pick the right power down handler for the requested level. The function
retrieves cpu_ops pointer member of per-CPU data, and from that, further
retrieves cpu_pwr_down_ops array, and indexes into the required level. If the
requested power level is higher than what a CPU driver supports, the handler
registered for highest level is invoked.
At runtime the platform hooks for power down are invoked by the PSCI service to perform platform specific operations during a power down sequence, for example turning off CCI coherency during a cluster power down.
CPU specific register reporting during crash
If the crash reporting is enabled in BL31, when a crash occurs, the crash
reporting framework calls do_cpu_reg_dump which retrieves the matching
cpu_ops using get_cpu_ops_ptr() function. The cpu_reg_dump() in
cpu_ops is invoked, which then returns the CPU specific register values to
be reported and a pointer to the ASCII list of register names in a format
expected by the crash reporting framework.
CPU errata status reporting
Errata workarounds for CPUs supported in ARM Trusted Firmware are applied during both cold and warm boots, shortly after reset. Individual Errata workarounds are enabled as build options. Some errata workarounds have potential run-time implications; therefore some are enabled by default, others not. Platform ports shall override build options to enable or disable errata as appropriate. The CPU drivers take care of applying errata workarounds that are enabled and applicable to a given CPU. Refer to the section titled CPU Errata Workarounds in CPUBM for more information.
Functions in CPU drivers that apply errata workaround must follow the conventions listed below.
The errata workaround must be authored as two separate functions:
-
One that checks for errata. This function must determine whether that errata applies to the current CPU. Typically this involves matching the current CPUs revision and variant against a value that's known to be affected by the errata. If the function determines that the errata applies to this CPU, it must return
ERRATA_APPLIES; otherwise, it must returnERRATA_NOT_APPLIES. The utility functionscpu_get_rev_varandcpu_rev_var_lsfunctions may come in handy for this purpose.For an errata identified as
E, the check function must be namedcheck_errata_E.This function will be invoked at different times, both from assembly and from C run time. Therefore it must follow AAPCS, and must not use stack.
-
Another one that applies the errata workaround. This function would call the check function described above, and applies errata workaround if required.
CPU drivers that apply errata workaround can optionally implement an assembly
function that report the status of errata workarounds pertaining to that CPU.
For a driver that registers the CPU, for example, cpux via. declare_cpu_ops
macro, the errata reporting function, if it exists, must be named
cpux_errata_report. This function will always be called with MMU enabled; it
must follow AAPCS and may use stack.
In a debug build of ARM Trusted Firmware, on a CPU that comes out of reset, both BL1 and the run time firmware (BL31 in AArch64, and BL32 in AArch32) will invoke errata status reporting function, if one exists, for that type of CPU.
To report the status of each errata workaround, the function shall use the
assembler macro report_errata, passing it:
-
The build option that enables the errata;
-
The name of the CPU: this must be the same identifier that CPU driver registered itself with, using
declare_cpu_ops; -
And the errata identifier: the identifier must match what's used in the errata's check function described above.
The errata status reporting function will be called once per CPU type/errata combination during the software's active life time.
It's expected that whenever an errata workaround is submitted to ARM Trusted Firmware, the errata reporting function is appropriately extended to report its status as well.
Reporting the status of errata workaround is for informational purpose only; it has no functional significance.
- Memory layout of BL images
Each bootloader image can be divided in 2 parts:
-
the static contents of the image. These are data actually stored in the binary on the disk. In the ELF terminology, they are called
PROGBITSsections; -
the run-time contents of the image. These are data that don't occupy any space in the binary on the disk. The ELF binary just contains some metadata indicating where these data will be stored at run-time and the corresponding sections need to be allocated and initialized at run-time. In the ELF terminology, they are called
NOBITSsections.
All PROGBITS sections are grouped together at the beginning of the image, followed by all NOBITS sections. This is true for all Trusted Firmware images and it is governed by the linker scripts. This ensures that the raw binary images are as small as possible. If a NOBITS section was inserted in between PROGBITS sections then the resulting binary file would contain zero bytes in place of this NOBITS section, making the image unnecessarily bigger. Smaller images allow faster loading from the FIP to the main memory.
Linker scripts and symbols
Each bootloader stage image layout is described by its own linker script. The linker scripts export some symbols into the program symbol table. Their values correspond to particular addresses. The trusted firmware code can refer to these symbols to figure out the image memory layout.
Linker symbols follow the following naming convention in the trusted firmware.
-
__<SECTION>_START__Start address of a given section named
<SECTION>. -
__<SECTION>_END__End address of a given section named
<SECTION>. If there is an alignment constraint on the section's end address then__<SECTION>_END__corresponds to the end address of the section's actual contents, rounded up to the right boundary. Refer to the value of__<SECTION>_UNALIGNED_END__to know the actual end address of the section's contents. -
__<SECTION>_UNALIGNED_END__End address of a given section named
<SECTION>without any padding or rounding up due to some alignment constraint. -
__<SECTION>_SIZE__Size (in bytes) of a given section named
<SECTION>. If there is an alignment constraint on the section's end address then__<SECTION>_SIZE__corresponds to the size of the section's actual contents, rounded up to the right boundary. In other words,__<SECTION>_SIZE__ = __<SECTION>_END__ - _<SECTION>_START__. Refer to the value of__<SECTION>_UNALIGNED_SIZE__to know the actual size of the section's contents. -
__<SECTION>_UNALIGNED_SIZE__Size (in bytes) of a given section named
<SECTION>without any padding or rounding up due to some alignment constraint. In other words,__<SECTION>_UNALIGNED_SIZE__ = __<SECTION>_UNALIGNED_END__ - __<SECTION>_START__.
