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Staging: rtxxx0: remove unused code

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Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <bzolnier@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This commit is contained in:
Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz 2009-08-16 21:32:09 +02:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 881abc9d22
commit 5b4df5c617
6 changed files with 0 additions and 1182 deletions
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113
drivers/staging/rt2860/common/cmm_data.c
View File

@ -2017,119 +2017,6 @@ VOID RTMPHandleRxCoherentInterrupt(
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("<== RTMPHandleRxCoherentInterrupt \n"));
}
VOID DBGPRINT_TX_RING(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
IN UCHAR QueIdx)
{
UINT32 Ac0Base;
UINT32 Ac0HwIdx = 0, Ac0SwIdx = 0, AC0freeIdx;
int i;
PULONG ptemp;
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("=====================================================\n " ));
switch (QueIdx)
{
case QID_AC_BE:
RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_BASE_PTR0, &Ac0Base);
RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_CTX_IDX0, &Ac0SwIdx);
RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_DTX_IDX0, &Ac0HwIdx);
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("All QID_AC_BE DESCRIPTOR \n " ));
for (i=0;i<TX_RING_SIZE;i++)
{
ptemp= (PULONG)pAd->TxRing[QID_AC_BE].Cell[i].AllocVa;
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("[%02d] %08lx: %08lx: %08lx: %08lx\n " , i, *ptemp,*(ptemp+1),*(ptemp+2),*(ptemp+3)));
}
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" \n " ));
break;
case QID_AC_BK:
RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_BASE_PTR1, &Ac0Base);
RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_CTX_IDX1, &Ac0SwIdx);
RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_DTX_IDX1, &Ac0HwIdx);
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("All QID_AC_BK DESCRIPTOR \n " ));
for (i=0;i<TX_RING_SIZE;i++)
{
ptemp= (PULONG)pAd->TxRing[QID_AC_BK].Cell[i].AllocVa;
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("[%02d] %08lx: %08lx: %08lx: %08lx\n " , i, *ptemp,*(ptemp+1),*(ptemp+2),*(ptemp+3)));
}
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" \n " ));
break;
case QID_AC_VI:
RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_BASE_PTR2, &Ac0Base);
RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_CTX_IDX2, &Ac0SwIdx);
RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_DTX_IDX2, &Ac0HwIdx);
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("All QID_AC_VI DESCRIPTOR \n " ));
for (i=0;i<TX_RING_SIZE;i++)
{
ptemp= (PULONG)pAd->TxRing[QID_AC_VI].Cell[i].AllocVa;
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("[%02d] %08lx: %08lx: %08lx: %08lx\n " , i, *ptemp,*(ptemp+1),*(ptemp+2),*(ptemp+3)));
}
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" \n " ));
break;
case QID_AC_VO:
RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_BASE_PTR3, &Ac0Base);
RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_CTX_IDX3, &Ac0SwIdx);
RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_DTX_IDX3, &Ac0HwIdx);
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("All QID_AC_VO DESCRIPTOR \n " ));
for (i=0;i<TX_RING_SIZE;i++)
{
ptemp= (PULONG)pAd->TxRing[QID_AC_VO].Cell[i].AllocVa;
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("[%02d] %08lx: %08lx: %08lx: %08lx\n " , i, *ptemp,*(ptemp+1),*(ptemp+2),*(ptemp+3)));
}
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" \n " ));
break;
case QID_MGMT:
RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_BASE_PTR5, &Ac0Base);
RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_CTX_IDX5, &Ac0SwIdx);
RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_DTX_IDX5, &Ac0HwIdx);
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" All QID_MGMT DESCRIPTOR \n " ));
for (i=0;i<MGMT_RING_SIZE;i++)
{
ptemp= (PULONG)pAd->MgmtRing.Cell[i].AllocVa;
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("[%02d] %08lx: %08lx: %08lx: %08lx\n " , i, *ptemp,*(ptemp+1),*(ptemp+2),*(ptemp+3)));
}
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" \n " ));
break;
default:
DBGPRINT_ERR(("DBGPRINT_TX_RING(Ring %d) not supported\n", QueIdx));
break;
}
AC0freeIdx = pAd->TxRing[QueIdx].TxSwFreeIdx;
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("TxRing%d, TX_DTX_IDX=%d, TX_CTX_IDX=%d\n", QueIdx, Ac0HwIdx, Ac0SwIdx));
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,(" TxSwFreeIdx[%d]", AC0freeIdx));
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,(" pending-NDIS=%ld\n", pAd->RalinkCounters.PendingNdisPacketCount));
}
VOID DBGPRINT_RX_RING(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd)
{
UINT32 Ac0Base;
UINT32 Ac0HwIdx = 0, Ac0SwIdx = 0, AC0freeIdx;
int i;
UINT32 *ptemp;
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("=====================================================\n " ));
RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, RX_BASE_PTR, &Ac0Base);
RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, RX_CRX_IDX, &Ac0SwIdx);
RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, RX_DRX_IDX, &Ac0HwIdx);
AC0freeIdx = pAd->RxRing.RxSwReadIdx;
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("All RX DSP \n " ));
for (i=0;i<RX_RING_SIZE;i++)
{
ptemp = (UINT32 *)pAd->RxRing.Cell[i].AllocVa;
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("[%02d] %08x: %08x: %08x: %08x\n " , i, *ptemp,*(ptemp+1),*(ptemp+2),*(ptemp+3)));
}
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("RxRing, RX_DRX_IDX=%d, RX_CRX_IDX=%d \n", Ac0HwIdx, Ac0SwIdx));
