Bug 1822691 — Bump cargo-vet to b31b5428709583d0de0fa1b54d88624fd04f8a50. r=nika,supply-chain-reviewers

Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D172727

supply-chain/config.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
 
 # cargo-vet config file
 
+[cargo-vet]
+version = "0.5"
+
 [imports.bytecode-alliance]
 url = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
 

supply-chain/imports.lock

@@ -201,58 +201,9 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "53.0.0"
 notes = "The Bytecode Alliance is the author of this crate."
 
-[audits.chromeos.criteria.crypto-safe]
-description = """
-All crypto algorithms in this crate have been reviewed by a relevant expert.
-
-**Note**: If a crate does not implement crypto, use `does-not-implement-crypto`,
-which implies `crypto-safe`, but does not require expert review in order to
-audit for."""
-
-[audits.chromeos.criteria.does-not-implement-crypto]
-description = """
-Inspection reveals that the crate in question does not attempt to implement any
-cryptographic algorithms on its own.
-
-Note that certification of this does not require an expert on all forms of
-cryptography: it's expected for crates we import to be \"good enough\" citizens,
-so they'll at least be forthcoming if they try to implement something
-cryptographic. When in doubt, please ask an expert."""
-implies = "crypto-safe"
-
-[audits.chromeos.criteria.rule-of-two-safe-to-deploy]
-description = """
-This is a stronger requirement than the built-in safe-to-deploy criteria,
-motivated by Chromium's rule-of-two related requirements:
-https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/security/rule-of-2.md#unsafe-code-in-safe-languages
-
-This crate will not introduce a serious security vulnerability to production
-software exposed to untrusted input.
-
-Auditors are not required to perform a full logic review of the entire crate.
-Rather, they must review enough to fully reason about the behavior of all unsafe
-blocks and usage of powerful imports. For any reasonable usage of the crate in
-real-world software, an attacker must not be able to manipulate the runtime
-behavior of these sections in an exploitable or surprising way.
-
-Ideally, ambient capabilities (e.g. filesystem access) are hardened against
-manipulation and consistent with the advertised behavior of the crate. However,
-some discretion is permitted. In such cases, the nature of the discretion should
-be recorded in the `notes` field of the audit record.
-
-Any unsafe code in this crate must, in general, be kept well-contained, and
-documentation must exist to describe how Rust's invariants are being upheld
-despite the unsafe block(s). Nontrivial uses of unsafe must be reviewed by an
-expert in Rust's unsafety guarantees/non-guarantees.
-
-For crates which generate deployed code (e.g. build dependencies or procedural
-macros), reasonable usage of the crate should output code which meets the above
-criteria."""
-implies = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[audits.chromeos.audits.fastrand]]
 who = "George Burgess IV <gbiv@google.com>"
-criteria = ["does-not-implement-crypto", "rule-of-two-safe-to-deploy"]
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "1.9.0"
 notes = """
 `does-not-implement-crypto` is certified because this crate explicitly says

taskcluster/ci/fetch/toolchains.yml

@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ cargo-vet:
     fetch:
         type: git
         repo: https://github.com/mozilla/cargo-vet
-        revision: 5461e5a3d459bea2c544002d9154c38f43f118a7
+        revision: b31b5428709583d0de0fa1b54d88624fd04f8a50
 
 symbol-scrapers:
     description: Linux distribution symbol scraper source