Some of the linker symbols are mandatory as the trusted firmware code relies on them to be defined. They are listed in the following subsections. Some of them must be provided for each bootloader stage and some are specific to a given bootloader stage.
The linker scripts define some extra, optional symbols. They are not actually used by any code but they help in understanding the bootloader images' memory layout as they are easy to spot in the link map files.
Common linker symbols
All BL images share the following requirements:
- The BSS section must be zero-initialised before executing any C code.
- The coherent memory section (if enabled) must be zero-initialised as well.
- The MMU setup code needs to know the extents of the coherent and read-only
memory regions to set the right memory attributes. When
SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA=1, it needs to know more specifically how the read-only memory region is divided between code and data.
The following linker symbols are defined for this purpose:
__BSS_START____BSS_SIZE____COHERENT_RAM_START__Must be aligned on a page-size boundary.__COHERENT_RAM_END__Must be aligned on a page-size boundary.__COHERENT_RAM_UNALIGNED_SIZE____RO_START____RO_END____TEXT_START____TEXT_END____RODATA_START____RODATA_END__
BL1's linker symbols
BL1 being the ROM image, it has additional requirements. BL1 resides in ROM and
it is entirely executed in place but it needs some read-write memory for its
mutable data. Its .data section (i.e. its allocated read-write data) must be
relocated from ROM to RAM before executing any C code.
The following additional linker symbols are defined for BL1:
__BL1_ROM_END__End address of BL1's ROM contents, covering its code and.datasection in ROM.__DATA_ROM_START__Start address of the.datasection in ROM. Must be aligned on a 16-byte boundary.__DATA_RAM_START__Address in RAM where the.datasection should be copied over. Must be aligned on a 16-byte boundary.__DATA_SIZE__Size of the.datasection (in ROM or RAM).__BL1_RAM_START__Start address of BL1 read-write data.__BL1_RAM_END__End address of BL1 read-write data.
How to choose the right base addresses for each bootloader stage image
There is currently no support for dynamic image loading in the Trusted Firmware. This means that all bootloader images need to be linked against their ultimate runtime locations and the base addresses of each image must be chosen carefully such that images don't overlap each other in an undesired way. As the code grows, the base addresses might need adjustments to cope with the new memory layout.
The memory layout is completely specific to the platform and so there is no
general recipe for choosing the right base addresses for each bootloader image.
However, there are tools to aid in understanding the memory layout. These are
the link map files: build/<platform>/<build-type>/bl<x>/bl<x>.map, with <x>
being the stage bootloader. They provide a detailed view of the memory usage of
each image. Among other useful information, they provide the end address of
each image.
bl1.maplink map file provides__BL1_RAM_END__address.bl2.maplink map file provides__BL2_END__address.bl31.maplink map file provides__BL31_END__address.bl32.maplink map file provides__BL32_END__address.
For each bootloader image, the platform code must provide its start address as well as a limit address that it must not overstep. The latter is used in the linker scripts to check that the image doesn't grow past that address. If that happens, the linker will issue a message similar to the following:
aarch64-none-elf-ld: BLx has exceeded its limit.
Additionally, if the platform memory layout implies some image overlaying like on FVP, BL31 and TSP need to know the limit address that their PROGBITS sections must not overstep. The platform code must provide those.
When LOAD_IMAGE_V2 is disabled, Trusted Firmware provides a mechanism to
verify at boot time that the memory to load a new image is free to prevent
overwriting a previously loaded image. For this mechanism to work, the platform
must specify the memory available in the system as regions, where each region
consists of base address, total size and the free area within it (as defined
in the meminfo_t structure). Trusted Firmware retrieves these memory regions
by calling the corresponding platform API:
meminfo_t *bl1_plat_sec_mem_layout(void)meminfo_t *bl2_plat_sec_mem_layout(void)void bl2_plat_get_scp_bl2_meminfo(meminfo_t *scp_bl2_meminfo)void bl2_plat_get_bl32_meminfo(meminfo_t *bl32_meminfo)void bl2_plat_get_bl33_meminfo(meminfo_t *bl33_meminfo)
For example, in the case of BL1 loading BL2, bl1_plat_sec_mem_layout() will
return the region defined by the platform where BL1 intends to load BL2. The
load_image() function will check that the memory where BL2 will be loaded is
within the specified region and marked as free.
