Commit Graph

95 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
David S. Miller
3610cda53f af_unix: Avoid socket->sk NULL OOPS in stream connect security hooks.
unix_release() can asynchornously set socket->sk to NULL, and
it does so without holding the unix_state_lock() on "other"
during stream connects.

However, the reverse mapping, sk->sk_socket, is only transitioned
to NULL under the unix_state_lock().

Therefore make the security hooks follow the reverse mapping instead
of the forward mapping.

Reported-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-01-05 15:38:53 -08:00
Eric Paris
12b3052c3e capabilities/syslog: open code cap_syslog logic to fix build failure
The addition of CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT resulted in a build
failure when CONFIG_PRINTK=n.  This is because the capabilities code
which used the new option was built even though the variable in question
didn't exist.

The patch here fixes this by moving the capabilities checks out of the
LSM and into the caller.  All (known) LSMs should have been calling the
capabilities hook already so it actually makes the code organization
better to eliminate the hook altogether.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-11-15 15:40:01 -08:00
Al Viro
fc14f2fef6 convert get_sb_single() users
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-10-29 04:16:28 -04:00
Linus Torvalds
092e0e7e52 Merge branch 'llseek' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/bkl
* 'llseek' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/bkl:
  vfs: make no_llseek the default
  vfs: don't use BKL in default_llseek
  llseek: automatically add .llseek fop
  libfs: use generic_file_llseek for simple_attr
  mac80211: disallow seeks in minstrel debug code
  lirc: make chardev nonseekable
  viotape: use noop_llseek
  raw: use explicit llseek file operations
  ibmasmfs: use generic_file_llseek
  spufs: use llseek in all file operations
  arm/omap: use generic_file_llseek in iommu_debug
  lkdtm: use generic_file_llseek in debugfs
  net/wireless: use generic_file_llseek in debugfs
  drm: use noop_llseek
2010-10-22 10:52:56 -07:00
Eric Paris
d5630b9d27 security: secid_to_secctx returns len when data is NULL
With the (long ago) interface change to have the secid_to_secctx functions
do the string allocation instead of having the caller do the allocation we
lost the ability to query the security server for the length of the
upcoming string.  The SECMARK code would like to allocate a netlink skb
with enough length to hold the string but it is just too unclean to do the
string allocation twice or to do the allocation the first time and hold
onto the string and slen.  This patch adds the ability to call
security_secid_to_secctx() with a NULL data pointer and it will just set
the slen pointer.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-10-21 10:12:50 +11:00
KOSAKI Motohiro
b0ae198113 security: remove unused parameter from security_task_setscheduler()
All security modules shouldn't change sched_param parameter of
security_task_setscheduler().  This is not only meaningless, but also
make a harmful result if caller pass a static variable.

This patch remove policy and sched_param parameter from
security_task_setscheduler() becuase none of security module is
using it.

Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-10-21 10:12:44 +11:00
Arnd Bergmann
6038f373a3 llseek: automatically add .llseek fop
All file_operations should get a .llseek operation so we can make
nonseekable_open the default for future file operations without a
.llseek pointer.

The three cases that we can automatically detect are no_llseek, seq_lseek
and default_llseek. For cases where we can we can automatically prove that
the file offset is always ignored, we use noop_llseek, which maintains
the current behavior of not returning an error from a seek.

New drivers should normally not use noop_llseek but instead use no_llseek
and call nonseekable_open at open time.  Existing drivers can be converted
to do the same when the maintainer knows for certain that no user code
relies on calling seek on the device file.

The generated code is often incorrectly indented and right now contains
comments that clarify for each added line why a specific variant was
chosen. In the version that gets submitted upstream, the comments will
be gone and I will manually fix the indentation, because there does not
seem to be a way to do that using coccinelle.

Some amount of new code is currently sitting in linux-next that should get
the same modifications, which I will do at the end of the merge window.

Many thanks to Julia Lawall for helping me learn to write a semantic
patch that does all this.

