2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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/* process_keys.c: management of a process's keyrings
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*
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2005-06-24 05:00:53 +00:00
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* Copyright (C) 2004-5 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
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* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/keyctl.h>
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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2006-03-22 08:09:14 +00:00
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#include <linux/mutex.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#include <asm/uaccess.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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/* session keyring create vs join semaphore */
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2006-03-22 08:09:14 +00:00
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static DEFINE_MUTEX(key_session_mutex);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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/* the root user's tracking struct */
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struct key_user root_key_user = {
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.usage = ATOMIC_INIT(3),
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2007-10-17 06:29:46 +00:00
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.cons_lock = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(root_key_user.cons_lock),
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2006-12-07 04:37:22 +00:00
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.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(root_key_user.lock),
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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.nkeys = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
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.nikeys = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
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.uid = 0,
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};
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/* the root user's UID keyring */
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struct key root_user_keyring = {
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.usage = ATOMIC_INIT(1),
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.serial = 2,
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.type = &key_type_keyring,
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.user = &root_key_user,
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.sem = __RWSEM_INITIALIZER(root_user_keyring.sem),
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2005-10-30 23:02:44 +00:00
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.perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_ALL,
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2005-06-24 05:00:49 +00:00
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.flags = 1 << KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED,
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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.description = "_uid.0",
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#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
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.magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC,
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#endif
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};
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/* the root user's default session keyring */
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struct key root_session_keyring = {
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.usage = ATOMIC_INIT(1),
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.serial = 1,
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.type = &key_type_keyring,
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.user = &root_key_user,
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.sem = __RWSEM_INITIALIZER(root_session_keyring.sem),
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2005-10-30 23:02:44 +00:00
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.perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_ALL,
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2005-06-24 05:00:49 +00:00
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.flags = 1 << KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED,
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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.description = "_uid_ses.0",
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#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
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.magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC,
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#endif
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};
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* allocate the keyrings to be associated with a UID
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*/
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2006-06-22 21:47:17 +00:00
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int alloc_uid_keyring(struct user_struct *user,
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struct task_struct *ctx)
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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{
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struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;
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char buf[20];
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int ret;
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/* concoct a default session keyring */
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sprintf(buf, "_uid_ses.%u", user->uid);
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2006-06-26 07:24:50 +00:00
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session_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, (gid_t) -1, ctx,
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KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);
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goto error;
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}
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/* and a UID specific keyring, pointed to by the default session
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* keyring */
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sprintf(buf, "_uid.%u", user->uid);
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2006-06-26 07:24:50 +00:00
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uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, (gid_t) -1, ctx,
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KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, session_keyring);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
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key_put(session_keyring);
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ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);
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goto error;
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}
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/* install the keyrings */
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user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;
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user->session_keyring = session_keyring;
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ret = 0;
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2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
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error:
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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return ret;
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} /* end alloc_uid_keyring() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* deal with the UID changing
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*/
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void switch_uid_keyring(struct user_struct *new_user)
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{
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#if 0 /* do nothing for now */
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struct key *old;
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/* switch to the new user's session keyring if we were running under
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* root's default session keyring */
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if (new_user->uid != 0 &&
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current->session_keyring == &root_session_keyring
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) {
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atomic_inc(&new_user->session_keyring->usage);