The actual number of regions and their base addresses and sizes is platform specific. The platform may return the same region or define a different one for each API. However, the overlap verification mechanism applies only to a single region. Hence, it is the platform responsibility to guarantee that different regions do not overlap, or that if they do, the overlapping images are not accessed at the same time. This could be used, for example, to load temporary images (e.g. certificates) or firmware images prior to being transfered to its corresponding processor (e.g. the SCP BL2 image).
To reduce fragmentation and simplify the tracking of free memory, all the free memory within a region is always located in one single buffer defined by its base address and size. Trusted Firmware implements a top/bottom load approach: after a new image is loaded, it checks how much memory remains free above and below the image. The smallest area is marked as unavailable, while the larger area becomes the new free memory buffer. Platforms should take this behaviour into account when defining the base address for each of the images. For example, if an image is loaded near the middle of the region, small changes in image size could cause a flip between a top load and a bottom load, which may result in an unexpected memory layout.
The following diagram is an example of an image loaded in the bottom part of the memory region. The region is initially free (nothing has been loaded yet):
Memory region
+----------+
| |
| | <<<<<<<<<<<<< Free
| |
|----------| +------------+
| image | <<<<<<<<<<<<< | image |
|----------| +------------+
| xxxxxxxx | <<<<<<<<<<<<< Marked as unavailable
+----------+
And the following diagram is an example of an image loaded in the top part:
Memory region
+----------+
| xxxxxxxx | <<<<<<<<<<<<< Marked as unavailable
|----------| +------------+
| image | <<<<<<<<<<<<< | image |
|----------| +------------+
| |
| | <<<<<<<<<<<<< Free
| |
+----------+
When LOAD_IMAGE_V2 is enabled, Trusted Firmware does not provide any mechanism to verify at boot time that the memory to load a new image is free to prevent overwriting a previously loaded image. The platform must specify the memory available in the system for all the relevant BL images to be loaded.
For example, in the case of BL1 loading BL2, bl1_plat_sec_mem_layout() will
return the region defined by the platform where BL1 intends to load BL2. The
load_image() function performs bounds check for the image size based on the
base and maximum image size provided by the platforms. Platforms must take
this behaviour into account when defining the base/size for each of the images.
Memory layout on ARM development platforms
The following list describes the memory layout on the ARM development platforms:
-
A 4KB page of shared memory is used for communication between Trusted Firmware and the platform's power controller. This is located at the base of Trusted SRAM. The amount of Trusted SRAM available to load the bootloader images is reduced by the size of the shared memory.
The shared memory is used to store the CPUs' entrypoint mailbox. On Juno, this is also used for the MHU payload when passing messages to and from the SCP.
-
On FVP, BL1 is originally sitting in the Trusted ROM at address
0x0. On Juno, BL1 resides in flash memory at address0x0BEC0000. BL1 read-write data are relocated to the top of Trusted SRAM at runtime. -
EL3 Runtime Software, BL31 for AArch64 and BL32 for AArch32 (e.g. SP_MIN), is loaded at the top of the Trusted SRAM, such that its NOBITS sections will overwrite BL1 R/W data. This implies that BL1 global variables remain valid only until execution reaches the EL3 Runtime Software entry point during a cold boot.
-
BL2 is loaded below EL3 Runtime Software.
-
On Juno, SCP_BL2 is loaded temporarily into the EL3 Runtime Software memory region and transfered to the SCP before being overwritten by EL3 Runtime Software.
-
BL32 (for AArch64) can be loaded in one of the following locations:
- Trusted SRAM
- Trusted DRAM (FVP only)
- Secure region of DRAM (top 16MB of DRAM configured by the TrustZone controller)
When BL32 (for AArch64) is loaded into Trusted SRAM, its NOBITS sections are allowed to overlay BL2. This memory layout is designed to give the BL32 image as much memory as possible when it is loaded into Trusted SRAM.
When LOAD_IMAGE_V2 is disabled the memory regions for the overlap detection mechanism at boot time are defined as follows (shown per API):
-
meminfo_t *bl1_plat_sec_mem_layout(void)This region corresponds to the whole Trusted SRAM except for the shared memory at the base. This region is initially free. At boot time, BL1 will mark the BL1(rw) section within this region as occupied. The BL1(rw) section is placed at the top of Trusted SRAM.
-
meminfo_t *bl2_plat_sec_mem_layout(void)This region corresponds to the whole Trusted SRAM as defined by
bl1_plat_sec_mem_layout(), but with the BL1(rw) section marked as occupied. This memory region is used to check that BL2 and BL31 do not overlap with each other. BL2_BASE and BL1_RW_BASE are carefully chosen so that the memory for BL31 is top loaded above BL2. -
void bl2_plat_get_scp_bl2_meminfo(meminfo_t *scp_bl2_meminfo)This region is an exact copy of the region defined by
bl2_plat_sec_mem_layout(). Being a disconnected copy means that all the changes made to this region by the Trusted Firmware will not be propagated. This approach is valid because the SCP BL2 image is loaded temporarily while it is being transferred to the SCP, so this memory is reused afterwards. -
void bl2_plat_get_bl32_meminfo(meminfo_t *bl32_meminfo)This region depends on the location of the BL32 image. Currently, ARM platforms support three different locations (detailed below): Trusted SRAM, Trusted DRAM and the TZC-Secured DRAM.
