mirror of
https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev.git
synced 2024-12-11 16:32:59 +00:00
1723 lines
58 KiB
C++
1723 lines
58 KiB
C++
/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
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/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#include "nsScriptSecurityManager.h"
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#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
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#include "xpcprivate.h"
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#include "XPCWrapper.h"
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#include "nsIAppsService.h"
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#include "nsIInputStreamChannel.h"
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#include "nsILoadContext.h"
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#include "nsIServiceManager.h"
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#include "nsIScriptObjectPrincipal.h"
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#include "nsIScriptContext.h"
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#include "nsIURL.h"
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#include "nsINestedURI.h"
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#include "nspr.h"
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#include "nsJSPrincipals.h"
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#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
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#include "nsSystemPrincipal.h"
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#include "nsPrincipal.h"
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#include "nsNullPrincipal.h"
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#include "DomainPolicy.h"
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#include "nsXPIDLString.h"
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#include "nsCRT.h"
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#include "nsCRTGlue.h"
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#include "nsDocShell.h"
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#include "nsError.h"
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#include "nsDOMCID.h"
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#include "nsIXPConnect.h"
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#include "nsTextFormatter.h"
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#include "nsIStringBundle.h"
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#include "nsNetUtil.h"
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#include "nsIEffectiveTLDService.h"
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#include "nsIProperties.h"
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#include "nsDirectoryServiceDefs.h"
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#include "nsIFile.h"
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#include "nsIFileURL.h"
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#include "nsIZipReader.h"
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#include "nsIXPConnect.h"
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#include "nsIScriptGlobalObject.h"
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#include "nsPIDOMWindow.h"
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#include "nsIDocShell.h"
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#include "nsIPrompt.h"
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#include "nsIWindowWatcher.h"
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#include "nsIConsoleService.h"
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#include "nsIObserverService.h"
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#include "nsIContent.h"
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#include "nsAutoPtr.h"
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#include "nsDOMJSUtils.h"
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#include "nsAboutProtocolUtils.h"
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#include "nsIClassInfo.h"
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#include "nsIURIFixup.h"
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#include "nsCDefaultURIFixup.h"
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#include "nsIChromeRegistry.h"
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#include "nsIContentSecurityPolicy.h"
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#include "nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback.h"
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#include "mozIApplication.h"
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#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
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#include "mozilla/dom/BindingUtils.h"
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include "mozilla/dom/ScriptSettings.h"
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#include "mozilla/ClearOnShutdown.h"
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#include "mozilla/StaticPtr.h"
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#include "nsContentUtils.h"
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#include "nsJSUtils.h"
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#include "nsILoadInfo.h"
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#include "nsXPCOMStrings.h"
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// This should be probably defined on some other place... but I couldn't find it
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#define WEBAPPS_PERM_NAME "webapps-manage"
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using namespace mozilla;
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using namespace mozilla::dom;
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nsIIOService *nsScriptSecurityManager::sIOService = nullptr;
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nsIStringBundle *nsScriptSecurityManager::sStrBundle = nullptr;
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JSRuntime *nsScriptSecurityManager::sRuntime = 0;
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bool nsScriptSecurityManager::sStrictFileOriginPolicy = true;
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///////////////////////////
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// Convenience Functions //
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///////////////////////////
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class nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter {
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public:
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nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter() {
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++sInPrincipalDomainOrigin;
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}
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~nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter() {
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--sInPrincipalDomainOrigin;
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}
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static uint32_t sInPrincipalDomainOrigin;
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};
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uint32_t nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter::sInPrincipalDomainOrigin;
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static
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nsresult
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GetOriginFromURI(nsIURI* aURI, nsACString& aOrigin)
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{
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if (nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter::sInPrincipalDomainOrigin > 1) {
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// Allow a single recursive call to GetPrincipalDomainOrigin, since that
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// might be happening on a different principal from the first call. But
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// after that, cut off the recursion; it just indicates that something
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// we're doing in this method causes us to reenter a security check here.
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return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
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}
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nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter autoSetter;
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri = NS_GetInnermostURI(aURI);
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NS_ENSURE_TRUE(uri, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
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nsAutoCString hostPort;
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nsresult rv = uri->GetHostPort(hostPort);
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if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
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nsAutoCString scheme;
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rv = uri->GetScheme(scheme);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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aOrigin = scheme + NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("://") + hostPort;
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}
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else {
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// Some URIs (e.g., nsSimpleURI) don't support host. Just
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// get the full spec.