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,(" RxSwReadIdx [%d]=", AC0freeIdx));
DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,(" pending-NDIS=%ld\n", pAd->RalinkCounters.PendingNdisPacketCount));
}
#endif /* RT2860 */
/*

184
drivers/staging/rt2860/common/cmm_sanity.c
View File

@ -1052,187 +1052,3 @@ NDIS_802_11_NETWORK_TYPE NetworkTypeInUseSanity(
return NetWorkType;
}
/*
==========================================================================
Description:
WPA message sanity check
Return:
TRUE if all parameters are OK, FALSE otherwise
==========================================================================
*/
BOOLEAN PeerWpaMessageSanity(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
IN PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg,
IN ULONG MsgLen,
IN UCHAR MsgType,
IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry)
{
UCHAR mic[LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC], digest[80], KEYDATA[MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE];
BOOLEAN bReplayDiff = FALSE;
BOOLEAN bWPA2 = FALSE;
KEY_INFO EapolKeyInfo;
UCHAR GroupKeyIndex = 0;
NdisZeroMemory(mic, sizeof(mic));
NdisZeroMemory(digest, sizeof(digest));
NdisZeroMemory(KEYDATA, sizeof(KEYDATA));
NdisZeroMemory((PUCHAR)&EapolKeyInfo, sizeof(EapolKeyInfo));
NdisMoveMemory((PUCHAR)&EapolKeyInfo, (PUCHAR)&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo, sizeof(KEY_INFO));
*((USHORT *)&EapolKeyInfo) = cpu2le16(*((USHORT *)&EapolKeyInfo));
// Choose WPA2 or not
if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) || (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK))
bWPA2 = TRUE;
// 0. Check MsgType
if ((MsgType > EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2) || (MsgType < EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1))
{
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("The message type is invalid(%d)! \n", MsgType));
return FALSE;
}
// 1. Replay counter check
if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1) // For supplicant
{
// First validate replay counter, only accept message with larger replay counter.
// Let equal pass, some AP start with all zero replay counter
UCHAR ZeroReplay[LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY];
NdisZeroMemory(ZeroReplay, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
if ((RTMPCompareMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, pEntry->R_Counter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY) != 1) &&
(RTMPCompareMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, ZeroReplay, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY) != 0))
{
bReplayDiff = TRUE;
}
}
else if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2) // For authenticator
{
// check Replay Counter coresponds to MSG from authenticator, otherwise discard
if (!NdisEqualMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, pEntry->R_Counter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY))
{
bReplayDiff = TRUE;
}
}
// Replay Counter different condition
if (bReplayDiff)
{
// send wireless event - for replay counter different
if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_REPLAY_COUNTER_DIFF_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0);
if (MsgType < EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
{
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("Replay Counter Different in pairwise msg %d of 4-way handshake!\n", MsgType));
}
else
{
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("Replay Counter Different in group msg %d of 2-way handshake!\n", (MsgType - EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4)));
}
hex_dump("Receive replay counter ", pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
hex_dump("Current replay counter ", pEntry->R_Counter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
return FALSE;
}
// 2. Verify MIC except Pairwise Msg1
if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
{
UCHAR rcvd_mic[LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC];
// Record the received MIC for check later
NdisMoveMemory(rcvd_mic, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
NdisZeroMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
if (pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) // TKIP
{
hmac_md5(pEntry->PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, (PUCHAR)pMsg, MsgLen, mic);
}
else if (pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) // AES
{
HMAC_SHA1((PUCHAR)pMsg, MsgLen, pEntry->PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, digest);
NdisMoveMemory(mic, digest, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
}
if (!NdisEqualMemory(rcvd_mic, mic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC))
{
// send wireless event - for MIC different
if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_MIC_DIFF_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0);
if (MsgType < EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
{
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("MIC Different in pairwise msg %d of 4-way handshake!\n", MsgType));
}
else
{
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("MIC Different in group msg %d of 2-way handshake!\n", (MsgType - EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4)));
}
hex_dump("Received MIC", rcvd_mic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
hex_dump("Desired MIC", mic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
return FALSE;
}
}
// Extract the context of the Key Data field if it exist
// The field in pairwise_msg_2_WPA1(WPA2) & pairwise_msg_3_WPA1 is un-encrypted.