-
void bl2_plat_get_bl33_meminfo(meminfo_t *bl33_meminfo)This region corresponds to the Non-Secure DDR-DRAM, excluding the TZC-Secured area.
The location of the BL32 image will result in different memory maps. This is illustrated for both FVP and Juno in the following diagrams, using the TSP as an example.
Note: Loading the BL32 image in TZC secured DRAM doesn't change the memory layout of the other images in Trusted SRAM.
FVP with TSP in Trusted SRAM (default option): (These diagrams only cover the AArch64 case)
Trusted SRAM
0x04040000 +----------+ loaded by BL2 ------------------
| BL1 (rw) | <<<<<<<<<<<<< | BL31 NOBITS |
|----------| <<<<<<<<<<<<< |----------------|
| | <<<<<<<<<<<<< | BL31 PROGBITS |
|----------| ------------------
| BL2 | <<<<<<<<<<<<< | BL32 NOBITS |
|----------| <<<<<<<<<<<<< |----------------|
| | <<<<<<<<<<<<< | BL32 PROGBITS |
0x04001000 +----------+ ------------------
| Shared |
0x04000000 +----------+
Trusted ROM
0x04000000 +----------+
| BL1 (ro) |
0x00000000 +----------+
FVP with TSP in Trusted DRAM:
Trusted DRAM
0x08000000 +----------+
| BL32 |
0x06000000 +----------+
Trusted SRAM
0x04040000 +----------+ loaded by BL2 ------------------
| BL1 (rw) | <<<<<<<<<<<<< | BL31 NOBITS |
|----------| <<<<<<<<<<<<< |----------------|
| | <<<<<<<<<<<<< | BL31 PROGBITS |
|----------| ------------------
| BL2 |
|----------|
| |
0x04001000 +----------+
| Shared |
0x04000000 +----------+
Trusted ROM
0x04000000 +----------+
| BL1 (ro) |
0x00000000 +----------+
FVP with TSP in TZC-Secured DRAM:
DRAM
0xffffffff +----------+
| BL32 | (secure)
0xff000000 +----------+
| |
: : (non-secure)
| |
0x80000000 +----------+
Trusted SRAM
0x04040000 +----------+ loaded by BL2 ------------------
| BL1 (rw) | <<<<<<<<<<<<< | BL31 NOBITS |
|----------| <<<<<<<<<<<<< |----------------|
| | <<<<<<<<<<<<< | BL31 PROGBITS |
|----------| ------------------
| BL2 |
|----------|
| |
0x04001000 +----------+
| Shared |
0x04000000 +----------+
Trusted ROM
0x04000000 +----------+
| BL1 (ro) |
0x00000000 +----------+
Juno with BL32 in Trusted SRAM (default option):
Flash0
0x0C000000 +----------+
: :
0x0BED0000 |----------|
| BL1 (ro) |
0x0BEC0000 |----------|
: :
0x08000000 +----------+ BL31 is loaded
after SCP_BL2 has
Trusted SRAM been sent to SCP
0x04040000 +----------+ loaded by BL2 ------------------
| BL1 (rw) | <<<<<<<<<<<<< | BL31 NOBITS |
|----------| <<<<<<<<<<<<< |----------------|
| SCP_BL2 | <<<<<<<<<<<<< | BL31 PROGBITS |
|----------| ------------------
| BL2 | <<<<<<<<<<<<< | BL32 NOBITS |
|----------| <<<<<<<<<<<<< |----------------|
| | <<<<<<<<<<<<< | BL32 PROGBITS |
0x04001000 +----------+ ------------------
| MHU |
0x04000000 +----------+
Juno with BL32 in TZC-secured DRAM:
DRAM
0xFFE00000 +----------+
| BL32 | (secure)
0xFF000000 |----------|
| |
: : (non-secure)
| |
0x80000000 +----------+
Flash0
0x0C000000 +----------+
: :
0x0BED0000 |----------|
| BL1 (ro) |
0x0BEC0000 |----------|
: :
0x08000000 +----------+ BL31 is loaded
after SCP_BL2 has
Trusted SRAM been sent to SCP
0x04040000 +----------+ loaded by BL2 ------------------
| BL1 (rw) | <<<<<<<<<<<<< | BL31 NOBITS |
|----------| <<<<<<<<<<<<< |----------------|
| SCP_BL2 | <<<<<<<<<<<<< | BL31 PROGBITS |
|----------| ------------------
| BL2 |
|----------|
| |
0x04001000 +----------+
| MHU |
0x04000000 +----------+
- Firmware Image Package (FIP)
Using a Firmware Image Package (FIP) allows for packing bootloader images (and potentially other payloads) into a single archive that can be loaded by the ARM Trusted Firmware from non-volatile platform storage. A driver to load images from a FIP has been added to the storage layer and allows a package to be read from supported platform storage. A tool to create Firmware Image Packages is also provided and described below.
Firmware Image Package layout
The FIP layout consists of a table of contents (ToC) followed by payload data. The ToC itself has a header followed by one or more table entries. The ToC is terminated by an end marker entry. All ToC entries describe some payload data that has been appended to the end of the binary package. With the information provided in the ToC entry the corresponding payload data can be retrieved.
