security/integrity: Harden against malformed xattrs

In general the handling of IMA/EVM xattrs is good, but I found
a few locations where either the xattr size or the value of the
type field in the xattr are not checked. Add a few simple checks
to these locations to prevent malformed or malicious xattrs from
causing problems.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Seth Forshee 2016-08-01 08:19:10 -05:00 committed by Mimi Zohar
parent 5465d02a49
commit b4bfec7f4a
3 changed files with 9 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static bool init_keyring __initdata;
int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
const char *digest, int digestlen)
{
if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX)
if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX || siglen < 2)
return -EINVAL;
if (!keyring[id]) {

View File

@ -145,6 +145,10 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
/* check value type */
switch (xattr_data->type) {
case EVM_XATTR_HMAC:
if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data)) {
evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
goto out;
}
rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
if (rc)

View File

@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len)
{
struct signature_v2_hdr *sig;
enum hash_algo ret;
if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 2)
/* return default hash algo */
@ -143,7 +144,9 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
return sig->hash_algo;
break;
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
return xattr_value->digest[0];
ret = xattr_value->digest[0];
if (ret < HASH_ALGO__LAST)
return ret;
break;
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
/* this is for backward compatibility */