FEX-Emu/linux
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/FEX-Emu/linux.git synced 2024-12-03 21:27:10 +00:00
Code Issues Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Browse Source 
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
 "In terms of changes, there's general maintenance to the Smack,
  SELinux, and integrity code.

  The IMA code adds a new kconfig option, IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT,
  which allows IMA appraisal to require signatures.  Support for reading
  keys from rootfs before init is call is also added"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
  selinux: Remove security_ops extern
  security: smack: fix out-of-bounds access in smk_parse_smack()
  VFS: refactor vfs_read()
  ima: require signature based appraisal
  integrity: provide a hook to load keys when rootfs is ready
  ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel
  integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the kernel
  integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file()
  Security: smack: replace kzalloc with kmem_cache for inode_smack
  Smack: Lock mode for the floor and hat labels
  ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt
  ima: allocate field pointers array on demand in template_desc_init_fields()
  ima: don't allocate a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields()
  ima: display template format in meas. list if template name length is zero
  ima: added error messages to template-related functions
  ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface
  ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines
  ima: no need to allocate entry for comment
  ima: report policy load status
  ima: use path names cache
  ...
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2014-12-14 20:36:37 -08:00
commit 67e2c38838
21 changed files with 374 additions and 155 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

4
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
View File

@ -1376,6 +1376,10 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" }
Default: "ima-ng"
ima_template_fmt=
[IMA] Define a custom template format.
Format: { "field1|...|fieldN" }
ima.ahash_minsize= [IMA] Minimum file size for asynchronous hash usage
Format: <min_file_size>
Set the minimal file size for using asynchronous hash.

29
Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt
View File

@ -27,25 +27,22 @@ Managing templates with these structures is very simple. To support
a new data type, developers define the field identifier and implement
two functions, init() and show(), respectively to generate and display
measurement entries. Defining a new template descriptor requires
specifying the template format, a string of field identifiers separated
by the '|' character. While in the current implementation it is possible
to define new template descriptors only by adding their definition in the
template specific code (ima_template.c), in a future version it will be
possible to register a new template on a running kernel by supplying to IMA
the desired format string. In this version, IMA initializes at boot time
all defined template descriptors by translating the format into an array
of template fields structures taken from the set of the supported ones.
specifying the template format (a string of field identifiers separated
by the '|' character) through the 'ima_template_fmt' kernel command line
parameter. At boot time, IMA initializes the chosen template descriptor
by translating the format into an array of template fields structures taken
from the set of the supported ones.
After the initialization step, IMA will call ima_alloc_init_template()
(new function defined within the patches for the new template management
mechanism) to generate a new measurement entry by using the template
descriptor chosen through the kernel configuration or through the newly
introduced 'ima_template=' kernel command line parameter. It is during this
phase that the advantages of the new architecture are clearly shown:
the latter function will not contain specific code to handle a given template
but, instead, it simply calls the init() method of the template fields
associated to the chosen template descriptor and store the result (pointer
to allocated data and data length) in the measurement entry structure.
introduced 'ima_template' and 'ima_template_fmt' kernel command line parameters.
It is during this phase that the advantages of the new architecture are
clearly shown: the latter function will not contain specific code to handle
a given template but, instead, it simply calls the init() method of the template
fields associated to the chosen template descriptor and store the result
(pointer to allocated data and data length) in the measurement entry structure.
The same mechanism is employed to display measurements entries.
The functions ima[_ascii]_measurements_show() retrieve, for each entry,
@ -86,4 +83,6 @@ currently the following methods are supported:
- select a template descriptor among those supported in the kernel
configuration ('ima-ng' is the default choice);
- specify a template descriptor name from the kernel command line through
the 'ima_template=' parameter.
the 'ima_template=' parameter;
- register a new template descriptor with custom format through the kernel
command line parameter 'ima_template_fmt='.

24
fs/read_write.c
View File

@ -412,6 +412,23 @@ ssize_t new_sync_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *p
EXPORT_SYMBOL(new_sync_read);
ssize_t __vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count,
loff_t *pos)
{
ssize_t ret;
if (file->f_op->read)
ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, pos);
else if (file->f_op->aio_read)
ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos);
else if (file->f_op->read_iter)
ret = new_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos);
else
ret = -EINVAL;
return ret;
}
ssize_t vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos)
{
ssize_t ret;
@ -426,12 +443,7 @@ ssize_t vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos)
ret = rw_verify_area(READ, file, pos, count);
if (ret >= 0) {
count = ret;
if (file->f_op->read)
ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, pos);
else if (file->f_op->aio_read)
ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos);
else
ret = new_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos);
ret = __vfs_read(file, buf, count, pos);
if (ret > 0) {
fsnotify_access(file);
add_rchar(current, ret);

