/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ #include "nsCSPUtils.h" #include "nsDebug.h" #include "nsIConsoleService.h" #include "nsICryptoHash.h" #include "nsIScriptError.h" #include "nsIServiceManager.h" #include "nsIStringBundle.h" #include "nsNetUtil.h" #include "nsReadableUtils.h" #if defined(PR_LOGGING) static PRLogModuleInfo* GetCspUtilsLog() { static PRLogModuleInfo* gCspUtilsPRLog; if (!gCspUtilsPRLog) gCspUtilsPRLog = PR_NewLogModule("CSPUtils"); return gCspUtilsPRLog; } #endif #define CSPUTILSLOG(args) PR_LOG(GetCspUtilsLog(), 4, args) void CSP_GetLocalizedStr(const char16_t* aName, const char16_t** aParams, uint32_t aLength, char16_t** outResult) { nsCOMPtr keyStringBundle; nsCOMPtr stringBundleService = mozilla::services::GetStringBundleService(); NS_ASSERTION(stringBundleService, "String bundle service must be present!"); stringBundleService->CreateBundle("chrome://global/locale/security/csp.properties", getter_AddRefs(keyStringBundle)); NS_ASSERTION(keyStringBundle, "Key string bundle must be available!"); if (!keyStringBundle) { return; } keyStringBundle->FormatStringFromName(aName, aParams, aLength, outResult); } void CSP_LogStrMessage(const nsAString& aMsg) { nsCOMPtr console(do_GetService("@mozilla.org/consoleservice;1")); if (!console) { return; } nsString msg = PromiseFlatString(aMsg); console->LogStringMessage(msg.get()); } void CSP_LogMessage(const nsAString& aMessage, const nsAString& aSourceName, const nsAString& aSourceLine, uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber, uint32_t aFlags, const char *aCategory, uint32_t aInnerWindowID) { nsCOMPtr console(do_GetService(NS_CONSOLESERVICE_CONTRACTID)); nsCOMPtr error(do_CreateInstance(NS_SCRIPTERROR_CONTRACTID)); if (!console || !error) { return; } // Prepending CSP to the outgoing console message nsString cspMsg; cspMsg.Append(NS_LITERAL_STRING("Content Security Policy: ")); cspMsg.Append(aMessage); nsresult rv; if (aInnerWindowID > 0) { nsCString catStr; catStr.AssignASCII(aCategory); rv = error->InitWithWindowID(cspMsg, aSourceName, aSourceLine, aLineNumber, aColumnNumber, aFlags, catStr, aInnerWindowID); } else { rv = error->Init(cspMsg, aSourceName, aSourceLine, aLineNumber, aColumnNumber, aFlags, aCategory); } if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return; } console->LogMessage(error); } /** * Combines CSP_LogMessage and CSP_GetLocalizedStr into one call. */ void CSP_LogLocalizedStr(const char16_t* aName, const char16_t** aParams, uint32_t aLength, const nsAString& aSourceName, const nsAString& aSourceLine, uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber, uint32_t aFlags, const char* aCategory, uint32_t aInnerWindowID) { nsXPIDLString logMsg; CSP_GetLocalizedStr(aName, aParams, aLength, getter_Copies(logMsg)); CSP_LogMessage(logMsg, aSourceName, aSourceLine, aLineNumber, aColumnNumber, aFlags, aCategory, aInnerWindowID); } /* ===== Helpers ============================ */ CSPDirective CSP_ContentTypeToDirective(nsContentPolicyType aType) { switch (aType) { case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE: case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET: return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::IMG_SRC_DIRECTIVE; // BLock XSLT as script, see bug 910139 case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XSLT: case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT: return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE; case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET: return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::STYLE_SRC_DIRECTIVE; case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FONT: return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FONT_SRC_DIRECTIVE; case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_MEDIA: return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::MEDIA_SRC_DIRECTIVE; case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT: return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_SRC_DIRECTIVE; case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET: case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST: case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_BEACON: case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH: return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::CONNECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE; case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT: case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST: return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::OBJECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE; case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XBL: case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_PING: case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD: case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER: return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::DEFAULT_SRC_DIRECTIVE; // csp shold not block top level loads, e.g. in case // of a redirect. case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT: // CSP can not block csp reports case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT: return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::NO_DIRECTIVE; // Fall through to error for all other directives default: MOZ_ASSERT(false, "Can not map nsContentPolicyType to CSPDirective"); } return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::DEFAULT_SRC_DIRECTIVE; } nsCSPHostSrc* CSP_CreateHostSrcFromURI(nsIURI* aURI) { // Create the host first nsCString host; aURI->GetHost(host); nsCSPHostSrc *hostsrc = new nsCSPHostSrc(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(host)); // Add the scheme. nsCString scheme; aURI->GetScheme(scheme); hostsrc->setScheme(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(scheme)); int32_t port; aURI->GetPort(&port); // Only add port if it's not default port. if (port > 0) { nsAutoString portStr; portStr.AppendInt(port); hostsrc->setPort(portStr); } return hostsrc; } bool CSP_IsValidDirective(const nsAString& aDir) { uint32_t numDirs = (sizeof(CSPStrDirectives) / sizeof(CSPStrDirectives[0])); for (uint32_t i = 0; i < numDirs; i++) { if (aDir.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(CSPStrDirectives[i])) { return true; } } return false; } bool CSP_IsDirective(const nsAString& aValue, CSPDirective aDir) { return aValue.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(aDir)); } bool CSP_IsKeyword(const nsAString& aValue, enum CSPKeyword aKey) { return aValue.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKey)); } bool CSP_IsQuotelessKeyword(const nsAString& aKey) { nsString lowerKey = PromiseFlatString(aKey); ToLowerCase(lowerKey); static_assert(CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE == (sizeof(CSPStrKeywords) / sizeof(CSPStrKeywords[0])), "CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE does not match length of CSPStrKeywords"); nsAutoString keyword; for (uint32_t i = 0; i < CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE; i++) { // skipping the leading ' and trimming the trailing ' keyword.AssignASCII(CSPStrKeywords[i] + 1); keyword.Trim("'", false, true); if (lowerKey.Equals(keyword)) { return true; } } return false; } /* ===== nsCSPSrc ============================ */ nsCSPBaseSrc::nsCSPBaseSrc() { } nsCSPBaseSrc::~nsCSPBaseSrc() { } // ::permits is only called for external load requests, therefore: // nsCSPKeywordSrc and nsCSPHashSource fall back to this base class // implementation which will never allow the load. bool nsCSPBaseSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected) const { #ifdef PR_LOGGING { nsAutoCString spec; aUri->GetSpec(spec); CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPBaseSrc::permits, aUri: %s", spec.get())); } #endif return false; } // ::allows is only called for inlined loads, therefore: // nsCSPSchemeSrc, nsCSPHostSrc fall back // to this base class implementation which will never allow the load. bool nsCSPBaseSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce) const { CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPBaseSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s", aKeyword == CSP_HASH ? "hash" : CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get())); return false; } /* ====== nsCSPSchemeSrc ===================== */ nsCSPSchemeSrc::nsCSPSchemeSrc(const nsAString& aScheme) : mScheme(aScheme) { ToLowerCase(mScheme); } nsCSPSchemeSrc::~nsCSPSchemeSrc() { } bool nsCSPSchemeSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected) const { #ifdef PR_LOGGING { nsAutoCString spec; aUri->GetSpec(spec); CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPSchemeSrc::permits, aUri: %s", spec.get())); } #endif NS_ASSERTION((!mScheme.EqualsASCII("")), "scheme can not be the empty string"); nsAutoCString scheme; nsresult rv = aUri->GetScheme(scheme); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); return mScheme.EqualsASCII(scheme.get()); } void nsCSPSchemeSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const { outStr.Append(mScheme); outStr.AppendASCII(":"); } /* ===== nsCSPHostSrc ======================== */ nsCSPHostSrc::nsCSPHostSrc(const nsAString& aHost) : mHost(aHost) , mAllowHttps(false) { ToLowerCase(mHost); } nsCSPHostSrc::~nsCSPHostSrc() { } bool nsCSPHostSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected) const { #ifdef PR_LOGGING { nsAutoCString spec; aUri->GetSpec(spec); CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPHostSrc::permits, aUri: %s", spec.get())); } #endif // we are following the enforcement rules from the spec, see: // http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#match-source-expression // 4.3) scheme matching: Check if the scheme matches. nsAutoCString scheme; nsresult rv = aUri->GetScheme(scheme); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); if (!mScheme.IsEmpty() && !mScheme.EqualsASCII(scheme.get())) { // We should not return false for scheme-less sources where the protected resource // is http and the load is https, see: // http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#match-source-expression bool isHttpsScheme = (NS_SUCCEEDED(aUri->SchemeIs("https", &isHttpsScheme)) && isHttpsScheme); if (!