/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ /* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */ /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ #include "nsScriptSecurityManager.h" #include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h" #include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_extensions.h" #include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h" #include "mozilla/StoragePrincipalHelper.h" #include "xpcpublic.h" #include "XPCWrapper.h" #include "nsILoadContext.h" #include "nsIScriptObjectPrincipal.h" #include "nsIScriptContext.h" #include "nsIScriptError.h" #include "nsINestedURI.h" #include "nspr.h" #include "nsJSPrincipals.h" #include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h" #include "mozilla/ContentPrincipal.h" #include "ExpandedPrincipal.h" #include "SystemPrincipal.h" #include "DomainPolicy.h" #include "nsString.h" #include "nsCRT.h" #include "nsCRTGlue.h" #include "nsContentSecurityUtils.h" #include "nsDocShell.h" #include "nsError.h" #include "nsGlobalWindowInner.h" #include "nsDOMCID.h" #include "nsTextFormatter.h" #include "nsIStringBundle.h" #include "nsNetUtil.h" #include "nsIEffectiveTLDService.h" #include "nsDirectoryServiceDefs.h" #include "nsIScriptGlobalObject.h" #include "nsPIDOMWindow.h" #include "nsIDocShell.h" #include "nsIConsoleService.h" #include "nsIOService.h" #include "nsIContent.h" #include "nsDOMJSUtils.h" #include "nsAboutProtocolUtils.h" #include "nsIClassInfo.h" #include "nsIURIFixup.h" #include "nsIURIMutator.h" #include "nsIChromeRegistry.h" #include "nsIResProtocolHandler.h" #include "nsIContentSecurityPolicy.h" #include "mozilla/Components.h" #include "mozilla/Preferences.h" #include "mozilla/dom/BindingUtils.h" #include "mozilla/NullPrincipal.h" #include #include "mozilla/dom/ContentChild.h" #include "mozilla/dom/ContentParent.h" #include "mozilla/dom/Exceptions.h" #include "mozilla/dom/nsCSPContext.h" #include "mozilla/dom/ScriptSettings.h" #include "mozilla/ClearOnShutdown.h" #include "mozilla/ExtensionPolicyService.h" #include "mozilla/ResultExtensions.h" #include "mozilla/StaticPtr.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerCommon.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h" #include "nsContentUtils.h" #include "nsJSUtils.h" #include "nsILoadInfo.h" // This should be probably defined on some other place... but I couldn't find it #define WEBAPPS_PERM_NAME "webapps-manage" using namespace mozilla; using namespace mozilla::dom; nsIIOService* nsScriptSecurityManager::sIOService = nullptr; std::atomic nsScriptSecurityManager::sStrictFileOriginPolicy = true; namespace { class BundleHelper { public: NS_INLINE_DECL_REFCOUNTING(BundleHelper) static nsIStringBundle* GetOrCreate() { MOZ_ASSERT(!sShutdown); // Already shutting down. Nothing should require the use of the string // bundle when shutting down. if (sShutdown) { return nullptr; } if (!sSelf) { sSelf = new BundleHelper(); } return sSelf->GetOrCreateInternal(); } static void Shutdown() { sSelf = nullptr; sShutdown = true; } private: ~BundleHelper() = default; nsIStringBundle* GetOrCreateInternal() { if (!mBundle) { nsCOMPtr bundleService = mozilla::components::StringBundle::Service(); if (NS_WARN_IF(!bundleService)) { return nullptr; } nsresult rv = bundleService->CreateBundle( "chrome://global/locale/security/caps.properties", getter_AddRefs(mBundle)); if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) { return nullptr; } } return mBundle; } nsCOMPtr mBundle; static StaticRefPtr sSelf; static bool sShutdown; }; StaticRefPtr BundleHelper::sSelf; bool BundleHelper::sShutdown = false; } // namespace /////////////////////////// // Convenience Functions // /////////////////////////// class nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter { public: nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter() { ++sInPrincipalDomainOrigin; } ~nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter() { --sInPrincipalDomainOrigin; } static uint32_t sInPrincipalDomainOrigin; }; uint32_t nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter::sInPrincipalDomainOrigin; static nsresult GetOriginFromURI(nsIURI* aURI, nsACString& aOrigin) { if (!aURI) { return NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER; } if (nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter::sInPrincipalDomainOrigin > 1) { // Allow a single recursive call to GetPrincipalDomainOrigin, since that // might be happening on a different principal from the first call. But // after that, cut off the recursion; it just indicates that something // we're doing in this method causes us to reenter a security check here. return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE; } nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter autoSetter; nsCOMPtr uri = NS_GetInnermostURI(aURI); NS_ENSURE_TRUE(uri, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED); nsAutoCString hostPort; nsresult rv = uri->GetHostPort(hostPort); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { nsAutoCString scheme; rv = uri->GetScheme(scheme); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); aOrigin = scheme + "://"_ns + hostPort; } else { // Some URIs (e.g., nsSimpleURI) don't support host. Just // get the full spec. rv = uri->GetSpec(aOrigin); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } return NS_OK; } static nsresult GetPrincipalDomainOrigin(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, nsACString& aOrigin) { aOrigin.Truncate(); nsCOMPtr uri; aPrincipal->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(uri)); nsresult rv = GetOriginFromURI(uri, aOrigin); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { return rv; } // If there is no Domain fallback to the Principals Origin return aPrincipal->GetOriginNoSuffix(aOrigin); } inline void SetPendingExceptionASCII(JSContext* cx, const char* aMsg) { JS_ReportErrorASCII(cx, "%s", aMsg); } inline void SetPendingException(JSContext* cx, const char16_t* aMsg) { NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8 msg(aMsg); JS_ReportErrorUTF8(cx, "%s", msg.get()); } /* static */ bool nsScriptSecurityManager::SecurityCompareURIs(nsIURI* aSourceURI, nsIURI* aTargetURI) { return NS_SecurityCompareURIs(aSourceURI, aTargetURI, sStrictFileOriginPolicy); } // SecurityHashURI is consistent with SecurityCompareURIs because // NS_SecurityHashURI is consistent with NS_SecurityCompareURIs. See // nsNetUtil.h. uint32_t nsScriptSecurityManager::SecurityHashURI(nsIURI* aURI) { return NS_SecurityHashURI(aURI); } /* * GetChannelResultPrincipal will return the principal that the resource * returned by this channel will use. For example, if the resource is in * a sandbox, it will return the nullprincipal. If the resource is forced * to inherit principal, it will return the principal of its parent. If * the load doesn't require sandboxing or inheriting, it will return the same * principal as GetChannelURIPrincipal. Namely the principal of the URI * that is being loaded. */ NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultPrincipal(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) { return GetChannelResultPrincipal(aChannel, aPrincipal, /*aIgnoreSandboxing*/ false); } nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultPrincipalIfNotSandboxed( nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) { return GetChannelResultPrincipal(aChannel, aPrincipal, /*aIgnoreSandboxing*/ true); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultStoragePrincipal( nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) { nsCOMPtr principal; nsresult rv = GetChannelResultPrincipal(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(principal), /*aIgnoreSandboxing*/ false); if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv) || !principal)) { return rv; } if (!