Permissions checks for popups were happening in nsIPopupWindowManager,
but that really only required a pref and perm check. The XPCOM
machinery around this isn't really needed, and the check was only
called from two places in content, so this fits in nsContentUtils.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 9x60x1BKWcr
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : d6e2dcfcae8310770eb209ccb42c96315511bb86
This method is not a virtual call, and also looks nicer.
This patch was mostly generated by a Python script, but I manually
cleaned up the code in a few places where statements didn't need to be
split across multiple lines any more.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 8JExxqSRc59
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : df6330a89e8d65dfe7a6fda0c8cb9f9732302efc
Initial version r=smaug.
Rebased to c616a6fd5e4b by Jan-Ivar Bruaroey <jib@mozilla.com> r=karlt.
Rebased to 83de58ddda20 by Karl Tomlinson <karlt+@karlt.net> r=baku.
MozReview-Commit-ID: Lo8TWtN8qyz
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : ffcb7b835ea49cda3e25dfa94a91b3725fdbfb29
This will make it possible to migrate existing bindings without also needing to
mass-rewrite frontend code at the same time.
MozReview-Commit-ID: IBBqC4eeDDX
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : e901ac665208b3a683668c1bb33a26dcf479580c
And then fix up everything else that needs to change as well.
MozReview-Commit-ID: GDMfERqdQAc
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 01fe06c3182245a409099a53383d92bf4fa0155c
This will make it possible to migrate existing bindings without also needing to
mass-rewrite frontend code at the same time.
MozReview-Commit-ID: IBBqC4eeDDX
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : e901ac665208b3a683668c1bb33a26dcf479580c
This attribute was added in bug 1432966 when we started sanitizing
chrome usage of innerHTML to allow devtools to use custom attributes
in React via dangerouslySetInnerHTML.
Devtools removed its usage of dangerouslySetInnerHTML in bug 1434155, so
document.allowUnsafeHTML is no longer used and can be removed.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 8xTVZDmPqRa
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 3d427133ccb8975163b4459af57b5d96ef54c93e
NullPrincipal::Create() (will null OA) may cause an OriginAttributes bypass.
We change Create() so OriginAttributes is no longer optional, and rename
Create() with no arguments to make it more explicit about what the caller is doing.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 7DQGlgh1tgJ
This allows custom elements to work in any document in the parent process that
allows XUL and XBL. The test takes the easy option of moving the existing XUL
custom element test to a run with the custom element pref disabled.
MozReview-Commit-ID: CMiLzmp60jA
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 735688061116c633b816f4f9d488712408df11a5
extra : source : 794ee6857d83dfe0b18629c12e96a622fc899586
This allows custom elements to work in any document in the parent process that
allows XUL and XBL. The test takes the easy option of moving the existing XUL
custom element test to a run with the custom element pref disabled.
MozReview-Commit-ID: CMiLzmp60jA
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : b9632de82cf79c1df15be09fadf1d25817c8a894
extra : amend_source : 235a76453d1d6782903d5051ee8e234b965dcc36
This pref was introduced in case we encountered compatibility issues from
changing the return value of Animation.playState (bug 1412765). Now that the
change to Animation.playState has shipped to release channel without any known
problems we should drop this pref.
MozReview-Commit-ID: CwMWRRtIf6u
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : b26c59a51880406c2b94baad8da2eafeb3ae3202
Summary: It uses two node bits that can be better suited for something else.
Reviewers: xidorn, smaug
Bug #: 1444905
Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D709
MozReview-Commit-ID: HIPDtHm6xpM
Now that what we use to decide whether a document is styled by Servo are only
prefs and the doc principal, we don't need to inherit the style backend type,
since unless the pref has changed, the result will be the same.
MozReview-Commit-ID: KBmeBn1cRne
Poking at the frame tree has problems: If we poke in negative (using
eSkipNativeAnonymousContent), as we were doing, we mess up the case where we're
actually _not_ doc-level, and _not_ ::before or ::after. This can't happen for
content documents, but can happen for chrome (since nsDocElementBoxFrame
implements nsIAnonymousContentCreator).
If we poke in positive, as we used to, you get that right, but mess up the
root scrollbar case.
Instead, use a node property to mark doc level anon content. This is a case rare
enough that it seems worth to not steal a node bit.
To recap the failure:
* The initial value of -moz-control-character-visiblity is different on beta
and nightly.
* XUL has a global rule setting -moz-control-character-visibility on the root,
to a value so that it's the initial one on nightly, but the non-initial one
on beta.
* Changes to this property cause a reframe.
* Reframes of a nsIAnonymousContentCreator anon content reframe the container.