===== begin semantic patch =====
// This adds an llseek= method to all file operations,
// as a preparation for making no_llseek the default.
//
// The rules are
// - use no_llseek explicitly if we do nonseekable_open
// - use seq_lseek for sequential files
// - use default_llseek if we know we access f_pos
// - use noop_llseek if we know we don't access f_pos,
//   but we still want to allow users to call lseek
//
@ open1 exists @
identifier nested_open;
@@
nested_open(...)
{
<+...
nonseekable_open(...)
...+>
}

@ open exists@
identifier open_f;
identifier i, f;
identifier open1.nested_open;
@@
int open_f(struct inode *i, struct file *f)
{
<+...
(
nonseekable_open(...)
|
nested_open(...)
)
...+>
}

@ read disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
   *off = E
|
   *off += E
|
   func(..., off, ...)
|
   E = *off
)
...+>
}

@ read_no_fpos disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}

@ write @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
  *off = E
|
  *off += E
|
  func(..., off, ...)
|
  E = *off
)
...+>
}

@ write_no_fpos @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}

@ fops0 @
identifier fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
 ...
};

@ has_llseek depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier llseek_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
 .llseek = llseek_f,
...
};

@ has_read depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
 .read = read_f,
...
};

@ has_write depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
 .write = write_f,
...
};

@ has_open depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
 .open = open_f,
...
};

// use no_llseek if we call nonseekable_open
////////////////////////////////////////////
@ nonseekable1 depends on !has_llseek && has_open @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier nso ~= "nonseekable_open";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...  .open = nso, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* nonseekable */
};

@ nonseekable2 depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open.open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...  .open = open_f, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* open uses nonseekable */
};

// use seq_lseek for sequential files
/////////////////////////////////////
@ seq depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier sr ~= "seq_read";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...  .read = sr, ...
+.llseek = seq_lseek, /* we have seq_read */
};

// use default_llseek if there is a readdir
///////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops1 depends on !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier readdir_e;
@@
// any other fop is used that changes pos
struct file_operations fops = {
... .readdir = readdir_e, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* readdir is present */
};

// use default_llseek if at least one of read/write touches f_pos
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops2 depends on !fops1 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read.read_f;
@@
// read fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* read accesses f_pos */
};

@ fops3 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+	.llseek = default_llseek, /* write accesses f_pos */
};

// Use noop_llseek if neither read nor write accesses f_pos
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

@ fops4 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !fops3 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
...
 .write = write_f,
 .read = read_f,
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read and write both use no f_pos */
};

@ depends on has_write && !has_read && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* write uses no f_pos */
};

@ depends on has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read uses no f_pos */
};

@ depends on !has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* no read or write fn */
};
===== End semantic patch =====

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
2010-10-15 15:53:27 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
3cfc2c42c1 Merge branch 'for-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial
* 'for-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial: (48 commits)
  Documentation: update broken web addresses.
  fix comment typo "choosed" -> "chosen"
  hostap:hostap_hw.c Fix typo in comment
  Fix spelling contorller -> controller in comments
  Kconfig.debug: FAIL_IO_TIMEOUT: typo Faul -> Fault
  fs/Kconfig: Fix typo Userpace -> Userspace
  Removing dead MACH_U300_BS26
  drivers/infiniband: Remove unnecessary casts of private_data
  fs/ocfs2: Remove unnecessary casts of private_data
  libfc: use ARRAY_SIZE
  scsi: bfa: use ARRAY_SIZE
  drm: i915: use ARRAY_SIZE
  drm: drm_edid: use ARRAY_SIZE
  synclink: use ARRAY_SIZE
  block: cciss: use ARRAY_SIZE
  comment typo fixes: charater => character
  fix comment typos concerning "challenge"
  arm: plat-spear: fix typo in kerneldoc
  reiserfs: typo comment fix
  update email address
  ...
2010-08-04 15:31:02 -07:00
Eric Paris
d09ca73979 security: make LSMs explicitly mask off permissions
SELinux needs to pass the MAY_ACCESS flag so it can handle auditting
correctly.  Presently the masking of MAY_* flags is done in the VFS.  In
order to allow LSMs to decide what flags they care about and what flags
they don't just pass them all and the each LSM mask off what they don't
need.  This patch should contain no functional changes to either the VFS or
any LSM.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02 15:35:07 +10:00
Mimi Zohar
af4f136056 security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h
Make the security extended attributes names global. Updated to move
the remaining Smack xattrs.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02 15:34:57 +10:00
Dan Carpenter
3e62cbb843 smack: opt_dentry is never null in in smack_d_instantiate()
This patch removes some unneeded code for if opt_dentry is null because
that can never happen.