// The field in group_msg_1_WPA1(WPA2) & pairwise_msg_3_WPA2 is encrypted.
if (pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1] > 0)
{
// Decrypt this field
if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
{
if(pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
{
// AES
AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP(&pEntry->PTK[16], KEYDATA, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1],pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData);
}
else
{
INT i;
UCHAR Key[32];
// Decrypt TKIP GTK
// Construct 32 bytes RC4 Key
NdisMoveMemory(Key, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv, 16);
NdisMoveMemory(&Key[16], &pEntry->PTK[16], 16);
ARCFOUR_INIT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, Key, 32);
//discard first 256 bytes
for(i = 0; i < 256; i++)
ARCFOUR_BYTE(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT);
// Decrypt GTK. Becareful, there is no ICV to check the result is correct or not
ARCFOUR_DECRYPT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, KEYDATA, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1]);
}
if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
GroupKeyIndex = EapolKeyInfo.KeyIndex;
}
else if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && !bWPA2))
{
NdisMoveMemory(KEYDATA, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1]);
}
else
{
return TRUE;
}
// Parse Key Data field to
// 1. verify RSN IE for pairwise_msg_2_WPA1(WPA2) ,pairwise_msg_3_WPA1(WPA2)
// 2. verify KDE format for pairwise_msg_3_WPA2, group_msg_1_WPA2
// 3. update shared key for pairwise_msg_3_WPA2, group_msg_1_WPA1(WPA2)
if (!RTMPParseEapolKeyData(pAd, KEYDATA, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1], GroupKeyIndex, MsgType, bWPA2, pEntry))
{
return FALSE;
}
}
return TRUE;
}

794
drivers/staging/rt2860/common/cmm_wpa.c
View File

@ -771,70 +771,6 @@ BOOLEAN RTMPCheckWPAframe(
return TRUE;
}
/*
==========================================================================
Description:
ENCRYPT AES GTK before sending in EAPOL frame.
AES GTK length = 128 bit, so fix blocks for aes-key-wrap as 2 in this function.
This function references to RFC 3394 for aes key wrap algorithm.
Return:
==========================================================================
*/
VOID AES_GTK_KEY_WRAP(
IN UCHAR *key,
IN UCHAR *plaintext,
IN UCHAR p_len,
OUT UCHAR *ciphertext)
{
UCHAR A[8], BIN[16], BOUT[16];
UCHAR R[512];
INT num_blocks = p_len/8; // unit:64bits
INT i, j;
aes_context aesctx;
UCHAR xor;
rtmp_aes_set_key(&aesctx, key, 128);
// Init IA
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
A[i] = 0xa6;
//Input plaintext
for (i = 0; i < num_blocks; i++)
{
for (j = 0 ; j < 8; j++)
R[8 * (i + 1) + j] = plaintext[8 * i + j];
}
// Key Mix
for (j = 0; j < 6; j++)
{
for(i = 1; i <= num_blocks; i++)
{
//phase 1
NdisMoveMemory(BIN, A, 8);
NdisMoveMemory(&BIN[8], &R[8 * i], 8);
rtmp_aes_encrypt(&aesctx, BIN, BOUT);
NdisMoveMemory(A, &BOUT[0], 8);
xor = num_blocks * j + i;
A[7] = BOUT[7] ^ xor;
NdisMoveMemory(&R[8 * i], &BOUT[8], 8);
}
}
// Output ciphertext
NdisMoveMemory(ciphertext, A, 8);
for (i = 1; i <= num_blocks; i++)
{
for (j = 0 ; j < 8; j++)
ciphertext[8 * i + j] = R[8 * i + j];
}
}
/*
========================================================================
@ -906,733 +842,3 @@ VOID AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP(
os_free_mem(NULL, R);
}
/*
==========================================================================
Description:
Report the EAP message type
Arguments:
msg - EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1
EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2
EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3
EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4
EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1
EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2
Return:
message type string
==========================================================================
*/
CHAR *GetEapolMsgType(CHAR msg)
{
if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
return "Pairwise Message 1";
else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2)
return "Pairwise Message 2";
else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
return "Pairwise Message 3";
else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4)
return "Pairwise Message 4";
else if(msg == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
return "Group Message 1";
else if(msg == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2)
return "Group Message 2";
else
return "Invalid Message";
}
/*
========================================================================
Routine Description:
Check Sanity RSN IE of EAPoL message