------------------
| ToC Header |
|----------------|
| ToC Entry 0 |
|----------------|
| ToC Entry 1 |
|----------------|
| ToC End Marker |
|----------------|
| |
| Data 0 |
| |
|----------------|
| |
| Data 1 |
| |
------------------
The ToC header and entry formats are described in the header file
include/firmware_image_package.h. This file is used by both the tool and the
ARM Trusted firmware.
The ToC header has the following fields:
`name`: The name of the ToC. This is currently used to validate the header.
`serial_number`: A non-zero number provided by the creation tool
`flags`: Flags associated with this data.
Bits 0-13: Reserved
Bits 32-47: Platform defined
Bits 48-63: Reserved
A ToC entry has the following fields:
`uuid`: All files are referred to by a pre-defined Universally Unique
IDentifier [UUID] . The UUIDs are defined in
`include/firmware_image_package`. The platform translates the requested
image name into the corresponding UUID when accessing the package.
`offset_address`: The offset address at which the corresponding payload data
can be found. The offset is calculated from the ToC base address.
`size`: The size of the corresponding payload data in bytes.
`flags`: Flags associated with this entry. Non are yet defined.
Firmware Image Package creation tool
The FIP creation tool can be used to pack specified images into a binary package that can be loaded by the ARM Trusted Firmware from platform storage. The tool currently only supports packing bootloader images. Additional image definitions can be added to the tool as required.
The tool can be found in tools/fiptool.
Loading from a Firmware Image Package (FIP)
The Firmware Image Package (FIP) driver can load images from a binary package on non-volatile platform storage. For the ARM development platforms, this is currently NOR FLASH.
Bootloader images are loaded according to the platform policy as specified by
the function plat_get_image_source(). For the ARM development platforms, this
means the platform will attempt to load images from a Firmware Image Package
located at the start of NOR FLASH0.
The ARM development platforms' policy is to only allow loading of a known set of images. The platform policy can be modified to allow additional images.
- Use of coherent memory in Trusted Firmware
There might be loss of coherency when physical memory with mismatched shareability, cacheability and memory attributes is accessed by multiple CPUs (refer to section B2.9 of ARM ARM for more details). This possibility occurs in Trusted Firmware during power up/down sequences when coherency, MMU and caches are turned on/off incrementally.
Trusted Firmware defines coherent memory as a region of memory with Device nGnRE attributes in the translation tables. The translation granule size in Trusted Firmware is 4KB. This is the smallest possible size of the coherent memory region.
By default, all data structures which are susceptible to accesses with mismatched attributes from various CPUs are allocated in a coherent memory region (refer to section 2.1 of Porting Guide). The coherent memory region accesses are Outer Shareable, non-cacheable and they can be accessed with the Device nGnRE attributes when the MMU is turned on. Hence, at the expense of at least an extra page of memory, Trusted Firmware is able to work around coherency issues due to mismatched memory attributes.
The alternative to the above approach is to allocate the susceptible data structures in Normal WriteBack WriteAllocate Inner shareable memory. This approach requires the data structures to be designed so that it is possible to work around the issue of mismatched memory attributes by performing software cache maintenance on them.
Disabling the use of coherent memory in Trusted Firmware
It might be desirable to avoid the cost of allocating coherent memory on
platforms which are memory constrained. Trusted Firmware enables inclusion of
coherent memory in firmware images through the build flag USE_COHERENT_MEM.
This flag is enabled by default. It can be disabled to choose the second
approach described above.
The below sections analyze the data structures allocated in the coherent memory region and the changes required to allocate them in normal memory.
Coherent memory usage in PSCI implementation
The psci_non_cpu_pd_nodes data structure stores the platform's power domain
tree information for state management of power domains. By default, this data
structure is allocated in the coherent memory region in the Trusted Firmware
because it can be accessed by multple CPUs, either with caches enabled or
disabled.
typedef struct non_cpu_pwr_domain_node {
/*
* Index of the first CPU power domain node level 0 which has this node
* as its parent.
*/
unsigned int cpu_start_idx;
/*
* Number of CPU power domains which are siblings of the domain indexed
* by 'cpu_start_idx' i.e. all the domains in the range 'cpu_start_idx
* -> cpu_start_idx + ncpus' have this node as their parent.
*/
unsigned int ncpus;
/*
* Index of the parent power domain node.
* TODO: Figure out whether to whether using pointer is more efficient.
*/
unsigned int parent_node;
plat_local_state_t local_state;
unsigned char level;
/* For indexing the psci_lock array*/
unsigned char lock_index;
} non_cpu_pd_node_t;
In order to move this data structure to normal memory, the use of each of its
fields must be analyzed. Fields like cpu_start_idx, ncpus, parent_node
level and lock_index are only written once during cold boot. Hence removing
them from coherent memory involves only doing a clean and invalidate of the
cache lines after these fields are written.
