Backed out changeset 2df66e8b7411 (bug 1302140) for Windows build bustage in CertVerifier.cpp. r=backout on a CLOSED TREE

This commit is contained in:
Sebastian Hengst 2016-09-21 20:47:08 +02:00
parent 08c00f4fad
commit d8888f81d1
9 changed files with 82 additions and 92 deletions

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@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ pref("security.OCSP.GET.enabled", false);
pref("security.pki.cert_short_lifetime_in_days", 10);
// NB: Changes to this pref affect CERT_CHAIN_SHA1_POLICY_STATUS telemetry.
// See the comment in CertVerifier.cpp.
// 4 = allow SHA-1 for certificates issued before 2016 or by an imported root.
pref("security.pki.sha1_enforcement_level", 4);
// 3 = allow SHA-1 for certificates issued before 2016 or by an imported root.
pref("security.pki.sha1_enforcement_level", 3);
// security.pki.name_matching_mode controls how the platform matches hostnames
// to name information in TLS certificates. The possible values are:

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@ -152,9 +152,9 @@ CertVerifier::SHA1ModeMoreRestrictiveThanGivenMode(SHA1Mode mode)
switch (mSHA1Mode) {
case SHA1Mode::Forbidden:
return mode != SHA1Mode::Forbidden;
case SHA1Mode::Before2016:
return mode != SHA1Mode::Forbidden && mode != SHA1Mode::Before2016;
case SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot:
return mode != SHA1Mode::Forbidden && mode != SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot;
case SHA1Mode::ImportedRootOrBefore2016:
return mode == SHA1Mode::Allowed;
case SHA1Mode::Allowed:
return false;
@ -283,15 +283,15 @@ CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage,
// results of setting the default policy to a particular configuration.
SHA1Mode sha1ModeConfigurations[] = {
SHA1Mode::Forbidden,
SHA1Mode::Before2016,
SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot,
SHA1Mode::ImportedRootOrBefore2016,
SHA1Mode::Allowed,
};
SHA1ModeResult sha1ModeResults[] = {
SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithoutSHA1,
SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithSHA1Before2016,
SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithImportedRoot,
SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithImportedRootOrSHA1Before2016,
SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithSHA1,
};
@ -346,6 +346,15 @@ CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage,
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth,
evPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse,
ocspStaplingStatus);
// If we succeeded with the SHA1Mode of only allowing imported roots to
// issue SHA1 certificates after 2015, if the chain we built doesn't
// terminate with an imported root, we must reject it. (This only works
// because we try SHA1 configurations in order of decreasing
// strictness.)
// Note that if there existed a certificate chain with a built-in root
// that had SHA1 certificates issued before 2016, it would have already
// been accepted. If such a chain had SHA1 certificates issued after
// 2015, it will only be accepted in the SHA1Mode::Allowed case.
if (rv == Success &&
sha1ModeConfigurations[i] == SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot) {
bool isBuiltInRoot = false;
@ -429,6 +438,15 @@ CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
stapledOCSPResponse,
ocspStaplingStatus);
// If we succeeded with the SHA1Mode of only allowing imported roots
// to issue SHA1 certificates after 2015, if the chain we built
// doesn't terminate with an imported root, we must reject it. (This
// only works because we try SHA1 configurations in order of
// decreasing strictness.)
// Note that if there existed a certificate chain with a built-in root
// that had SHA1 certificates issued before 2016, it would have
// already been accepted. If such a chain had SHA1 certificates issued
// after 2015, it will only be accepted in the SHA1Mode::Allowed case.
if (rv == Success &&
sha1ModeConfigurations[j] == SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot) {
bool isBuiltInRoot = false;
@ -458,13 +476,10 @@ CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage,
if (keySizeStatus) {
*keySizeStatus = KeySizeStatus::AlreadyBad;
}
// The telemetry probe CERT_CHAIN_SHA1_POLICY_STATUS gives us feedback on
// the result of setting a specific policy. However, we don't want noise
// from users who have manually set the policy to Allowed or Forbidden, so
// we only collect for ImportedRoot or ImportedRootOrBefore2016.
if (sha1ModeResult &&
(mSHA1Mode == SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot ||
mSHA1Mode == SHA1Mode::ImportedRootOrBefore2016)) {
// Only collect CERT_CHAIN_SHA1_POLICY_STATUS telemetry indicating a
// failure when mSHA1Mode is the default.
// NB: When we change the default, we have to change this.
if (sha1ModeResult && mSHA1Mode == SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot) {
*sha1ModeResult = SHA1ModeResult::Failed;
}
@ -477,7 +492,7 @@ CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage,
mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
SHA1Mode::Allowed, mNetscapeStepUpPolicy,
mSHA1Mode, mNetscapeStepUpPolicy,
builtChain, nullptr, nullptr);
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA, KeyUsage::keyCertSign,

