nsCertOverrideService uses a ReentrantMonitor to protect its inner
state. However, there's no way for nsCertOverrideService's methods to
be re-entered when calling outside code. The use of ReentrantMonitor
appears to be compensating for an unclear division of locking
responsibilities, by enabling every method to simply lock the
ReentrantMonitor upon entrance without care for who might have locked it
beforehand.
Using Mutex is cheaper than ReentrantMonitor, and also forces us to
make explicit who's required to do locking, and who needs to do work
with the lock held.
Calling VFY_VerifyDigestDirect causes the provided SECKEYPublicKey to be
reimported to the softoken regardless of if it already exists on it. EC keys
must be verified upon import (to see if the point is on the curve to avoid some
small subgroup attacks), and so repeatedly doing this with a static key (say,
for example, a key corresponding to a built-in certificate transparency log) is
inefficient. This patch alters the certificate transparency implementation to
import these keys each once and then use PK11_Verify for ECDSA signature
verification, which doesn't have the same drawback.
Since this change causes CertVerifier to hold an NSS resource (via its
MultiLogCTVerifier having a list of CTLogVerifier, each of which now has a
SECKEYPublicKey), nsNSSComponent has to make sure it goes away before shutting
down NSS. This patch ensures this happens in nsNSSComponent::ShutdownNSS().
MozReview-Commit-ID: 6VSmz7S53y2
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 4994db9de80a6c1aec3d7e322ff30d040140ce92
Everything depending on the widget being gonk can go away, as well as
everything depending on MOZ_AUDIO_CHANNEL_MANAGER, which was only
defined on gonk builds under b2g/ (which goes away in bug 1357326).
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 9f0aeeb7eea8417fa4e06d662d566d67ecaf2a24
This changes does several things:
1. Changes some titles to include the word "driver" for better clarity.
2. Moves and cleans up the JS implementation of load_device.xul. Having a
cleaner implementation in a separate file makes the code easier to discover
and maintain.
3. Removes code that tries to show a special case message if a module was
already loaded.
3A. The backend code doesn't provide distinction from this case and failure to
add in general.
3B. The backend code would only return the error code being checked for if a
blank module name was provided.
4. Adds tests.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 8BxKWKw5rvp
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 15a29bf7d46f523a11eac37c9f0c6efb2b5d0114
The default OCSP timeout for soft-fail DV is still 2 seconds. This patch makes
it configurable on the interval (0, 5] seconds.
The default OCSP timeout for EV and hard-fail DV is still 10 seconds. This patch
makes it configurable on the interval (0, 20] seconds.
MozReview-Commit-ID: CPd8pwYrJhj
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 45bd7d06ea013f0a776ea18be9408dedb18271d8
(adapted from bug 1349762 comment 0)
Google Trust Services (GTS) recently purchased two roots from GlobalSign that
are both enabled for EV treatment: "GlobalSign Root CA - R2" and "GlobalSign ECC
Root CA - R4".
However, GTS does not have an EV audit, so we are going to turn off EV treatment
for both of those root certificates.
But "GlobalSign Root CA - R2" has intermediate cert "GlobalSign Extended
Validation CA - SHA256 - G2" that continues to be controlled by GlobalSign, to
be used to migrate their customers off dependence on that root.
This patch removes EV treatment for "GlobalSign ECC Root CA - R4". It also
removes EV treatment for all chains rooted in "GlobalSign Root CA - R2" unless
the "GlobalSign Extended Validation CA - SHA256 - G2" intermediate is in the
chain.
MozReview-Commit-ID: Ej9L9zTwoPN
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 575f1a48646cf728d879d0cf53c888654e4a32ad
These directories contain sensitive content, and access is not necessary now that we have file content processes.
r=haik
MozReview-Commit-ID: FiRJkMnlYUx
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 0bcdefcb1ea410fb26c3f8373673488e2a5fdd75
