Bug 1691122 - Remove subject common name fallback support in CertVerifier. r=keeler,necko-reviewers,kershaw

Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D143808
This commit is contained in:
John Schanck 2022-04-28 19:48:06 +00:00
parent c3a7e39783
commit 6028a138e9
22 changed files with 30 additions and 408 deletions

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@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
subject:www.suggestion-example.com
extension:subjectAlternativeName:www.suggestion-example.com
issuer:printableString/CN=Temporary Certificate Authority/O=Mozilla Testing/OU=Profile Guided Optimization

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@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
subject:www.redirect-example.com
extension:subjectAlternativeName:www.redirect-example.com
issuer:printableString/CN=Temporary Certificate Authority/O=Mozilla Testing/OU=Profile Guided Optimization

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@ -234,7 +234,6 @@
#include "nsXULAppAPI.h"
#include "ThirdPartyUtil.h"
#include "BRNameMatchingPolicy.h"
#include "GeckoProfiler.h"
#include "mozilla/NullPrincipal.h"
#include "Navigator.h"
@ -6090,10 +6089,7 @@ already_AddRefed<nsIURI> nsDocShell::MaybeFixBadCertDomainErrorURI(
// Check if adding a "www." prefix to the request's hostname will
// cause the response's certificate to match.
mozilla::psm::BRNameMatchingPolicy nameMatchingPolicy(
mozilla::psm::BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode::Enforce);
rv1 = mozilla::pkix::CheckCertHostname(serverCertInput, newHostInput,
nameMatchingPolicy);
rv1 = mozilla::pkix::CheckCertHostname(serverCertInput, newHostInput);
if (rv1 != mozilla::pkix::Success) {
return nullptr;
}

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@ -111,18 +111,6 @@ pref("security.pki.sha1_enforcement_level", 3);
// x_11_x: COSE is required, PKCS#7 disabled (fail when present)
pref("security.signed_app_signatures.policy", 2);
// security.pki.name_matching_mode controls how the platform matches hostnames
// to name information in TLS certificates. The possible values are:
// 0: always fall back to the subject common name if necessary (as in, if the
// subject alternative name extension is either not present or does not
// contain any DNS names or IP addresses)
// 1: fall back to the subject common name for certificates valid before 23
// August 2016 if necessary
// 2: fall back to the subject common name for certificates valid before 23
// August 2015 if necessary
// 3: only use name information from the subject alternative name extension
pref("security.pki.name_matching_mode", 3);
// security.pki.netscape_step_up_policy controls how the platform handles the
// id-Netscape-stepUp OID in extended key usage extensions of CA certificates.
// 0: id-Netscape-stepUp is always considered equivalent to id-kp-serverAuth

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@ -252,7 +252,6 @@ static const char* gCallbackSecurityPrefs[] = {
"security.ssl.enable_ocsp_stapling",
"security.ssl.enable_ocsp_must_staple",
"security.pki.certificate_transparency.mode",
"security.pki.name_matching_mode",
nullptr,
};
@ -407,8 +406,7 @@ void nsIOService::OnTLSPrefChange(const char* aPref, void* aSelf) {
LOG(("HandleTLSPrefChange done"));
} else if (pref.EqualsLiteral("security.ssl.enable_ocsp_stapling") ||
pref.EqualsLiteral("security.ssl.enable_ocsp_must_staple") ||
pref.EqualsLiteral("security.pki.certificate_transparency.mode") ||
pref.EqualsLiteral("security.pki.name_matching_mode")) {
pref.EqualsLiteral("security.pki.certificate_transparency.mode")) {
SetValidationOptionsCommon();
}
}

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@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "BRNameMatchingPolicy.h"
#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
using namespace mozilla::psm;
using namespace mozilla::pkix;
Result BRNameMatchingPolicy::FallBackToCommonName(
Time notBefore,
/*out*/ FallBackToSearchWithinSubject& fallBackToCommonName) {
// (new Date("2015-08-23T00:00:00Z")).getTime() / 1000
static const Time AUGUST_23_2015 = TimeFromEpochInSeconds(1440288000);
// (new Date("2016-08-23T00:00:00Z")).getTime() / 1000
static const Time AUGUST_23_2016 = TimeFromEpochInSeconds(1471910400);
switch (mMode) {
case Mode::Enforce:
fallBackToCommonName = FallBackToSearchWithinSubject::No;
break;
case Mode::EnforceAfter23August2015:
fallBackToCommonName = notBefore > AUGUST_23_2015
? FallBackToSearchWithinSubject::No
: FallBackToSearchWithinSubject::Yes;
break;
case Mode::EnforceAfter23August2016:
fallBackToCommonName = notBefore > AUGUST_23_2016
? FallBackToSearchWithinSubject::No
: FallBackToSearchWithinSubject::Yes;
break;
case Mode::DoNotEnforce:
fallBackToCommonName = FallBackToSearchWithinSubject::Yes;
break;
default:
MOZ_CRASH("Unexpected Mode");
}
return Success;
}