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@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ enum class KeySizeStatus {
enum class SHA1ModeResult {
NeverChecked = 0,
SucceededWithoutSHA1 = 1,
SucceededWithImportedRoot = 2,
SucceededWithImportedRootOrSHA1Before2016 = 3,
SucceededWithSHA1Before2016 = 2,
SucceededWithImportedRoot = 3,
SucceededWithSHA1 = 4,
Failed = 5,
};
@ -110,12 +110,8 @@ public:
enum class SHA1Mode {
Allowed = 0,
Forbidden = 1,
// There used to be a policy that only allowed SHA1 for certificates issued
// before 2016. This is no longer available. If a user has selected this
// policy in about:config, it now maps to Forbidden.
UsedToBeBefore2016ButNowIsForbidden = 2,
Before2016 = 2,
ImportedRoot = 3,
ImportedRootOrBefore2016 = 4,
};
enum OcspDownloadConfig {
@ -149,8 +145,8 @@ private:
// Returns true if the configured SHA1 mode is more restrictive than the given
// mode. SHA1Mode::Forbidden is more restrictive than any other mode except
// Forbidden. Next is ImportedRoot, then ImportedRootOrBefore2016, then
// Allowed. (A mode is never more restrictive than itself.)
// Forbidden. Next is Before2016, then ImportedRoot, then Allowed.
// (A mode is never more restrictive than itself.)
bool SHA1ModeMoreRestrictiveThanGivenMode(SHA1Mode mode);
};

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@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ NSSCertDBTrustDomain::CheckSignatureDigestAlgorithm(DigestAlgorithm aAlg,
case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::Forbidden:
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("SHA-1 certificate rejected"));
return Result::ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED;
case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::ImportedRootOrBefore2016:
case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::Before2016:
if (JANUARY_FIRST_2016 <= notBefore) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("Post-2015 SHA-1 certificate rejected"));
return Result::ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED;

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@ -1516,20 +1516,14 @@ void nsNSSComponent::setValidationOptions(bool isInitialSetting,
switch (sha1Mode) {
case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::Allowed:
case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::Forbidden:
case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::UsedToBeBefore2016ButNowIsForbidden:
case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::Before2016:
case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot:
case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::ImportedRootOrBefore2016:
break;
default:
sha1Mode = CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::Allowed;
break;
}
// Convert a previously-available setting to a safe one.
if (sha1Mode == CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::UsedToBeBefore2016ButNowIsForbidden) {
sha1Mode = CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::Forbidden;
}
BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode nameMatchingMode =
static_cast<BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode>
(Preferences::GetInt("security.pki.name_matching_mode",

