gecko-dev/security/sandbox/linux/Sandbox.cpp
Jed Davis 1acb8c0912 Bug 945330 - Reword and slightly improve sandbox violation log message. r=kang
The main goal is to have a message that unambiguously indicates a crash,
so mozharness can grep for it even if some of the details change later.

Also now includes the entire argument list; most syscalls don't use all
six, so the last few will be meaningless, but it can't hurt to log them.
2014-01-10 08:22:58 -05:00

199 lines
5.2 KiB
C++

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,
* You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
#include "mozilla/NullPtr.h"
#if defined(ANDROID)
#include "android_ucontext.h"
#include <android/log.h>
#endif
#include "seccomp_filter.h"
#include "linux_seccomp.h"
#ifdef MOZ_LOGGING
#define FORCE_PR_LOG 1
#endif
#include "prlog.h"
namespace mozilla {
#if defined(ANDROID)
#define LOG_ERROR(args...) __android_log_print(ANDROID_LOG_ERROR, "Sandbox", ## args)
#elif defined(PR_LOGGING)
static PRLogModuleInfo* gSeccompSandboxLog;
#define LOG_ERROR(args...) PR_LOG(gSeccompSandboxLog, PR_LOG_ERROR, (args))
#else
#define LOG_ERROR(args...)
#endif
struct sock_filter seccomp_filter[] = {
VALIDATE_ARCHITECTURE,
EXAMINE_SYSCALL,
SECCOMP_WHITELIST,
#ifdef MOZ_CONTENT_SANDBOX_REPORTER
TRAP_PROCESS,
#else
KILL_PROCESS,
#endif
};
struct sock_fprog seccomp_prog = {
(unsigned short)MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(seccomp_filter),
seccomp_filter,
};
/**
* This is the SIGSYS handler function. It is used to report to the user
* which system call has been denied by Seccomp.
* This function also makes the process exit as denying the system call
* will otherwise generally lead to unexpected behavior from the process,
* since we don't know if all functions will handle such denials gracefully.
*
* @see InstallSyscallReporter() function.
*/
#ifdef MOZ_CONTENT_SANDBOX_REPORTER
static void
Reporter(int nr, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context)
{
ucontext_t *ctx = static_cast<ucontext_t*>(void_context);
unsigned long syscall, args[6];
if (nr != SIGSYS) {
return;
}
if (info->si_code != SYS_SECCOMP) {
return;
}
if (!ctx) {
return;
}
syscall = SECCOMP_SYSCALL(ctx);
args[0] = SECCOMP_PARM1(ctx);
args[1] = SECCOMP_PARM2(ctx);
args[2] = SECCOMP_PARM3(ctx);
args[3] = SECCOMP_PARM4(ctx);
args[4] = SECCOMP_PARM5(ctx);
args[5] = SECCOMP_PARM6(ctx);
LOG_ERROR("seccomp sandbox violation: pid %u, syscall %lu, args %lu %lu %lu"
" %lu %lu %lu. Killing process.", getpid(), syscall,
args[0], args[1], args[2], args[3], args[4], args[5]);
_exit(127);
}
/**
* The reporter is called when the process receives a SIGSYS signal.
* The signal is sent by the kernel when Seccomp encounter a system call
* that has not been allowed.
* We register an action for that signal (calling the Reporter function).
*
* This function should not be used in production and thus generally be
* called from debug code. In production, the process is directly killed.
* For this reason, the function is ifdef'd, as there is no reason to
* compile it while unused.
*
* @return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
* @see Reporter() function.
*/
static int
InstallSyscallReporter(void)
{
struct sigaction act;
sigset_t mask;
memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act));
sigemptyset(&mask);
sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS);
act.sa_sigaction = &Reporter;
act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_NODEFER;
if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, nullptr) < 0) {
return -1;
}
if (sigemptyset(&mask) ||
sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS) ||
sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, nullptr)) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
#endif
/**
* This function installs the syscall filter, a.k.a. seccomp.
* PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS ensures that it is impossible to grant more
* syscalls to the process beyond this point (even after fork()).
* SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER is the "bpf" mode of seccomp which allows
* to pass a bpf program (in our case, it contains a syscall
* whitelist).
*
* @return 0 on success, 1 on failure.
* @see sock_fprog (the seccomp_prog).
*/
static int
InstallSyscallFilter(void)
{
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
return 1;
}
if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &seccomp_prog, 0, 0)) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* Starts the seccomp sandbox for this process.
* Generally called just after SetCurrentProcessPrivileges.
* Should be called only once, and before any potentially harmful content is loaded.
*
* Should normally make the process exit on failure.
*/
void
SetCurrentProcessSandbox(void)
{
#if !defined(ANDROID) && defined(PR_LOGGING)
if (!gSeccompSandboxLog) {
gSeccompSandboxLog = PR_NewLogModule("SeccompSandbox");
}
PR_ASSERT(gSeccompSandboxLog);
#endif
#ifdef MOZ_CONTENT_SANDBOX_REPORTER
if (InstallSyscallReporter()) {
LOG_ERROR("install_syscall_reporter() failed\n");
/* This is disabled so that we do not exit if seccomp-bpf is not available
* This will be re-enabled when all B2G devices are required to support seccomp-bpf
* See bug 880797 for reversal
*/
/* _exit(127); */
}
#endif
if (InstallSyscallFilter()) {
LOG_ERROR("install_syscall_filter() failed\n");
/* This is disabled so that we do not exit if seccomp-bpf is not available
* This will be re-enabled when all B2G devices are required to support seccomp-bpf
* See bug 880797 for reversal
*/
/* _exit(127); */
}
}
} // namespace mozilla