* We were failing to inherit correctly for the nsIAnonymousContentCreator
content for the root XUL element on the initial styling, inheriting from the
default computed values instead, since we failed to reach the root element's
primary frame from GetFlattenedTreeParentForDocumentElementNAC ->
AppendDocumentLevelNativeAnonymousContentTo, since the primary frame is set
_after_ processing children.
This seems somewhat risky to change, and inconsistent with any other stuff
the frame constructor does, see bug 973390.
* Given that, the next restyle of the root element, in this case caused due to
the customizable UI, we _found_ the actual correct parent, recomputed the
style, saw that -moz-control-character-visiblity had changed, and reframed.
But we were reframing the whole window, not just the NAC, because of the
fourth bullet point. Reframing the whole window caused us to lose the popup
state (that's bug 1440506).
Worse than that is the fact that given we reframe and reconstruct the
anonymous countent again, we go back to the initial bogus state, just
awaiting for the next restyle to reframe the whole window.
I wish there was a bullet-proof way to test it that isn't just counting reframes
and relying on which properties reframe or not, but due to the nature of
nsIAnonymousContentCreator's NAC, it's not possible in any easy way I can think
of.
MozReview-Commit-ID: IPYB5trsN8R
It would be convenient to get nsPresContext from nsIDocument.
MozReview-Commit-ID: Ei6V3UE8XGr
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 8d2a917eb62cf341e4e1810451fd01c01dbc3bad
nsIDOMWindowUtils::sendKeyEvent() is already replaced with nsITextInputProcessor
for making callers set any attributes of KeyboardEvent and guaranteeing
consistency behavior with keyboard events caused by native key events. E.g.,
whether keypress event should be dispatched or not is automatically decided.
nsIFrameLoader::sendCrossProcessKeyEvent() is similart to
nsIDOMWindowUtils::sendKeyEvent() but it dispatches keyboard events in
child process directly. Currently, nsITextInputProcessor doesn't have this
feature but nobody wants/uses this feature. So, for removing actual
implementation of nsIDOMWindowUtils::sendKeyEvent(), i.e.,
nsContentUtils::SendKeyEvent(), which is shared by both
nsDOMWindowUtils::SendKeyEvent() and nsFrameLoader::SendCrossProcessKeyEvent(),
we should remove this unused API too. (FYI: it's implemented for old Fennec,
by bug 553149.)
MozReview-Commit-ID: 9n0UVo8Me8k
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : e9b117f5b9afec76e63d57ab8cd86dafb5873789
Since we are dealing with the element (nodeInfo->LocalName() and NameAtom() are the same value),
we could use nodeInfo->NameAtom() instead.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 4vIBDEM1Nwv
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 150d5ea982363eb2ef4c5039fae67be1e08884ba
This is a short-term solution to our inability to apply CSP to
chrome-privileged documents.
Ideally, we should be preventing all inline script execution in
chrome-privileged documents, since the reprecussions of XSS in chrome
documents are much worse than in content documents. Unfortunately, that's not
possible in the near term because a) we don't support CSP in system principal
documents at all, and b) we rely heavily on inline JS in our static XUL.
This stop-gap solution at least prevents some of the most common vectors of
XSS attack, by automatically sanitizing any HTML fragment created for a
chrome-privileged document.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 5w17celRFr
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 1c0a1448a06d5b65e548d9f5362d06cc6d865dbe
extra : amend_source : 7184593019f238b86fd1e261941d8e8286fa4006
Most of the Shadow DOM related code are behind "dom.webcomponents.enabled" and
this pref is only used by Shadow DOM right now, so we should rename it to
"dom.webcomponents.shadowdom.enabled"
MozReview-Commit-ID: er1c7AsSSW
The whole function doesn't have much sense.
I killed its only DOM use in bug 1427511.
Now it only has two callers in nsCSSFrameConstructor, which basically only want
to know whether the children of the same node can have different flattened tree
parents.
So let's check that directly instead (checking whether the element has a binding
or a shadow root), and simplify a bit other surrounding code while at it.
Leave the XUL popup / menubar code doing the broken thing they were doing
beforehand, because it doesn't look to me like it's trivial to fix... They're
effectively assuming that the children of the menupopup end up in a single
insertion point, which is true, but doesn't need to be. Maybe they should walk
the DOM tree? Don't want to dig into that right now, since XUL insertion points
can be filtered and all that... Not fun.
Also, this removes the broken optimization that used to check
mParentFrame->GetContent()->HasChildren(), because it's pretty broken. It used
to be relevant before bug 653881, because <children> element used to not exist,
but now the insertion point at least needs to contain the <children> element all
the time.
There even used to be a XXX comment saying that the optimization didn't work,
which was removed in:
https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/2d8585ec74b3
We could still check for "no insertion points", and optimize that, but it
doesn't seem worth it.
MozReview-Commit-ID: L4lspkxKENr