Arguments:
Return Value:
========================================================================
*/
BOOLEAN RTMPCheckRSNIE(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
IN PUCHAR pData,
IN UCHAR DataLen,
IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry,
OUT UCHAR *Offset)
{
PUCHAR pVIE;
UCHAR len;
PEID_STRUCT pEid;
BOOLEAN result = FALSE;
pVIE = pData;
len = DataLen;
*Offset = 0;
while (len > sizeof(RSNIE2))
{
pEid = (PEID_STRUCT) pVIE;
// WPA RSN IE
if ((pEid->Eid == IE_WPA) && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet, WPA_OUI, 4)))
{
if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) &&
(NdisEqualMemory(pVIE, pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len)) &&
(pEntry->RSNIE_Len == (pEid->Len + 2)))
{
result = TRUE;
}
*Offset += (pEid->Len + 2);
}
// WPA2 RSN IE
else if ((pEid->Eid == IE_RSN) && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet + 2, RSN_OUI, 3)))
{
if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2 || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) &&
(NdisEqualMemory(pVIE, pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len)) &&
(pEntry->RSNIE_Len == (pEid->Len + 2))/* ToDo-AlbertY for mesh*/)
{
result = TRUE;
}
*Offset += (pEid->Len + 2);
}
else
{
break;
}
pVIE += (pEid->Len + 2);
len -= (pEid->Len + 2);
}
return result;
}
/*
========================================================================
Routine Description:
Parse KEYDATA field. KEYDATA[] May contain 2 RSN IE and optionally GTK.
GTK is encaptulated in KDE format at p.83 802.11i D10
Arguments:
Return Value:
Note:
802.11i D10
========================================================================
*/
BOOLEAN RTMPParseEapolKeyData(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
IN PUCHAR pKeyData,
IN UCHAR KeyDataLen,
IN UCHAR GroupKeyIndex,
IN UCHAR MsgType,
IN BOOLEAN bWPA2,
IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry)
{
PKDE_ENCAP pKDE = NULL;
PUCHAR pMyKeyData = pKeyData;
UCHAR KeyDataLength = KeyDataLen;
UCHAR GTKLEN = 0;
UCHAR DefaultIdx = 0;
UCHAR skip_offset;
// Verify The RSN IE contained in pairewise_msg_2 && pairewise_msg_3 and skip it
if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
{
// Check RSN IE whether it is WPA2/WPA2PSK
if (!RTMPCheckRSNIE(pAd, pKeyData, KeyDataLen, pEntry, &skip_offset))
{
// send wireless event - for RSN IE different
if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_RSNIE_DIFF_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0);
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("RSN_IE Different in msg %d of 4-way handshake!\n", MsgType));
hex_dump("Receive RSN_IE ", pKeyData, KeyDataLen);
hex_dump("Desired RSN_IE ", pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len);
return FALSE;
}
else
{
if (bWPA2 && MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
{
// skip RSN IE
pMyKeyData += skip_offset;
KeyDataLength -= skip_offset;
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("RTMPParseEapolKeyData ==> WPA2/WPA2PSK RSN IE matched in Msg 3, Length(%d) \n", skip_offset));
}
else
return TRUE;
}
}
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("RTMPParseEapolKeyData ==> KeyDataLength %d without RSN_IE \n", KeyDataLength));
// Parse EKD format in pairwise_msg_3_WPA2 && group_msg_1_WPA2
if (bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
{
if (KeyDataLength >= 8) // KDE format exclude GTK length
{
pKDE = (PKDE_ENCAP) pMyKeyData;
DefaultIdx = pKDE->GTKEncap.Kid;
// Sanity check - KED length
if (KeyDataLength < (pKDE->Len + 2))
{
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: The len from KDE is too short \n"));
return FALSE;
}
// Get GTK length - refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004 p.82
GTKLEN = pKDE->Len -6;
if (GTKLEN < LEN_AES_KEY)
{
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: GTK Key length is too short (%d) \n", GTKLEN));
return FALSE;
}
}
else
{
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: KDE format length is too short \n"));
return FALSE;
}
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("GTK in KDE format ,DefaultKeyID=%d, KeyLen=%d \n", DefaultIdx, GTKLEN));
// skip it
pMyKeyData += 8;
KeyDataLength -= 8;
}
else if (!bWPA2 && MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
{
DefaultIdx = GroupKeyIndex;
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("GTK DefaultKeyID=%d \n", DefaultIdx));
}
// Sanity check - shared key index must be 1 ~ 3
if (DefaultIdx < 1 || DefaultIdx > 3)
{
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: GTK Key index(%d) is invalid in %s %s \n", DefaultIdx, ((bWPA2) ? "WPA2" : "WPA"), GetEapolMsgType(MsgType)));
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
/*