The field local_state can be concurrently accessed by multiple CPUs in
different cache states. A Lamport's Bakery lock psci_locks is used to ensure
mutual exlusion to this field and a clean and invalidate is needed after it
is written.
Bakery lock data
The bakery lock data structure bakery_lock_t is allocated in coherent memory
and is accessed by multiple CPUs with mismatched attributes. bakery_lock_t is
defined as follows:
typedef struct bakery_lock {
/*
* The lock_data is a bit-field of 2 members:
* Bit[0] : choosing. This field is set when the CPU is
* choosing its bakery number.
* Bits[1 - 15] : number. This is the bakery number allocated.
*/
volatile uint16_t lock_data[BAKERY_LOCK_MAX_CPUS];
} bakery_lock_t;
It is a characteristic of Lamport's Bakery algorithm that the volatile per-CPU fields can be read by all CPUs but only written to by the owning CPU.
Depending upon the data cache line size, the per-CPU fields of the
bakery_lock_t structure for multiple CPUs may exist on a single cache line.
These per-CPU fields can be read and written during lock contention by multiple
CPUs with mismatched memory attributes. Since these fields are a part of the
lock implementation, they do not have access to any other locking primitive to
safeguard against the resulting coherency issues. As a result, simple software
cache maintenance is not enough to allocate them in coherent memory. Consider
the following example.
CPU0 updates its per-CPU field with data cache enabled. This write updates a
local cache line which contains a copy of the fields for other CPUs as well. Now
CPU1 updates its per-CPU field of the bakery_lock_t structure with data cache
disabled. CPU1 then issues a DCIVAC operation to invalidate any stale copies of
its field in any other cache line in the system. This operation will invalidate
the update made by CPU0 as well.
To use bakery locks when USE_COHERENT_MEM is disabled, the lock data structure
has been redesigned. The changes utilise the characteristic of Lamport's Bakery
algorithm mentioned earlier. The bakery_lock structure only allocates the memory
for a single CPU. The macro DEFINE_BAKERY_LOCK allocates all the bakery locks
needed for a CPU into a section bakery_lock. The linker allocates the memory
for other cores by using the total size allocated for the bakery_lock section
and multiplying it with (PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT - 1). This enables software to
perform software cache maintenance on the lock data structure without running
into coherency issues associated with mismatched attributes.
The bakery lock data structure bakery_info_t is defined for use when
USE_COHERENT_MEM is disabled as follows:
typedef struct bakery_info {
/*
* The lock_data is a bit-field of 2 members:
* Bit[0] : choosing. This field is set when the CPU is
* choosing its bakery number.
* Bits[1 - 15] : number. This is the bakery number allocated.
*/
volatile uint16_t lock_data;
} bakery_info_t;
The bakery_info_t represents a single per-CPU field of one lock and
the combination of corresponding bakery_info_t structures for all CPUs in the
system represents the complete bakery lock. The view in memory for a system
with n bakery locks are:
bakery_lock section start
|----------------|
| `bakery_info_t`| <-- Lock_0 per-CPU field
| Lock_0 | for CPU0
|----------------|
| `bakery_info_t`| <-- Lock_1 per-CPU field
| Lock_1 | for CPU0
|----------------|
| .... |
|----------------|
| `bakery_info_t`| <-- Lock_N per-CPU field
| Lock_N | for CPU0
------------------
| XXXXX |
| Padding to |
| next Cache WB | <--- Calculate PERCPU_BAKERY_LOCK_SIZE, allocate
| Granule | continuous memory for remaining CPUs.
------------------
| `bakery_info_t`| <-- Lock_0 per-CPU field
| Lock_0 | for CPU1
|----------------|
| `bakery_info_t`| <-- Lock_1 per-CPU field
| Lock_1 | for CPU1
|----------------|
| .... |
|----------------|
| `bakery_info_t`| <-- Lock_N per-CPU field
| Lock_N | for CPU1
------------------
| XXXXX |
| Padding to |
| next Cache WB |
| Granule |
------------------
Consider a system of 2 CPUs with 'N' bakery locks as shown above. For an
operation on Lock_N, the corresponding bakery_info_t in both CPU0 and CPU1
bakery_lock section need to be fetched and appropriate cache operations need
to be performed for each access.
On ARM Platforms, bakery locks are used in psci (psci_locks) and power controller
driver (arm_lock).
Non Functional Impact of removing coherent memory
Removal of the coherent memory region leads to the additional software overhead of performing cache maintenance for the affected data structures. However, since the memory where the data structures are allocated is cacheable, the overhead is mostly mitigated by an increase in performance.
There is however a performance impact for bakery locks, due to:
- Additional cache maintenance operations, and
- Multiple cache line reads for each lock operation, since the bakery locks for each CPU are distributed across different cache lines.
The implementation has been optimized to minimize this additional overhead. Measurements indicate that when bakery locks are allocated in Normal memory, the minimum latency of acquiring a lock is on an average 3-4 micro seconds whereas in Device memory the same is 2 micro seconds. The measurements were done on the Juno ARM development platform.
