The telemetry result indicate that unexplained install failures are very rare,
so we don't need to bother keeping this probe.
We should still need to check whether the GMP files disappear from disk, as
telemetry indicates this does happen, though quite rarely.
MozReview-Commit-ID: K64tlRajACJ
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 0778f4bdf85cbd448ca71694c65bd99806307386
The telemetry results indicate there's not a big problem here that we need to
solve. So doesn't seem worth while keeping the probes.
MozReview-Commit-ID: Jnh2Od6jV2X
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : e68addd5883b56c20caaad4c4e958221069f9692
We're actively trying to encourage people to install Windows system decoders to
drive the "can't create" number to 0. So we need this probe to measure our
progress.
MozReview-Commit-ID: BDE7nbaK4NX
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : d98da189ad94906ff79085aac7e0d4bed9e018ce
The best kind of patch: bulk deletion. This removes two separate but
similar build flags, and an unsupported integration piece. The first
packaged Fennec's resources into an ill-defined GeckoView archive; the
second built on the first to produce an Android ARchive for external
consumption. Neither of these artifacts are supported or have
consumers; in fact, they mislead potential consumers, since they're
known to be broken. The Gradle build work under the --with-gradle
flag, and significant follow-up, is the path forward if Mozilla wants
to invest in packaging GeckoView on Android for external consumption.
That is, rather than hacking together AAR files, we'll use the
well-supported Gradle mechanisms for building and publishing such
libraries.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 4Z1jJ8z0cyJ
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : b8e65f39c286313fe8963bf3832d9b6977ef188f
Adds content sandbox metadata to parent and child crash reports:
Includes the value of pref security.sandbox.content.level,
whether or not the system is capable of sandboxing, if the
sandbox was successfully turned on, and (on Linux systems)
the sandbox capabilities flags.
New crash report keys:
"ContentSandboxLevel" in parent and content
"ContentSandboxCapable" in parent
"ContentSandboxEnabled" in content
"ContentSandboxCapabilities" in content on Linux
HSTS priming changes the order of mixed-content blocking and HSTS
upgrades, and adds a priming request to check if a mixed-content load is
accesible over HTTPS and the server supports upgrading via the
Strict-Transport-Security header.
Every call site that uses AsyncOpen2 passes through the mixed-content
blocker, and has a LoadInfo. If the mixed-content blocker marks the load as
needing HSTS priming, nsHttpChannel will build and send an HSTS priming
request on the same URI with the scheme upgraded to HTTPS. If the server
allows the upgrade, then channel performs an internal redirect to the HTTPS URI,
otherwise use the result of mixed-content blocker to allow or block the
load.
nsISiteSecurityService adds an optional boolean out parameter to
determine if the HSTS state is already cached for negative assertions.
If the host has been probed within the previous 24 hours, no HSTS
priming check will be sent.
(r=ckerschb,r=mayhemer,r=jld,r=smaug,r=dkeeler,r=jmaher,p=ally)
HSTS priming changes the order of mixed-content blocking and HSTS
upgrades, and adds a priming request to check if a mixed-content load is
accesible over HTTPS and the server supports upgrading via the
Strict-Transport-Security header.
Every call site that uses AsyncOpen2 passes through the mixed-content
blocker, and has a LoadInfo. If the mixed-content blocker marks the load as
needing HSTS priming, nsHttpChannel will build and send an HSTS priming
request on the same URI with the scheme upgraded to HTTPS. If the server
allows the upgrade, then channel performs an internal redirect to the HTTPS URI,
otherwise use the result of mixed-content blocker to allow or block the
load.
nsISiteSecurityService adds an optional boolean out parameter to
determine if the HSTS state is already cached for negative assertions.
If the host has been probed within the previous 24 hours, no HSTS
priming check will be sent.
(r=ckerschb,r=mayhemer,r=jld,r=smaug,r=dkeeler,r=jmaher,p=ally)
HSTS priming changes the order of mixed-content blocking and HSTS
upgrades, and adds a priming request to check if a mixed-content load is
accesible over HTTPS and the server supports upgrading via the
Strict-Transport-Security header.
Every call site that uses AsyncOpen2 passes through the mixed-content
blocker, and has a LoadInfo. If the mixed-content blocker marks the load as
needing HSTS priming, nsHttpChannel will build and send an HSTS priming
request on the same URI with the scheme upgraded to HTTPS. If the server
allows the upgrade, then channel performs an internal redirect to the HTTPS URI,
otherwise use the result of mixed-content blocker to allow or block the
load.
nsISiteSecurityService adds an optional boolean out parameter to
determine if the HSTS state is already cached for negative assertions.
If the host has been probed within the previous 24 hours, no HSTS
priming check will be sent.
(r=ckerschb,r=mayhemer,r=jld,r=smaug,r=dkeeler,r=jmaher,p=ally)