========================================================================
Routine Description:
Construct EAPoL message for WPA handshaking
Its format is below,
+--------------------+
| Protocol Version | 1 octet
+--------------------+
| Protocol Type | 1 octet
+--------------------+
| Body Length | 2 octets
+--------------------+
| Descriptor Type | 1 octet
+--------------------+
| Key Information | 2 octets
+--------------------+
| Key Length | 1 octet
+--------------------+
| Key Repaly Counter | 8 octets
+--------------------+
| Key Nonce | 32 octets
+--------------------+
| Key IV | 16 octets
+--------------------+
| Key RSC | 8 octets
+--------------------+
| Key ID or Reserved | 8 octets
+--------------------+
| Key MIC | 16 octets
+--------------------+
| Key Data Length | 2 octets
+--------------------+
| Key Data | n octets
+--------------------+
Arguments:
pAd Pointer to our adapter
Return Value:
None
Note:
========================================================================
*/
VOID ConstructEapolMsg(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
IN UCHAR AuthMode,
IN UCHAR WepStatus,
IN UCHAR GroupKeyWepStatus,
IN UCHAR MsgType,
IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx,
IN UCHAR *ReplayCounter,
IN UCHAR *KeyNonce,
IN UCHAR *TxRSC,
IN UCHAR *PTK,
IN UCHAR *GTK,
IN UCHAR *RSNIE,
IN UCHAR RSNIE_Len,
OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg)
{
BOOLEAN bWPA2 = FALSE;
// Choose WPA2 or not
if ((AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) || (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK))
bWPA2 = TRUE;
// Init Packet and Fill header
pMsg->ProVer = EAPOL_VER;
pMsg->ProType = EAPOLKey;
// Default 95 bytes, the EAPoL-Key descriptor exclude Key-data field
pMsg->Body_Len[1] = LEN_EAPOL_KEY_MSG;
// Fill in EAPoL descriptor
if (bWPA2)
pMsg->KeyDesc.Type = WPA2_KEY_DESC;
else
pMsg->KeyDesc.Type = WPA1_KEY_DESC;
// Fill in Key information, refer to IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 page 78
// When either the pairwise or the group cipher is AES, the DESC_TYPE_AES(2) shall be used.
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyDescVer =
(((WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) || (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)) ? (DESC_TYPE_AES) : (DESC_TYPE_TKIP));
// Specify Key Type as Group(0) or Pairwise(1)
if (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyType = GROUPKEY;
else
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyType = PAIRWISEKEY;
// Specify Key Index, only group_msg1_WPA1
if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyIndex = DefaultKeyIdx;
if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.Install = 1;
if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyAck = 1;
if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyMic = 1;
if ((bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)) || (!bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
{
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.Secure = 1;
}
if (bWPA2 && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
{
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.EKD_DL = 1;
}
// key Information element has done.
*(USHORT *)(&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo) = cpu2le16(*(USHORT *)(&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo));
// Fill in Key Length
{
if (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
{
// the length of group key cipher
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1] = ((GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) ? TKIP_GTK_LENGTH : LEN_AES_KEY);
}
else
{
// the length of pairwise key cipher
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1] = ((WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) ? LEN_TKIP_KEY : LEN_AES_KEY);
}
}
// Fill in replay counter
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, ReplayCounter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
// Fill Key Nonce field
// ANonce : pairwise_msg1 & pairwise_msg3
// SNonce : pairwise_msg2
// GNonce : group_msg1_wpa1
if ((MsgType <= EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || ((!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))))
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyNonce, KeyNonce, LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE);
// Fill key IV - WPA2 as 0, WPA1 as random
if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
{
// Suggest IV be random number plus some number,
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv, &KeyNonce[16], LEN_KEY_DESC_IV);
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv[15] += 2;
}
// Fill Key RSC field
// It contains the RSC for the GTK being installed.
