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Daniel wrote: The last pull I'd like to squeeze into 3.5, safe for the hsw stuff mostly bugfixes: - last few patches for basic hsw enabling (Eugeni, infoframe support by Paulo) - Fix up infoframe support, we've hopefully squashed all the cargo-culting in there (Paulo). Among all the issues, this finally fixes some of the infoframe regressions seen on g4x and snb systems. - Fixup sdvo infoframe support, this fixes a regression from 2.6.37. - Correctly enable semaphores on snb, we've enabled it already for 3.5, but the dmar check was slightly wrong. - gen6 irq fixlets from Chris. - disable gmbus on i830, the hw seems to be simply broken. - fix up the pch pll fallout (Chris & me). - for_each_ring macro from Chris - I've figured I'll merge this now to avoid backport pain. - complain when the rps state isn't what we expect (Chris). Note that this is shockingly easy to hit and hence pretty much will cause a regression report. But it only tells us that the gpu turbo state got out of whack, a problem we know off since a long time (it cause the gpu to get stuck a a fixed frequency, usually the lowest one). Chris is working on a fix, but we haven't yet found a magic formula that works perfectly (only patches that massively reduce the frequency of this happening). - MAINTAINERS patch, I'm now officially the guy to beat up." * tag 'drm-intel-next-2012-05-20' of git://people.freedesktop.org/~danvet/drm-intel: (57 commits) drm/i915: IBX has a fixed pch pll to pch pipe mapping drm/i915: implement hsw_write_infoframe drm/i915: small hdmi coding style cleanups drm/i915: fixup infoframe support for sdvo drm/i915: Enable the PCH PLL for all generations after link training drm/i915: Convert BUG_ON(!pll->active) and friends to a WARN drm/i915: don't clobber the pipe param in sanitize_modesetting drm/i915: disable gmbus on i830 drm/i915: Replace the feature tests for BLT/BSD with ring init checks drm/i915: Check whether the ring is initialised prior to dispatch drm/i915: Introduce for_each_ring() macro drm/i915: Assert that the transcoder is indeed off before modifying it drm/i915: hook Haswell devices in place drm/i915: prepare HDMI link for Haswell drm/i915: move HDMI structs to shared location drm/i915: add WR PLL programming table drm/i915: add support for DDI-controlled digital outputs drm/i915: detect digital outputs on Haswell drm/i915: program iCLKIP on Lynx Point drm/i915: program WM_LINETIME on Haswell ...
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* For the very latest on DRI development, please see: *
* http://dri.freedesktop.org/ *
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The Direct Rendering Manager (drm) is a device-independent kernel-level
device driver that provides support for the XFree86 Direct Rendering
Infrastructure (DRI).
The DRM supports the Direct Rendering Infrastructure (DRI) in four major
ways:
1. The DRM provides synchronized access to the graphics hardware via
the use of an optimized two-tiered lock.
2. The DRM enforces the DRI security policy for access to the graphics
hardware by only allowing authenticated X11 clients access to
restricted regions of memory.
3. The DRM provides a generic DMA engine, complete with multiple
queues and the ability to detect the need for an OpenGL context
switch.
4. The DRM is extensible via the use of small device-specific modules
that rely extensively on the API exported by the DRM module.
Documentation on the DRI is available from:
http://dri.freedesktop.org/wiki/Documentation
http://sourceforge.net/project/showfiles.php?group_id=387
http://dri.sourceforge.net/doc/
For specific information about kernel-level support, see:
The Direct Rendering Manager, Kernel Support for the Direct Rendering
Infrastructure
http://dri.sourceforge.net/doc/drm_low_level.html
Hardware Locking for the Direct Rendering Infrastructure
http://dri.sourceforge.net/doc/hardware_locking_low_level.html
A Security Analysis of the Direct Rendering Infrastructure
http://dri.sourceforge.net/doc/security_low_level.html