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Bug 921895: Check extended key usage in insanity::pkix, r=keeler, r=cviecco

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--HG--
extra : rebase_source : f8faa0b9269a40dd28850c9444f4723d1dad8451
extra : source : 32ea705bdfd196e037060b3bb7da081c1eed356d
This commit is contained in:
Brian Smith 2014-02-08 15:00:32 -08:00
parent e9ac2e3539
commit 9e617fc0fc
5 changed files with 109 additions and 6 deletions
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1
security/insanity/include/insanity/pkix.h
View File

@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SECStatus BuildCertChain(TrustDomain& trustDomain,
CERTCertificate* cert,
PRTime time,
/*optional*/ KeyUsages requiredKeyUsagesIfPresent,
/*optional*/ SECOidTag requiredEKUIfPresent,
/*out*/ ScopedCERTCertList& results);
// Verify the given signed data using the public key of the given certificate.

12
security/insanity/lib/pkixbuild.cpp
View File

@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ BackCert::Init()
case 15: out = &encodedKeyUsage; break;
case 19: out = &encodedBasicConstraints; break;
case 35: out = &dummyEncodedAuthorityKeyIdentifier; break; // bug 965136
case 37: out = &encodedExtendedKeyUsage; break;
}
} else if (ext->id.len == 9 &&
ext->id.data[0] == 0x2b && ext->id.data[1] == 0x06 &&
@ -91,6 +92,7 @@ static Result BuildForward(TrustDomain& trustDomain,
PRTime time,
EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
KeyUsages requiredKeyUsagesIfPresent,
SECOidTag requiredEKUIfPresent,
unsigned int subCACount,
/*out*/ ScopedCERTCertList& results);
@ -100,6 +102,7 @@ BuildForwardInner(TrustDomain& trustDomain,
BackCert& subject,
PRTime time,
EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
SECOidTag requiredEKUIfPresent,
CERTCertificate* potentialIssuerCertToDup,
unsigned int subCACount,
ScopedCERTCertList& results)
@ -142,7 +145,7 @@ BuildForwardInner(TrustDomain& trustDomain,
}
rv = BuildForward(trustDomain, potentialIssuer, time, MustBeCA,
KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN,
KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN, requiredEKUIfPresent,
newSubCACount, results);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
@ -163,6 +166,7 @@ BuildForward(TrustDomain& trustDomain,
PRTime time,
EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
KeyUsages requiredKeyUsagesIfPresent,
SECOidTag requiredEKUIfPresent,
unsigned int subCACount,
/*out*/ ScopedCERTCertList& results)
{
@ -191,7 +195,7 @@ BuildForward(TrustDomain& trustDomain,
rv = CheckExtensions(subject, endEntityOrCA,
trustLevel == TrustDomain::TrustAnchor,
requiredKeyUsagesIfPresent,
requiredKeyUsagesIfPresent, requiredEKUIfPresent,
subCACount);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
@ -223,6 +227,7 @@ BuildForward(TrustDomain& trustDomain,
for (CERTCertListNode* n = CERT_LIST_HEAD(candidates);
!CERT_LIST_END(n, candidates); n = CERT_LIST_NEXT(n)) {
rv = BuildForwardInner(trustDomain, subject, time, endEntityOrCA,
requiredEKUIfPresent,
n->cert, subCACount, results);
if (rv == Success) {
// We found a trusted issuer. At this point, we know the cert is valid
@ -241,6 +246,7 @@ BuildCertChain(TrustDomain& trustDomain,
CERTCertificate* certToDup,
PRTime time,
/*optional*/ KeyUsages requiredKeyUsagesIfPresent,
/*optional*/ SECOidTag requiredEKUIfPresent,
/*out*/ ScopedCERTCertList& results)
{
PORT_Assert(certToDup);
@ -260,7 +266,7 @@ BuildCertChain(TrustDomain& trustDomain,
}
rv = BuildForward(trustDomain, ee, time, MustBeEndEntity,
requiredKeyUsagesIfPresent,
requiredKeyUsagesIfPresent, requiredEKUIfPresent,
0, results);
if (rv != Success) {
results = nullptr;