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@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#ifndef BRNameMatchingPolicy_h
#define BRNameMatchingPolicy_h
#include "mozpkix/pkixtypes.h"
namespace mozilla {
namespace psm {
// According to the Baseline Requirements version 1.3.3 section 7.1.4.2.2.a,
// the requirements of the subject common name field are as follows:
// "If present, this field MUST contain a single IP address or FullyQualified
// Domain Name that is one of the values contained in the Certificates
// subjectAltName extension". Consequently, since any name information present
// in the common name must be present in the subject alternative name extension,
// when performing name matching, it should not be necessary to fall back to the
// common name. Because this consequence has not commonly been enforced, this
// implementation provides a mechanism to start enforcing it gradually while
// maintaining some backwards compatibility. If configured with the mode
// "EnforceAfter23August2016", name matching will only fall back to using the
// subject common name for certificates where the notBefore field is before 23
// August 2016. Similarly, the mode "EnforceAfter23August2015" is also
// available. This is to provide a balance between allowing preexisting
// long-lived certificates and detecting newly-issued problematic certificates.
// Note that this implementation does not actually directly enforce that if the
// subject common name is present, its value corresponds to a dNSName or
// iPAddress entry in the subject alternative name extension.
class BRNameMatchingPolicy : public mozilla::pkix::NameMatchingPolicy {
public:
enum class Mode {
DoNotEnforce = 0,
EnforceAfter23August2016 = 1,
EnforceAfter23August2015 = 2,
Enforce = 3,
};
explicit BRNameMatchingPolicy(Mode mode) : mMode(mode) {}
virtual mozilla::pkix::Result FallBackToCommonName(
mozilla::pkix::Time notBefore,
/*out*/ mozilla::pkix::FallBackToSearchWithinSubject&
fallBacktoCommonName) override;
private:
Mode mMode;
};
} // namespace psm
} // namespace mozilla
#endif // BRNameMatchingPolicy_h

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@ -105,7 +105,6 @@ CertVerifier::CertVerifier(OcspDownloadConfig odc, OcspStrictConfig osc,
mozilla::TimeDuration ocspTimeoutSoft,
mozilla::TimeDuration ocspTimeoutHard,
uint32_t certShortLifetimeInDays, SHA1Mode sha1Mode,
BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode nameMatchingMode,
NetscapeStepUpPolicy netscapeStepUpPolicy,
CertificateTransparencyMode ctMode,
CRLiteMode crliteMode,
@ -116,7 +115,6 @@ CertVerifier::CertVerifier(OcspDownloadConfig odc, OcspStrictConfig osc,
mOCSPTimeoutHard(ocspTimeoutHard),
mCertShortLifetimeInDays(certShortLifetimeInDays),
mSHA1Mode(sha1Mode),
mNameMatchingMode(nameMatchingMode),
mNetscapeStepUpPolicy(netscapeStepUpPolicy),
mCTMode(ctMode),
mCRLiteMode(crliteMode) {
@ -990,11 +988,7 @@ Result CertVerifier::VerifySSLServerCert(
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
}
BRNameMatchingPolicy nameMatchingPolicy(
isBuiltChainRootBuiltInRootLocal
? mNameMatchingMode
: BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode::DoNotEnforce);
rv = CheckCertHostname(peerCertInput, hostnameInput, nameMatchingPolicy);
rv = CheckCertHostname(peerCertInput, hostnameInput);
if (rv != Success) {
// Treat malformed name information as a domain mismatch.
if (rv == Result::ERROR_BAD_DER) {