The function dereferences "opt_dentry" earlier when it checks
"if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {".  That code was added in
2008.

This function called from security_d_instantiate().  I checked all the
places which call security_d_instantiate() and dentry is always non-null.
I also checked the selinux version of this hook and there is a comment
which says that dentry should be non-null if called from
d_instantiate().

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02 15:33:39 +10:00
Uwe Kleine-König
421f91d21a fix typos concerning "initiali[zs]e"
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2010-06-16 18:05:05 +02:00
James Morris
0ffbe2699c Merge branch 'master' into next 2010-05-06 10:56:07 +10:00
David Howells
98ec4373ba SMACK: Don't #include Ext2 headers
Don't #include Ext2 headers into Smack unnecessarily.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-04-27 08:46:00 +10:00
Eric Paris
e2902eb79f SMACK: remove dead cred_commit hook
This is an unused hook in SMACK so remove it.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-04-08 09:20:21 +10:00
Tejun Heo
5a0e3ad6af include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files.  percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.

percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed.  Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability.  As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.

  http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py

The script does the followings.

* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
  only the necessary includes are there.  ie. if only gfp is used,
  gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.

* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
  blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
  to its surrounding.  It's put in the include block which contains
  core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
  alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
  doesn't seem to be any matching order.

* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
  because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
  an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
  file.

The conversion was done in the following steps.

1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
   over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
   and ~3000 slab.h inclusions.  The script emitted errors for ~400
   files.

2. Each error was manually checked.  Some didn't need the inclusion,
   some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
   embedding .c file was more appropriate for others.  This step added
   inclusions to around 150 files.

3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
   from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.

4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
   e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
   APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.

5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
   editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
   files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell.  Most gfp.h
   inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
   wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros.  Each
   slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
   necessary.

6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.

7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
   were fixed.  CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
   distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
   more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
   build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).

   * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
   * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
   * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
   * ia64 SMP allmodconfig
   * s390 SMP allmodconfig
   * alpha SMP allmodconfig
   * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig

8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
   a separate patch and serve as bisection point.

Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-30 22:02:32 +09:00
Linus Torvalds
0f2cc4ecd8 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (52 commits)
  init: Open /dev/console from rootfs
  mqueue: fix typo "failues" -> "failures"
  mqueue: only set error codes if they are really necessary
  mqueue: simplify do_open() error handling
  mqueue: apply mathematics distributivity on mq_bytes calculation
  mqueue: remove unneeded info->messages initialization
  mqueue: fix mq_open() file descriptor leak on user-space processes
  fix race in d_splice_alias()
  set S_DEAD on unlink() and non-directory rename() victims
  vfs: add NOFOLLOW flag to umount(2)
  get rid of ->mnt_parent in tomoyo/realpath
  hppfs can use existing proc_mnt, no need for do_kern_mount() in there
  Mirror MS_KERNMOUNT in ->mnt_flags
  get rid of useless vfsmount_lock use in put_mnt_ns()
  Take vfsmount_lock to fs/internal.h
  get rid of insanity with namespace roots in tomoyo
  take check for new events in namespace (guts of mounts_poll()) to namespace.c
  Don't mess with generic_permission() under ->d_lock in hpfs
  sanitize const/signedness for udf
  nilfs: sanitize const/signedness in dealing with ->d_name.name
  ...

Fix up fairly trivial (famous last words...) conflicts in
drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c and security/tomoyo/realpath.c
2010-03-04 08:15:33 -08:00
Al Viro
de27a5bf9c fix mnt_mountpoint abuse in smack
(mnt,mnt_mountpoint) pair is conceptually wrong; if you want
to use it for generating pathname and for nothing else *and*
if you know that vfsmount tree is unchanging, you can get
away with that, but the right solution for that is (mnt,mnt_root).

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-03-03 14:07:56 -05:00
Kees Cook
002345925e syslog: distinguish between /proc/kmsg and syscalls
This allows the LSM to distinguish between syslog functions originating
from /proc/kmsg access and direct syscalls.  By default, the commoncaps
will now no longer require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read an opened /proc/kmsg
file descriptor.  For example the kernel syslog reader can now drop
privileges after opening /proc/kmsg, instead of staying privileged with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.  MAC systems that implement security_syslog have unchanged
behavior.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-02-04 14:20:12 +11:00
Eric Dumazet
8964be4a9a net: rename skb->iif to skb->skb_iif
To help grep games, rename iif to skb_iif

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2009-11-20 15:35:04 -08:00
James Morris
88e9d34c72 seq_file: constify seq_operations
Make all seq_operations structs const, to help mitigate against
revectoring user-triggerable function pointers.

