Bug 1480757 - [1.0] Move safe intent handling utilities from IntentHelper to IntentUtils to make them accessible in GeckoView. r=jchen

This commit is contained in:
Eugen Sawin 2018-08-03 15:03:46 +02:00
parent 70d6c88eae
commit af25612f9c
3 changed files with 118 additions and 64 deletions

View File

@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ import org.mozilla.gecko.util.ActivityResultHandler;
import org.mozilla.gecko.util.BundleEventListener;
import org.mozilla.gecko.util.EventCallback;
import org.mozilla.gecko.util.GeckoBundle;
import org.mozilla.gecko.util.IntentUtils;
import org.mozilla.gecko.widget.ExternalIntentDuringPrivateBrowsingPromptFragment;
import android.annotation.TargetApi;
import android.app.Activity;
import android.content.ClipData;
import android.content.Context;
@ -318,41 +318,21 @@ public final class IntentHelper implements BundleEventListener {
context.getResources().getString(R.string.share_title));
}
Uri uri = normalizeUriScheme(targetURI.indexOf(':') >= 0 ? Uri.parse(targetURI) : new Uri.Builder().scheme(targetURI).build());
Uri uri = IntentUtils.normalizeUri(targetURI);
if (!TextUtils.isEmpty(mimeType)) {
Intent intent = getIntentForActionString(action);
intent.setDataAndType(uri, mimeType);
return intent;
}
if (!GeckoAppShell.isUriSafeForScheme(uri)) {
if (!IntentUtils.isUriSafeForScheme(targetURI)) {
return null;
}
final String scheme = uri.getScheme();
if ("intent".equals(scheme) || "android-app".equals(scheme)) {
final Intent intent;
try {
intent = Intent.parseUri(targetURI, 0);
} catch (final URISyntaxException e) {
Log.e(LOGTAG, "Unable to parse URI - " + e);
return null;
}
final Uri data = intent.getData();
if (data != null && "file".equals(normalizeUriScheme(data).getScheme())) {
Log.w(LOGTAG, "Blocked intent with \"file://\" data scheme.");
return null;
}
// Only open applications which can accept arbitrary data from a browser.
intent.addCategory(Intent.CATEGORY_BROWSABLE);
// Prevent site from explicitly opening our internal activities, which can leak data.
intent.setComponent(null);
nullIntentSelector(intent);
return intent;
return IntentUtils.getSafeIntent(uri);
}
// Compute our most likely intent, then check to see if there are any
@ -427,31 +407,6 @@ public final class IntentHelper implements BundleEventListener {
return intent;
}
// We create a separate method to better encapsulate the @TargetApi use.
@TargetApi(15)
private static void nullIntentSelector(final Intent intent) {
intent.setSelector(null);
}
/**
* Return a <code>Uri</code> instance which is equivalent to <code>u</code>,
* but with a guaranteed-lowercase scheme as if the API level 16 method
* <code>u.normalizeScheme</code> had been called.
*
* @param u the <code>Uri</code> to normalize.
* @return a <code>Uri</code>, which might be <code>u</code>.
*/
private static Uri normalizeUriScheme(final Uri u) {
final String scheme = u.getScheme();
final String lower = scheme.toLowerCase(Locale.US);
if (lower.equals(scheme)) {
return u;
}
// Otherwise, return a new URI with a normalized scheme.
return u.buildUpon().scheme(lower).build();
}
@Override // BundleEventHandler
public void handleMessage(final String event, final GeckoBundle message,
final EventCallback callback) {

View File

@ -936,20 +936,6 @@ public class GeckoAppShell
return type + "/" + subType;
}
static boolean isUriSafeForScheme(Uri aUri) {
// Bug 794034 - We don't want to pass MWI or USSD codes to the
// dialer, and ensure the Uri class doesn't parse a URI
// containing a fragment ('#')
final String scheme = aUri.getScheme();
if ("tel".equals(scheme) || "sms".equals(scheme)) {
final String number = aUri.getSchemeSpecificPart();
if (number.contains("#") || number.contains("*") || aUri.getFragment() != null) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
@WrapForJNI(calledFrom = "gecko")
private static boolean openUriExternal(String targetURI,
String mimeType,

