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This patch uses the log state information in the known CT log list to differentiate qualified, usable, and readonly (collectively now referred to as "admissible") logs from retired logs. This patch also takes the opportunity to update the language in the implementation from "disqualified" to "retired" to match the current terminology from the source data. Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D218266
181 lines
5.3 KiB
C++
181 lines
5.3 KiB
C++
/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
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/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#include "MultiLogCTVerifier.h"
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#include "CTObjectsExtractor.h"
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#include "CTSerialization.h"
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namespace mozilla {
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namespace ct {
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using namespace mozilla::pkix;
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void MultiLogCTVerifier::AddLog(CTLogVerifier&& log) {
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mLogs.push_back(std::move(log));
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}
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Result MultiLogCTVerifier::Verify(Input cert, Input issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfo,
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Input sctListFromCert,
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Input sctListFromOCSPResponse,
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Input sctListFromTLSExtension, Time time,
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CTVerifyResult& result) {
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assert(cert.GetLength() > 0);
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result.Reset();
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Result rv;
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// Verify embedded SCTs
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if (issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfo.GetLength() > 0 &&
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sctListFromCert.GetLength() > 0) {
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LogEntry precertEntry;
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rv = GetPrecertLogEntry(cert, issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfo, precertEntry);
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if (rv != Success) {
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return rv;
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}
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rv = VerifySCTs(sctListFromCert, precertEntry, SCTOrigin::Embedded, time,
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result);
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if (rv != Success) {
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return rv;
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}
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}
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LogEntry x509Entry;
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GetX509LogEntry(cert, x509Entry);
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// Verify SCTs from a stapled OCSP response
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if (sctListFromOCSPResponse.GetLength() > 0) {
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rv = VerifySCTs(sctListFromOCSPResponse, x509Entry, SCTOrigin::OCSPResponse,
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time, result);
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if (rv != Success) {
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return rv;
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}
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}
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// Verify SCTs from a TLS extension
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if (sctListFromTLSExtension.GetLength() > 0) {
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rv = VerifySCTs(sctListFromTLSExtension, x509Entry, SCTOrigin::TLSExtension,
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time, result);
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if (rv != Success) {
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return rv;
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}
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}
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return Success;
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}
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void DecodeSCTs(Input encodedSctList,
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std::vector<SignedCertificateTimestamp>& decodedSCTs,
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size_t& decodingErrors) {
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decodedSCTs.clear();
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Reader listReader;
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Result rv = DecodeSCTList(encodedSctList, listReader);
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if (rv != Success) {
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decodingErrors++;
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return;
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}
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while (!listReader.AtEnd()) {
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Input encodedSct;
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rv = ReadSCTListItem(listReader, encodedSct);
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if (rv != Success) {
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decodingErrors++;
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return;
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}
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Reader encodedSctReader(encodedSct);
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SignedCertificateTimestamp sct;
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rv = DecodeSignedCertificateTimestamp(encodedSctReader, sct);
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if (rv != Success) {
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decodingErrors++;
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continue;
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}
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decodedSCTs.push_back(std::move(sct));
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}
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}
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Result MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySCTs(Input encodedSctList,
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const LogEntry& expectedEntry,
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SCTOrigin origin, Time time,
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CTVerifyResult& result) {
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std::vector<SignedCertificateTimestamp> decodedSCTs;
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DecodeSCTs(encodedSctList, decodedSCTs, result.decodingErrors);
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for (auto sct : decodedSCTs) {
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Result rv =
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VerifySingleSCT(std::move(sct), expectedEntry, origin, time, result);
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if (rv != Success) {
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return rv;
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}
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}
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return Success;
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}
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Result MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySingleSCT(SignedCertificateTimestamp&& sct,
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const LogEntry& expectedEntry,
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SCTOrigin origin, Time time,
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CTVerifyResult& result) {
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switch (origin) {
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case SCTOrigin::Embedded:
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result.embeddedSCTs++;
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break;
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case SCTOrigin::TLSExtension:
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result.sctsFromTLSHandshake++;
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break;
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case SCTOrigin::OCSPResponse:
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result.sctsFromOCSP++;
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break;
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}
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CTLogVerifier* matchingLog = nullptr;
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for (auto& log : mLogs) {
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if (log.keyId() == sct.logId) {
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matchingLog = &log;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (!matchingLog) {
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// SCT does not match any known log.
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result.sctsFromUnknownLogs++;
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return Success;
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}
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if (!matchingLog->SignatureParametersMatch(sct.signature)) {
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// SCT signature parameters do not match the log's.
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result.sctsWithInvalidSignatures++;
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return Success;
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}
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Result rv = matchingLog->Verify(expectedEntry, sct);
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if (rv != Success) {
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if (rv == Result::ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE) {
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result.sctsWithInvalidSignatures++;
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return Success;
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}
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return rv;
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}
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// Make sure the timestamp is legitimate (not in the future).
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// SCT's |timestamp| is measured in milliseconds since the epoch,
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// ignoring leap seconds. When converting it to a second-level precision
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// pkix::Time, we need to round it either up or down. In our case, rounding up
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// (towards the future) is more "secure", although practically
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// it does not matter.
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Time sctTime = TimeFromEpochInSeconds((sct.timestamp + 999u) / 1000u);
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if (sctTime > time) {
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result.sctsWithInvalidTimestamps++;
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return Success;
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}
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VerifiedSCT verifiedSct(std::move(sct), origin, matchingLog->operatorId(),
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matchingLog->state(), matchingLog->timestamp());
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result.verifiedScts.push_back(std::move(verifiedSct));
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return Success;
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}
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} // namespace ct
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} // namespace mozilla
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