gecko-dev/security/certverifier/OCSPVerificationTrustDomain.cpp
David Keeler 47263aefb3 bug 1349762 - handle two GlobalSign EV root transfers r=Cykesiopka,jcj
(adapted from bug 1349762 comment 0)
Google Trust Services (GTS) recently purchased two roots from GlobalSign that
are both enabled for EV treatment: "GlobalSign Root CA - R2" and "GlobalSign ECC
Root CA - R4".

However, GTS does not have an EV audit, so we are going to turn off EV treatment
for both of those root certificates.

But "GlobalSign Root CA - R2" has intermediate cert "GlobalSign Extended
Validation CA - SHA256 - G2" that continues to be controlled by GlobalSign, to
be used to migrate their customers off dependence on that root.

This patch removes EV treatment for "GlobalSign ECC Root CA - R4". It also
removes EV treatment for all chains rooted in "GlobalSign Root CA - R2" unless
the "GlobalSign Extended Validation CA - SHA256 - G2" intermediate is in the
chain.

MozReview-Commit-ID: Ej9L9zTwoPN

--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 575f1a48646cf728d879d0cf53c888654e4a32ad
2017-04-03 17:17:38 -07:00

130 lines
4.2 KiB
C++

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "OCSPVerificationTrustDomain.h"
using namespace mozilla;
using namespace mozilla::pkix;
namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
OCSPVerificationTrustDomain::OCSPVerificationTrustDomain(
NSSCertDBTrustDomain& certDBTrustDomain)
: mCertDBTrustDomain(certDBTrustDomain)
{
}
Result
OCSPVerificationTrustDomain::GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
const CertPolicyId& policy,
Input candidateCertDER,
/*out*/ TrustLevel& trustLevel)
{
return mCertDBTrustDomain.GetCertTrust(endEntityOrCA, policy,
candidateCertDER, trustLevel);
}
Result
OCSPVerificationTrustDomain::FindIssuer(Input, IssuerChecker&, Time)
{
// We do not expect this to be called for OCSP signers
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
Result
OCSPVerificationTrustDomain::IsChainValid(const DERArray&, Time,
const CertPolicyId&)
{
// We do not expect this to be called for OCSP signers
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
Result
OCSPVerificationTrustDomain::CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA, const CertID&,
Time, Duration, const Input*,
const Input*)
{
// We do not expect this to be called for OCSP signers
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
Result
OCSPVerificationTrustDomain::CheckSignatureDigestAlgorithm(
DigestAlgorithm aAlg, EndEntityOrCA aEEOrCA, Time notBefore)
{
// The reason for wrapping the NSSCertDBTrustDomain in an
// OCSPVerificationTrustDomain is to allow us to bypass the weaker signature
// algorithm check - thus all allowable signature digest algorithms should
// always be accepted. This is only needed while we gather telemetry on SHA-1.
return Success;
}
Result
OCSPVerificationTrustDomain::CheckRSAPublicKeyModulusSizeInBits(
EndEntityOrCA aEEOrCA, unsigned int aModulusSizeInBits)
{
return mCertDBTrustDomain.
CheckRSAPublicKeyModulusSizeInBits(aEEOrCA, aModulusSizeInBits);
}
Result
OCSPVerificationTrustDomain::VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDigest(
const SignedDigest& aSignedDigest, Input aSubjectPublicKeyInfo)
{
return mCertDBTrustDomain.VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDigest(aSignedDigest,
aSubjectPublicKeyInfo);
}
Result
OCSPVerificationTrustDomain::CheckECDSACurveIsAcceptable(
EndEntityOrCA aEEOrCA, NamedCurve aCurve)
{
return mCertDBTrustDomain.CheckECDSACurveIsAcceptable(aEEOrCA, aCurve);
}
Result
OCSPVerificationTrustDomain::VerifyECDSASignedDigest(
const SignedDigest& aSignedDigest, Input aSubjectPublicKeyInfo)
{
return mCertDBTrustDomain.VerifyECDSASignedDigest(aSignedDigest,
aSubjectPublicKeyInfo);
}
Result
OCSPVerificationTrustDomain::CheckValidityIsAcceptable(
Time notBefore, Time notAfter, EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
KeyPurposeId keyPurpose)
{
return mCertDBTrustDomain.CheckValidityIsAcceptable(notBefore, notAfter,
endEntityOrCA,
keyPurpose);
}
Result
OCSPVerificationTrustDomain::NetscapeStepUpMatchesServerAuth(Time notBefore,
/*out*/ bool& matches)
{
return mCertDBTrustDomain.NetscapeStepUpMatchesServerAuth(notBefore, matches);
}
void
OCSPVerificationTrustDomain::NoteAuxiliaryExtension(
AuxiliaryExtension extension, Input extensionData)
{
mCertDBTrustDomain.NoteAuxiliaryExtension(extension, extensionData);
}
Result
OCSPVerificationTrustDomain::DigestBuf(
Input item, DigestAlgorithm digestAlg,
/*out*/ uint8_t* digestBuf, size_t digestBufLen)
{
return mCertDBTrustDomain.DigestBuf(item, digestAlg, digestBuf, digestBufLen);
}
} } // namespace mozilla::psm