(principal->GetIsContentPrincipal())) { // If for some reason we don't have a content principal here, just reuse our // principal for the storage principal too, since attempting to create a // storage principal would fail anyway. principal.forget(aPrincipal); return NS_OK; } return StoragePrincipalHelper::Create( aChannel, principal, /* aForceIsolation */ false, aPrincipal); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultPrincipals( nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal, nsIPrincipal** aPartitionedPrincipal) { nsresult rv = GetChannelResultPrincipal(aChannel, aPrincipal, /*aIgnoreSandboxing*/ false); if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) { return rv; } if (!(*aPrincipal)->GetIsContentPrincipal()) { // If for some reason we don't have a content principal here, just reuse our // principal for the storage principal too, since attempting to create a // storage principal would fail anyway. nsCOMPtr copy = *aPrincipal; copy.forget(aPartitionedPrincipal); return NS_OK; } return StoragePrincipalHelper::Create( aChannel, *aPrincipal, /* aForceIsolation */ true, aPartitionedPrincipal); } nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultPrincipal( nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal, bool aIgnoreSandboxing) { MOZ_ASSERT(aChannel, "Must have channel!"); // Check whether we have an nsILoadInfo that says what we should do. nsCOMPtr loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo(); if (loadInfo->GetForceInheritPrincipalOverruleOwner()) { nsCOMPtr principalToInherit = loadInfo->FindPrincipalToInherit(aChannel); principalToInherit.forget(aPrincipal); return NS_OK; } nsCOMPtr owner; aChannel->GetOwner(getter_AddRefs(owner)); if (owner) { CallQueryInterface(owner, aPrincipal); if (*aPrincipal) { return NS_OK; } } if (!aIgnoreSandboxing && loadInfo->GetLoadingSandboxed()) { // Determine the unsandboxed result principal to use as this null // principal's precursor. Ignore errors here, as the precursor isn't // required. nsCOMPtr precursor; GetChannelResultPrincipal(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(precursor), /*aIgnoreSandboxing*/ true); // Construct a deterministic null principal URI from the precursor and the // loadinfo's nullPrincipalID. nsCOMPtr nullPrincipalURI = NullPrincipal::CreateURI( precursor, &loadInfo->GetSandboxedNullPrincipalID()); // Use the URI to construct the sandboxed result principal. OriginAttributes attrs; loadInfo->GetOriginAttributes(&attrs); nsCOMPtr sandboxedPrincipal = NullPrincipal::Create(attrs, nullPrincipalURI); sandboxedPrincipal.forget(aPrincipal); return NS_OK; } bool forceInherit = loadInfo->GetForceInheritPrincipal(); if (aIgnoreSandboxing && !forceInherit) { // Check if SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL was dropped because of // sandboxing: if (loadInfo->GetLoadingSandboxed() && loadInfo->GetForceInheritPrincipalDropped()) { forceInherit = true; } } if (forceInherit) { nsCOMPtr principalToInherit = loadInfo->FindPrincipalToInherit(aChannel); principalToInherit.forget(aPrincipal); return NS_OK; } auto securityMode = loadInfo->GetSecurityMode(); // The data: inheritance flags should only apply to the initial load, // not to loads that it might have redirected to. if (loadInfo->RedirectChain().IsEmpty() && (securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT || securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT || securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT)) { nsCOMPtr uri; nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); nsCOMPtr principalToInherit = loadInfo->FindPrincipalToInherit(aChannel); bool inheritForAboutBlank = loadInfo->GetAboutBlankInherits(); if (nsContentUtils::ChannelShouldInheritPrincipal( principalToInherit, uri, inheritForAboutBlank, false)) { principalToInherit.forget(aPrincipal); return NS_OK; } } return GetChannelURIPrincipal(aChannel, aPrincipal); } /* The principal of the URI that this channel is loading. This is never * affected by things like sandboxed loads, or loads where we forcefully * inherit the principal. Think of this as the principal of the server * which this channel is loading from. Most callers should use * GetChannelResultPrincipal instead of GetChannelURIPrincipal. Only * call GetChannelURIPrincipal if you are sure that you want the * principal that matches the uri, even in cases when the load is * sandboxed or when the load could be a blob or data uri (i.e even when * you encounter loads that may or may not be sandboxed and loads * that may or may not inherit)." */ NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelURIPrincipal(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) { MOZ_ASSERT(aChannel, "Must have channel!"); // Get the principal from the URI. Make sure this does the same thing // as Document::Reset and PrototypeDocumentContentSink::Init. nsCOMPtr uri; nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); nsCOMPtr loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo(); // Inherit the origin attributes from loadInfo. // If this is a top-level document load, the origin attributes of the // loadInfo will be set from nsDocShell::DoURILoad. // For subresource loading, the origin attributes of the loadInfo is from // its loadingPrincipal. OriginAttributes attrs = loadInfo->GetOriginAttributes(); // If the URI is supposed to inherit the security context of whoever loads it, // we shouldn't make a content principal for it, so instead return a null // principal. bool inheritsPrincipal = false; rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(uri, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT, &inheritsPrincipal); if (NS_FAILED(rv) || inheritsPrincipal) { // Find a precursor principal to credit for the load. This won't impact // security checks, but makes tracking the source of related loads easier. nsCOMPtr precursorPrincipal = loadInfo->FindPrincipalToInherit(aChannel); nsCOMPtr nullPrincipalURI = NullPrincipal::CreateURI(precursorPrincipal); *aPrincipal = NullPrincipal::Create(attrs, nullPrincipalURI).take(); return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } nsCOMPtr prin = BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(uri, attrs); prin.forget(aPrincipal); return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } ///////////////////////////// // nsScriptSecurityManager // ///////////////////////////// //////////////////////////////////// // Methods implementing ISupports // //////////////////////////////////// NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsScriptSecurityManager, nsIScriptSecurityManager) /////////////////////////////////////////////////// // Methods implementing nsIScriptSecurityManager // /////////////////////////////////////////////////// ///////////////// Security Checks ///////////////// bool nsScriptSecurityManager::ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction( JSContext* cx, JS::RuntimeCode aKind, JS::Handle aCode) { MOZ_ASSERT(cx == nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext()); nsCOMPtr subjectPrincipal = nsContentUtils::SubjectPrincipal(); // Check if Eval is allowed per firefox hardening policy bool contextForbidsEval = (subjectPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal() || XRE_IsE10sParentProcess()); #if defined(ANDROID) contextForbidsEval = false; #endif if (contextForbidsEval) { nsAutoJSString scriptSample; if (aKind == JS::RuntimeCode::JS && NS_WARN_IF(!scriptSample.init(cx, aCode))) { return false; } if (!nsContentSecurityUtils::IsEvalAllowed( cx, subjectPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal(), scriptSample)) { return false; } } // Get the window, if any, corresponding to the current global nsCOMPtr csp; if (nsGlobalWindowInner* win = xpc::CurrentWindowOrNull(cx)) { csp = win->GetCsp(); } if (!csp) { // Get the CSP for addon sandboxes. If the principal is expanded and has a // csp, we're probably in luck. auto* basePrin = BasePrincipal::Cast(subjectPrincipal); // ContentScriptAddonPolicy means it is also an expanded principal, thus // this is in a sandbox used as a content script. if (basePrin->ContentScriptAddonPolicy()) { basePrin->As()->GetCsp(getter_AddRefs(csp)); } // don't do anything unless there's a CSP if (!csp) { return true; } } nsCOMPtr cspEventListener; if (!NS_IsMainThread()) { WorkerPrivate* workerPrivate = mozilla::dom::GetWorkerPrivateFromContext(cx); if (workerPrivate) { cspEventListener = workerPrivate->CSPEventListener(); } } bool evalOK = true; bool reportViolation = false; if (aKind == JS::RuntimeCode::JS) { nsresult rv = csp->GetAllowsEval(&reportViolation, &evalOK); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { NS_WARNING("CSP: failed to get allowsEval"); return true; // fail open to not break sites. } } else { if (NS_FAILED(csp->GetAllowsWasmEval(&reportViolation, &evalOK))) { return false; } if (!evalOK) { // Historically, CSP did not block WebAssembly in Firefox, and some // add-ons use wasm and a stricter CSP. To avoid breaking them, ignore // 'wasm-unsafe-eval' violations for MV2 extensions. // TODO bug 1770909: remove this exception. auto* addonPolicy = BasePrincipal::Cast(subjectPrincipal)->AddonPolicy(); if (addonPolicy && addonPolicy->ManifestVersion() == 2) { reportViolation = true; evalOK = true; } } } if (reportViolation) { JS::AutoFilename scriptFilename; nsAutoString fileName; uint32_t lineNum = 0; uint32_t columnNum = 0; if (JS::DescribeScriptedCaller(cx, &scriptFilename, &lineNum, &columnNum)) { if (const char* file = scriptFilename.get()) { CopyUTF8toUTF16(nsDependentCString(file), fileName); } } else { MOZ_ASSERT(!JS_IsExceptionPending(cx)); } nsAutoJSString scriptSample; if (aKind == JS::RuntimeCode::JS && NS_WARN_IF(!scriptSample.init(cx, aCode))) { JS_ClearPendingException(cx); return false; } uint16_t violationType = aKind == JS::RuntimeCode::JS ? nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_EVAL : nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_WASM_EVAL; csp->LogViolationDetails(violationType, nullptr, // triggering element cspEventListener, fileName, scriptSample, lineNum, columnNum, u""_ns, u""_ns); } return evalOK; } // static bool nsScriptSecurityManager::JSPrincipalsSubsume(JSPrincipals* first, JSPrincipals* second) { return nsJSPrincipals::get(first)->Subsumes(nsJSPrincipals::get(second)); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckSameOriginURI(nsIURI* aSourceURI, nsIURI* aTargetURI, bool reportError, bool aFromPrivateWindow) { // Please note that aFromPrivateWindow is only 100% accurate if // reportError is true. if (!SecurityCompareURIs(aSourceURI, aTargetURI)) { if (reportError) { ReportError("CheckSameOriginError", aSourceURI, aTargetURI, aFromPrivateWindow); } return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI; } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIFromScript(JSContext* cx, nsIURI* aURI) { // Get principal of currently executing script. MOZ_ASSERT(cx == nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext()); nsIPrincipal* principal = nsContentUtils::SubjectPrincipal(); nsresult rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal( // Passing 0 for the window ID here is OK, because we will report a // script-visible exception anyway. principal, aURI, nsIScriptSecurityManager::STANDARD, 0); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { // OK to load return NS_OK; } // Report error. nsAutoCString spec; if (NS_FAILED(aURI->GetAsciiSpec(spec))) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; nsAutoCString msg("Access to '"); msg.Append(spec); msg.AppendLiteral("' from script denied"); SetPendingExceptionASCII(cx, msg.get()); return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI; } /** * Helper method to handle cases where a flag passed to * CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal means denying loading if the given URI has certain * nsIProtocolHandler flags set. * @return if success, access is allowed. Otherwise, deny access */ static nsresult DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(nsIURI* aURI, uint32_t aURIFlags) { MOZ_ASSERT(aURI, "Must have URI!"); bool uriHasFlags; nsresult rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aURI, aURIFlags, &uriHasFlags); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (uriHasFlags) { return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI; } return NS_OK; } static bool EqualOrSubdomain(nsIURI* aProbeArg, nsIURI* aBase) { nsresult rv; nsCOMPtr probe = aProbeArg; nsCOMPtr tldService = do_GetService(NS_EFFECTIVETLDSERVICE_CONTRACTID); NS_ENSURE_TRUE(tldService, false); while (true) { if (nsScriptSecurityManager::SecurityCompareURIs(probe, aBase)) { return true; } nsAutoCString host, newHost; rv = probe->GetHost(host); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); rv = tldService->GetNextSubDomain(host, newHost); if (rv == NS_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DOMAIN_LEVELS) { return false; } NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); rv = NS_MutateURI(probe).SetHost(newHost).Finalize(probe); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); } } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, nsIURI* aTargetURI, uint32_t aFlags, uint64_t aInnerWindowID) { MOZ_ASSERT(aPrincipal, "CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal must have a principal"); // If someone passes a flag that we don't understand, we should // fail, because they may need a security check that we don't // provide. NS_ENSURE_FALSE( aFlags & ~(nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT | nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME | nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT | nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL | nsIScriptSecurityManager::DONT_REPORT_ERRORS), NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED); NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aPrincipal); NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aTargetURI); // If DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL is set, we prevent loading of URIs which // would do such inheriting. That would be URIs that do not have their own // security context. We do this even for the system principal. if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL) { nsresult rv = DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags( aTargetURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } if (aPrincipal == mSystemPrincipal) { // Allow access return NS_OK; } nsCOMPtr sourceURI; auto* basePrin = BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal); basePrin->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(sourceURI)); if (!sourceURI) { if (basePrin->Is()) { // If the target addon is MV3 or the pref is on we