if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
{
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyRsc, TxRSC, 6);
}
// Clear Key MIC field for MIC calculation later
NdisZeroMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
ConstructEapolKeyData(pAd,
AuthMode,
WepStatus,
GroupKeyWepStatus,
MsgType,
DefaultKeyIdx,
bWPA2,
PTK,
GTK,
RSNIE,
RSNIE_Len,
pMsg);
// Calculate MIC and fill in KeyMic Field except Pairwise Msg 1.
if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
{
CalculateMIC(pAd, WepStatus, PTK, pMsg);
}
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> ConstructEapolMsg for %s %s\n", ((bWPA2) ? "WPA2" : "WPA"), GetEapolMsgType(MsgType)));
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" Body length = %d \n", pMsg->Body_Len[1]));
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" Key length = %d \n", pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1]));
}
/*
========================================================================
Routine Description:
Construct the Key Data field of EAPoL message
Arguments:
pAd Pointer to our adapter
Elem Message body
Return Value:
None
Note:
========================================================================
*/
VOID ConstructEapolKeyData(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
IN UCHAR AuthMode,
IN UCHAR WepStatus,
IN UCHAR GroupKeyWepStatus,
IN UCHAR MsgType,
IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx,
IN BOOLEAN bWPA2Capable,
IN UCHAR *PTK,
IN UCHAR *GTK,
IN UCHAR *RSNIE,
IN UCHAR RSNIE_LEN,
OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg)
{
UCHAR *mpool, *Key_Data, *Rc4GTK;
UCHAR ekey[(LEN_KEY_DESC_IV+LEN_EAP_EK)];
UCHAR data_offset;
if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2)
return;
// allocate memory pool
os_alloc_mem(pAd, (PUCHAR *)&mpool, 1500);
if (mpool == NULL)
return;
/* Rc4GTK Len = 512 */
Rc4GTK = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(mpool, 4);
/* Key_Data Len = 512 */
Key_Data = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(Rc4GTK + 512, 4);
NdisZeroMemory(Key_Data, 512);
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1] = 0;
data_offset = 0;
// Encapsulate RSNIE in pairwise_msg2 & pairwise_msg3
if (RSNIE_LEN && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)))
{
if (bWPA2Capable)
Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = IE_WPA2;
else
Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = IE_WPA;
Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = RSNIE_LEN;
NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset + 2], RSNIE, RSNIE_LEN);
data_offset += (2 + RSNIE_LEN);
}
// Encapsulate KDE format in pairwise_msg3_WPA2 & group_msg1_WPA2
if (bWPA2Capable && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
{
// Key Data Encapsulation (KDE) format - 802.11i-2004 Figure-43w and Table-20h
Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = 0xDD;
if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
{
Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0x16;// 4+2+16(OUI+DataType+DataField)
}
else
{
Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0x26;// 4+2+32(OUI+DataType+DataField)
}
Key_Data[data_offset + 2] = 0x00;
Key_Data[data_offset + 3] = 0x0F;
Key_Data[data_offset + 4] = 0xAC;
Key_Data[data_offset + 5] = 0x01;
// GTK KDE format - 802.11i-2004 Figure-43x
Key_Data[data_offset + 6] = (DefaultKeyIdx & 0x03);
Key_Data[data_offset + 7] = 0x00; // Reserved Byte
data_offset += 8;
}
// Encapsulate GTK and encrypt the key-data field with KEK.
// Only for pairwise_msg3_WPA2 and group_msg1
if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2Capable) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
{
// Fill in GTK
if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
{
NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset], GTK, LEN_AES_KEY);
data_offset += LEN_AES_KEY;
}
else
{
NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset], GTK, TKIP_GTK_LENGTH);
data_offset += TKIP_GTK_LENGTH;
}
// Still dont know why, but if not append will occur "GTK not include in MSG3"
// Patch for compatibility between zero config and funk
if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2Capable)
{
if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
{
Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = 0xDD;
Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0;
data_offset += 2;
}
else
{
Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = 0xDD;
Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0;
Key_Data[data_offset + 2] = 0;
Key_Data[data_offset + 3] = 0;
Key_Data[data_offset + 4] = 0;
Key_Data[data_offset + 5] = 0;
data_offset += 6;
}
}
// Encrypt the data material in key data field
if (WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
{
AES_GTK_KEY_WRAP(&PTK[16], Key_Data, data_offset, Rc4GTK);
// AES wrap function will grow 8 bytes in length
data_offset += 8;
}
else
{
// PREPARE Encrypted "Key DATA" field. (Encrypt GTK with RC4, usinf PTK[16]->[31] as Key, IV-field as IV)
// put TxTsc in Key RSC field
pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32 = PPPINITFCS32; //Init crc32.