(isHttpsScheme && mAllowHttps)) { return false; } } // The host in nsCSpHostSrc should never be empty. In case we are enforcing // just a specific scheme, the parser should generate a nsCSPSchemeSource. NS_ASSERTION((!mHost.IsEmpty()), "host can not be the empty string"); // 2) host matching: Enforce a single * if (mHost.EqualsASCII("*")) { return true; } // Before we can check if the host matches, we have to // extract the host part from aUri. nsAutoCString uriHost; rv = aUri->GetHost(uriHost); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); // 4.5) host matching: Check if the allowed host starts with a wilcard. if (mHost.First() == '*') { NS_ASSERTION(mHost[1] == '.', "Second character needs to be '.' whenever host starts with '*'"); // Eliminate leading "*", but keeping the FULL STOP (.) thereafter before checking // if the remaining characters match nsString wildCardHost = mHost; wildCardHost = Substring(wildCardHost, 1, wildCardHost.Length() - 1); if (!StringEndsWith(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriHost), wildCardHost)) { return false; } } // 4.6) host matching: Check if hosts match. else if (!mHost.Equals(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriHost))) { return false; } // 4.9) Path matching: If there is a path, we have to enforce // path-level matching, unless the channel got redirected, see: // http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#source-list-paths-and-redirects if (!aWasRedirected && !mPath.IsEmpty()) { // cloning uri so we can ignore the ref nsCOMPtr uri; aUri->CloneIgnoringRef(getter_AddRefs(uri)); nsAutoCString uriPath; rv = uri->GetPath(uriPath); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); // check if the last character of mPath is '/'; if so // we just have to check loading resource is within // the allowed path. if (mPath.Last() == '/') { if (!StringBeginsWith(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriPath), mPath)) { return false; } } // otherwise mPath whitelists a specific file, and we have to // check if the loading resource matches that whitelisted file. else { if (!mPath.Equals(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriPath))) { return false; } } } // 4.8) Port matching: If port uses wildcard, allow the load. if (mPort.EqualsASCII("*")) { return true; } // Before we can check if the port matches, we have to // query the port from aUri. int32_t uriPort; rv = aUri->GetPort(&uriPort); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); uriPort = (uriPort > 0) ? uriPort : NS_GetDefaultPort(scheme.get()); // 4.7) Default port matching: If mPort is empty, we have to compare default ports. if (mPort.IsEmpty()) { int32_t port = NS_GetDefaultPort(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mScheme).get()); if (port != uriPort) { // We should not return false for scheme-less sources where the protected resource // is http and the load is https, see: http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#match-source-expression // BUT, we only allow scheme-less sources to be upgraded from http to https if CSP // does not explicitly define a port. if (!(uriPort == NS_GetDefaultPort("https") && mAllowHttps)) { return false; } } } // 4.7) Port matching: Compare the ports. else { nsString portStr; portStr.AppendInt(uriPort); if (!mPort.Equals(portStr)) { return false; } } // At the end: scheme, host, path, and port match -> allow the load. return true; } void nsCSPHostSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const { // If mHost is a single "*", we append the wildcard and return. if (mHost.EqualsASCII("*") && mScheme.IsEmpty() && mPort.IsEmpty()) { outStr.Append(mHost); return; } // append scheme outStr.Append(mScheme); // append host outStr.AppendASCII("://"); outStr.Append(mHost); // append port if (!mPort.IsEmpty()) { outStr.AppendASCII(":"); outStr.Append(mPort); } // append path outStr.Append(mPath); } void nsCSPHostSrc::setScheme(const nsAString& aScheme, bool aAllowHttps) { mScheme = aScheme; ToLowerCase(mScheme); mAllowHttps = aAllowHttps; } void nsCSPHostSrc::setPort(const nsAString& aPort) { mPort = aPort; ToLowerCase(mPort); } void nsCSPHostSrc::appendPath(const nsAString& aPath) { mPath.Append(aPath); ToLowerCase(mPath); } /* ===== nsCSPKeywordSrc ===================== */ nsCSPKeywordSrc::nsCSPKeywordSrc(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword) { NS_ASSERTION((aKeyword != CSP_SELF), "'self' should have been replaced in the parser"); mKeyword = aKeyword; } nsCSPKeywordSrc::~nsCSPKeywordSrc() { } bool nsCSPKeywordSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce) const { CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPKeywordSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s", CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get())); return mKeyword == aKeyword; } void nsCSPKeywordSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const { outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_EnumToKeyword(mKeyword)); } /* ===== nsCSPNonceSrc ==================== */ nsCSPNonceSrc::nsCSPNonceSrc(const nsAString& aNonce) : mNonce(aNonce) { } nsCSPNonceSrc::~nsCSPNonceSrc() { } bool nsCSPNonceSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected) const { #ifdef PR_LOGGING { nsAutoCString spec; aUri->GetSpec(spec); CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPNonceSrc::permits, aUri: %s, aNonce: %s", spec.get(), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aNonce).get())); } #endif return mNonce.Equals(aNonce); } bool nsCSPNonceSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce) const { CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPNonceSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s", CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get())); if (aKeyword != CSP_NONCE) { return false; } return mNonce.Equals(aHashOrNonce); } void nsCSPNonceSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const { outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_EnumToKeyword(CSP_NONCE)); outStr.Append(mNonce); outStr.AppendASCII("'"); } /* ===== nsCSPHashSrc ===================== */ nsCSPHashSrc::nsCSPHashSrc(const nsAString& aAlgo, const nsAString& aHash) : mAlgorithm(aAlgo) , mHash(aHash) { // Only the algo should be rewritten to lowercase, the hash must remain the same. ToLowerCase(mAlgorithm); } nsCSPHashSrc::~nsCSPHashSrc() { } bool nsCSPHashSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce) const { CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPHashSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s", CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get())); if (aKeyword != CSP_HASH) { return false; } // Convert aHashOrNonce to UTF-8 NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8 utf8_hash(aHashOrNonce); nsresult rv; nsCOMPtr hasher; hasher = do_CreateInstance("@mozilla.org/security/hash;1", &rv); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); rv = hasher->InitWithString(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mAlgorithm)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); rv = hasher->Update((uint8_t *)utf8_hash.get(), utf8_hash.Length()); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); nsAutoCString hash; rv = hasher->Finish(true, hash); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); // The NSS Base64 encoder automatically adds linebreaks "\r\n" every 64 // characters. We need to remove these so we can properly validate longer // (SHA-512) base64-encoded hashes hash.StripChars("\r\n"); return NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mHash).Equals(hash); } void nsCSPHashSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const { outStr.AppendASCII("'"); outStr.Append(mAlgorithm); outStr.AppendASCII("-"); outStr.Append(mHash); outStr.AppendASCII("'"); } /* ===== nsCSPReportURI ===================== */ nsCSPReportURI::nsCSPReportURI(nsIURI *aURI) :mReportURI(aURI) { } nsCSPReportURI::~nsCSPReportURI() { } void nsCSPReportURI::toString(nsAString& outStr) const { nsAutoCString spec; nsresult rv = mReportURI->GetSpec(spec); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return; } outStr.AppendASCII(spec.get()); } /* ===== nsCSPDirective ====================== */ nsCSPDirective::nsCSPDirective(CSPDirective aDirective) { mDirective = aDirective; } nsCSPDirective::~nsCSPDirective() { for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) { delete mSrcs[i]; } } bool nsCSPDirective::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected) const { #ifdef PR_LOGGING { nsAutoCString spec; aUri->GetSpec(spec); CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPDirective::permits, aUri: %s", spec.get())); } #endif for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) { if (mSrcs[i]->permits(aUri, aNonce, aWasRedirected)) { return true; } } return false; } bool nsCSPDirective::permits(nsIURI* aUri) const { nsString dummyNonce; return permits(aUri, dummyNonce, false); } bool nsCSPDirective::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce) const { CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPDirective::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s", CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get())); for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) { if (mSrcs[i]->allows(aKeyword, aHashOrNonce)) { return true; } } return false; } void nsCSPDirective::toString(nsAString& outStr) const { // Append directive name outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(mDirective)); outStr.AppendASCII(" "); // Append srcs uint32_t length = mSrcs.Length(); for (uint32_t i = 0; i < length; i++) { mSrcs[i]->toString(outStr); if (i != (length - 1)) { outStr.AppendASCII(" "); } } } bool nsCSPDirective::restrictsContentType(nsContentPolicyType aContentType) const { // make sure we do not check for the default src before any other sources if (isDefaultDirective()) { return false; } return mDirective == CSP_ContentTypeToDirective(aContentType); } void nsCSPDirective::getReportURIs(nsTArray &outReportURIs) const { NS_ASSERTION((mDirective == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REPORT_URI_DIRECTIVE), "not a report-uri directive"); // append uris nsString tmpReportURI; for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) { tmpReportURI.Truncate(); mSrcs[i]->toString(tmpReportURI); outReportURIs.AppendElement(tmpReportURI); } } /* ===== nsCSPPolicy ========================= */ nsCSPPolicy::nsCSPPolicy() : mReportOnly(false) { CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPPolicy::nsCSPPolicy")); } nsCSPPolicy::~nsCSPPolicy() { CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPPolicy::~nsCSPPolicy")); for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) { delete