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ba0c1709f4
The ACPI dependency moved to the TPM, where it belongs. Although IMA per-se does not require access to the bios measurement log, verifying the IMA boot aggregate does, which requires ACPI. This patch prereq's 'TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal' http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/4/378. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Reported-by: Jean-Christophe Dubois <jcd@tribudubois.net> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
56 lines
1.6 KiB
Plaintext
56 lines
1.6 KiB
Plaintext
# IBM Integrity Measurement Architecture
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#
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config IMA
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bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)"
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depends on SECURITY
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select SECURITYFS
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select CRYPTO
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select CRYPTO_HMAC
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select CRYPTO_MD5
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select CRYPTO_SHA1
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select TCG_TPM if !S390
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select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM
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help
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The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
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Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
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values of executables and other sensitive system files,
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as they are read or executed. If an attacker manages
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to change the contents of an important system file
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being measured, we can tell.
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If your system has a TPM chip, then IMA also maintains
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an aggregate integrity value over this list inside the
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TPM hardware, so that the TPM can prove to a third party
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whether or not critical system files have been modified.
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Read <http://www.usenix.org/events/sec04/tech/sailer.html>
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to learn more about IMA.
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If unsure, say N.
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config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
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int
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depends on IMA
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range 8 14
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default 10
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help
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IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX determines the TPM PCR register index
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that IMA uses to maintain the integrity aggregate of the
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measurement list. If unsure, use the default 10.
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config IMA_AUDIT
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bool
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depends on IMA
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default y
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help
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This option adds a kernel parameter 'ima_audit', which
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allows informational auditing messages to be enabled
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at boot. If this option is selected, informational integrity
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auditing messages can be enabled with 'ima_audit=1' on
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the kernel command line.
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config IMA_LSM_RULES
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bool
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depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK)
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default y
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help
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Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules.
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