// ekey is the contanetion of IV-field, and PTK[16]->PTK[31]
NdisMoveMemory(ekey, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv, LEN_KEY_DESC_IV);
NdisMoveMemory(&ekey[LEN_KEY_DESC_IV], &PTK[16], LEN_EAP_EK);
ARCFOUR_INIT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, ekey, sizeof(ekey)); //INIT SBOX, KEYLEN+3(IV)
pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32 = RTMP_CALC_FCS32(pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32, Key_Data, data_offset);
WPAARCFOUR_ENCRYPT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, Rc4GTK, Key_Data, data_offset);
}
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, Rc4GTK, data_offset);
}
else
{
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, Key_Data, data_offset);
}
// set key data length field and total length
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1] = data_offset;
pMsg->Body_Len[1] += data_offset;
os_free_mem(pAd, mpool);
}
/*
========================================================================
Routine Description:
Calcaulate MIC. It is used during 4-ways handsharking.
Arguments:
pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
PeerWepStatus - indicate the encryption type
Return Value:
Note:
========================================================================
*/
VOID CalculateMIC(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
IN UCHAR PeerWepStatus,
IN UCHAR *PTK,
OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg)
{
UCHAR *OutBuffer;
ULONG FrameLen = 0;
UCHAR mic[LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC];
UCHAR digest[80];
// allocate memory for MIC calculation
os_alloc_mem(pAd, (PUCHAR *)&OutBuffer, 512);
if (OutBuffer == NULL)
{
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!CalculateMIC: no memory!!!\n"));
return;
}
// make a frame for calculating MIC.
MakeOutgoingFrame(OutBuffer, &FrameLen,
pMsg->Body_Len[1] + 4, pMsg,
END_OF_ARGS);
NdisZeroMemory(mic, sizeof(mic));
// Calculate MIC
if (PeerWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
{
HMAC_SHA1(OutBuffer, FrameLen, PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, digest);
NdisMoveMemory(mic, digest, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
}
else
{
hmac_md5(PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, OutBuffer, FrameLen, mic);
}
// store the calculated MIC
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, mic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
os_free_mem(pAd, OutBuffer);
}
/*
========================================================================
Routine Description:
Some received frames can't decrypt by Asic, so decrypt them by software.
Arguments:
pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
PeerWepStatus - indicate the encryption type
Return Value:
NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS - decryption successful
NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE - decryption failure
========================================================================
*/
NDIS_STATUS RTMPSoftDecryptBroadCastData(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
IN RX_BLK *pRxBlk,
IN NDIS_802_11_ENCRYPTION_STATUS GroupCipher,
IN PCIPHER_KEY pShard_key)
{
PRXWI_STRUC pRxWI = pRxBlk->pRxWI;
// handle WEP decryption
if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption1Enabled)
{
if (RTMPSoftDecryptWEP(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount, pShard_key))
{
//Minus IV[4] & ICV[4]
pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 8;
}
else
{
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : Software decrypt WEP data fails.\n"));
// give up this frame
return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
}
}
// handle TKIP decryption
else if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled)
{
if (RTMPSoftDecryptTKIP(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount, 0, pShard_key))
{
//Minus 8 bytes MIC, 8 bytes IV/EIV, 4 bytes ICV
pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 20;
}
else
{
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : RTMPSoftDecryptTKIP Failed\n"));
// give up this frame
return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
}
}
// handle AES decryption
else if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
{
if (RTMPSoftDecryptAES(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount , pShard_key))
{
//8 bytes MIC, 8 bytes IV/EIV (CCMP Header)
pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 16;
}
else
{
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : RTMPSoftDecryptAES Failed\n"));
// give up this frame
return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
}
}
else
{
// give up this frame