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task_lock(current);
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old = current->session_keyring;
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current->session_keyring = new_user->session_keyring;
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task_unlock(current);
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key_put(old);
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}
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#endif
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} /* end switch_uid_keyring() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* install a fresh thread keyring, discarding the old one
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*/
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int install_thread_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk)
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{
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struct key *keyring, *old;
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char buf[20];
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int ret;
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sprintf(buf, "_tid.%u", tsk->pid);
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2006-06-26 07:24:50 +00:00
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keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk,
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KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
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goto error;
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}
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task_lock(tsk);
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old = tsk->thread_keyring;
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tsk->thread_keyring = keyring;
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task_unlock(tsk);
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ret = 0;
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key_put(old);
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2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
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error:
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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return ret;
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} /* end install_thread_keyring() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* make sure a process keyring is installed
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*/
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[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
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int install_process_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk)
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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{
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struct key *keyring;
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char buf[20];
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int ret;
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2006-04-11 05:54:26 +00:00
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might_sleep();
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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if (!tsk->signal->process_keyring) {
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sprintf(buf, "_pid.%u", tsk->tgid);
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2006-06-26 07:24:50 +00:00
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keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk,
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KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
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goto error;
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}
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2005-06-24 05:00:53 +00:00
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/* attach keyring */
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2006-04-11 05:54:26 +00:00
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spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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if (!tsk->signal->process_keyring) {
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tsk->signal->process_keyring = keyring;
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keyring = NULL;
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}
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2006-04-11 05:54:26 +00:00
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spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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key_put(keyring);
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}
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ret = 0;
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2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
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error:
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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return ret;
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} /* end install_process_keyring() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* install a session keyring, discarding the old one
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* - if a keyring is not supplied, an empty one is invented
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*/
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static int install_session_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk,
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struct key *keyring)
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{
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2006-06-26 07:24:50 +00:00
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unsigned long flags;
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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struct key *old;
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char buf[20];
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2006-04-11 05:54:26 +00:00
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might_sleep();
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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/* create an empty session keyring */
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if (!keyring) {
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sprintf(buf, "_ses.%u", tsk->tgid);
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2006-06-26 07:24:50 +00:00
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flags = KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN;
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if (tsk->signal->session_keyring)
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flags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA;
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keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk,
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flags, NULL);
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2006-04-11 05:54:26 +00:00
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if (IS_ERR(keyring))
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return PTR_ERR(keyring);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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}
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else {
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atomic_inc(&keyring->usage);
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}
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/* install the keyring */
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2006-04-11 05:54:26 +00:00
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spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
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old = tsk->signal->session_keyring;
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2005-06-24 05:00:53 +00:00
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rcu_assign_pointer(tsk->signal->session_keyring, keyring);
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2006-04-11 05:54:26 +00:00
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spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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2006-04-11 05:54:26 +00:00
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/* we're using RCU on the pointer, but there's no point synchronising
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* on it if it didn't previously point to anything */
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if (old) {
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synchronize_rcu();
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key_put(old);
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}
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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2006-04-11 05:54:26 +00:00
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return 0;