99
security/insanity/lib/pkixcheck.cpp
View File

@ -149,12 +149,17 @@ CheckBasicConstraints(const BackCert& cert,
// CA certificates are not trusted as EE certs.
if (basicConstraints.isCA) {
// XXX: We use SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE here so we can distinguish
// XXX: We use SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID here so we can distinguish
// this error from other errors, given that NSS does not have a "CA cert
// used as end-entity" error code since it doesn't have such a
// prohibition. We should add such an error code and stop abusing
// SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE this way.
return Fail(RecoverableError, SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE);
// SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID this way.
//
// Note, in particular, that this check prevents a delegated OCSP
// response signing certificate with the CA bit from successfully
// validating when we check it from pkixocsp.cpp, which is a good thing.
//
return Fail(RecoverableError, SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID);
}
return Success;
@ -177,6 +182,82 @@ CheckBasicConstraints(const BackCert& cert,
return Success;
}
// 4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage (id-ce-extKeyUsage)
// 4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage (id-ce-extKeyUsage)
Result
CheckExtendedKeyUsage(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA, const SECItem* encodedEKUs,
SECOidTag requiredEKU)
{
// TODO: Either do not allow anyExtendedKeyUsage to be passed as requiredEKU,
// or require that callers pass anyExtendedKeyUsage instead of
// SEC_OID_UNKNWON and disallow SEC_OID_UNKNWON.
// XXX: We're using SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE here so that callers can
// distinguish EKU mismatch from KU mismatch from basic constraints mismatch.
// We should probably add a new error code that is more clear for this type
// of problem.
bool foundOCSPSigning = false;
if (encodedEKUs) {
ScopedPtr<CERTOidSequence, CERT_DestroyOidSequence>
seq(CERT_DecodeOidSequence(encodedEKUs));
if (!seq) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE, 0);
return RecoverableError;
}
bool found = false;
// XXX: We allow duplicate entries.
for (const SECItem* const* oids = seq->oids; oids && *oids; ++oids) {
SECOidTag oidTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(*oids);
if (requiredEKU != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN && oidTag == requiredEKU) {
found = true;
}
if (oidTag == SEC_OID_OCSP_RESPONDER) {
foundOCSPSigning = true;
}
}
// If the EKU extension was included, then the required EKU must be in the
// list.
if (!found) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE, 0);
return RecoverableError;
}
}
// pkixocsp.cpp depends on the following additional checks.
if (foundOCSPSigning) {
// When validating anything other than an delegated OCSP signing cert,
// reject any cert that also claims to be an OCSP responder, because such
// a cert does not make sense. For example, if an SSL certificate were to
// assert id-kp-OCSPSigning then it could sign OCSP responses for itself,
// if not for this check.
if (requiredEKU != SEC_OID_OCSP_RESPONDER) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE, 0);
return RecoverableError;
}
} else if (requiredEKU == SEC_OID_OCSP_RESPONDER &&
endEntityOrCA == MustBeEndEntity) {
// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6960#section-4.2.2.2:
// "OCSP signing delegation SHALL be designated by the inclusion of
// id-kp-OCSPSigning in an extended key usage certificate extension
// included in the OCSP response signer's certificate."
//
// id-kp-OCSPSigning is the only EKU that isn't implicitly assumed when the
// EKU extension is missing from an end-entity certificate. However, any CA
// certificate can issue a delegated OCSP response signing certificate, so
// we can't require the EKU be explicitly included for CA certificates.
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE, 0);
return RecoverableError;
}
return Success;
}
// Checks extensions that apply to both EE and intermediate certs,
// except for AIA, CRL, and AKI/SKI, which are handled elsewhere.
Result
@ -184,8 +265,14 @@ CheckExtensions(BackCert& cert,
EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
bool isTrustAnchor,
KeyUsages requiredKeyUsagesIfPresent,
SECOidTag requiredEKUIfPresent,
unsigned int subCACount)
{
if (endEntityOrCA != MustBeCA && isTrustAnchor) {
PR_NOT_REACHED("only CAs can be trust anchors.");
return Fail(FatalError, PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR);
}
// 4.2.1.1. Authority Key Identifier dealt with as part of path building
// 4.2.1.2. Subject Key Identifier dealt with as part of path building
@ -221,6 +308,12 @@ CheckExtensions(BackCert& cert,
// 4.2.1.10. Name Constraints
// 4.2.1.11. Policy Constraints
// 4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage
rv = CheckExtendedKeyUsage(endEntityOrCA, cert.encodedExtendedKeyUsage,
requiredEKUIfPresent);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
// 4.2.1.13. CRL Distribution Points will be dealt with elsewhere
// 4.2.1.14. Inhibit anyPolicy

1
security/insanity/lib/pkixcheck.h
View File

@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ Result CheckExtensions(BackCert& certExt,
EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
bool isTrustAnchor,
KeyUsages requiredKeyUsagesIfPresent,
SECOidTag requiredEKUIfPresent,
unsigned int depth);
} } // namespace insanity::pkix

2
security/insanity/lib/pkixutil.h
View File

@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ public:
// nssCert and childCert must be valid for the lifetime of BackCert
BackCert(CERTCertificate* nssCert, BackCert* childCert)
: encodedBasicConstraints(nullptr)
, encodedExtendedKeyUsage(nullptr)
, encodedKeyUsage(nullptr)
, childCert(childCert)
, nssCert(nssCert)
@ -93,6 +94,7 @@ public:
Result Init();
const SECItem* encodedBasicConstraints;
const SECItem* encodedExtendedKeyUsage;
const SECItem* encodedKeyUsage;
BackCert* const childCert;