This is derived from the grsecurity patch, although generated from scratch
because it's simpler than extracting the changes from there.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-23 07:39:29 -07:00
Nick Black
1fd7317d02 Move magic numbers into magic.h
Move various magic-number definitions into magic.h.

Signed-off-by: Nick Black <dank@qemfd.net>
Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-23 07:39:28 -07:00
David P. Quigley
ddd29ec659 sysfs: Add labeling support for sysfs
This patch adds a setxattr handler to the file, directory, and symlink
inode_operations structures for sysfs. The patch uses hooks introduced in the
previous patch to handle the getting and setting of security information for
the sysfs inodes. As was suggested by Eric Biederman the struct iattr in the
sysfs_dirent structure has been replaced by a structure which contains the
iattr, secdata and secdata length to allow the changes to persist in the event
that the inode representing the sysfs_dirent is evicted. Because sysfs only
stores this information when a change is made all the optional data is moved
into one dynamically allocated field.

This patch addresses an issue where SELinux was denying virtd access to the PCI
configuration entries in sysfs. The lack of setxattr handlers for sysfs
required that a single label be assigned to all entries in sysfs. Granting virtd
access to every entry in sysfs is not an acceptable solution so fine grained
labeling of sysfs is required such that individual entries can be labeled
appropriately.

[sds:  Fixed compile-time warnings, coding style, and setting of inode security init flags.]

Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-10 10:11:29 +10:00
David P. Quigley
1ee65e37e9 LSM/SELinux: inode_{get,set,notify}secctx hooks to access LSM security context information.
This patch introduces three new hooks. The inode_getsecctx hook is used to get
all relevant information from an LSM about an inode. The inode_setsecctx is
used to set both the in-core and on-disk state for the inode based on a context
derived from inode_getsecctx.The final hook inode_notifysecctx will notify the
LSM of a change for the in-core state of the inode in question. These hooks are
for use in the labeled NFS code and addresses concerns of how to set security
on an inode in a multi-xattr LSM. For historical reasons Stephen Smalley's
explanation of the reason for these hooks is pasted below.

Quote Stephen Smalley

inode_setsecctx:  Change the security context of an inode.  Updates the
in core security context managed by the security module and invokes the
fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing
xattrs that represent the context.  Example usage:  NFS server invokes
this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the
backing file system to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR
operation.

inode_notifysecctx:  Notify the security module of what the security
context of an inode should be.  Initializes the incore security context
managed by the security module for this inode.  Example usage:  NFS
client invokes this hook to initialize the security context in its
incore inode to the value provided by the server for the file when the
server returned the file's attributes to the client.

Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-10 10:11:24 +10:00
David Howells
ee18d64c1f KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent.  This
replaces the parent's session keyring.  Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again.  Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.

To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.

The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.

Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME.  This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.

This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership.  However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.

This can be tested with the following program:

	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <keyutils.h>

	#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT	18

	#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)

	int main(int argc, char **argv)
	{
		key_serial_t keyring, key;
		long ret;

		keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
		OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");

		key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
		OSERROR(key, "add_key");

		ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
		OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");

		return 0;
	}

Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:

	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: _ses
	355907932 --alswrv   4043    -1   \_ keyring: _uid.4043
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: _ses
	1055658746 --alswrv   4043  4043   \_ user: a
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: hello
	340417692 --alswrv   4043  4043   \_ user: a

Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:22 +10:00
Julia Lawall
da34d4248b security/smack: Use AF_INET for sin_family field
Elsewhere the sin_family field holds a value with a name of the form
AF_..., so it seems reasonable to do so here as well.  Also the values of
PF_INET and AF_INET are the same.