mDirectives[i]; } } bool nsCSPPolicy::permits(CSPDirective aDir, nsIURI* aUri, bool aSpecific) const { nsString outp; return this->permits(aDir, aUri, EmptyString(), false, aSpecific, outp); } bool nsCSPPolicy::permits(CSPDirective aDir, nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected, bool aSpecific, nsAString& outViolatedDirective) const { #ifdef PR_LOGGING { nsAutoCString spec; aUri->GetSpec(spec); CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPPolicy::permits, aUri: %s, aDir: %d, aSpecific: %s", spec.get(), aDir, aSpecific ? "true" : "false")); } #endif NS_ASSERTION(aUri, "permits needs an uri to perform the check!"); nsCSPDirective* defaultDir = nullptr; // Try to find a relevant directive // These directive arrays are short (1-5 elements), not worth using a hashtable. for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) { if (mDirectives[i]->equals(aDir)) { if (!mDirectives[i]->permits(aUri, aNonce, aWasRedirected)) { mDirectives[i]->toString(outViolatedDirective); return false; } return true; } if (mDirectives[i]->isDefaultDirective()) { defaultDir = mDirectives[i]; } } // If the above loop runs through, we haven't found a matching directive. // Avoid relooping, just store the result of default-src while looping. if (!aSpecific && defaultDir) { if (!defaultDir->permits(aUri, aNonce, aWasRedirected)) { defaultDir->toString(outViolatedDirective); return false; } return true; } // Nothing restricts this, so we're allowing the load // See bug 764937 return true; } bool nsCSPPolicy::allows(nsContentPolicyType aContentType, enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce) const { CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPPolicy::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s", CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get())); nsCSPDirective* defaultDir = nullptr; // Try to find a matching directive for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) { if (mDirectives[i]->restrictsContentType(aContentType)) { if (mDirectives[i]->allows(aKeyword, aHashOrNonce)) { return true; } return false; } if (mDirectives[i]->isDefaultDirective()) { defaultDir = mDirectives[i]; } } // Only match {nonce,hash}-source on specific directives (not default-src) if (aKeyword == CSP_NONCE || aKeyword == CSP_HASH) { return false; } // If the above loop runs through, we haven't found a matching directive. // Avoid relooping, just store the result of default-src while looping. if (defaultDir) { return defaultDir->allows(aKeyword, aHashOrNonce); } // Allowing the load; see Bug 885433 // a) inline scripts (also unsafe eval) should only be blocked // if there is a [script-src] or [default-src] // b) inline styles should only be blocked // if there is a [style-src] or [default-src] return true; } bool nsCSPPolicy::allows(nsContentPolicyType aContentType, enum CSPKeyword aKeyword) const { return allows(aContentType, aKeyword, NS_LITERAL_STRING("")); } void nsCSPPolicy::toString(nsAString& outStr) const { uint32_t length = mDirectives.Length(); for (uint32_t i = 0; i < length; ++i) { if (mDirectives[i]->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REFERRER_DIRECTIVE)) { outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REFERRER_DIRECTIVE)); outStr.AppendASCII(" "); outStr.Append(mReferrerPolicy); } else { mDirectives[i]->toString(outStr); } if (i != (length - 1)) { outStr.AppendASCII("; "); } } } bool nsCSPPolicy::hasDirective(CSPDirective aDir) const { for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) { if (mDirectives[i]->equals(aDir)) { return true; } } return false; } /* * Use this function only after ::allows() returned 'false'. Most and * foremost it's used to get the violated directive before sending reports. * The parameter outDirective is the equivalent of 'outViolatedDirective' * for the ::permits() function family. */ void nsCSPPolicy::getDirectiveStringForContentType(nsContentPolicyType aContentType, nsAString& outDirective) const { nsCSPDirective* defaultDir = nullptr; for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) { if (mDirectives[i]->restrictsContentType(aContentType)) { mDirectives[i]->toString(outDirective); return; } if (mDirectives[i]->isDefaultDirective()) { defaultDir = mDirectives[i]; } } // if we haven't found a matching directive yet, // the contentType must be restricted by the default directive if (defaultDir) { defaultDir->toString(outDirective); return; } NS_ASSERTION(false, "Can not query directive string for contentType!"); outDirective.AppendASCII("couldNotQueryViolatedDirective"); } void nsCSPPolicy::getDirectiveAsString(CSPDirective aDir, nsAString& outDirective) const { for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) { if (mDirectives[i]->equals(aDir)) { mDirectives[i]->toString(outDirective); return; } } } void nsCSPPolicy::getReportURIs(nsTArray& outReportURIs) const { for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) { if (mDirectives[i]->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REPORT_URI_DIRECTIVE)) { mDirectives[i]->getReportURIs(outReportURIs); return; } } }