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@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ function checkEndEntity(cert, expectedResult) {
certificateUsageSSLServer, VALIDATION_TIME);
}
function checkIntermediate(cert, expectedResult) {
checkCertErrorGenericAtTime(certdb, cert, expectedResult,
certificateUsageSSLCA, VALIDATION_TIME);
}
function run_test() {
loadCertWithTrust("ca", "CTu,,");
loadCertWithTrust("int-pre", ",,");
@ -42,101 +47,81 @@ function run_test() {
// ===========================
// root
// |
// +--- pre-2016
// +--- pre-2016 <--- (a)
// | |
// | +----- pre-2016 <--- (a)
// | +----- post-2016 <--- (b)
// | +----- pre-2016 <--- (b)
// | +----- post-2016 <--- (c)
// |
// +--- post-2016
// +--- post-2016 <--- (d)
// |
// +----- post-2016 <--- (c)
// +----- post-2016 <--- (e)
//
// Expected outcomes (accept / reject):
//
// a b c
// Allowed (0) Accept Accept Accept
// Forbidden (1) Reject Reject Reject
// (2) is no longer available and is treated as Forbidden (1) internally.
// ImportedRoot (3) Reject Reject Reject (for built-in roots)
// ImportedRoot Accept Accept Accept (for non-built-in roots)
// ImportedRootOrBefore2016 (4) Accept Reject Reject (for built-in roots)
// ImportedRootOrBefore2016 Accept Accept Accept (for non-built-in roots)
// a b c d e
// Allowed=0 Acc Acc Acc Acc Acc
// Forbidden=1 Rej Rej Rej Rej Rej
// Before2016=2 Acc Acc Rej Rej Rej
//
// The pref setting of ImportedRoot accepts usage of SHA-1 only for
// certificates issued by non-built-in roots. By default, the testing
// The pref setting of ImportedRoot (3) accepts usage of SHA-1 for
// certificates valid before 2016 issued by built-in roots or SHA-1 for
// certificates issued any time by non-built-in roots. By default, the testing
// certificates are all considered issued by a non-built-in root. However, we
// have the ability to treat a given non-built-in root as built-in. We test
// both of these situations below.
//
// As a historical note, a policy option (Before2016) was previously available
// that only allowed SHA-1 for certificates with a notBefore before 2016.
// However, to enable the policy of only allowing SHA-1 from non-built-in
// roots in the most straightforward way (while still having a time-based
// policy that users could enable if this new policy were problematic),
// Before2016 was shifted to also allow SHA-1 from non-built-in roots, hence
// ImportedRootOrBefore2016.
//
// A note about intermediate certificates: the certificate verifier has the
// ability to directly verify a given certificate for the purpose of issuing
// TLS web server certificates. However, when asked to do so, the certificate
// verifier does not take into account the currently configured SHA-1 policy.
// This is in part due to implementation complexity and because this isn't
// actually how TLS web server certificates are verified in the TLS handshake
// (which makes a full implementation that supports heeding the SHA-1 policy
// unnecessary).
// now have the ability to treat a given non-built-in root as built-in. We
// test both of these situations below.
// SHA-1 allowed
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.pki.sha1_enforcement_level", 0);
checkIntermediate(certFromFile("int-pre"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-pre_int-pre"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-post_int-pre"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
checkIntermediate(certFromFile("int-post"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-post_int-post"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
// SHA-1 forbidden
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.pki.sha1_enforcement_level", 1);
checkIntermediate(certFromFile("int-pre"), SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-pre_int-pre"), SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-post_int-pre"), SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
checkIntermediate(certFromFile("int-post"), SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-post_int-post"), SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
// SHA-1 forbidden (test the case where the pref has been set to 2)
// SHA-1 allowed only before 2016
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.pki.sha1_enforcement_level", 2);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-pre_int-pre"), SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
checkIntermediate(certFromFile("int-pre"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-pre_int-pre"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-post_int-pre"), SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
checkIntermediate(certFromFile("int-post"), SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-post_int-post"), SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
// SHA-1 allowed only when issued by an imported root. First test with the
// test root considered a built-in (on debug only - this functionality is
// disabled on non-debug builds).
// SHA-1 allowed only before 2016 or when issued by an imported root. First
// test with the test root considered a built-in (on debug only - this
// functionality is disabled on non-debug builds).
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.pki.sha1_enforcement_level", 3);
if (isDebugBuild) {
let root = certFromFile("ca");
Services.prefs.setCharPref("security.test.built_in_root_hash", root.sha256Fingerprint);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-pre_int-pre"), SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-post_int-pre"), SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-post_int-post"), SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
Services.prefs.clearUserPref("security.test.built_in_root_hash");
}
// SHA-1 still allowed only when issued by an imported root.
// Now test with the test root considered a non-built-in.
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-pre_int-pre"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-post_int-pre"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-post_int-post"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
// SHA-1 allowed before 2016 or when issued by an imported root. First test
// with the test root considered a built-in.
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.pki.sha1_enforcement_level", 4);
if (isDebugBuild) {
let root = certFromFile("ca");
Services.prefs.setCharPref("security.test.built_in_root_hash", root.sha256Fingerprint);
checkIntermediate(certFromFile("int-pre"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-pre_int-pre"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-post_int-pre"), SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
// This should fail but it doesn't, because the implementation makes no
// effort to enforce that when verifying a certificate for the capability
// of issuing TLS server auth certificates (i.e. the
// "certificateUsageSSLCA" usage), if SHA-1 was necessary, then the root of
// trust is an imported certificate. We don't really care, though, because
// the platform doesn't actually make trust decisions in this way and the
// ability to even verify a certificate for this purpose is intended to go
// away in bug 1257362.
// checkIntermediate(certFromFile("int-post"), SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-post_int-post"), SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
Services.prefs.clearUserPref("security.test.built_in_root_hash");
}
// SHA-1 still only allowed before 2016 or when issued by an imported root.
// SHA-1 still allowed only before 2016 or when issued by an imported root.
// Now test with the test root considered a non-built-in.
checkIntermediate(certFromFile("int-pre"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-pre_int-pre"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-post_int-pre"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
checkIntermediate(certFromFile("int-post"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
checkEndEntity(certFromFile("ee-post_int-post"), PRErrorCodeSuccess);
}

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@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ function run_test() {
do_get_profile();
Services.prefs.setBoolPref("security.ssl.enable_ocsp_stapling", true);
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.OCSP.enabled", 1);
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.pki.sha1_enforcement_level", 4);
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.pki.sha1_enforcement_level", 3);
add_tls_server_setup("OCSPStaplingServer", "ocsp_certs");
let ocspResponder = new HttpServer();

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@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ function add_ocsp_test(aHost, aExpectedResult, aOCSPResponseToServe,
do_get_profile();
Services.prefs.setBoolPref("security.ssl.enable_ocsp_stapling", true);
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.OCSP.enabled", 1);
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.pki.sha1_enforcement_level", 4);
Services.prefs.setIntPref("security.pki.sha1_enforcement_level", 3);
var args = [["good", "default-ee", "unused"],
["expiredresponse", "default-ee", "unused"],
["oldvalidperiod", "default-ee", "unused"],

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@ -8176,7 +8176,7 @@
"expires_in_version": "default",
"kind": "enumerated",
"n_values": 6,
"description": "1 = No SHA1 signatures, 2 = SHA1 certificates issued by an imported root, 3 = SHA1 certificates issued before 2016, 4 = SHA1 certificates issued after 2015, 5 = another error prevented successful verification"
"description": "1 = No SHA1 signatures, 2 = SHA1 certificates issued before 2016, 3 = SHA1 certificates issued by an imported root, 4 = SHA1 certificates issued after 2015, 5 = another error prevented successful verification"
},
"WEAVE_CONFIGURED": {
"expires_in_version": "default",