As mentioned earlier, almost a page of memory can be saved by disabling
USE_COHERENT_MEM. Each platform needs to consider these trade-offs to decide
whether coherent memory should be used. If a platform disables
USE_COHERENT_MEM and needs to use bakery locks in the porting layer, it can
optionally define macro PLAT_PERCPU_BAKERY_LOCK_SIZE (see the Porting
Guide). Refer to the reference platform code for examples.
- Isolating code and read-only data on separate memory pages
In the ARMv8 VMSA, translation table entries include fields that define the properties of the target memory region, such as its access permissions. The smallest unit of memory that can be addressed by a translation table entry is a memory page. Therefore, if software needs to set different permissions on two memory regions then it needs to map them using different memory pages.
The default memory layout for each BL image is as follows:
| ... |
+-------------------+
| Read-write data |
+-------------------+ Page boundary
| <Padding> |
+-------------------+
| Exception vectors |
+-------------------+ 2 KB boundary
| <Padding> |
+-------------------+
| Read-only data |
+-------------------+
| Code |
+-------------------+ BLx_BASE
Note: The 2KB alignment for the exception vectors is an architectural requirement.
The read-write data start on a new memory page so that they can be mapped with read-write permissions, whereas the code and read-only data below are configured as read-only.
However, the read-only data are not aligned on a page boundary. They are contiguous to the code. Therefore, the end of the code section and the beginning of the read-only data one might share a memory page. This forces both to be mapped with the same memory attributes. As the code needs to be executable, this means that the read-only data stored on the same memory page as the code are executable as well. This could potentially be exploited as part of a security attack.
TF provides the build flag SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA to isolate the code and
read-only data on separate memory pages. This in turn allows independent control
of the access permissions for the code and read-only data. In this case,
platform code gets a finer-grained view of the image layout and can
appropriately map the code region as executable and the read-only data as
execute-never.
This has an impact on memory footprint, as padding bytes need to be introduced between the code and read-only data to ensure the segragation of the two. To limit the memory cost, this flag also changes the memory layout such that the code and exception vectors are now contiguous, like so:
| ... |
+-------------------+
| Read-write data |
+-------------------+ Page boundary
| <Padding> |
+-------------------+
| Read-only data |
+-------------------+ Page boundary
| <Padding> |
+-------------------+
| Exception vectors |
+-------------------+ 2 KB boundary
| <Padding> |
+-------------------+
| Code |
+-------------------+ BLx_BASE
With this more condensed memory layout, the separation of read-only data will add zero or one page to the memory footprint of each BL image. Each platform should consider the trade-off between memory footprint and security.
This build flag is disabled by default, minimising memory footprint. On ARM platforms, it is enabled.
- Performance Measurement Framework
The Performance Measurement Framework (PMF) facilitates collection of timestamps by registered services and provides interfaces to retrieve them from within the ARM Trusted Firmware. A platform can choose to expose appropriate SMCs to retrieve these collected timestamps.
By default, the global physical counter is used for the timestamp
value and is read via CNTPCT_EL0. The framework allows to retrieve
timestamps captured by other CPUs.
Timestamp identifier format
A PMF timestamp is uniquely identified across the system via the
timestamp ID or tid. The tid is composed as follows:
Bits 0-7: The local timestamp identifier.
Bits 8-9: Reserved.
Bits 10-15: The service identifier.
Bits 16-31: Reserved.
-
The service identifier. Each PMF service is identified by a service name and a service identifier. Both the service name and identifier are unique within the system as a whole.
-
The local timestamp identifier. This identifier is unique within a given service.
Registering a PMF service
To register a PMF service, the PMF_REGISTER_SERVICE() macro from pmf.h
is used. The arguments required are the service name, the service ID,
the total number of local timestamps to be captured and a set of flags.
The flags field can be specified as a bitwise-OR of the following values:
PMF_STORE_ENABLE: The timestamp is stored in memory for later retrieval.
PMF_DUMP_ENABLE: The timestamp is dumped on the serial console.
The PMF_REGISTER_SERVICE() reserves memory to store captured
timestamps in a PMF specific linker section at build time.
Additionally, it defines necessary functions to capture and
retrieve a particular timestamp for the given service at runtime.
The macro PMF_REGISTER_SERVICE() only enables capturing PMF
timestamps from within ARM Trusted Firmware. In order to retrieve
timestamps from outside of ARM Trusted Firmware, the
PMF_REGISTER_SERVICE_SMC() macro must be used instead. This macro
accepts the same set of arguments as the PMF_REGISTER_SERVICE()
macro but additionally supports retrieving timestamps using SMCs.
Capturing a timestamp
PMF timestamps are stored in a per-service timestamp region. On a system with multiple CPUs, each timestamp is captured and stored in a per-CPU cache line aligned memory region.
Having registered the service, the PMF_CAPTURE_TIMESTAMP() macro can be
used to capture a timestamp at the location where it is used. The macro
takes the service name, a local timestamp identifier and a flag as arguments.
The flags field argument can be zero, or PMF_CACHE_MAINT which
instructs PMF to do cache maintenance following the capture. Cache
maintenance is required if any of the service's timestamps are captured
with data cache disabled.
