Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Ard Biesheuvel
f9040773b7 arm64: move kernel image to base of vmalloc area
This moves the module area to right before the vmalloc area, and moves
the kernel image to the base of the vmalloc area. This is an intermediate
step towards implementing KASLR, which allows the kernel image to be
located anywhere in the vmalloc area.

Since other subsystems such as hibernate may still need to refer to the
kernel text or data segments via their linears addresses, both are mapped
in the linear region as well. The linear alias of the text region is
mapped read-only/non-executable to prevent inadvertent modification or
execution.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-02-18 18:16:44 +00:00
Mark Rutland
068a17a580 arm64: mm: create new fine-grained mappings at boot
At boot we may change the granularity of the tables mapping the kernel
(by splitting or making sections). This may happen when we create the
linear mapping (in __map_memblock), or at any point we try to apply
fine-grained permissions to the kernel (e.g. fixup_executable,
mark_rodata_ro, fixup_init).

Changing the active page tables in this manner may result in multiple
entries for the same address being allocated into TLBs, risking problems
such as TLB conflict aborts or issues derived from the amalgamation of
TLB entries. Generally, a break-before-make (BBM) approach is necessary
to avoid conflicts, but we cannot do this for the kernel tables as it
risks unmapping text or data being used to do so.

Instead, we can create a new set of tables from scratch in the safety of
the existing mappings, and subsequently migrate over to these using the
new cpu_replace_ttbr1 helper, which avoids the two sets of tables being
active simultaneously.

To avoid issues when we later modify permissions of the page tables
(e.g. in fixup_init), we must create the page tables at a granularity
such that later modification does not result in splitting of tables.

This patch applies this strategy, creating a new set of fine-grained
page tables from scratch, and safely migrating to them. The existing
fixmap and kasan shadow page tables are reused in the new fine-grained
tables.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-02-16 15:10:46 +00:00
Will Deacon
83040123fd arm64: kasan: fix issues reported by sparse
Sparse reports some new issues introduced by the kasan patches:

  arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c:91:13: warning: no previous prototype for
  'kasan_early_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes] void __init kasan_early_init(void)
             ^
  arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c:91:13: warning: symbol 'kasan_early_init'
  was not declared. Should it be static? [sparse]

This patch resolves the problem by adding a prototype for
kasan_early_init and marking the function as asmlinkage, since it's only
called from head.S.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2015-10-13 14:54:42 +01:00
Andrey Ryabinin
39d114ddc6 arm64: add KASAN support
This patch adds arch specific code for kernel address sanitizer
(see Documentation/kasan.txt).

1/8 of kernel addresses reserved for shadow memory. There was no
big enough hole for this, so virtual addresses for shadow were
stolen from vmalloc area.

At early boot stage the whole shadow region populated with just
one physical page (kasan_zero_page). Later, this page reused
as readonly zero shadow for some memory that KASan currently
don't track (vmalloc).
After mapping the physical memory, pages for shadow memory are
allocated and mapped.

Functions like memset/memmove/memcpy do a lot of memory accesses.
If bad pointer passed to one of these function it is important
to catch this. Compiler's instrumentation cannot do this since
these functions are written in assembly.
KASan replaces memory functions with manually instrumented variants.
Original functions declared as weak symbols so strong definitions
in mm/kasan/kasan.c could replace them. Original functions have aliases
with '__' prefix in name, so we could call non-instrumented variant
if needed.
Some files built without kasan instrumentation (e.g. mm/slub.c).
Original mem* function replaced (via #define) with prefixed variants
to disable memory access checks for such files.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2015-10-12 17:46:36 +01:00