require extension // resources loaded from content to be listed in web_accessible_resources. auto* targetPolicy = ExtensionPolicyService::GetSingleton().GetByURL(aTargetURI); bool contentAccessRequired = targetPolicy && (targetPolicy->ManifestVersion() > 2 || StaticPrefs::extensions_content_web_accessible_enabled()); auto expanded = basePrin->As(); const auto& allowList = expanded->AllowList(); // Only report errors when all principals fail. // With expanded principals, which are used by extension content scripts, // we check only against non-extension principals for access to extension // resource to enforce making those resources explicitly web accessible. uint32_t flags = aFlags | nsIScriptSecurityManager::DONT_REPORT_ERRORS; for (size_t i = 0; i < allowList.Length() - 1; i++) { if (contentAccessRequired && BasePrincipal::Cast(allowList[i])->AddonPolicy()) { continue; } nsresult rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(allowList[i], aTargetURI, flags, aInnerWindowID); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { // Allow access if it succeeded with one of the allowlisted principals return NS_OK; } } if (contentAccessRequired && BasePrincipal::Cast(allowList.LastElement())->AddonPolicy()) { bool reportErrors = !(aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DONT_REPORT_ERRORS); if (reportErrors) { ReportError("CheckLoadURI", sourceURI, aTargetURI, allowList.LastElement() ->OriginAttributesRef() .mPrivateBrowsingId > 0, aInnerWindowID); } return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI; } // Report errors (if requested) for the last principal. return CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(allowList.LastElement(), aTargetURI, aFlags, aInnerWindowID); } NS_ERROR( "Non-system principals or expanded principal passed to " "CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal " "must have a URI!"); return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED; } // Automatic loads are not allowed from certain protocols. if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT) { nsresult rv = DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags( sourceURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_FORBIDS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } // If either URI is a nested URI, get the base URI nsCOMPtr sourceBaseURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(sourceURI); nsCOMPtr targetBaseURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(aTargetURI); //-- get the target scheme nsAutoCString targetScheme; nsresult rv = targetBaseURI->GetScheme(targetScheme); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; //-- Some callers do not allow loading javascript: if ((aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT) && targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("javascript")) { return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI; } // Check for uris that are only loadable by principals that subsume them bool targetURIIsLoadableBySubsumers = false; rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(targetBaseURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS, &targetURIIsLoadableBySubsumers); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (targetURIIsLoadableBySubsumers) { // check nothing else in the URI chain has flags that prevent // access: rv = CheckLoadURIFlags( sourceURI, aTargetURI, sourceBaseURI, targetBaseURI, aFlags, aPrincipal->OriginAttributesRef().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0, aInnerWindowID); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // Check the principal is allowed to load the target. if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DONT_REPORT_ERRORS) { return aPrincipal->CheckMayLoad(targetBaseURI, false); } return aPrincipal->CheckMayLoadWithReporting(targetBaseURI, false, aInnerWindowID); } //-- get the source scheme nsAutoCString sourceScheme; rv = sourceBaseURI->GetScheme(sourceScheme); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; if (sourceScheme.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral(NS_NULLPRINCIPAL_SCHEME)) { // A null principal can target its own URI. if (sourceURI == aTargetURI) { return NS_OK; } } else if (sourceScheme.EqualsIgnoreCase("file") && targetScheme.EqualsIgnoreCase("moz-icon")) { // exception for file: linking to moz-icon://.ext?size=... // Note that because targetScheme is the base (innermost) URI scheme, // this does NOT allow file -> moz-icon:file:///... links. // This is intentional. return NS_OK; } // Check for webextension bool targetURIIsLoadableByExtensions = false; rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_EXTENSIONS, &targetURIIsLoadableByExtensions); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (targetURIIsLoadableByExtensions && BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal)->AddonPolicy()) { return NS_OK; } // If we get here, check all the schemes can link to each other, from the top // down: nsCOMPtr currentURI = sourceURI; nsCOMPtr currentOtherURI = aTargetURI; bool denySameSchemeLinks = false; rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_SCHEME_NOT_SELF_LINKABLE, &denySameSchemeLinks); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; while (currentURI && currentOtherURI) { nsAutoCString scheme, otherScheme; currentURI->GetScheme(scheme); currentOtherURI->GetScheme(otherScheme); bool schemesMatch = scheme.Equals(otherScheme, nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator); bool isSamePage = false; bool isExtensionMismatch = false; // about: URIs are special snowflakes. if (scheme.EqualsLiteral("about") && schemesMatch) { nsAutoCString moduleName, otherModuleName; // about: pages can always link to themselves: isSamePage = NS_SUCCEEDED(NS_GetAboutModuleName(currentURI, moduleName)) && NS_SUCCEEDED( NS_GetAboutModuleName(currentOtherURI, otherModuleName)) && moduleName.Equals(otherModuleName); if (!isSamePage) { // We will have allowed the load earlier if the source page has // system principal. So we know the source has a content // principal, and it's trying to link to something else. // Linkable about: pages are always reachable, even if we hit // the CheckLoadURIFlags call below. // We punch only 1 other hole: iff the source is unlinkable, // we let them link to other pages explicitly marked SAFE // for content. This avoids world-linkable about: pages linking // to non-world-linkable about: pages. nsCOMPtr module, otherModule; bool knowBothModules = NS_SUCCEEDED( NS_GetAboutModule(currentURI, getter_AddRefs(module))) && NS_SUCCEEDED(NS_GetAboutModule(currentOtherURI, getter_AddRefs(otherModule))); uint32_t aboutModuleFlags = 0; uint32_t otherAboutModuleFlags = 0; knowBothModules = knowBothModules && NS_SUCCEEDED(module->GetURIFlags(currentURI, &aboutModuleFlags)) && NS_SUCCEEDED(otherModule->GetURIFlags(currentOtherURI, &otherAboutModuleFlags)); if (knowBothModules) { isSamePage = !