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@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
#ifndef CertVerifier_h
#define CertVerifier_h
#include "BRNameMatchingPolicy.h"
#include "CTPolicyEnforcer.h"
#include "CTVerifyResult.h"
#include "EnterpriseRoots.h"
@ -220,7 +219,6 @@ class CertVerifier {
mozilla::TimeDuration ocspTimeoutSoft,
mozilla::TimeDuration ocspTimeoutHard,
uint32_t certShortLifetimeInDays, SHA1Mode sha1Mode,
BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode nameMatchingMode,
NetscapeStepUpPolicy netscapeStepUpPolicy,
CertificateTransparencyMode ctMode, CRLiteMode crliteMode,
const Vector<EnterpriseCert>& thirdPartyCerts);
@ -234,7 +232,6 @@ class CertVerifier {
const mozilla::TimeDuration mOCSPTimeoutHard;
const uint32_t mCertShortLifetimeInDays;
const SHA1Mode mSHA1Mode;
const BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode mNameMatchingMode;
const NetscapeStepUpPolicy mNetscapeStepUpPolicy;
const CertificateTransparencyMode mCTMode;
const CRLiteMode mCRLiteMode;

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@ -8,13 +8,11 @@ with Files("**"):
BUG_COMPONENT = ("Core", "Security: PSM")
EXPORTS += [
"BRNameMatchingPolicy.h",
"CertVerifier.h",
"OCSPCache.h",
]
UNIFIED_SOURCES += [
"BRNameMatchingPolicy.cpp",
"CertVerifier.cpp",
"NSSCertDBTrustDomain.cpp",
"OCSPCache.cpp",

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@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
namespace mozilla {
namespace ct {
void DecodeSCTs(Input encodedSctList,
void DecodeSCTs(pkix::Input encodedSctList,
std::vector<SignedCertificateTimestamp>& decodedSCTs,
size_t& decodingErrors);

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@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
#include "CommonSocketControl.h"
#include "BRNameMatchingPolicy.h"
#include "PublicKeyPinningService.h"
#include "SharedCertVerifier.h"
#include "nsNSSComponent.h"
@ -192,11 +191,7 @@ CommonSocketControl::IsAcceptableForHost(const nsACString& hostname,
return NS_OK;
}
mozilla::psm::BRNameMatchingPolicy nameMatchingPolicy(
mIsBuiltCertChainRootBuiltInRoot
? mozilla::psm::PublicSSLState()->NameMatchingMode()
: mozilla::psm::BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode::DoNotEnforce);
rv = CheckCertHostname(serverCertInput, hostnameInput, nameMatchingPolicy);
rv = CheckCertHostname(serverCertInput, hostnameInput);
if (rv != Success) {
return NS_OK;
}

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@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
#include "ContentSignatureVerifier.h"
#include "BRNameMatchingPolicy.h"
#include "CryptoTask.h"
#include "CSTrustDomain.h"
#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
@ -279,8 +278,7 @@ static nsresult VerifyContentSignatureInternal(
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
BRNameMatchingPolicy nameMatchingPolicy(BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode::Enforce);
result = CheckCertHostname(certInput, hostnameInput, nameMatchingPolicy);
result = CheckCertHostname(certInput, hostnameInput);
if (result != Success) {
// EE cert isnot valid for the given host name.
aErrorLabel = Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err7;

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@ -95,7 +95,6 @@
#include <cstring>
#include "BRNameMatchingPolicy.h"
#include "CertVerifier.h"
#include "CryptoTask.h"
#include "ExtendedValidation.h"
@ -372,10 +371,6 @@ SECStatus DetermineCertOverrideErrors(const nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert>& cert,
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
// Use a lax policy so as to not generate potentially spurious name
// mismatch "hints".
BRNameMatchingPolicy nameMatchingPolicy(
BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode::DoNotEnforce);
// CheckCertHostname expects that its input represents a certificate that
// has already been successfully validated by BuildCertChain. This is
// obviously not the case, however, because we're in the error path of
@ -383,7 +378,7 @@ SECStatus DetermineCertOverrideErrors(const nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert>& cert,
// would be nice to remove this optimistic additional error checking and
// simply punt to the front-end, which can more easily (and safely) perform
// extra checks to give the user hints as to why verification failed.
result = CheckCertHostname(certInput, hostnameInput, nameMatchingPolicy);
result = CheckCertHostname(certInput, hostnameInput);
// Treat malformed name information as a domain mismatch.
if (result == Result::ERROR_BAD_DER ||
result == Result::ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN) {