To capture a timestamp in assembly code, the caller should use
pmf_calc_timestamp_addr macro (defined in pmf_asm_macros.S) to
calculate the address of where the timestamp would be stored. The
caller should then read CNTPCT_EL0 register to obtain the timestamp
and store it at the determined address for later retrieval.
Retrieving a timestamp
From within ARM Trusted Firmware, timestamps for individual CPUs can
be retrieved using either PMF_GET_TIMESTAMP_BY_MPIDR() or
PMF_GET_TIMESTAMP_BY_INDEX() macros. These macros accept the CPU's MPIDR
value, or its ordinal position, respectively.
From outside ARM Trusted Firmware, timestamps for individual CPUs can be
retrieved by calling into pmf_smc_handler().
Interface : pmf_smc_handler()
Argument : unsigned int smc_fid, u_register_t x1,
u_register_t x2, u_register_t x3,
u_register_t x4, void *cookie,
void *handle, u_register_t flags
Return : uintptr_t
smc_fid: Holds the SMC identifier which is either `PMF_SMC_GET_TIMESTAMP_32`
when the caller of the SMC is running in AArch32 mode
or `PMF_SMC_GET_TIMESTAMP_64` when the caller is running in AArch64 mode.
x1: Timestamp identifier.
x2: The `mpidr` of the CPU for which the timestamp has to be retrieved.
This can be the `mpidr` of a different core to the one initiating
the SMC. In that case, service specific cache maintenance may be
required to ensure the updated copy of the timestamp is returned.
x3: A flags value that is either 0 or `PMF_CACHE_MAINT`. If
`PMF_CACHE_MAINT` is passed, then the PMF code will perform a
cache invalidate before reading the timestamp. This ensures
an updated copy is returned.
The remaining arguments, x4, cookie, handle and flags are unused
in this implementation.
PMF code structure
-
pmf_main.cconsists of core functions that implement service registration, initialization, storing, dumping and retrieving timestamps. -
pmf_smc.ccontains the SMC handling for registered PMF services. -
pmf.hcontains the public interface to Performance Measurement Framework. -
pmf_asm_macros.Sconsists of macros to facilitate capturing timestamps in assembly code. -
pmf_helpers.his an internal header used bypmf.h. -
ARMv8 Architecture Extensions
ARM Trusted Firmware makes use of ARMv8 Architecture Extensions where applicable. This section lists the usage of Architecture Extensions, and build flags controlling them.
In general, and unless individually mentioned, the build options
ARM_ARCH_MAJOR and ARM_ARCH_MINOR selects the Architecture Extension to
target when building ARM Trusted Firmware. Subsequent ARM Architecture
Extensions are backward compatible with previous versions.
The build system only requires that ARM_ARCH_MAJOR and ARM_ARCH_MINOR have a
valid numeric value. These build options only control whether or not
Architecture Extension-specific code is included in the build. Otherwise, ARM
Trusted Firmware targets the base ARMv8.0 architecture; i.e. as if
ARM_ARCH_MAJOR == 8 and ARM_ARCH_MINOR == 0, which are also their respective
default values.
See also the Summary of build options in User Guide.
For details on the Architecture Extension and available features, please refer to the respective Architecture Extension Supplement.
ARMv8.1
This Architecture Extension is targeted when ARM_ARCH_MAJOR >= 8, or when
ARM_ARCH_MAJOR == 8 and ARM_ARCH_MINOR >= 1.
- The Compare and Swap instruction is used to implement spinlocks. Otherwise, the load-/store-exclusive instruction pair is used.
- Code Structure
Trusted Firmware code is logically divided between the three boot loader stages mentioned in the previous sections. The code is also divided into the following categories (present as directories in the source code):
- Platform specific. Choice of architecture specific code depends upon the platform.
- Common code. This is platform and architecture agnostic code.
- Library code. This code comprises of functionality commonly used by all other code. The PSCI implementation and other EL3 runtime frameworks reside as Library components.
- Stage specific. Code specific to a boot stage.
- Drivers.
- Services. EL3 runtime services (eg: SPD). Specific SPD services
reside in the
services/spddirectory (e.g.services/spd/tspd).
Each boot loader stage uses code from one or more of the above mentioned categories. Based upon the above, the code layout looks like this:
Directory Used by BL1? Used by BL2? Used by BL31?
bl1 Yes No No
bl2 No Yes No
bl31 No No Yes
plat Yes Yes Yes
drivers Yes No Yes
common Yes Yes Yes
lib Yes Yes Yes
services No No Yes
The build system provides a non configurable build option IMAGE_BLx for each boot loader stage (where x = BL stage). e.g. for BL1 , IMAGE_BL1 will be defined by the build system. This enables the Trusted Firmware to compile certain code only for specific boot loader stages
All assembler files have the .S extension. The linker source files for each
boot stage have the extension .ld.S. These are processed by GCC to create the
linker scripts which have the extension .ld.
FDTs provide a description of the hardware platform and are used by the Linux
kernel at boot time. These can be found in the fdts directory.
- References
-
Trusted Board Boot Requirements CLIENT PDD (ARM DEN 0006B-5). Available under NDA through your ARM account representative.
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