1
include/linux/fs.h
View File

@ -1582,6 +1582,7 @@ ssize_t rw_copy_check_uvector(int type, const struct iovec __user * uvector,
struct iovec *fast_pointer,
struct iovec **ret_pointer);
extern ssize_t __vfs_read(struct file *, char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
extern ssize_t vfs_read(struct file *, char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
extern ssize_t vfs_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
extern ssize_t vfs_readv(struct file *, const struct iovec __user *,

6
include/linux/integrity.h
View File

@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ enum integrity_status {
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY
extern struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode);
extern void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
extern void __init integrity_load_keys(void);
#else
static inline struct integrity_iint_cache *
@ -36,5 +37,10 @@ static inline void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
{
return;
}
static inline void integrity_load_keys(void)
{
}
#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY */
#endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */

6
init/main.c
View File

@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
#include <linux/context_tracking.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/integrity.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
@ -1031,8 +1032,11 @@ static noinline void __init kernel_init_freeable(void)
* Ok, we have completed the initial bootup, and
* we're essentially up and running. Get rid of the
* initmem segments and start the user-mode stuff..
*
* rootfs is available now, try loading the public keys
* and default modules
*/
/* rootfs is available now, try loading default modules */
integrity_load_keys();
load_default_modules();
}

38
security/integrity/digsig.c
View File

@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/rbtree.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/digsig.h>
@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int err = 0;
@ -84,3 +84,37 @@ int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
}
return err;
}
int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path)
{
key_ref_t key;
char *data;
int rc;
if (!keyring[id])
return -EINVAL;
rc = integrity_read_file(path, &data);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring[id], 1),
"asymmetric",
NULL,
data,
rc,
((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(key);
pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate (%d): %s\n",
rc, path);
} else {
pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s': %s\n",
key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description, path);
key_ref_put(key);
}
kfree(data);
return 0;
}

11
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
View File

@ -162,9 +162,14 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
(const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest));
if (!rc) {
/* we probably want to replace rsa with hmac here */
evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len);
/* Replace RSA with HMAC if not mounted readonly and
* not immutable
*/
if (!IS_RDONLY(dentry->d_inode) &&
!IS_IMMUTABLE(dentry->d_inode))
evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name,
xattr_value,
xattr_value_len);
}
break;
default:

88
security/integrity/iint.c
View File

@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/rbtree.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include "integrity.h"
static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT;
static DEFINE_RWLOCK(integrity_iint_lock);
static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __read_mostly;
int iint_initialized;
/*
* __integrity_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode
*/
@ -166,7 +166,89 @@ static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void)
iint_cache =
kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct integrity_iint_cache),
0, SLAB_PANIC, init_once);
iint_initialized = 1;
return 0;
}
security_initcall(integrity_iintcache_init);
/*
* integrity_kernel_read - read data from the file
*
* This is a function for reading file content instead of kernel_read().
* It does not perform locking checks to ensure it cannot be blocked.
* It does not perform security checks because it is irrelevant for IMA.
*
*/
int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
char *addr, unsigned long count)
{
mm_segment_t old_fs;
char __user *buf = (char __user *)addr;
ssize_t ret;
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
return -EBADF;
old_fs = get_fs();
set_fs(get_ds());
ret = __vfs_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
set_fs(old_fs);
return ret;
}
/*
* integrity_read_file - read entire file content into the buffer
*
* This is function opens a file, allocates the buffer of required
* size, read entire file content to the buffer and closes the file
*
* It is used only by init code.
*
*/
int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data)
{
struct file *file;
loff_t size;
char *buf;
int rc = -EINVAL;
file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(file);
pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
return rc;
}
size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
if (size <= 0)
goto out;
buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
rc = integrity_kernel_read(file, 0, buf, size);
if (rc < 0)
kfree(buf);
else if (rc != size)
rc = -EIO;
else
*data = buf;
out:
fput(file);
return rc;
}
/*
* integrity_load_keys - load integrity keys hook
*
* Hooks is called from init/main.c:kernel_init_freeable()
* when rootfs is ready
*/
void __init integrity_load_keys(void)
{
ima_load_x509();
}

25
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
View File

@ -131,3 +131,28 @@ config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
help
This option requires that all keys added to the .ima
keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring.
config IMA_LOAD_X509
bool "Load X509 certificate onto the '.ima' trusted keyring"
depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
default n
help
File signature verification is based on the public keys
loaded on the .ima trusted keyring. These public keys are
X509 certificates signed by a trusted key on the
.system keyring. This option enables X509 certificate
loading from the kernel onto the '.ima' trusted keyring.
config IMA_X509_PATH
string "IMA X509 certificate path"
depends on IMA_LOAD_X509
default "/etc/keys/x509_ima.der"
help
This option defines IMA X509 certificate path.
config IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
bool "Require signed user-space initialization"
depends on IMA_LOAD_X509
default n
help
This option requires user-space init to be signed.

