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Bug 1386558 - Check sandboxing level 2 after permissions are available. r=jld

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MozReview-Commit-ID: 9Pqwk45pJbe

--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 1c21f21d04cddd6c00e5f495c6686c671aa9cac1
This commit is contained in:
Gian-Carlo Pascutto 2017-08-03 12:31:37 +02:00
parent 36784f22aa
commit 60d25346d1
2 changed files with 27 additions and 23 deletions
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4
security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp
View File

@ -214,7 +214,9 @@ SandboxBroker::Policy::AddDir(int aPerms, const char* aPath)
// be opened. We're guaranteed to have a trailing / now,
// so just cut that.
path.Truncate(path.Length() - 1);
Policy::AddPath(aPerms, path.get(), AddAlways);
if (!path.IsEmpty()) {
Policy::AddPath(aPerms, path.get(), AddAlways);
}
}
void

46
security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBrokerPolicyFactory.cpp
View File

@ -88,12 +88,6 @@ SandboxBrokerPolicyFactory::SandboxBrokerPolicyFactory()
#endif
// Read permissions
// No read blocking at level 2 and below
if (Preferences::GetInt("security.sandbox.content.level") <= 2) {
policy->AddDir(rdonly, "/");
mCommonContentPolicy.reset(policy);
return;
}
policy->AddPath(rdonly, "/dev/urandom");
policy->AddPath(rdonly, "/proc/cpuinfo");
policy->AddPath(rdonly, "/proc/meminfo");
@ -233,29 +227,37 @@ SandboxBrokerPolicyFactory::GetContentPolicy(int aPid, bool aFileProcess)
UniquePtr<SandboxBroker::Policy>
policy(new SandboxBroker::Policy(*mCommonContentPolicy));
// Read any extra paths that will get write permissions,
// configured by the user or distro
AddDynamicPathList(policy.get(),
"security.sandbox.content.write_path_whitelist",
rdwr);
// No read blocking at level 2 and below.
// file:// processes also get global read permissions
// This requires accessing user preferences so we can only do it now.
// Our constructor is initialized before user preferences are read in.
if (GetEffectiveContentSandboxLevel() <= 2 || aFileProcess) {
policy->AddDir(rdonly, "/");
return policy;
}
// Read permissions only from here on!
// Whitelisted for reading by the user/distro
AddDynamicPathList(policy.get(),
"security.sandbox.content.read_path_whitelist",
rdonly);
// Bug 1198550: the profiler's replacement for dl_iterate_phdr
policy->AddPath(rdonly, nsPrintfCString("/proc/%d/maps", aPid).get());
// Bug 1198552: memory reporting.
policy->AddPath(rdonly, nsPrintfCString("/proc/%d/statm", aPid).get());
policy->AddPath(rdonly, nsPrintfCString("/proc/%d/smaps", aPid).get());
// Now read any extra paths, this requires accessing user preferences
// so we can only do it now. Our constructor is initialized before
// user preferences are read in.
AddDynamicPathList(policy.get(),
"security.sandbox.content.read_path_whitelist",
rdonly);
AddDynamicPathList(policy.get(),
"security.sandbox.content.write_path_whitelist",
rdwr);
// file:// processes get global read permissions
if (aFileProcess) {
policy->AddDir(rdonly, "/");
}
// userContent.css sits in the profile, which is normally blocked
// and we can't get the profile dir earlier
// userContent.css and the extensions dir sit in the profile, which is
// normally blocked and we can't get the profile dir earlier in startup,
// so this must happen here.
nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> profileDir;
nsresult rv = NS_GetSpecialDirectory(NS_APP_USER_PROFILE_50_DIR,
getter_AddRefs(profileDir));