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Bug 986730 - Run the FeedWriter sandbox with an expanded principal. r=mrbkap
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@ -221,8 +221,20 @@ FeedWriter.prototype = {
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*/
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__contentSandbox: null,
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get _contentSandbox() {
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// This whole sandbox setup is totally archaic. It was introduced in bug
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// 360529, presumably before the existence of a solid security membrane,
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// since all of the manipulation of content here should be made safe by
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// Xrays. And now that anonymous content is no longer content-accessible,
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// manipulating the xml stylesheet content can't be done from content
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// anymore.
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//
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// The right solution would be to rip out all of this sandbox junk and
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// manipulate the DOM directly. But that's a big yak to shave, so for now,
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// we just give the sandbox an nsExpandedPrincipal with []. This has the
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// effect of giving it Xrays, and making it same-origin with the XBL scope,
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// thereby letting it manipulate anonymous content.
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if (!this.__contentSandbox)
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this.__contentSandbox = new Cu.Sandbox(this._window,
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this.__contentSandbox = new Cu.Sandbox([this._window],
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{sandboxName: 'FeedWriter'});
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return this.__contentSandbox;
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