(aboutModuleFlags & nsIAboutModule::MAKE_LINKABLE) && (otherAboutModuleFlags & nsIAboutModule::URI_SAFE_FOR_UNTRUSTED_CONTENT); if (isSamePage && otherAboutModuleFlags & nsIAboutModule::MAKE_LINKABLE) { // XXXgijs: this is a hack. The target will be nested // (with innerURI of moz-safe-about:whatever), and // the source isn't, so we won't pass if we finish // the loop. We *should* pass, though, so return here. // This hack can go away when bug 1228118 is fixed. return NS_OK; } } } } else if (schemesMatch && scheme.EqualsLiteral("moz-extension")) { // If it is not the same exension, we want to ensure we end up // calling CheckLoadURIFlags nsAutoCString host, otherHost; currentURI->GetHost(host); currentOtherURI->GetHost(otherHost); isExtensionMismatch = !host.Equals(otherHost); } else { bool equalExceptRef = false; rv = currentURI->EqualsExceptRef(currentOtherURI, &equalExceptRef); isSamePage = NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && equalExceptRef; } // If schemes are not equal, or they're equal but the target URI // is different from the source URI and doesn't always allow linking // from the same scheme, or this is two different extensions, check // if the URI flags of the current target URI allow the current // source URI to link to it. // The policy is specified by the protocol flags on both URIs. if (!schemesMatch || (denySameSchemeLinks && !isSamePage) || isExtensionMismatch) { return CheckLoadURIFlags( currentURI, currentOtherURI, sourceBaseURI, targetBaseURI, aFlags, aPrincipal->OriginAttributesRef().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0, aInnerWindowID); } // Otherwise... check if we can nest another level: nsCOMPtr nestedURI = do_QueryInterface(currentURI); nsCOMPtr nestedOtherURI = do_QueryInterface(currentOtherURI); // If schemes match and neither URI is nested further, we're OK. if (!nestedURI && !nestedOtherURI) { return NS_OK; } // If one is nested and the other isn't, something is wrong. if (!nestedURI != !nestedOtherURI) { return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI; } // Otherwise, both should be nested and we'll go through the loop again. nestedURI->GetInnerURI(getter_AddRefs(currentURI)); nestedOtherURI->GetInnerURI(getter_AddRefs(currentOtherURI)); } // We should never get here. We should always return from inside the loop. return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI; } /** * Helper method to check whether the target URI and its innermost ("base") URI * has protocol flags that should stop it from being loaded by the source URI * (and/or the source URI's innermost ("base") URI), taking into account any * nsIScriptSecurityManager flags originally passed to * CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal and friends. * * @return if success, access is allowed. Otherwise, deny access */ nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIFlags( nsIURI* aSourceURI, nsIURI* aTargetURI, nsIURI* aSourceBaseURI, nsIURI* aTargetBaseURI, uint32_t aFlags, bool aFromPrivateWindow, uint64_t aInnerWindowID) { // Note that the order of policy checks here is very important! // We start from most restrictive and work our way down. bool reportErrors = !(aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DONT_REPORT_ERRORS); const char* errorTag = "CheckLoadURIError"; nsAutoCString targetScheme; nsresult rv = aTargetBaseURI->GetScheme(targetScheme); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; // Check for system target URI. Regular (non web accessible) extension // URIs will also have URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD. rv = DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(aTargetURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { // Deny access, since the origin principal is not system if (reportErrors) { ReportError(errorTag, aSourceURI, aTargetURI, aFromPrivateWindow, aInnerWindowID); } return rv; } // Used by ExtensionProtocolHandler to prevent loading extension resources // in private contexts if the extension does not have permission. if (aFromPrivateWindow) { rv = DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags( aTargetURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_DISALLOW_IN_PRIVATE_CONTEXT); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { if (reportErrors) { ReportError(errorTag, aSourceURI, aTargetURI, aFromPrivateWindow, aInnerWindowID); } return rv; } } // If MV3 Extension uris are web accessible they have // WEBEXT_URI_WEB_ACCESSIBLE. bool maybeWebAccessible = false; NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetURI, nsIProtocolHandler::WEBEXT_URI_WEB_ACCESSIBLE, &maybeWebAccessible); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (maybeWebAccessible) { bool isWebAccessible = false; rv = ExtensionPolicyService::GetSingleton().SourceMayLoadExtensionURI( aSourceURI, aTargetURI, &isWebAccessible); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && isWebAccessible) { return NS_OK; } if (reportErrors) { ReportError(errorTag, aSourceURI, aTargetURI, aFromPrivateWindow, aInnerWindowID); } return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI; } // Check for chrome target URI bool targetURIIsUIResource = false; rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE, &targetURIIsUIResource); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (targetURIIsUIResource) { // ALLOW_CHROME is a flag that we pass on all loads _except_ docshell // loads (since docshell loads run the loaded content with its origin // principal). We are effectively allowing resource:// and chrome:// // URIs to load as long as they are content accessible and as long // they're not loading it as a document. if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME) { bool sourceIsUIResource = false; rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aSourceBaseURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE, &sourceIsUIResource); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (sourceIsUIResource) { // Special case for moz-icon URIs loaded by a local resources like // e.g. chrome: or resource: if (targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("moz-icon")) { return NS_OK; } } if (targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("resource")) { if (StaticPrefs::security_all_resource_uri_content_accessible()) { return NS_OK; } nsCOMPtr ph; rv = sIOService->GetProtocolHandler("resource", getter_AddRefs(ph)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (!ph) { return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI; } nsCOMPtr rph = do_QueryInterface(ph); if (!rph) { return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI; } bool accessAllowed = false; rph->AllowContentToAccess(aTargetBaseURI, &accessAllowed); if (accessAllowed) { return NS_OK; } } else if (targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("chrome")) { // Allow the load only if the chrome package is allowlisted. nsCOMPtr reg( do_GetService(NS_CHROMEREGISTRY_CONTRACTID)); if (reg) { bool accessAllowed = false; reg->AllowContentToAccess(aTargetBaseURI, &accessAllowed); if (accessAllowed) { return NS_OK; } } } else if (targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("moz-page-thumb") || targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("page-icon")) { if (XRE_IsParentProcess()) { return NS_OK; } auto& remoteType = dom::ContentChild::GetSingleton()->GetRemoteType(); if (remoteType == PRIVILEGEDABOUT_REMOTE_TYPE) { return NS_OK; } } } if (reportErrors) { ReportError(errorTag, aSourceURI, aTargetURI, aFromPrivateWindow, aInnerWindowID); } return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI; } // Check for target URI pointing to a file bool targetURIIsLocalFile = false; rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE, &targetURIIsLocalFile); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (targetURIIsLocalFile) { // Allow domains that were allowlisted in the prefs. In 99.9% of cases, // this array is empty. bool isAllowlisted; MOZ_ALWAYS_SUCCEEDS(InFileURIAllowlist(aSourceURI, &isAllowlisted)); if (isAllowlisted) { return NS_OK; } // Allow chrome:// if (aSourceBaseURI->SchemeIs("chrome")) { return