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5096add84b
The /proc/pid/ "maps", "smaps", and "numa_maps" files contain sensitive information about the memory location and usage of processes. Issues: - maps should not be world-readable, especially if programs expect any kind of ASLR protection from local attackers. - maps cannot just be 0400 because "-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -O2" makes glibc check the maps when %n is in a *printf call, and a setuid(getuid()) process wouldn't be able to read its own maps file. (For reference see http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/1/22/150) - a system-wide toggle is needed to allow prior behavior in the case of non-root applications that depend on access to the maps contents. This change implements a check using "ptrace_may_attach" before allowing access to read the maps contents. To control this protection, the new knob /proc/sys/kernel/maps_protect has been added, with corresponding updates to the procfs documentation. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: New sysctl numbers are old hat] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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.. | ||
array.c | ||
base.c | ||
generic.c | ||
inode-alloc.txt | ||
inode.c | ||
internal.h | ||
kcore.c | ||
kmsg.c | ||
Makefile | ||
mmu.c | ||
nommu.c | ||
proc_devtree.c | ||
proc_misc.c | ||
proc_sysctl.c | ||
proc_tty.c | ||
root.c | ||
task_mmu.c | ||
task_nommu.c | ||
vmcore.c |