7
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
View File

@ -173,8 +173,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
{
int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE;
if (!ima_appraise)
flags &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
flags &= ima_policy_flag;
return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, flags);
}
@ -325,11 +324,11 @@ const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf)
{
char *pathname = NULL;
*pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
*pathbuf = __getname();
if (*pathbuf) {
pathname = d_absolute_path(path, *pathbuf, PATH_MAX);
if (IS_ERR(pathname)) {
kfree(*pathbuf);
__putname(*pathbuf);
*pathbuf = NULL;
pathname = NULL;
}

35
security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
View File

@ -67,36 +67,6 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ahash_bufsize, "Maximum ahash buffer size");
static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm;
static struct crypto_ahash *ima_ahash_tfm;
/**
* ima_kernel_read - read file content
*
* This is a function for reading file content instead of kernel_read().
* It does not perform locking checks to ensure it cannot be blocked.
* It does not perform security checks because it is irrelevant for IMA.
*
*/
static int ima_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
char *addr, unsigned long count)
{
mm_segment_t old_fs;
char __user *buf = addr;
ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
return -EBADF;
old_fs = get_fs();
set_fs(get_ds());
if (file->f_op->read)
ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, &offset);
else if (file->f_op->aio_read)
ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
else if (file->f_op->read_iter)
ret = new_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
set_fs(old_fs);
return ret;
}
int __init ima_init_crypto(void)
{
long rc;
@ -324,7 +294,8 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file,
}
/* read buffer */
rbuf_len = min_t(loff_t, i_size - offset, rbuf_size[active]);
rc = ima_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf[active], rbuf_len);
rc = integrity_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf[active],
rbuf_len);
if (rc != rbuf_len)
goto out3;
@ -414,7 +385,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
while (offset < i_size) {
int rbuf_len;
rbuf_len = ima_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE);
rbuf_len = integrity_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE);
if (rbuf_len < 0) {
rc = rbuf_len;
break;

37
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
View File

@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
/* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */
struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
struct ima_template_entry *e;
char *template_name;
int namelen;
u32 pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
bool is_ima_template = false;
@ -128,6 +129,9 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
if (e == NULL)
return -1;
template_name = (e->template_desc->name[0] != '\0') ?
e->template_desc->name : e->template_desc->fmt;
/*
* 1st: PCRIndex
* PCR used is always the same (config option) in
@ -139,14 +143,14 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
/* 3rd: template name size */
namelen = strlen(e->template_desc->name);
namelen = strlen(template_name);
ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof(namelen));
/* 4th: template name */
ima_putc(m, e->template_desc->name, namelen);
ima_putc(m, template_name, namelen);
/* 5th: template length (except for 'ima' template) */
if (strcmp(e->template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0)
if (strcmp(template_name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0)
is_ima_template = true;
if (!is_ima_template)
@ -200,6 +204,7 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
/* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */
struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
struct ima_template_entry *e;
char *template_name;
int i;
/* get entry */
@ -207,6 +212,9 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
if (e == NULL)
return -1;
template_name = (e->template_desc->name[0] != '\0') ?
e->template_desc->name : e->template_desc->fmt;
/* 1st: PCR used (config option) */
seq_printf(m, "%2d ", CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
@ -214,7 +222,7 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
ima_print_digest(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
/* 3th: template name */
seq_printf(m, " %s", e->template_desc->name);
seq_printf(m, " %s", template_name);
/* 4th: template specific data */
for (i = 0; i < e->template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
@ -288,7 +296,12 @@ static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count;
static struct dentry *violations;
static struct dentry *ima_policy;
static atomic_t policy_opencount = ATOMIC_INIT(1);
enum ima_fs_flags {
IMA_FS_BUSY,
};
static unsigned long ima_fs_flags;
/*
* ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file
*/
@ -297,9 +310,9 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
/* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */
if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY))
return -EACCES;
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&policy_opencount))
return 0;
return -EBUSY;
if (test_and_set_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags))
return -EBUSY;
return 0;
}
/*
@ -311,10 +324,16 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
*/
static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed";
pr_info("IMA: policy update %s\n", cause);
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
"policy_update", cause, !valid_policy, 0);
if (!valid_policy) {
ima_delete_rules();
valid_policy = 1;
atomic_set(&policy_opencount, 1);
clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags);
return 0;
}
ima_update_policy();

