Remove special-case for setting the "src" of a chrome <iframe> or <browser>.

Treat it like we would any other subframe load -- use the chrome as the owner.
Bug 348672, r+sr=jst
This commit is contained in:
bzbarsky%mit.edu 2006-08-19 02:43:00 +00:00
parent 4e325afd57
commit 4615137f49

View File

@ -165,8 +165,6 @@ nsFrameLoader::LoadURI(nsIURI* aURI)
// Get our principal
nsIPrincipal* principal = mOwnerContent->NodePrincipal();
NS_ASSERTION(principal == doc->NodePrincipal(),
"Principal mismatch. Should not happen");
// Check if we are allowed to load absURL
rv = secMan->CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(principal, aURI,
@ -179,27 +177,6 @@ nsFrameLoader::LoadURI(nsIURI* aURI)
rv = CheckForRecursiveLoad(aURI);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Is our principal the system principal?
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> sysPrin;
rv = secMan->GetSystemPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(sysPrin));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (principal == sysPrin) {
// We're a chrome node. Belt and braces -- inherit the principal for this
// load instead of just forcing the system principal. That way if we have
// something loaded already the principal used will be that of what we
// already have loaded.
// XXX bz I'd love to nix this, but the problem is chrome calling
// setAttribute() on an iframe or browser and passing in a javascript: URI.
// We probably don't want to run that with chrome privileges... Though in
// similar circumstances, if one sets window.location.href from chrome we
// _do_ run that with chrome privileges, so maybe we should do the same
// here?
loadInfo->SetInheritOwner(PR_TRUE);
// Also, in this case we don't set a referrer, just in case.
} else {
// We'll use our principal, not that of the document loaded inside us.
// This is very important; needed to prevent XSS attacks on documents
// loaded in subframes!
@ -210,7 +187,6 @@ nsFrameLoader::LoadURI(nsIURI* aURI)
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
loadInfo->SetReferrer(referrer);
}
// Kick off the load...
rv = mDocShell->LoadURI(aURI, loadInfo, nsIWebNavigation::LOAD_FLAGS_NONE,