The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)

// <smpl>
@@
struct sockaddr_in sip;
@@

(
sip.sin_family ==
- PF_INET
+ AF_INET
|
sip.sin_family !=
- PF_INET
+ AF_INET
|
sip.sin_family =
- PF_INET
+ AF_INET
)
// </smpl>

Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-06 08:46:15 +10:00
Thomas Liu
d4131ded4d security: Make lsm_priv union in lsm_audit.h anonymous
Made the lsm_priv union in include/linux/lsm_audit.h
anonymous.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-07-10 08:58:39 +10:00
Thomas Liu
ed5215a214 Move variable function in lsm_audit.h into SMACK private space
Moved variable function in include/linux/lsm_audit.h into the
smack_audit_data struct since it is never used outside of it.

Also removed setting of function in the COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT
macro because that variable is now private to SMACK.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
I-dont-see-any-problems-with-it: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-07-10 08:54:14 +10:00
Ingo Molnar
9e48858f7d security: rename ptrace_may_access => ptrace_access_check
The ->ptrace_may_access() methods are named confusingly - the real
ptrace_may_access() returns a bool, while these security checks have
a retval convention.

Rename it to ptrace_access_check, to reduce the confusion factor.

[ Impact: cleanup, no code changed ]

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-25 00:18:05 +10:00
Linus Torvalds
3296ca27f5 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (44 commits)
  nommu: Provide mmap_min_addr definition.
  TOMOYO: Add description of lists and structures.
  TOMOYO: Remove unused field.
  integrity: ima audit dentry_open failure
  TOMOYO: Remove unused parameter.
  security: use mmap_min_addr indepedently of security models
  TOMOYO: Simplify policy reader.
  TOMOYO: Remove redundant markers.
  SELinux: define audit permissions for audit tree netlink messages
  TOMOYO: Remove unused mutex.
  tomoyo: avoid get+put of task_struct
  smack: Remove redundant initialization.
  integrity: nfsd imbalance bug fix
  rootplug: Remove redundant initialization.
  smack: do not beyond ARRAY_SIZE of data
  integrity: move ima_counts_get
  integrity: path_check update
  IMA: Add __init notation to ima functions
  IMA: Minimal IMA policy and boot param for TCB IMA policy
  selinux: remove obsolete read buffer limit from sel_read_bool
  ...
2009-06-11 10:01:41 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
20f3f3ca49 Merge branch 'rcu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'rcu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
  rcu: rcu_sched_grace_period(): kill the bogus flush_signals()
  rculist: use list_entry_rcu in places where it's appropriate
  rculist.h: introduce list_entry_rcu() and list_first_entry_rcu()
  rcu: Update RCU tracing documentation for __rcu_pending
  rcu: Add __rcu_pending tracing to hierarchical RCU
  RCU: make treercu be default
2009-06-10 19:50:03 -07:00
Tetsuo Handa
13b297d943 smack: Remove redundant initialization.
We don't need to explicitly initialize to cap_* because
it will be filled by security_fixup_ops().

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-28 11:57:09 +10:00
Roel Kluin
6470c077ca smack: do not beyond ARRAY_SIZE of data
Do not go beyond ARRAY_SIZE of data

Signed-off-by: Roel Kluin <roel.kluin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-22 12:34:48 +10:00
James Morris
d254117099 Merge branch 'master' into next 2009-05-08 17:56:47 +10:00
Etienne Basset
defc433ba3 Smack: check for SMACK xattr validity in smack_inode_setxattr
the following patch moves checks for SMACK xattr validity
from smack_inode_post_setxattr (which cannot return an error to the user)
to smack_inode_setxattr (which can return an error).

Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-18 12:58:25 +10:00
Jiri Pirko
05725f7eb4 rculist: use list_entry_rcu in places where it's appropriate
Use previously introduced list_entry_rcu instead of an open-coded
list_entry + rcu_dereference combination.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: dipankar@in.ibm.com
LKML-Reference: <20090414181715.GA3634@psychotron.englab.brq.redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-04-15 12:05:25 +02:00
Etienne Basset
ecfcc53fef smack: implement logging V3
the following patch, add logging of Smack security decisions.
This is of course very useful to understand what your current smack policy does.
As suggested by Casey, it also now forbids labels with ', " or \

It introduces a '/smack/logging' switch :
0: no logging
1: log denied (default)
2: log accepted
3: log denied&accepted

Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-14 09:00:23 +10:00
Etienne Basset
4303154e86 smack: Add a new '-CIPSO' option to the network address label configuration
This patch adds a new special option '-CIPSO' to the Smack subsystem. When used
in the netlabel list, it means "use CIPSO networking". A use case is when your
local network speaks CIPSO and you want also to connect to the unlabeled
Internet. This patch also add some documentation describing that. The patch
also corrects an oops when setting a '' SMACK64 xattr to a file.

Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 15:01:37 +11:00
Paul Moore
07feee8f81 netlabel: Cleanup the Smack/NetLabel code to fix incoming TCP connections
This patch cleans up a lot of the Smack network access control code.  The
largest changes are to fix the labeling of incoming TCP connections in a
manner similar to the recent SELinux changes which use the
security_inet_conn_request() hook to label the request_sock and let the label
move to the child socket via the normal network stack mechanisms.  In addition
to the incoming TCP connection fixes this patch also removes the smk_labled
field from the socket_smack struct as the minor optimization advantage was
outweighed by the difficulty in maintaining it's proper state.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 15:01:37 +11:00
Paul Moore
389fb800ac netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux
The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but
only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of
standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality
imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints.  The problem is that network sockets
created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire
labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based
on the wire label of the remote peer.  The issue had to do with how IP options
were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in
relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child
sockets.  While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire
label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP
options of the remote peer.

This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook
locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming
connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook.  Besides the
correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant
is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks
which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get
ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies
the NetLabel/SELinux glue code.  In the process of developing this patch I
also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been
fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 15:01:36 +11:00
Etienne Basset
7198e2eeb4 smack: convert smack to standard linux lists
the following patch (on top of 2.6.29) converts Smack lists to standard linux lists
Please review and consider for inclusion in 2.6.30-rc

regards,
Etienne

Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2009-03-26 09:17:04 +11:00
James Morris
703a3cd728 Merge branch 'master' into next 2009-03-24 10:52:46 +11:00
etienne
211a40c087 smack: fixes for unlabeled host support
The following patch (against 2.6.29rc5) fixes a few issues in the
smack/netlabel "unlabeled host support" functionnality that was added in
2.6.29rc.  It should go in before -final.

1) smack_host_label disregard a "0.0.0.0/0 @" rule (or other label),
preventing 'tagged' tasks to access Internet (many systems drop packets with
IP options)

2) netmasks were not handled correctly, they were stored in a way _not
equivalent_ to conversion to be32 (it was equivalent for /0, /8, /16, /24,
/32 masks but not other masks)

3) smack_netlbladdr prefixes (IP/mask) were not consistent (mask&IP was not
done), so there could have been different list entries for the same IP
prefix; if those entries had different labels, well ...

4) they were not sorted

1) 2) 3) are bugs, 4) is a more cosmetic issue.
The patch :

-creates a new helper smk_netlbladdr_insert to insert a smk_netlbladdr,
-sorted by netmask length

-use the new sorted nature of  smack_netlbladdrs list to simplify
 smack_host_label : the first match _will_ be the more specific

-corrects endianness issues in smk_write_netlbladdr &  netlbladdr_seq_show

Signed-off-by: <etienne.basset@numericable.fr>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-05 08:36:34 +11:00
etienne
113a0e4590 smack: fixes for unlabeled host support
The following patch (against 2.6.29rc5) fixes a few issues in the
smack/netlabel "unlabeled host support" functionnality that was added in
2.6.29rc.  It should go in before -final.

1) smack_host_label disregard a "0.0.0.0/0 @" rule (or other label),
preventing 'tagged' tasks to access Internet (many systems drop packets with
IP options)

2) netmasks were not handled correctly, they were stored in a way _not
equivalent_ to conversion to be32 (it was equivalent for /0, /8, /16, /24,
/32 masks but not other masks)

3) smack_netlbladdr prefixes (IP/mask) were not consistent (mask&IP was not
done), so there could have been different list entries for the same IP
prefix; if those entries had different labels, well ...

4) they were not sorted

1) 2) 3) are bugs, 4) is a more cosmetic issue.
The patch :

-creates a new helper smk_netlbladdr_insert to insert a smk_netlbladdr,
-sorted by netmask length

-use the new sorted nature of  smack_netlbladdrs list to simplify
 smack_host_label : the first match _will_ be the more specific

-corrects endianness issues in smk_write_netlbladdr &  netlbladdr_seq_show

Signed-off-by: <etienne.basset@numericable.fr>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-05 08:30:01 +11:00
Randy Dunlap
251a2a958b smack: fix lots of kernel-doc notation
Fix/add kernel-doc notation and fix typos in security/smack/.