NS_OK; } // Nothing else. if (reportErrors) { ReportError(errorTag, aSourceURI, aTargetURI, aFromPrivateWindow, aInnerWindowID); } return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI; } #ifdef DEBUG { // Everyone is allowed to load this. The case URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS // is handled by the caller which is just delegating to us as a helper. bool hasSubsumersFlag = false; NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetBaseURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS, &hasSubsumersFlag); bool hasLoadableByAnyone = false; NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetBaseURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE, &hasLoadableByAnyone); MOZ_ASSERT(hasLoadableByAnyone || hasSubsumersFlag, "why do we get here and do not have any of the two flags set?"); } #endif return NS_OK; } nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::ReportError(const char* aMessageTag, const nsACString& aSourceSpec, const nsACString& aTargetSpec, bool aFromPrivateWindow, uint64_t aInnerWindowID) { if (aSourceSpec.IsEmpty() || aTargetSpec.IsEmpty()) { return NS_OK; } nsCOMPtr bundle = BundleHelper::GetOrCreate(); if (NS_WARN_IF(!bundle)) { return NS_OK; } // Localize the error message nsAutoString message; AutoTArray formatStrings; CopyASCIItoUTF16(aSourceSpec, *formatStrings.AppendElement()); CopyASCIItoUTF16(aTargetSpec, *formatStrings.AppendElement()); nsresult rv = bundle->FormatStringFromName(aMessageTag, formatStrings, message); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); nsCOMPtr console( do_GetService(NS_CONSOLESERVICE_CONTRACTID)); NS_ENSURE_TRUE(console, NS_ERROR_FAILURE); nsCOMPtr error(do_CreateInstance(NS_SCRIPTERROR_CONTRACTID)); NS_ENSURE_TRUE(error, NS_ERROR_FAILURE); // using category of "SOP" so we can link to MDN if (aInnerWindowID != 0) { rv = error->InitWithWindowID( message, u""_ns, u""_ns, 0, 0, nsIScriptError::errorFlag, "SOP"_ns, aInnerWindowID, true /* From chrome context */); } else { rv = error->Init(message, u""_ns, u""_ns, 0, 0, nsIScriptError::errorFlag, "SOP"_ns, aFromPrivateWindow, true /* From chrome context */); } NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); console->LogMessage(error); return NS_OK; } nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::ReportError(const char* aMessageTag, nsIURI* aSource, nsIURI* aTarget, bool aFromPrivateWindow, uint64_t aInnerWindowID) { NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aSource && aTarget, NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER); // Get the source URL spec nsAutoCString sourceSpec; nsresult rv = aSource->GetAsciiSpec(sourceSpec); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // Get the target URL spec nsAutoCString targetSpec; rv = aTarget->GetAsciiSpec(targetSpec); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); return ReportError(aMessageTag, sourceSpec, targetSpec, aFromPrivateWindow, aInnerWindowID); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIStrWithPrincipal( nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, const nsACString& aTargetURIStr, uint32_t aFlags) { nsresult rv; nsCOMPtr target; rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(target), aTargetURIStr); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(aPrincipal, target, aFlags, 0); if (rv == NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI) { // Don't warn because NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI is one of the expected // return values. return rv; } NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // Now start testing fixup -- since aTargetURIStr is a string, not // an nsIURI, we may well end up fixing it up before loading. // Note: This needs to stay in sync with the nsIURIFixup api. nsCOMPtr fixup = components::URIFixup::Service(); if (!fixup) { return rv; } // URIFixup's keyword and alternate flags can only fixup to http/https, so we // can skip testing them. This simplifies our life because this code can be // invoked from the content process where the search service would not be // available. uint32_t flags[] = {nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_NONE, nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_FIX_SCHEME_TYPOS}; for (uint32_t i = 0; i < ArrayLength(flags); ++i) { uint32_t fixupFlags = flags[i]; if (aPrincipal->OriginAttributesRef().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0) { fixupFlags |= nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_PRIVATE_CONTEXT; } nsCOMPtr fixupInfo; rv = fixup->GetFixupURIInfo(aTargetURIStr, fixupFlags, getter_AddRefs(fixupInfo)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); rv = fixupInfo->GetPreferredURI(getter_AddRefs(target)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(aPrincipal, target, aFlags, 0); if (rv == NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI) { // Don't warn because NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI is one of the expected // return values. return rv; } NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } return rv; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIWithPrincipalFromJS( nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, nsIURI* aTargetURI, uint32_t aFlags, uint64_t aInnerWindowID, JSContext* aCx) { MOZ_ASSERT(aPrincipal, "CheckLoadURIWithPrincipalFromJS must have a principal"); NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aPrincipal); NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aTargetURI); nsresult rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(aPrincipal, aTargetURI, aFlags, aInnerWindowID); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { nsAutoCString uriStr; Unused << aTargetURI->GetSpec(uriStr); nsAutoCString message("Load of "); message.Append(uriStr); nsAutoCString principalStr; Unused << aPrincipal->GetSpec(principalStr); if (!principalStr.IsEmpty()) { message.AppendPrintf(" from %s", principalStr.get()); } message.Append(" denied"); dom::Throw(aCx, rv, message); } return rv; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIStrWithPrincipalFromJS( nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, const nsACString& aTargetURIStr, uint32_t aFlags, JSContext* aCx) { nsCOMPtr targetURI; MOZ_TRY(NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(targetURI), aTargetURIStr)); return CheckLoadURIWithPrincipalFromJS(aPrincipal, targetURI, aFlags, 0, aCx); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::InFileURIAllowlist(nsIURI* aUri, bool* aResult) { MOZ_ASSERT(aUri); MOZ_ASSERT(aResult); *aResult = false; for (nsIURI* uri : EnsureFileURIAllowlist()) { if (EqualOrSubdomain(aUri, uri)) { *aResult = true; return NS_OK; } } return NS_OK; } ///////////////// Principals /////////////////////// NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::GetSystemPrincipal(nsIPrincipal** result) { NS_ADDREF(*result = mSystemPrincipal); return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CreateContentPrincipal( nsIURI* aURI, JS::Handle aOriginAttributes, JSContext* aCx, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) { OriginAttributes attrs; if (!aOriginAttributes.isObject() || !attrs.Init(aCx, aOriginAttributes)) { return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG; } nsCOMPtr prin = BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(aURI, attrs); prin.forget(aPrincipal); return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CreateContentPrincipalFromOrigin( const nsACString& aOrigin, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) { if (StringBeginsWith(aOrigin, "["_ns)) { return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG; } if (StringBeginsWith(aOrigin, nsLiteralCString(NS_NULLPRINCIPAL_SCHEME ":"))) { return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG; } nsCOMPtr prin = BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(aOrigin); prin.forget(aPrincipal); return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::PrincipalToJSON(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, nsACString& aJSON) { aJSON.Truncate(); if (!aPrincipal) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal)->ToJSON(aJSON); if (aJSON.IsEmpty()) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::JSONToPrincipal(const nsACString& aJSON, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) { if (aJSON.IsEmpty()) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } nsCOMPtr principal = BasePrincipal::FromJSON(aJSON); if (!principal) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } principal.forget(aPrincipal); return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CreateNullPrincipal( JS::Handle aOriginAttributes, JSContext* aCx, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) { OriginAttributes attrs; if (!aOriginAttributes.isObject() || !attrs.Init(aCx, aOriginAttributes)) { return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG; } nsCOMPtr prin = NullPrincipal::Create(attrs); prin.forget(aPrincipal); return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::GetLoadContextContentPrincipal( nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadContext* aLoadContext, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) { NS_ENSURE_STATE(aLoadContext); OriginAttributes docShellAttrs; aLoadContext->GetOriginAttributes(docShellAttrs); nsCOMPtr prin = BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(aURI, docShellAttrs); prin.forget(aPrincipal); return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::GetDocShellContentPrincipal( nsIURI* aURI, nsIDocShell* aDocShell, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) { nsCOMPtr prin = BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal( aURI, nsDocShell::Cast(aDocShell)->GetOriginAttributes()); prin.forget(aPrincipal); return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::PrincipalWithOA( nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, JS::Handle aOriginAttributes, JSContext* aCx, nsIPrincipal** aReturnPrincipal) { if (!aPrincipal) { return NS_OK; } if (aPrincipal->GetIsContentPrincipal()) { OriginAttributes attrs; if (!aOriginAttributes.isObject() || !attrs.Init(aCx, aOriginAttributes)) { return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG; } auto* contentPrincipal = static_cast(aPrincipal); RefPtr copy = new ContentPrincipal(contentPrincipal, attrs); NS_ENSURE_TRUE(copy, NS_ERROR_FAILURE); copy.forget(aReturnPrincipal); } else { // We do this for null principals, system principals (both fine) // ... and expanded principals, where we should probably do something // cleverer, but I also don't think we care too much. nsCOMPtr prin = aPrincipal; prin.forget(aReturnPrincipal); } return *aReturnPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CanCreateWrapper(JSContext* cx, const nsIID& aIID, nsISupports* aObj, nsIClassInfo* aClassInfo) { // XXX Special case for Exception ? // We give remote-XUL allowlisted domains a free pass here. See bug 932906. JS::Rooted contextRealm(cx, JS::GetCurrentRealmOrNull(cx)); MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(contextRealm); if (!xpc::AllowContentXBLScope(contextRealm)) { return NS_OK; } if (nsContentUtils::IsCallerChrome()) { return NS_OK; } //-- Access denied, report an error nsAutoCString originUTF8; nsIPrincipal* subjectPrincipal = nsContentUtils::SubjectPrincipal(); GetPrincipalDomainOrigin(subjectPrincipal, originUTF8); NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 originUTF16(originUTF8); nsAutoCString classInfoNameUTF8; if (aClassInfo) { aClassInfo->GetClassDescription(classInfoNameUTF8); } if (classInfoNameUTF8.IsEmpty()) { classInfoNameUTF8.AssignLiteral("UnnamedClass"); } nsCOMPtr bundle = BundleHelper::GetOrCreate(); if (NS_WARN_IF(!bundle)) { return NS_OK; } NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 classInfoUTF16(classInfoNameUTF8); nsresult rv; nsAutoString errorMsg; if (originUTF16.IsEmpty()) { AutoTArray formatStrings = {classInfoUTF16}; rv = bundle->FormatStringFromName("CreateWrapperDenied", formatStrings, errorMsg); } else { AutoTArray formatStrings = {classInfoUTF16, originUTF16}; rv = bundle->FormatStringFromName("CreateWrapperDeniedForOrigin", formatStrings, errorMsg); } NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); SetPendingException(cx, errorMsg.get()); return NS_ERROR_DOM_XPCONNECT_ACCESS_DENIED; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CanCreateInstance(JSContext* cx, const nsCID& aCID) { if (nsContentUtils::IsCallerChrome()) { return NS_OK; } //-- Access denied, report an error nsAutoCString errorMsg("Permission denied to create instance of class. CID="); char cidStr[NSID_LENGTH]; aCID.ToProvidedString(cidStr); errorMsg.Append(cidStr); SetPendingExceptionASCII(cx, errorMsg.get()); return NS_ERROR_DOM_XPCONNECT_ACCESS_DENIED; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CanGetService(JSContext* cx, const nsCID& aCID) { if (nsContentUtils::IsCallerChrome()) { return NS_OK; } //-- Access denied, report an error nsAutoCString errorMsg("Permission denied to get service. CID="); char cidStr[NSID_LENGTH]; aCID.ToProvidedString(cidStr); errorMsg.Append(cidStr); SetPendingExceptionASCII(cx, errorMsg.get()); return NS_ERROR_DOM_XPCONNECT_ACCESS_DENIED; } const char sJSEnabledPrefName[] = "javascript.enabled"; const char sFileOriginPolicyPrefName[] = "security.fileuri.strict_origin_policy"; static const char* kObservedPrefs[] = {sJSEnabledPrefName, sFileOriginPolicyPrefName, "capability.policy.", nullptr}; ///////////////////////////////////////////// // Constructor, Destructor, Initialization // ///////////////////////////////////////////// nsScriptSecurityManager::nsScriptSecurityManager(void) : mPrefInitialized(false), mIsJavaScriptEnabled(false) { static_assert( sizeof(intptr_t) == sizeof(void*), "intptr_t and void* have different lengths on this platform. " "This may cause a security failure with the SecurityLevel union."); } nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::Init() { nsresult rv = CallGetService(NS_IOSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &sIOService); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); InitPrefs(); // Create our system principal singleton mSystemPrincipal = SystemPrincipal::Init(); return NS_OK; } void nsScriptSecurityManager::InitJSCallbacks(JSContext* aCx) { //-- Register security check callback in the JS engine // Currently this is used to control access to function.caller static const JSSecurityCallbacks securityCallbacks = { ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction, JSPrincipalsSubsume, }; MOZ_ASSERT(!JS_GetSecurityCallbacks(aCx)); JS_SetSecurityCallbacks(aCx, &securityCallbacks); JS_InitDestroyPrincipalsCallback(aCx, nsJSPrincipals::Destroy); JS_SetTrustedPrincipals(aCx, BasePrincipal::Cast(mSystemPrincipal)); } /* static */ void nsScriptSecurityManager::ClearJSCallbacks(JSContext* aCx) { JS_SetSecurityCallbacks(aCx, nullptr); JS_SetTrustedPrincipals(aCx, nullptr); } static StaticRefPtr