17
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
View File

@ -24,6 +24,12 @@
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include "ima.h"
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH
#define IMA_X509_PATH CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH
#else
#define IMA_X509_PATH "/etc/keys/x509_ima.der"
#endif
/* name for boot aggregate entry */
static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate";
int ima_used_chip;
@ -91,6 +97,17 @@ err_out:
return result;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509
void __init ima_load_x509(void)
{
int unset_flags = ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE;
ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags;
integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, IMA_X509_PATH);
ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags;
}
#endif
int __init ima_init(void)
{
u8 pcr_i[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];

5
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
View File

@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
if (!iint_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return;
iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
@ -246,7 +246,8 @@ out_digsig:
rc = -EACCES;
kfree(xattr_value);
out_free:
kfree(pathbuf);
if (pathbuf)
__putname(pathbuf);
out:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))

42
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
View File

@ -100,7 +100,13 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
#else
/* force signature */
{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
.flags = IMA_FOWNER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
#endif
};
static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
@ -356,19 +362,8 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
*/
void ima_update_policy(void)
{
static const char op[] = "policy_update";
const char *cause = "already-exists";
int result = 1;
int audit_info = 0;
if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) {
ima_rules = &ima_policy_rules;
ima_update_policy_flag();
cause = "complete";
result = 0;
}
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
NULL, op, cause, result, audit_info);
ima_rules = &ima_policy_rules;
ima_update_policy_flag();
}
enum {
@ -686,13 +681,12 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
ssize_t result, len;
int audit_info = 0;
/* Prevent installed policy from changing */
if (ima_rules != &ima_default_rules) {
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
NULL, op, "already-exists",
-EACCES, audit_info);
return -EACCES;
}
p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
len = strlen(p) + 1;
p += strspn(p, " \t");
if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0')
return len;
entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!entry) {
@ -703,14 +697,6 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
len = strlen(p) + 1;
if (*p == '#') {
kfree(entry);
return len;
}
result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
if (result) {
kfree(entry);

103
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
View File

@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = {
{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
{.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
{.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
{.name = "", .fmt = ""}, /* placeholder for a custom format */
};
static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
@ -41,19 +42,28 @@ static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;
static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name);
static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
struct ima_template_field ***fields,
int *num_fields);
static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
{
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
int template_len = strlen(str);
if (ima_template)
return 1;
/*
* Verify that a template with the supplied name exists.
* If not, use CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE.
*/
template_desc = lookup_template_desc(str);
if (!template_desc)
if (!template_desc) {
pr_err("template %s not found, using %s\n",
str, CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE);
return 1;
}
/*
* Verify whether the current hash algorithm is supported
@ -70,6 +80,25 @@ static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
}
__setup("ima_template=", ima_template_setup);
static int __init ima_template_fmt_setup(char *str)
{
int num_templates = ARRAY_SIZE(defined_templates);
if (ima_template)
return 1;
if (template_desc_init_fields(str, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
pr_err("format string '%s' not valid, using template %s\n",
str, CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE);
return 1;
}
defined_templates[num_templates - 1].fmt = str;
ima_template = defined_templates + num_templates - 1;
return 1;
}
__setup("ima_template_fmt=", ima_template_fmt_setup);
static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name)
{
int i;
@ -113,43 +142,46 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
struct ima_template_field ***fields,
int *num_fields)
{
char *c, *template_fmt_copy, *template_fmt_ptr;
const char *template_fmt_ptr;
struct ima_template_field *found_fields[IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX];
int template_num_fields = template_fmt_size(template_fmt);
int i, result = 0;
int i, len;
if (template_num_fields > IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX)
if (template_num_fields > IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX) {
pr_err("format string '%s' contains too many fields\n",
template_fmt);
return -EINVAL;
/* copying is needed as strsep() modifies the original buffer */
template_fmt_copy = kstrdup(template_fmt, GFP_KERNEL);
if (template_fmt_copy == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
*fields = kzalloc(template_num_fields * sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
if (*fields == NULL) {
result = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
template_fmt_ptr = template_fmt_copy;
for (i = 0; (c = strsep(&template_fmt_ptr, "|")) != NULL &&
i < template_num_fields; i++) {
struct ima_template_field *f = lookup_template_field(c);
for (i = 0, template_fmt_ptr = template_fmt; i < template_num_fields;
i++, template_fmt_ptr += len + 1) {
char tmp_field_id[IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN + 1];
if (!f) {
result = -ENOENT;
goto out;
len = strchrnul(template_fmt_ptr, '|') - template_fmt_ptr;
if (len == 0 || len > IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN) {
pr_err("Invalid field with length %d\n", len);
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(tmp_field_id, template_fmt_ptr, len);
tmp_field_id[len] = '\0';
found_fields[i] = lookup_template_field(tmp_field_id);
if (!found_fields[i]) {
pr_err("field '%s' not found\n", tmp_field_id);
return -ENOENT;
}
(*fields)[i] = f;
}
*num_fields = i;
out:
if (result < 0) {
kfree(*fields);
*fields = NULL;
if (fields && num_fields) {
*fields = kmalloc_array(i, sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
if (*fields == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(*fields, found_fields, i * sizeof(*fields));
*num_fields = i;
}
kfree(template_fmt_copy);
return result;
return 0;
}
struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void)
@ -163,8 +195,15 @@ struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void)
int __init ima_init_template(void)
{
struct ima_template_desc *template = ima_template_desc_current();
int result;
return template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt,
&(template->fields),
&(template->num_fields));
result = template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt,
&(template->fields),
&(template->num_fields));
if (result < 0)
pr_err("template %s init failed, result: %d\n",
(strlen(template->name) ?
template->name : template->fmt), result);
return result;
}