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@ -24,14 +24,13 @@ class SharedCertVerifier : public mozilla::psm::CertVerifier {
mozilla::TimeDuration ocspSoftTimeout,
mozilla::TimeDuration ocspHardTimeout,
uint32_t certShortLifetimeInDays, SHA1Mode sha1Mode,
BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode nameMatchingMode,
NetscapeStepUpPolicy netscapeStepUpPolicy,
CertificateTransparencyMode ctMode, CRLiteMode crliteMode,
const Vector<EnterpriseCert>& thirdPartyCerts)
: mozilla::psm::CertVerifier(odc, osc, ocspSoftTimeout, ocspHardTimeout,
certShortLifetimeInDays, sha1Mode,
nameMatchingMode, netscapeStepUpPolicy,
ctMode, crliteMode, thirdPartyCerts) {}
netscapeStepUpPolicy, ctMode, crliteMode,
thirdPartyCerts) {}
};
} // namespace psm

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@ -36,9 +36,6 @@ class SharedSSLState {
void SetSignedCertTimestampsEnabled(bool signedCertTimestampsEnabled) {
mSignedCertTimestampsEnabled = signedCertTimestampsEnabled;
}
void SetNameMatchingMode(BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode aMode) {
mNameMatchingMode = aMode;
}
// The following methods may be called from any thread
bool SocketCreated();
@ -49,7 +46,6 @@ class SharedSSLState {
bool IsSignedCertTimestampsEnabled() const {
return mSignedCertTimestampsEnabled;
}
BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode NameMatchingMode() { return mNameMatchingMode; }
private:
~SharedSSLState();
@ -67,7 +63,6 @@ class SharedSSLState {
bool mOCSPStaplingEnabled;
bool mOCSPMustStapleEnabled;
bool mSignedCertTimestampsEnabled;
BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode mNameMatchingMode;
};
SharedSSLState* PublicSSLState();

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@ -1340,23 +1340,6 @@ void SetValidationOptionsCommon() {
ctMode != CertVerifier::CertificateTransparencyMode::Disabled;
PublicSSLState()->SetSignedCertTimestampsEnabled(sctsEnabled);
PrivateSSLState()->SetSignedCertTimestampsEnabled(sctsEnabled);
BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode nameMatchingMode =
static_cast<BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode>(Preferences::GetInt(
"security.pki.name_matching_mode",
static_cast<int32_t>(BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode::DoNotEnforce)));
switch (nameMatchingMode) {
case BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode::Enforce:
case BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode::EnforceAfter23August2015:
case BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode::EnforceAfter23August2016:
case BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode::DoNotEnforce:
break;
default:
nameMatchingMode = BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode::DoNotEnforce;
break;
}
PublicSSLState()->SetNameMatchingMode(nameMatchingMode);
PrivateSSLState()->SetNameMatchingMode(nameMatchingMode);
}
namespace {
@ -1558,8 +1541,7 @@ void nsNSSComponent::setValidationOptions(
mDefaultCertVerifier = new SharedCertVerifier(
odc, osc, softTimeout, hardTimeout, certShortLifetimeInDays, sha1Mode,
PublicSSLState()->NameMatchingMode(), netscapeStepUpPolicy, ctMode,
crliteMode, mEnterpriseCerts);
netscapeStepUpPolicy, ctMode, crliteMode, mEnterpriseCerts);
}
void nsNSSComponent::UpdateCertVerifierWithEnterpriseRoots() {
@ -1576,7 +1558,6 @@ void nsNSSComponent::UpdateCertVerifierWithEnterpriseRoots() {
: CertVerifier::ocspRelaxed,
oldCertVerifier->mOCSPTimeoutSoft, oldCertVerifier->mOCSPTimeoutHard,
oldCertVerifier->mCertShortLifetimeInDays, oldCertVerifier->mSHA1Mode,
oldCertVerifier->mNameMatchingMode,
oldCertVerifier->mNetscapeStepUpPolicy, oldCertVerifier->mCTMode,
oldCertVerifier->mCRLiteMode, mEnterpriseCerts);
}
@ -2384,7 +2365,6 @@ nsNSSComponent::Observe(nsISupports* aSubject, const char* aTopic,
prefName.EqualsLiteral(
"security.pki.certificate_transparency.mode") ||
prefName.EqualsLiteral("security.pki.sha1_enforcement_level") ||
prefName.EqualsLiteral("security.pki.name_matching_mode") ||
prefName.EqualsLiteral("security.pki.netscape_step_up_policy") ||
prefName.EqualsLiteral(
"security.OCSP.timeoutMilliseconds.soft") ||

