This is enough to get the stylo-enabled build green.
There's still some orange in WPT with stylo disabled (due to interfaces not
exposed and that) that I'll update tomorrow.
Will send a different patch on top of this for that, though I'll land together.
MozReview-Commit-ID: CsN5CM93RUz
Note that this patch also replaces legacy VK_* with KEY_*, and replaces
synthesizeKey() for inputting some characters with sendString() because
it's better and clearer what it does and it sets shiftKey state properly.
MozReview-Commit-ID: De4enbjux3T
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 2296b84bff8e22f01eeb48cd8614fac5db11136a
* The number is no longer selected on number input focus
MozReview-Commit-ID: AmR5c6YKTCP
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : fdaab23fca57f361c9185191d9c30e047375cbe8
* The number is no longer selected on number input focus
MozReview-Commit-ID: EoXNqhXwK95
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : b5a522e11796ec42c87019f6c3955e6c40eb21d0
* The number is no longer selected on number input focus
MozReview-Commit-ID: 6XQdnJP65m0
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 96d16469e99fc52c15a0b5024bdf9c3b4211a171
Gecko has two document roles: roles::DOCUMENT_FRAME and roles::DOCUMENT.
However, the former was not being used at all; the latter was being used
for both ARIA documents and for the native document container. We can
therefore fix this issue by repurposing the unused internal role:
* Rename the role from roles::DOCUMENT_FRAME to roles::NON_NATIVE_DOCUMENT,
and add clarification to the doc strings in Role.h
* Ensure load events are still emitted for ARIA documents (bug 759833)
* Update the ARIA-document mochitests to reflect the above changes
* Change the ATK role mapping for roles::DOCUMENT (the native container)
from ATK_ROLE_DOCUMENT_FRAME TO ATK_ROLE_DOCUMENT_WEB.
* On IAccessible2, map roles::NON_NATIVE_DOCUMENT to ROLE_SYSTEM_DOCUMENT.
This should cause there to be no change in behavior for that platform.
* On macOS map roles::NON_NATIVE_DOCUMENT to NSAccessibilityGroupRole
with a subrole of AXDocument.
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : bb6bacfa08c0d22e4e52a25d309d15b2a913320d
This patch was autogenerated by my decomponents.py
It covers almost every file with the extension js, jsm, html, py,
xhtml, or xul.
It removes blank lines after removed lines, when the removed lines are
preceded by either blank lines or the start of a new block. The "start
of a new block" is defined fairly hackily: either the line starts with
//, ends with */, ends with {, <![CDATA[, """ or '''. The first two
cover comments, the third one covers JS, the fourth covers JS embedded
in XUL, and the final two cover JS embedded in Python. This also
applies if the removed line was the first line of the file.
It covers the pattern matching cases like "var {classes: Cc,
interfaces: Ci, utils: Cu, results: Cr} = Components;". It'll remove
the entire thing if they are all either Ci, Cr, Cc or Cu, or it will
remove the appropriate ones and leave the residue behind. If there's
only one behind, then it will turn it into a normal, non-pattern
matching variable definition. (For instance, "const { classes: Cc,
Constructor: CC, interfaces: Ci, utils: Cu } = Components" becomes
"const CC = Components.Constructor".)
MozReview-Commit-ID: DeSHcClQ7cG
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : d9c41878036c1ef7766ef5e91a7005025bc1d72b
This was done using the following script:
37e3803c7a/processors/chromeutils-import.jsm
MozReview-Commit-ID: 1Nc3XDu0wGl
--HG--
extra : source : 12fc4dee861c812fd2bd032c63ef17af61800c70
extra : intermediate-source : 34c999fa006bffe8705cf50c54708aa21a962e62
extra : histedit_source : b2be2c5e5d226e6c347312456a6ae339c1e634b0
This was done using the following script:
37e3803c7a/processors/chromeutils-import.jsm
MozReview-Commit-ID: 1Nc3XDu0wGl
--HG--
extra : source : 12fc4dee861c812fd2bd032c63ef17af61800c70
This was done using the following script:
37e3803c7a/processors/chromeutils-import.jsm
MozReview-Commit-ID: 1Nc3XDu0wGl
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : c004a023389f1f6bf3d2f3efe93c13d423b23ccd
This is a short-term solution to our inability to apply CSP to
chrome-privileged documents.
Ideally, we should be preventing all inline script execution in
chrome-privileged documents, since the reprecussions of XSS in chrome
documents are much worse than in content documents. Unfortunately, that's not
possible in the near term because a) we don't support CSP in system principal
documents at all, and b) we rely heavily on inline JS in our static XUL.
This stop-gap solution at least prevents some of the most common vectors of
XSS attack, by automatically sanitizing any HTML fragment created for a
chrome-privileged document.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 5w17celRFr
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 1c0a1448a06d5b65e548d9f5362d06cc6d865dbe
extra : amend_source : 7184593019f238b86fd1e261941d8e8286fa4006
Recognize the graphics-document, graphics-object, and graphics-symbol
ARIA roles, mapping them to the DOCUMENT, GROUPING, and GRAPHIC internal
roles respectively.
Most of the Shadow DOM related code are behind "dom.webcomponents.enabled" and
this pref is only used by Shadow DOM right now, so we should rename it to
"dom.webcomponents.shadowdom.enabled"
MozReview-Commit-ID: er1c7AsSSW