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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} /* end install_session_keyring() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* copy the keys in a thread group for fork without CLONE_THREAD
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*/
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int copy_thread_group_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
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{
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key_check(current->thread_group->session_keyring);
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key_check(current->thread_group->process_keyring);
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/* no process keyring yet */
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tsk->signal->process_keyring = NULL;
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/* same session keyring */
|
2005-06-24 05:00:53 +00:00
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rcu_read_lock();
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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tsk->signal->session_keyring =
|
2005-06-24 05:00:53 +00:00
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key_get(rcu_dereference(current->signal->session_keyring));
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rcu_read_unlock();
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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return 0;
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} /* end copy_thread_group_keys() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* copy the keys for fork
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*/
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int copy_keys(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
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{
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key_check(tsk->thread_keyring);
|
2006-01-08 09:02:47 +00:00
|
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key_check(tsk->request_key_auth);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
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/* no thread keyring yet */
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tsk->thread_keyring = NULL;
|
2006-01-08 09:02:47 +00:00
|
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/* copy the request_key() authorisation for this thread */
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key_get(tsk->request_key_auth);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
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|
return 0;
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} /* end copy_keys() */
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|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
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|
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/*
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|
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* dispose of thread group keys upon thread group destruction
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|
*/
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void exit_thread_group_keys(struct signal_struct *tg)
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|
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{
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key_put(tg->session_keyring);
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key_put(tg->process_keyring);
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|
|
} /* end exit_thread_group_keys() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2006-01-08 09:02:47 +00:00
|
|
|
* dispose of per-thread keys upon thread exit
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void exit_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
key_put(tsk->thread_keyring);
|
2006-01-08 09:02:47 +00:00
|
|
|
key_put(tsk->request_key_auth);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end exit_keys() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* deal with execve()
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int exec_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct key *old;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */
|
|
|
|
task_lock(tsk);
|
|
|
|
old = tsk->thread_keyring;
|
|
|
|
tsk->thread_keyring = NULL;
|
|
|
|
task_unlock(tsk);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_put(old);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* discard the process keyring from a newly exec'd task */
|
2006-04-11 05:54:26 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
old = tsk->signal->process_keyring;
|
|
|
|
tsk->signal->process_keyring = NULL;
|
2006-04-11 05:54:26 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_put(old);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end exec_keys() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* deal with SUID programs
|
|
|
|
* - we might want to make this invent a new session keyring
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int suid_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end suid_keys() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* the filesystem user ID changed
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* update the ownership of the thread keyring */
|
|
|
|
if (tsk->thread_keyring) {
|
|
|
|
down_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
tsk->thread_keyring->uid = tsk->fsuid;
|
|
|
|
up_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_fsuid_changed() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* the filesystem group ID changed
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* update the ownership of the thread keyring */
|
|
|
|
if (tsk->thread_keyring) {
|
|
|
|
down_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
tsk->thread_keyring->gid = tsk->fsgid;
|
|
|
|
up_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_fsgid_changed() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* search the process keyrings for the first matching key
|
|
|
|
* - we use the supplied match function to see if the description (or other
|
|
|
|
* feature of interest) matches
|
|
|
|
* - we return -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key
|
|
|
|
* - we return -ENOKEY if we found only negative matching keys
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
|
|
|
|
const void *description,
|
|
|
|
key_match_func_t match,
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct *context)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
struct request_key_auth *rka;
|
2006-01-08 09:02:47 +00:00
|
|
|
key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-22 21:47:18 +00:00
|
|
|
might_sleep();
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/* we want to return -EAGAIN or -ENOKEY if any of the keyrings were
|
|
|
|
* searchable, but we failed to find a key or we found a negative key;
|
|
|
|
* otherwise we want to return a sample error (probably -EACCES) if
|
|
|
|
* none of the keyrings were searchable
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* in terms of priority: success > -ENOKEY > -EAGAIN > other error
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
key_ref = NULL;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = NULL;
|
|
|
|
err = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* search the thread keyring first */
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (context->thread_keyring) {
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
|
|
|
|
make_key_ref(context->thread_keyring, 1),
|
|
|
|
context, type, description, match);
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
goto found;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = key_ref;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
err = key_ref;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* search the process keyring second */
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (context->signal->process_keyring) {
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
|
|
|
|
make_key_ref(context->signal->process_keyring, 1),
|
|
|
|
context, type, description, match);
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
goto found;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = key_ref;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
err = key_ref;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
/* search the session keyring */
|
|
|
|
if (context->signal->session_keyring) {
|
2005-06-24 05:00:53 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
|
|
|
|
make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(
|
|
|
|
context->signal->session_keyring),
|
|
|
|
1),
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
context, type, description, match);
|
2005-06-24 05:00:53 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
goto found;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = key_ref;
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
err = key_ref;
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-01-08 09:02:47 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* or search the user-session keyring */