return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
}
return NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}

4
drivers/staging/rt2860/common/mlme.c
View File

@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ UCHAR CISCO_OUI[] = {0x00, 0x40, 0x96};
UCHAR WPA_OUI[] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xf2, 0x01};
UCHAR RSN_OUI[] = {0x00, 0x0f, 0xac};
UCHAR WAPI_OUI[] = {0x00, 0x14, 0x72};
UCHAR WME_INFO_ELEM[] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xf2, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01};
UCHAR WME_PARM_ELEM[] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xf2, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01};
UCHAR Ccx2QosInfo[] = {0x00, 0x40, 0x96, 0x04};
@ -338,9 +337,6 @@ UCHAR WpaIe = IE_WPA;
UCHAR Wpa2Ie = IE_WPA2;
UCHAR IbssIe = IE_IBSS_PARM;
UCHAR Ccx2Ie = IE_CCX_V2;
#ifdef RT2870
UCHAR WapiIe = IE_WAPI;
#endif
extern UCHAR WPA_OUI[];

84
drivers/staging/rt2860/rtmp.h
View File

@ -231,15 +231,9 @@ extern UCHAR WpaIe;
extern UCHAR Wpa2Ie;
extern UCHAR IbssIe;
extern UCHAR Ccx2Ie;
#ifdef RT30xx
extern UCHAR WapiIe;
#endif
extern UCHAR WPA_OUI[];
extern UCHAR RSN_OUI[];
#ifdef RT30xx
extern UCHAR WAPI_OUI[];
#endif
extern UCHAR WME_INFO_ELEM[];
extern UCHAR WME_PARM_ELEM[];
extern UCHAR Ccx2QosInfo[];
@ -4554,13 +4548,6 @@ BOOLEAN PeerDisassocSanity(
OUT PUCHAR pAddr2,
OUT USHORT *Reason);
BOOLEAN PeerWpaMessageSanity(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
IN PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg,
IN ULONG MsgLen,
IN UCHAR MsgType,
IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry);
BOOLEAN PeerDeauthSanity(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
IN VOID *Msg,
@ -5082,13 +5069,6 @@ VOID AironetAddBeaconReport(
VOID AironetCreateBeaconReportFromBssTable(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd);
VOID DBGPRINT_TX_RING(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
IN UCHAR QueIdx);
VOID DBGPRINT_RX_RING(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd);
CHAR ConvertToRssi(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
IN CHAR Rssi,
@ -5110,64 +5090,6 @@ VOID AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP(
IN UCHAR c_len,
IN UCHAR *ciphertext);
BOOLEAN RTMPCheckRSNIE(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
IN PUCHAR pData,
IN UCHAR DataLen,
IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry,
OUT UCHAR *Offset);
BOOLEAN RTMPParseEapolKeyData(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
IN PUCHAR pKeyData,
IN UCHAR KeyDataLen,
IN UCHAR GroupKeyIndex,
IN UCHAR MsgType,
IN BOOLEAN bWPA2,
IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry);
VOID ConstructEapolMsg(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
IN UCHAR PeerAuthMode,
IN UCHAR PeerWepStatus,
IN UCHAR MyGroupKeyWepStatus,
IN UCHAR MsgType,
IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx,
IN UCHAR *ReplayCounter,
IN UCHAR *KeyNonce,
IN UCHAR *TxRSC,
IN UCHAR *PTK,
IN UCHAR *GTK,
IN UCHAR *RSNIE,
IN UCHAR RSNIE_Len,
OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg);
VOID CalculateMIC(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
IN UCHAR PeerWepStatus,
IN UCHAR *PTK,
OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg);
NDIS_STATUS RTMPSoftDecryptBroadCastData(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
IN RX_BLK *pRxBlk,
IN NDIS_802_11_ENCRYPTION_STATUS GroupCipher,
IN PCIPHER_KEY pShard_key);
VOID ConstructEapolKeyData(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
IN UCHAR PeerAuthMode,
IN UCHAR PeerWepStatus,
IN UCHAR GroupKeyWepStatus,
IN UCHAR MsgType,
IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx,
IN BOOLEAN bWPA2Capable,
IN UCHAR *PTK,
IN UCHAR *GTK,
IN UCHAR *RSNIE,
IN UCHAR RSNIE_LEN,
OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg);
VOID RTMPMakeRSNIE(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
IN UINT AuthMode,
@ -5182,12 +5104,6 @@ VOID HandleCounterMeasure(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry);
VOID AES_GTK_KEY_WRAP(
IN UCHAR *key,
IN UCHAR *plaintext,
IN UCHAR p_len,
OUT UCHAR *ciphertext);
/* timeout -- ms */
VOID RTMP_SetPeriodicTimer(
IN NDIS_MINIPORT_TIMER *pTimer,

3
drivers/staging/rt2860/rtmp_def.h
View File

@ -569,9 +569,6 @@
// For 802.11n D3.03
//#define IE_NEW_EXT_CHA_OFFSET 62 // 802.11n d1. New extension channel offset elemet
#define IE_SECONDARY_CH_OFFSET 62 // 802.11n D3.03 Secondary Channel Offset element
#ifdef RT2870
#define IE_WAPI 68 // WAPI information element
#endif
#define IE_2040_BSS_COEXIST 72 // 802.11n D3.0.3
#define IE_2040_BSS_INTOLERANT_REPORT 73 // 802.11n D3.03
#define IE_OVERLAPBSS_SCAN_PARM 74 // 802.11n D3.03