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255 lines
10 KiB
Plaintext
255 lines
10 KiB
Plaintext
/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#include "nsISupports.idl"
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interface nsIURI;
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interface nsIChannel;
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/**
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* nsIProtocolHandler
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*/
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[scriptable, uuid(15fd6940-8ea7-11d3-93ad-00104ba0fd40)]
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interface nsIProtocolHandler : nsISupports
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{
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/**
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* The scheme of this protocol (e.g., "file").
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*/
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readonly attribute ACString scheme;
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/**
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* The default port is the port that this protocol normally uses.
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* If a port does not make sense for the protocol (e.g., "about:")
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* then -1 will be returned.
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*/
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readonly attribute long defaultPort;
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/**
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* Returns the protocol specific flags (see flag definitions below).
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*/
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readonly attribute unsigned long protocolFlags;
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/**
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* Makes a URI object that is suitable for loading by this protocol,
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* where the URI string is given as an UTF-8 string. The caller may
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* provide the charset from which the URI string originated, so that
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* the URI string can be translated back to that charset (if necessary)
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* before communicating with, for example, the origin server of the URI
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* string. (Many servers do not support UTF-8 IRIs at the present time,
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* so we must be careful about tracking the native charset of the origin
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* server.)
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*
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* @param aSpec - the URI string in UTF-8 encoding. depending
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* on the protocol implementation, unicode character
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* sequences may or may not be %xx escaped.
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* @param aOriginCharset - the charset of the document from which this URI
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* string originated. this corresponds to the
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* charset that should be used when communicating
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* this URI to an origin server, for example. if
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* null, then UTF-8 encoding is assumed (i.e.,
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* no charset transformation from aSpec).
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* @param aBaseURI - if null, aSpec must specify an absolute URI.
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* otherwise, aSpec may be resolved relative
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* to aBaseURI, depending on the protocol.
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* If the protocol has no concept of relative
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* URI aBaseURI will simply be ignored.
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*/
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nsIURI newURI(in AUTF8String aSpec,
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in string aOriginCharset,
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in nsIURI aBaseURI);
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/**
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* Constructs a new channel from the given URI for this protocol handler.
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*/
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nsIChannel newChannel(in nsIURI aURI);
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/**
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* Allows a protocol to override blacklisted ports.
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*
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* This method will be called when there is an attempt to connect to a port
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* that is blacklisted. For example, for most protocols, port 25 (Simple Mail
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* Transfer) is banned. When a URI containing this "known-to-do-bad-things"
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* port number is encountered, this function will be called to ask if the
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* protocol handler wants to override the ban.
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*/
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boolean allowPort(in long port, in string scheme);
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/**************************************************************************
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* Constants for the protocol flags (the first is the default mask, the
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* others are deviations):
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*
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* NOTE: Implementation must ignore any flags they do not understand.
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*/
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/**
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* standard full URI with authority component and concept of relative
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* URIs (http, ftp, ...)
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*/
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const unsigned long URI_STD = 0;
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/**
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* no concept of relative URIs (about, javascript, finger, ...)
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*/
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const unsigned long URI_NORELATIVE = (1<<0);
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/**
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* no authority component (file, ...)
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*/
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const unsigned long URI_NOAUTH = (1<<1);
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/**
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* The URIs for this protocol have no inherent security context, so
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* documents loaded via this protocol should inherit the security context
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* from the document that loads them.
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*/
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const unsigned long URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT = (1<<4);
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/**
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* "Automatic" loads that would replace the document (e.g. <meta> refresh,
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* certain types of XLinks, possibly other loads that the application
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* decides are not user triggered) are not allowed if the originating (NOT
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* the target) URI has this protocol flag. Note that the decision as to
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* what constitutes an "automatic" load is made externally, by the caller
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* of nsIScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURI. See documentation for that
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* method for more information.
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*
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* A typical protocol that might want to set this flag is a protocol that
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* shows highly untrusted content in a viewing area that the user expects
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* to have a lot of control over, such as an e-mail reader.
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*/
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const unsigned long URI_FORBIDS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT = (1<<5);
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/**
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* +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
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* | |
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* | ALL PROTOCOL HANDLERS MUST SET ONE OF THE FOLLOWING FIVE FLAGS. |
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* | |
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* +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
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*
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* These flags are used to determine who is allowed to load URIs for this
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* protocol. Note that if a URI is nested, only the flags for the
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* innermost URI matter. See nsINestedURI.
