NFS Return -EPERM if no supported or matching SECINFO flavor

Do not return RPC_AUTH_UNIX if SEINFO reply tests fail. This
prevents an infinite loop of NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC for non RPC_AUTH_UNIX mounts.

Without this patch, a mount with no sec= option to a server
that does not include RPC_AUTH_UNIX in the
SECINFO return can be presented with an attemtp to use RPC_AUTH_UNIX
which will result in an NFS4ERR_WRONG_SEC which will prompt the SECINFO
call which will again try RPC_AUTH_UNIX....

Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Tested-By: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
This commit is contained in:
Andy Adamson 2014-06-09 15:33:20 -04:00 committed by Trond Myklebust
parent 57bbe3d7c1
commit 8445cd3528

View File

@ -140,10 +140,11 @@ static size_t nfs_parse_server_name(char *string, size_t len,
* @flavors: List of security tuples returned by SECINFO procedure
*
* Return the pseudoflavor of the first security mechanism in
* "flavors" that is locally supported. Return RPC_AUTH_UNIX if
* no matching flavor is found in the array. The "flavors" array
* "flavors" that is locally supported. The "flavors" array
* is searched in the order returned from the server, per RFC 3530
* recommendation.
*
* Return -EPERM if no matching flavor is found in the array.
*/
static rpc_authflavor_t nfs_find_best_sec(struct nfs_server *server,
struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors)
@ -170,11 +171,7 @@ static rpc_authflavor_t nfs_find_best_sec(struct nfs_server *server,
}
}
/* if there were any sec= options then nothing matched */
if (server->auth_info.flavor_len > 0)
return -EPERM;
return RPC_AUTH_UNIX;
return -EPERM;
}
static rpc_authflavor_t nfs4_negotiate_security(struct inode *inode, struct qstr *name)