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-19 15:51:10 +11:00
Casey Schaufler
152a649b64 smackfs load append mode fix
Given just how hard it is to find the code that uses MAY_APPEND
it's probably not a big surprise that this went unnoticed for so
long. The Smack rules loading code is incorrectly setting the
MAY_READ bit when MAY_APPEND is requested.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-27 20:13:32 -08:00
Fernando Carrijo
c19a28e119 remove lots of double-semicolons
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-08 08:31:14 -08:00
James Morris
ac8cc0fa53 Merge branch 'next' into for-linus 2009-01-07 09:58:22 +11:00
James Morris
29881c4502 Revert "CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() [ver #2]"
This reverts commit 14eaddc967.

David has a better version to come.
2009-01-07 09:21:54 +11:00
David Howells
14eaddc967 CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() [ver #2]
Fix a regression in cap_capable() due to:

	commit 5ff7711e635b32f0a1e558227d030c7e45b4a465
	Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
	Date:   Wed Dec 31 02:52:28 2008 +0000

	    CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task

The problem is that the above patch allows a process to have two sets of
credentials, and for the most part uses the subjective credentials when
accessing current's creds.

There is, however, one exception: cap_capable(), and thus capable(), uses the
real/objective credentials of the target task, whether or not it is the current
task.

Ordinarily this doesn't matter, since usually the two cred pointers in current
point to the same set of creds.  However, sys_faccessat() makes use of this
facility to override the credentials of the calling process to make its test,
without affecting the creds as seen from other processes.

One of the things sys_faccessat() does is to make an adjustment to the
effective capabilities mask, which cap_capable(), as it stands, then ignores.

The affected capability check is in generic_permission():

	if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode))
		if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
			return 0;

This change splits capable() from has_capability() down into the commoncap and
SELinux code.  The capable() security op now only deals with the current
process, and uses the current process's subjective creds.  A new security op -
task_capable() - is introduced that can check any task's objective creds.

strictly the capable() security op is superfluous with the presence of the
task_capable() op, however it should be faster to call the capable() op since
two fewer arguments need be passed down through the various layers.

This can be tested by compiling the following program from the XFS testsuite:

/*
 *  t_access_root.c - trivial test program to show permission bug.
 *
 *  Written by Michael Kerrisk - copyright ownership not pursued.
 *  Sourced from: http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Kernel/2003-10/6030.html
 */
#include <limits.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>

#define UID 500
#define GID 100
#define PERM 0
#define TESTPATH "/tmp/t_access"

static void
errExit(char *msg)
{
    perror(msg);
    exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} /* errExit */

static void
accessTest(char *file, int mask, char *mstr)
{
    printf("access(%s, %s) returns %d\n", file, mstr, access(file, mask));
} /* accessTest */

int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    int fd, perm, uid, gid;
    char *testpath;
    char cmd[PATH_MAX + 20];

    testpath = (argc > 1) ? argv[1] : TESTPATH;
    perm = (argc > 2) ? strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 8) : PERM;
    uid = (argc > 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : UID;
    gid = (argc > 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : GID;

    unlink(testpath);

    fd = open(testpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0);
    if (fd == -1) errExit("open");

    if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) == -1) errExit("fchown");
    if (fchmod(fd, perm) == -1) errExit("fchmod");
    close(fd);

    snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ls -l %s", testpath);
    system(cmd);

    if (seteuid(uid) == -1) errExit("seteuid");

    accessTest(testpath, 0, "0");
    accessTest(testpath, R_OK, "R_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, W_OK, "W_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, X_OK, "X_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK, "R_OK | W_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, R_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | X_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, W_OK | X_OK, "W_OK | X_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | W_OK | X_OK");

    exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
} /* main */

This can be run against an Ext3 filesystem as well as against an XFS
filesystem.  If successful, it will show:

	[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043
	---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 03:00 /tmp/xxx
	access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1

If unsuccessful, it will show:

	[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043
	---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 02:56 /tmp/xxx
	access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1

I've also tested the fix with the SELinux and syscalls LTP testsuites.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-05 11:17:04 +11:00