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*
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* If none of these five flags are set, the URI must be treated as if it
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* had the URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE flag set, for compatibility with protocol
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* handlers written against Gecko 1.8 or earlier. In this case, there may
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* be run-time warning messages indicating that a "default insecure"
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* assumption is being made. At some point in the futures (Mozilla 2.0,
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* most likely), these warnings will become errors.
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*/
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/**
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* The URIs for this protocol can be loaded by anyone. For example, any
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* website should be allowed to trigger a load of a URI for this protocol.
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* Web-safe protocols like "http" should set this flag.
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*/
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const unsigned long URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE = (1<<6);
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/**
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* The URIs for this protocol are UNSAFE if loaded by untrusted (web)
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* content and may only be loaded by privileged code (for example, code
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* which has the system principal). Various internal protocols should set
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* this flag.
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*/
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const unsigned long URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD = (1<<7);
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/**
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* The URIs for this protocol point to resources that are part of the
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* application's user interface. There are cases when such resources may
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* be made accessible to untrusted content such as web pages, so this is
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* less restrictive than URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD but more restrictive than
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* URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE. See the documentation for
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* nsIScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURI.
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*/
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const unsigned long URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE = (1<<8);
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/**
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* Loading of URIs for this protocol from other origins should only be
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* allowed if those origins should have access to the local filesystem.
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* It's up to the application to decide what origins should have such
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* access. Protocols like "file" that point to local data should set this
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* flag.
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*/
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const unsigned long URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE = (1<<9);
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/**
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* The URIs for this protocol can be loaded only by callers with a
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* principal that subsumes this uri. For example, privileged code and
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* websites that are same origin as this uri.
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*/
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const unsigned long URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS = (1<<14);
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/**
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* Loading channels from this protocol has side-effects that make
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* it unsuitable for saving to a local file.
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*/
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const unsigned long URI_NON_PERSISTABLE = (1<<10);
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/**
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* Channels using this protocol never call OnDataAvailable
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* on the listener passed to AsyncOpen and they therefore
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* do not return any data that we can use.
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*/
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const unsigned long URI_DOES_NOT_RETURN_DATA = (1<<11);
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/**
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* URIs for this protocol are considered to be local resources. This could
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* be a local file (URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE), a UI resource (URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE),
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* or something else that would not hit the network.
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*/
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const unsigned long URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE = (1<<12);
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/**
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* URIs for this protocol execute script when they are opened.
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*/
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const unsigned long URI_OPENING_EXECUTES_SCRIPT = (1<<13);
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// Note that 1 << 14 is used above
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/**
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* Channels for this protocol don't need to spin the event loop to handle
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* Open() and reads on the resulting stream.
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*/
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const unsigned long URI_SYNC_LOAD_IS_OK = (1<<15);
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/**
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* This protocol handler can be proxied via a proxy (socks or http)
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* (e.g., irc, smtp, http, etc.). If the protocol supports transparent
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* proxying, the handler should implement nsIProxiedProtocolHandler.
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*
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* If it supports only HTTP proxying, then it need not support
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* nsIProxiedProtocolHandler, but should instead set the ALLOWS_PROXY_HTTP
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* flag (see below).
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*
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* @see nsIProxiedProtocolHandler
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*/
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const unsigned long ALLOWS_PROXY = (1<<2);
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/**
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* This protocol handler can be proxied using a http proxy (e.g., http,
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* ftp, etc.). nsIIOService::newChannelFromURI will feed URIs from this
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* protocol handler to the HTTP protocol handler instead. This flag is
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* ignored if ALLOWS_PROXY is not set.
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*/
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const unsigned long ALLOWS_PROXY_HTTP = (1<<3);
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/**
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* This protocol handler forbids accessing cookies e.g. for mail related
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* protocols.
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*/
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const unsigned long URI_FORBIDS_COOKIE_ACCESS = (1<<15);
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};
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%{C++
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/**
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* Protocol handlers are registered with XPCOM under the following CONTRACTID prefix:
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*/
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#define NS_NETWORK_PROTOCOL_CONTRACTID_PREFIX "@mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name="
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/**
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* For example, "@mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=http"
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*/
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%}
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