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
|
|
|
|
make_key_ref(context->user->session_keyring, 1),
|
|
|
|
context, type, description, match);
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
goto found;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = key_ref;
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
err = key_ref;
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-24 05:00:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-01-08 09:02:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* if this process has an instantiation authorisation key, then we also
|
|
|
|
* search the keyrings of the process mentioned there
|
|
|
|
* - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (context->request_key_auth &&
|
|
|
|
context == current &&
|
2006-06-22 21:47:18 +00:00
|
|
|
type != &key_type_request_key_auth
|
2006-01-08 09:02:47 +00:00
|
|
|
) {
|
2006-06-22 21:47:18 +00:00
|
|
|
/* defend against the auth key being revoked */
|
|
|
|
down_read(&context->request_key_auth->sem);
|
2006-01-08 09:02:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-22 21:47:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if (key_validate(context->request_key_auth) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
rka = context->request_key_auth->payload.data;
|
2006-01-08 09:02:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-22 21:47:18 +00:00
|
|
|
key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description,
|
|
|
|
match, rka->context);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-22 21:47:18 +00:00
|
|
|
up_read(&context->request_key_auth->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
|
|
|
|
goto found;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
|
|
|
|
case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
|
|
|
|
ret = key_ref;
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2006-06-22 21:47:18 +00:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
err = key_ref;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
up_read(&context->request_key_auth->sem);
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
key_ref = ret ? ret : err;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
found:
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
return key_ref;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end search_process_keyrings() */
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* see if the key we're looking at is the target key
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return key == target;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end lookup_user_key_possessed() */
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* lookup a key given a key ID from userspace with a given permissions mask
|
|
|
|
* - don't create special keyrings unless so requested
|
|
|
|
* - partially constructed keys aren't found unless requested
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
key_ref_t lookup_user_key(struct task_struct *context, key_serial_t id,
|
|
|
|
int create, int partial, key_perm_t perm)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
struct key *key;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!context)
|
|
|
|
context = current;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (id) {
|
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!context->thread_keyring) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!create)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = install_thread_keyring(context);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
|
|
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
key = context->thread_keyring;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!context->signal->process_keyring) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!create)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = install_process_keyring(context);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
|
|
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
key = context->signal->process_keyring;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING:
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!context->signal->session_keyring) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/* always install a session keyring upon access if one
|
|
|
|
* doesn't exist yet */
|
|
|
|
ret = install_session_keyring(
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
context, context->user->session_keyring);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
|
key = rcu_dereference(context->signal->session_keyring);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING:
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
key = context->user->uid_keyring;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
key = context->user->session_keyring;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_GROUP_KEYRING:
|
|
|
|
/* group keyrings are not yet supported */
|
|
|
|
key = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-01-08 09:02:47 +00:00
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:
|
|
|
|
key = context->request_key_auth;
|
|
|
|
if (!key)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
default:
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (id < 1)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key = key_lookup(id);
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
|
2008-02-07 08:15:26 +00:00
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* check to see if we possess the key */
|
|
|
|
skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(key->type, key,
|
|
|
|
lookup_user_key_possessed,
|
|
|
|
current);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
|
|
|
|
key_put(key);
|
|
|
|
key_ref = skey_ref;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-17 06:29:46 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!partial) {
|
|
|
|
ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);
|
|
|
|
switch (ret) {
|
|
|
|
case -ERESTARTSYS:
|
|
|
|
goto invalid_key;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
if (perm)
|
|
|
|
goto invalid_key;
|
|
|
|
case 0:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (perm) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = key_validate(key);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto invalid_key;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -EIO;
|
2005-06-24 05:00:49 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!partial && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
goto invalid_key;
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
/* check the permissions */
|
2005-10-30 23:02:44 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, context, perm);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
goto invalid_key;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
return key_ref;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
invalid_key:
|
|
|
|
key_ref_put(key_ref);
|
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end lookup_user_key() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* join the named keyring as the session keyring if possible, or attempt to
|
|
|
|
* create a new one of that name if not
|
|
|
|
* - if the name is NULL, an empty anonymous keyring is installed instead
|
|
|
|
* - named session keyring joining is done with a semaphore held
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
|
|
|
|
struct key *keyring;
|
|
|
|
long ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* if no name is provided, install an anonymous keyring */
|
|
|
|
if (!name) {
|
|
|
|
ret = install_session_keyring(tsk, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 05:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
|
ret = rcu_dereference(tsk->signal->session_keyring)->serial;
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* allow the user to join or create a named keyring */
|
2006-03-22 08:09:14 +00:00
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&key_session_mutex);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* look for an existing keyring of this name */
|
|
|
|
keyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) {
|
|
|
|
/* not found - try and create a new one */
|
2006-06-26 07:24:50 +00:00
|
|
|
keyring = keyring_alloc(name, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk,
|
|
|
|
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
|
|
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
|
2005-08-04 20:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error2;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
|
|
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
|
|
|
|
goto error2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we've got a keyring - now to install it */
|
|
|
|
ret = install_session_keyring(tsk, keyring);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto error2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = keyring->serial;
|
|
|
|
key_put(keyring);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
error2:
|
2006-03-22 08:09:14 +00:00
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
|
2005-09-28 16:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
error:
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end join_session_keyring() */
|