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Author SHA1 Message Date
Andrey Ryabinin
923936157b mm/mempool.c: kasan: poison mempool elements 
Mempools keep allocated objects in reserved for situations when ordinary
allocation may not be possible to satisfy.  These objects shouldn't be
accessed before they leave the pool.

This patch poison elements when get into the pool and unpoison when they
leave it.  This will let KASan to detect use-after-free of mempool's
elements.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Tested-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <drcheren@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
 2015-04-15 16:35:20 -07:00
Andrey Ryabinin
a5af5aa8b6 kasan, module, vmalloc: rework shadow allocation for modules 
Current approach in handling shadow memory for modules is broken.

Shadow memory could be freed only after memory shadow corresponds it is no
longer used.  vfree() called from interrupt context could use memory its
freeing to store 'struct llist_node' in it:

    void vfree(const void *addr)
    {
    ...
        if (unlikely(in_interrupt())) {
            struct vfree_deferred *p = this_cpu_ptr(&vfree_deferred);
            if (llist_add((struct llist_node *)addr, &p->list))
                    schedule_work(&p->wq);

Later this list node used in free_work() which actually frees memory.
Currently module_memfree() called in interrupt context will free shadow
before freeing module's memory which could provoke kernel crash.

So shadow memory should be freed after module's memory.  However, such
deallocation order could race with kasan_module_alloc() in module_alloc().

Free shadow right before releasing vm area.  At this point vfree()'d
memory is not used anymore and yet not available for other allocations.
New VM_KASAN flag used to indicate that vm area has dynamically allocated
shadow memory so kasan frees shadow only if it was previously allocated.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
 2015-03-12 18:46:08 -07:00
Andrey Ryabinin
bebf56a1b1 kasan: enable instrumentation of global variables 
This feature let us to detect accesses out of bounds of global variables.
This will work as for globals in kernel image, so for globals in modules.
Currently this won't work for symbols in user-specified sections (e.g.
__init, __read_mostly, ...)

The idea of this is simple.  Compiler increases each global variable by
redzone size and add constructors invoking __asan_register_globals()
function.  Information about global variable (address, size, size with
redzone ...) passed to __asan_register_globals() so we could poison
variable's redzone.

This patch also forces module_alloc() to return 8*PAGE_SIZE aligned
address making shadow memory handling (
kasan_module_alloc()/kasan_module_free() ) more simple.  Such alignment
guarantees that each shadow page backing modules address space correspond
to only one module_alloc() allocation.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
 2015-02-13 21:21:42 -08:00
Andrey Ryabinin
c420f167db kasan: enable stack instrumentation 
Stack instrumentation allows to detect out of bounds memory accesses for
variables allocated on stack.  Compiler adds redzones around every
variable on stack and poisons redzones in function's prologue.

Such approach significantly increases stack usage, so all in-kernel stacks
size were doubled.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
 2015-02-13 21:21:41 -08:00
Andrey Ryabinin
393f203f5f x86_64: kasan: add interceptors for memset/memmove/memcpy functions 
Recently instrumentation of builtin functions calls was removed from GCC
5.0.  To check the memory accessed by such functions, userspace asan
always uses interceptors for them.

So now we should do this as well.  This patch declares
memset/memmove/memcpy as weak symbols.  In mm/kasan/kasan.c we have our
own implementation of those functions which checks memory before accessing
it.

Default memset/memmove/memcpy now now always have aliases with '__'
prefix.  For files that built without kasan instrumentation (e.g.
mm/slub.c) original mem* replaced (via #define) with prefixed variants,
cause we don't want to check memory accesses there.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
 2015-02-13 21:21:41 -08:00
Andrey Ryabinin
0316bec22e mm: slub: add kernel address sanitizer support for slub allocator 
With this patch kasan will be able to catch bugs in memory allocated by
slub.  Initially all objects in newly allocated slab page, marked as
redzone.  Later, when allocation of slub object happens, requested by
caller number of bytes marked as accessible, and the rest of the object
(including slub's metadata) marked as redzone (inaccessible).

We also mark object as accessible if ksize was called for this object.
There is some places in kernel where ksize function is called to inquire
size of really allocated area.  Such callers could validly access whole
allocated memory, so it should be marked as accessible.

Code in slub.c and slab_common.c files could validly access to object's
metadata, so instrumentation for this files are disabled.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
 2015-02-13 21:21:41 -08:00
Andrey Ryabinin
b8c73fc249 mm: page_alloc: add kasan hooks on alloc and free paths 
Add kernel address sanitizer hooks to mark allocated page's addresses as
accessible in corresponding shadow region.  Mark freed pages as
inaccessible.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
 2015-02-13 21:21:41 -08:00
Andrey Ryabinin
786a895991 kasan: disable memory hotplug 
Currently memory hotplug won't work with KASan.  As we don't have shadow
for hotplugged memory, kernel will crash on the first access to it.  To
make this work we will need to allocate shadow for new memory.

At some future point proper memory hotplug support will be implemented.
Until then, print a warning at startup and disable memory hot-add.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
 2015-02-13 21:21:40 -08:00
Andrey Ryabinin
0b24becc81 kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure 
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector.  It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.

KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required.  v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.

This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer.  It's
not available for use yet.  The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].

Basic idea:

The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.

Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.

Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:

     unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
     {
                return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
     }

where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.

So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible.  Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).

To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.

These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory.  If access is not valid an error
printed.

Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:

	"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
	ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
	them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
	running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
	scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
	open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
	lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
	The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.

	We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
	(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
	start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
	Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
	We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
	people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.

	[...]

	As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
	performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
	shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
	programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
	kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
	running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
	have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
	finish all tuning).

	I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
	working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
	memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
	others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
	can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
	if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.

	Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
	instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
	parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
	relatively easy to port."

Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================

KMEMCHECK:

  - KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can.  KASan uses
    compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
    kmemcheck.  The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
    uninitialized memory reads.

    Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
    x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:

$ netperf -l 30
		MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
		Recv   Send    Send
		Socket Socket  Message  Elapsed
		Size   Size    Size     Time     Throughput
		bytes  bytes   bytes    secs.    10^6bits/sec

no debug:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    41624.72

kasan inline:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    12870.54

kasan outline:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    10586.39

kmemcheck: 	87380  16384  16384    30.03      20.23

  - Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs.  It always sets
    number of CPUs to 1.  KASan doesn't have such limitation.

DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
	- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
	  granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.

SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
	- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.

	- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
	  KASan able to detect both reads and writes.

	- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
	  bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
	  bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
	  place of first bad read/write.

[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies

Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
 2015-02-13 21:21:40 -08:00