View File

@ -6,8 +6,10 @@
package org.mozilla.gecko.util;
import android.annotation.TargetApi;
import android.content.ComponentName;
import android.content.Intent;
import android.net.Uri;
import android.os.Bundle;
import android.support.annotation.CheckResult;
import android.support.annotation.NonNull;
@ -15,7 +17,9 @@ import android.text.TextUtils;
import org.mozilla.gecko.mozglue.SafeIntent;
import java.net.URISyntaxException;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.Locale;
import java.util.regex.Matcher;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
@ -104,4 +108,113 @@ public class IntentUtils {
final HashMap<String, String> envVars = IntentUtils.getEnvVarMap(intent);
return !TextUtils.isEmpty(envVars.get(IntentUtils.ENV_VAR_IN_AUTOMATION));
}
/**
* Return a Uri instance which is equivalent to uri,
* but with a guaranteed-lowercase scheme as if the API level 16 method
* Uri.normalizeScheme had been called.
*
* @param uri The URI string to normalize.
* @return The corresponding normalized Uri.
*/
private static Uri normalizeUriScheme(final Uri uri) {
final String scheme = uri.getScheme();
final String lower = scheme.toLowerCase(Locale.US);
if (lower.equals(scheme)) {
return uri;
}
// Otherwise, return a new URI with a normalized scheme.
return uri.buildUpon().scheme(lower).build();
}
/**
* Return a normalized Uri instance that corresponds to the given URI string
* with cross-API-level compatibility.
*
* @param aUri The URI string to normalize.
* @return The corresponding normalized Uri.
*/
public static Uri normalizeUri(final String aUri) {
final Uri normUri = normalizeUriScheme(
aUri.indexOf(':') >= 0
? Uri.parse(aUri)
: new Uri.Builder().scheme(aUri).build());
return normUri;
}
public static boolean isUriSafeForScheme(final String aUri) {
return isUriSafeForScheme(normalizeUri(aUri));
}
/**
* Verify whether the given URI is considered safe to load in respect to
* its scheme.
* Unsafe URIs should be blocked from further handling.
*
* @param aUri The URI instance to test.
* @return Whether the provided URI is considered safe in respect to its
* scheme.
*/
public static boolean isUriSafeForScheme(final Uri aUri) {
final String scheme = aUri.getScheme();
if ("tel".equals(scheme) || "sms".equals(scheme)) {
// Bug 794034 - We don't want to pass MWI or USSD codes to the
// dialer, and ensure the Uri class doesn't parse a URI
// containing a fragment ('#')
final String number = aUri.getSchemeSpecificPart();
if (number.contains("#") || number.contains("*") ||
aUri.getFragment() != null) {
return false;
}
}
if (("intent".equals(scheme) || "android-app".equals(scheme))) {
// Bug 1356893 - Rject intents with file data schemes.
return getSafeIntent(aUri) != null;
}
return true;
}
/**
* Create a safe intent for the given URI.
* Intents with file data schemes are considered unsafe.
*
* @param aUri The URI for the intent.
* @return A safe intent for the given URI or null if URI is considered
* unsafe.
*/
public static Intent getSafeIntent(final Uri aUri) {
final Intent intent;
try {
intent = Intent.parseUri(aUri.toString(), 0);
} catch (final URISyntaxException e) {
return null;
}
final Uri data = intent.getData();
if (data != null &&
"file".equals(normalizeUriScheme(data).getScheme())) {
return null;
}
// Only open applications which can accept arbitrary data from a browser.
intent.addCategory(Intent.CATEGORY_BROWSABLE);
// Prevent site from explicitly opening our internal activities,
// which can leak data.
intent.setComponent(null);
nullIntentSelector(intent);
return intent;
}
// We create a separate method to better encapsulate the @TargetApi use.
@TargetApi(15)
private static void nullIntentSelector(final Intent intent) {
intent.setSelector(null);
}
}