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@ -3,16 +3,6 @@
// License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
// file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
// The preference security.pki.name_matching_mode controls whether or not
// mozilla::pkix will fall back to using a certificate's subject common name
// during name matching. If the Baseline Requirements are followed, fallback
// should not be necessary (because any name information in the subject common
// name should be present in the subject alternative name extension). Due to
// compatibility concerns, the platform can be configured to fall back for
// certificates that are valid before 23 August 2016. Note that for certificates
// issued by an imported root, the platform will fall back if necessary,
// regardless of the value of the preference.
"use strict";
do_get_profile(); // must be called before getting nsIX509CertDB
@ -48,8 +38,6 @@ function checkCertOn25August2016(cert, expectedResult) {
add_task(async function() {
registerCleanupFunction(() => {
Services.prefs.clearUserPref("security.pki.name_matching_mode");
Services.prefs.clearUserPref("security.test.built_in_root_hash");
Services.prefs.clearUserPref("privacy.reduceTimerPrecision");
});
@ -57,216 +45,12 @@ add_task(async function() {
loadCertWithTrust("ca", "CTu,,");
// When verifying a certificate, if the trust anchor is not a built-in root,
// name matching will fall back to using the subject common name if necessary
// (i.e. if there is no subject alternative name extension or it does not
// contain any dNSName or iPAddress entries). Thus, since imported roots are
// not in general treated as built-ins, these should all successfully verify
// regardless of the value of the pref.
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.pki.name_matching_mode", 0);
info("current mode: always fall back, root not built-in");
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("no-san-recent"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(certFromFile("no-san-old"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("no-san-older"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-recent"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-old"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-older"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
// At one time there was a preference security.pki.name_matching_mode that
// controlled whether or not mozilla::pkix would fall back to using a
// certificate's subject common name during name matching. This no longer
// exists, and certificates that previously required the fallback should fail
// to verify.
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.pki.name_matching_mode", 1);
info(
"current mode: fall back for notBefore < August 23, 2016, root " +
"not built-in"
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("no-san-recent"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(certFromFile("no-san-old"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("no-san-older"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-recent"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-old"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-older"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.pki.name_matching_mode", 2);
info(
"current mode: fall back for notBefore < August 23, 2015, root " +
"not built-in"
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("no-san-recent"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(certFromFile("no-san-old"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("no-san-older"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-recent"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-old"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-older"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.pki.name_matching_mode", 3);
info("current mode: never fall back, root not built-in");
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("no-san-recent"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(certFromFile("no-san-old"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("no-san-older"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-recent"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-old"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-older"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
// In debug builds, we can treat an imported root as a built-in, and thus we
// can actually test the different values of the pref.
if (isDebugBuild) {
let root = certFromFile("ca");
Services.prefs.setCharPref(
"security.test.built_in_root_hash",
root.sha256Fingerprint
);
// Always fall back if necessary.
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.pki.name_matching_mode", 0);
info("current mode: always fall back, root built-in");
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("no-san-recent"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("no-san-old"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("no-san-older"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-recent"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-old"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-older"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
// Only fall back if notBefore < 23 August 2016
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.pki.name_matching_mode", 1);
info(
"current mode: fall back for notBefore < August 23, 2016, root " +
"built-in"
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("no-san-recent"),
SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("no-san-old"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("no-san-older"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-recent"),
SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-old"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-older"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
// Only fall back if notBefore < 23 August 2015
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.pki.name_matching_mode", 2);
info(
"current mode: fall back for notBefore < August 23, 2015, root " +
"built-in"
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("no-san-recent"),
SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("no-san-old"),
SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("no-san-older"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-recent"),
SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-old"),
SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN
);
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-older"),
PRErrorCodeSuccess
);
// Never fall back.
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.pki.name_matching_mode", 3);
info("current mode: never fall back, root built-in");
await checkCertOn25August2016(
certFromFile("no-san-recent"),
SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN
@ -291,5 +75,4 @@ add_task(async function() {
certFromFile("san-contains-no-hostnames-older"),
SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN
);
}
});

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@ -882,6 +882,9 @@ def create_self_signed_cert(name):
cert.gmtime_adj_notAfter(10 * 365 * 24 * 60 * 60)
cert.set_issuer(cert.get_subject())
cert.set_pubkey(k)
cert.add_extensions(
[crypto.X509Extension(b"subjectAltName", False, f"DNS:{name}".encode())]
)
cert.sign(k, "sha1")
open(CERT_FILE, "wb").write(crypto.dump_certificate(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, cert))