19
security/integrity/integrity.h
View File

@ -120,6 +120,10 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
*/
struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
char *addr, unsigned long count);
int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data);
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM 0
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MODULE 1
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA 2
@ -130,7 +134,8 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
const char *digest, int digestlen);
int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path);
#else
static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
@ -144,6 +149,7 @@ static inline int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
{
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE */
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
@ -157,6 +163,14 @@ static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509
void __init ima_load_x509(void);
#else
static inline void ima_load_x509(void)
{
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT
/* declarations */
void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
@ -170,6 +184,3 @@ static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
{
}
#endif
/* set during initialization */
extern int iint_initialized;

2
security/selinux/hooks.c
View File

@ -95,8 +95,6 @@
#include "audit.h"
#include "avc_ss.h"
extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
/* SECMARK reference count */
static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);

17
security/smack/smack_access.c
View File

@ -142,8 +142,7 @@ int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject, struct smack_known *object,
* Tasks cannot be assigned the internet label.
* An internet subject can access any object.
*/
if (object == &smack_known_web ||
subject == &smack_known_web)
if (object == &smack_known_web || subject == &smack_known_web)
goto out_audit;
/*
* A star object can be accessed by any subject.
@ -157,10 +156,11 @@ int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject, struct smack_known *object,
if (subject->smk_known == object->smk_known)
goto out_audit;
/*
* A hat subject can read any object.
* A floor object can be read by any subject.
* A hat subject can read or lock any object.
* A floor object can be read or locked by any subject.
*/
if ((request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request) {
if ((request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request ||
(request & MAY_LOCK) == request) {
if (object == &smack_known_floor)
goto out_audit;
if (subject == &smack_known_hat)
@ -452,10 +452,9 @@ char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len)
return NULL;
smack = kzalloc(i + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (smack != NULL) {
strncpy(smack, string, i + 1);
smack[i] = '\0';
}
if (smack != NULL)
strncpy(smack, string, i);
return smack;
}

13
security/smack/smack_lsm.c
View File

@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
#define SMK_SENDING 2
LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
@ -240,7 +241,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
{
struct inode_smack *isp;
isp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct inode_smack), GFP_NOFS);
isp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
if (isp == NULL)
return NULL;
@ -767,7 +768,7 @@ static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
*/
static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
{
kfree(inode->i_security);
kmem_cache_free(smack_inode_cache, inode->i_security);
inode->i_security = NULL;
}
@ -4264,10 +4265,16 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
return 0;
smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0);
if (!smack_inode_cache)
return -ENOMEM;
tsp = new_task_smack(&smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (tsp == NULL)
if (tsp == NULL) {
kmem_cache_destroy(smack_inode_cache);
return -ENOMEM;
}
printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n");