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Bug 1633338: Use IsPotentiallyTrustworthy to indicate top level window is secure for mixed content blocker. r=baku

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Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D75939
This commit is contained in:
Christoph Kerschbaumer 2020-06-08 07:05:16 +00:00
parent b970921b67
commit fbce1c6145
6 changed files with 22 additions and 24 deletions
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3
docshell/base/WindowContext.cpp
View File

@ -120,7 +120,8 @@ bool WindowContext::CheckOnlyOwningProcessCanSet(ContentParent* aSource) {
return false;
}
bool WindowContext::CanSet(FieldIndex<IDX_IsSecure>, const bool& aIsSecure,
bool WindowContext::CanSet(FieldIndex<IDX_IsPotentiallyTrustWorthy>,
const bool& aIsPotentiallyTrustWorthy,
ContentParent* aSource) {
return CheckOnlyOwningProcessCanSet(aSource);
}

10
docshell/base/WindowContext.h
View File

@ -28,9 +28,9 @@ class BrowsingContextGroup;
* tracking resource */ \
FIELD(IsThirdPartyTrackingResourceWindow, bool) \
FIELD(IsSecureContext, bool) \
/* Mixed-Content: If the corresponding documentURI is https, \
* then this flag is true. */ \
FIELD(IsSecure, bool) \
/* Mixed-Content: If the corresponding document URI is potentially \
* trustworthy, then this flag is true. */ \
FIELD(IsPotentiallyTrustWorthy, bool) \
/* Whether the user has overriden the mixed content blocker to allow \
* mixed content loads to happen */ \
FIELD(AllowMixedContent, bool) \
@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ class WindowContext : public nsISupports, public nsWrapperCache {
bool CheckOnlyOwningProcessCanSet(ContentParent* aSource);
// Overload `CanSet` to get notifications for a particular field being set.
bool CanSet(FieldIndex<IDX_IsSecure>, const bool& aIsSecure,
ContentParent* aSource);
bool CanSet(FieldIndex<IDX_IsPotentiallyTrustWorthy>,
const bool& aIsPotentiallyTrustWorthy, ContentParent* aSource);
bool CanSet(FieldIndex<IDX_AllowMixedContent>, const bool& aAllowMixedContent,
ContentParent* aSource);

8
dom/ipc/WindowGlobalActor.cpp
View File

@ -115,11 +115,9 @@ WindowGlobalInit WindowGlobalActor::WindowInitializer(
}
// Init Mixed Content Fields
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerDocURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(doc->GetDocumentURI());
if (innerDocURI) {
mozilla::Get<WindowContext::IDX_IsSecure>(init.context().mFields) =
innerDocURI->SchemeIs("https");
}
mozilla::Get<WindowContext::IDX_IsPotentiallyTrustWorthy>(
init.context().mFields) =
doc->NodePrincipal()->GetIsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy();
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> mixedChannel;
aWindow->GetDocShell()->GetMixedContentChannel(getter_AddRefs(mixedChannel));
// A non null mixedContent channel on the docshell indicates,

7
dom/ipc/WindowGlobalChild.cpp
View File

@ -220,11 +220,8 @@ void WindowGlobalChild::OnNewDocument(Document* aDocument) {
}
// Init Mixed Content Fields
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerDocURI =
NS_GetInnermostURI(aDocument->GetDocumentURI());
if (innerDocURI) {
txn.SetIsSecure(innerDocURI->SchemeIs("https"));
}
txn.SetIsPotentiallyTrustWorthy(
aDocument->NodePrincipal()->GetIsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy());
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> mixedChannel;
mWindowGlobal->GetDocShell()->GetMixedContentChannel(
getter_AddRefs(mixedChannel));

13
dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp
View File

@ -700,22 +700,23 @@ nsresult nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldLoad(bool aHadInsecureImageRedirect,
// Determine if the rootDoc is https and if the user decided to allow Mixed
// Content
WindowContext* topWC = requestingWindow->TopWindowContext();
bool rootHasSecureConnection = topWC->GetIsSecure();
bool rootIsPotentiallyTrustWorthy = topWC->GetIsPotentiallyTrustWorthy();
bool allowMixedContent = topWC->GetAllowMixedContent();
// When navigating an iframe, the iframe may be https
// but its parents may not be. Check the parents to see if any of them are
// https. If none of the parents are https, allow the load.
if (contentType == TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT && !rootHasSecureConnection) {
bool httpsParentExists = false;
if (contentType == TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT && !rootIsPotentiallyTrustWorthy) {
bool potentiallyTrustWorthyParentExists = false;
RefPtr<WindowContext> curWindow = requestingWindow;
while (!httpsParentExists && curWindow) {
httpsParentExists = curWindow->GetIsSecure();
while (!potentiallyTrustWorthyParentExists && curWindow) {
potentiallyTrustWorthyParentExists =
curWindow->GetIsPotentiallyTrustWorthy();
curWindow = curWindow->GetParentWindowContext();
}
if (!httpsParentExists) {
if (!potentiallyTrustWorthyParentExists) {
*aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
return NS_OK;
}

5
security/manager/ssl/nsSecureBrowserUI.cpp
View File

@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ void nsSecureBrowserUI::UpdateForLocationOrMixedContentChange() {
// with a channel that has a securityInfo that indicates the connection is
// secure - e.g. h2/alt-svc or by visiting an http URI over an https proxy).
nsCOMPtr<nsITransportSecurityInfo> securityInfo;
if (win && win->GetIsSecure()) {
if (win && win->GetIsPotentiallyTrustWorthy()) {
securityInfo = win->GetSecurityInfo();
if (securityInfo) {
MOZ_LOG(gSecureBrowserUILog, LogLevel::Debug,
@ -148,7 +148,8 @@ void nsSecureBrowserUI::UpdateForLocationOrMixedContentChange() {
static const uint32_t kLoadedMixedContentFlags =
nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT |
nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT;
if (win && win->GetIsSecure() && (mState & kLoadedMixedContentFlags)) {
if (win && win->GetIsPotentiallyTrustWorthy() &&
(mState & kLoadedMixedContentFlags)) {
// reset state security flag
mState = mState >> 4 << 4;
// set state security flag to broken, since there is mixed content