gScriptSecMan; nsScriptSecurityManager::~nsScriptSecurityManager(void) { Preferences::UnregisterPrefixCallbacks( nsScriptSecurityManager::ScriptSecurityPrefChanged, kObservedPrefs, this); if (mDomainPolicy) { mDomainPolicy->Deactivate(); } // ContentChild might hold a reference to the domain policy, // and it might release it only after the security manager is // gone. But we can still assert this for the main process. MOZ_ASSERT_IF(XRE_IsParentProcess(), !mDomainPolicy); } void nsScriptSecurityManager::Shutdown() { NS_IF_RELEASE(sIOService); BundleHelper::Shutdown(); SystemPrincipal::Shutdown(); } nsScriptSecurityManager* nsScriptSecurityManager::GetScriptSecurityManager() { return gScriptSecMan; } /* static */ void nsScriptSecurityManager::InitStatics() { RefPtr ssManager = new nsScriptSecurityManager(); nsresult rv = ssManager->Init(); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { MOZ_CRASH("ssManager->Init() failed"); } ClearOnShutdown(&gScriptSecMan); gScriptSecMan = ssManager; } // Currently this nsGenericFactory constructor is used only from FastLoad // (XPCOM object deserialization) code, when "creating" the system principal // singleton. already_AddRefed nsScriptSecurityManager::SystemPrincipalSingletonConstructor() { if (gScriptSecMan) return do_AddRef(gScriptSecMan->mSystemPrincipal) .downcast(); return nullptr; } struct IsWhitespace { static bool Test(char aChar) { return NS_IsAsciiWhitespace(aChar); }; }; struct IsWhitespaceOrComma { static bool Test(char aChar) { return aChar == ',' || NS_IsAsciiWhitespace(aChar); }; }; template uint32_t SkipPast(const nsCString& str, uint32_t base) { while (base < str.Length() && Predicate::Test(str[base])) { ++base; } return base; } template uint32_t SkipUntil(const nsCString& str, uint32_t base) { while (base < str.Length() && !Predicate::Test(str[base])) { ++base; } return base; } // static void nsScriptSecurityManager::ScriptSecurityPrefChanged(const char* aPref, void* aSelf) { static_cast(aSelf)->ScriptSecurityPrefChanged( aPref); } inline void nsScriptSecurityManager::ScriptSecurityPrefChanged( const char* aPref) { MOZ_ASSERT(mPrefInitialized); mIsJavaScriptEnabled = Preferences::GetBool(sJSEnabledPrefName, mIsJavaScriptEnabled); sStrictFileOriginPolicy = Preferences::GetBool(sFileOriginPolicyPrefName, false); mFileURIAllowlist.reset(); } void nsScriptSecurityManager::AddSitesToFileURIAllowlist( const nsCString& aSiteList) { for (uint32_t base = SkipPast(aSiteList, 0), bound = 0; base < aSiteList.Length(); base = SkipPast(aSiteList, bound)) { // Grab the current site. bound = SkipUntil(aSiteList, base); nsAutoCString site(Substring(aSiteList, base, bound - base)); // Check if the URI is schemeless. If so, add both http and https. nsAutoCString unused; if (NS_FAILED(sIOService->ExtractScheme(site, unused))) { AddSitesToFileURIAllowlist("http://"_ns + site); AddSitesToFileURIAllowlist("https://"_ns + site); continue; } // Convert it to a URI and add it to our list. nsCOMPtr uri; nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), site); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { mFileURIAllowlist.ref().AppendElement(uri); } else { nsCOMPtr console( do_GetService("@mozilla.org/consoleservice;1")); if (console) { nsAutoString msg = u"Unable to to add site to file:// URI allowlist: "_ns + NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16(site); console->LogStringMessage(msg.get()); } } } } nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::InitPrefs() { nsIPrefBranch* branch = Preferences::GetRootBranch(); NS_ENSURE_TRUE(branch, NS_ERROR_FAILURE); mPrefInitialized = true; // Set the initial value of the "javascript.enabled" prefs ScriptSecurityPrefChanged(); // set observer callbacks in case the value of the prefs change Preferences::RegisterPrefixCallbacks( nsScriptSecurityManager::ScriptSecurityPrefChanged, kObservedPrefs, this); return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::GetDomainPolicyActive(bool* aRv) { *aRv = !!mDomainPolicy; return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::ActivateDomainPolicy(nsIDomainPolicy** aRv) { if (!XRE_IsParentProcess()) { return NS_ERROR_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE; } return ActivateDomainPolicyInternal(aRv); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::ActivateDomainPolicyInternal(nsIDomainPolicy** aRv) { // We only allow one domain policy at a time. The holder of the previous // policy must explicitly deactivate it first. if (mDomainPolicy) { return NS_ERROR_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE; } mDomainPolicy = new DomainPolicy(); nsCOMPtr ptr = mDomainPolicy; ptr.forget(aRv); return NS_OK; } // Intentionally non-scriptable. Script must have a reference to the // nsIDomainPolicy to deactivate it. void nsScriptSecurityManager::DeactivateDomainPolicy() { mDomainPolicy = nullptr; } void nsScriptSecurityManager::CloneDomainPolicy(DomainPolicyClone* aClone) { MOZ_ASSERT(aClone); if (mDomainPolicy) { mDomainPolicy->CloneDomainPolicy(aClone); } else { aClone->active() = false; } } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::PolicyAllowsScript(nsIURI* aURI, bool* aRv) { nsresult rv; // Compute our rule. If we don't have any domain policy set up that might // provide exceptions to this rule, we're done. *aRv = mIsJavaScriptEnabled; if (!mDomainPolicy) { return NS_OK; } // We have a domain policy. Grab the appropriate set of exceptions to the // rule (either the blocklist or the allowlist, depending on whether script // is enabled or disabled by default). nsCOMPtr exceptions; nsCOMPtr superExceptions; if (*aRv) { mDomainPolicy->GetBlocklist(getter_AddRefs(exceptions)); mDomainPolicy->GetSuperBlocklist(getter_AddRefs(superExceptions)); } else { mDomainPolicy->GetAllowlist(getter_AddRefs(exceptions)); mDomainPolicy->GetSuperAllowlist(getter_AddRefs(superExceptions)); } bool contains; rv = exceptions->Contains(aURI, &contains); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (contains) { *aRv = !*aRv; return NS_OK; } rv = superExceptions->ContainsSuperDomain(aURI, &contains); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (contains) { *aRv = !*aRv; } return NS_OK; } const nsTArray>& nsScriptSecurityManager::EnsureFileURIAllowlist() { if (mFileURIAllowlist.isSome()) { return mFileURIAllowlist.ref(); } // // Rebuild the set of principals for which we allow file:// URI loads. This // implements a small subset of an old pref-based CAPS people that people // have come to depend on. See bug 995943. // mFileURIAllowlist.emplace(); nsAutoCString policies; mozilla::Preferences::GetCString("capability.policy.policynames", policies); for (uint32_t base = SkipPast(policies, 0), bound = 0; base < policies.Length(); base = SkipPast(policies, bound)) { // Grab the current policy name. bound = SkipUntil(policies, base); auto policyName = Substring(policies, base, bound - base); // Figure out if this policy allows loading file:// URIs. If not, we can // skip it. nsCString checkLoadURIPrefName = "capability.policy."_ns + policyName + ".checkloaduri.enabled"_ns; nsAutoString value; nsresult rv = Preferences::GetString(checkLoadURIPrefName.get(), value); if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !value.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("allaccess")) { continue; } // Grab the list of domains associated with this policy. nsCString domainPrefName = "capability.policy."_ns + policyName + ".sites"_ns; nsAutoCString siteList; Preferences::GetCString(domainPrefName.get(), siteList); AddSitesToFileURIAllowlist(siteList); } return mFileURIAllowlist.ref(); }