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rv = uri->GetSpec(aOrigin);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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static
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nsresult
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GetPrincipalDomainOrigin(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
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nsACString& aOrigin)
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{
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
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aPrincipal->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(uri));
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if (!uri) {
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aPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
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}
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NS_ENSURE_TRUE(uri, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
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return GetOriginFromURI(uri, aOrigin);
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}
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inline void SetPendingException(JSContext *cx, const char *aMsg)
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{
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JS_ReportError(cx, "%s", aMsg);
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}
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inline void SetPendingException(JSContext *cx, const char16_t *aMsg)
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{
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JS_ReportError(cx, "%hs", aMsg);
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}
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// Helper class to get stuff from the ClassInfo and not waste extra time with
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// virtual method calls for things it has already gotten
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class ClassInfoData
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{
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public:
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ClassInfoData(nsIClassInfo *aClassInfo, const char *aName)
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: mClassInfo(aClassInfo),
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mName(const_cast<char *>(aName)),
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mDidGetFlags(false),
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mMustFreeName(false)
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{
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}
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~ClassInfoData()
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{
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if (mMustFreeName)
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free(mName);
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}
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uint32_t GetFlags()
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{
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if (!mDidGetFlags) {
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if (mClassInfo) {
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nsresult rv = mClassInfo->GetFlags(&mFlags);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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mFlags = 0;
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}
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} else {
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mFlags = 0;
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}
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mDidGetFlags = true;
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}
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return mFlags;
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}
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bool IsDOMClass()
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{
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return !!(GetFlags() & nsIClassInfo::DOM_OBJECT);
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}
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const char* GetName()
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{
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if (!mName) {
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if (mClassInfo) {
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mClassInfo->GetClassDescription(&mName);
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}
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if (mName) {
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mMustFreeName = true;
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} else {
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mName = const_cast<char *>("UnnamedClass");
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}
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}
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return mName;
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}
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private:
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nsIClassInfo *mClassInfo; // WEAK
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uint32_t mFlags;
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char *mName;
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bool mDidGetFlags;
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bool mMustFreeName;
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};
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/* static */
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bool
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nsScriptSecurityManager::SecurityCompareURIs(nsIURI* aSourceURI,
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nsIURI* aTargetURI)
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{
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return NS_SecurityCompareURIs(aSourceURI, aTargetURI, sStrictFileOriginPolicy);
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}
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// SecurityHashURI is consistent with SecurityCompareURIs because NS_SecurityHashURI
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// is consistent with NS_SecurityCompareURIs. See nsNetUtil.h.
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uint32_t
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nsScriptSecurityManager::SecurityHashURI(nsIURI* aURI)
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{
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return NS_SecurityHashURI(aURI);
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}
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uint16_t
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nsScriptSecurityManager::AppStatusForPrincipal(nsIPrincipal *aPrin)
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{
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uint32_t appId = aPrin->GetAppId();
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// After bug 1238160, the principal no longer knows how to answer "is this a
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// browser element", which is really what this code path wants. Currently,
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// desktop is the only platform where we intend to disable isolation on a
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// browser frame, so non-desktop should be able to assume that
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// inIsolatedMozBrowser is true for all mozbrowser frames. Additionally,
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// apps are no longer used on desktop, so appId is always NO_APP_ID. We use
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// a release assertion in nsFrameLoader::OwnerIsIsolatedMozBrowserFrame so
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// that platforms with apps can assume inIsolatedMozBrowser is true for all
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// mozbrowser frames.
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bool inIsolatedMozBrowser = aPrin->GetIsInIsolatedMozBrowserElement();
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NS_WARN_IF_FALSE(appId != nsIScriptSecurityManager::UNKNOWN_APP_ID,
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"Asking for app status on a principal with an unknown app id");
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// Installed apps have a valid app id (not NO_APP_ID or UNKNOWN_APP_ID)
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// and they are not inside a mozbrowser.
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if (appId == nsIScriptSecurityManager::NO_APP_ID ||
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appId == nsIScriptSecurityManager::UNKNOWN_APP_ID ||
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inIsolatedMozBrowser)
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{
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return nsIPrincipal::APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED;
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}
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nsCOMPtr<nsIAppsService> appsService = do_GetService(APPS_SERVICE_CONTRACTID);
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NS_ENSURE_TRUE(appsService, nsIPrincipal::APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED);
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nsCOMPtr<mozIApplication> app;
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appsService->GetAppByLocalId(appId, getter_AddRefs(app));
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NS_ENSURE_TRUE(app, nsIPrincipal::APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED);
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uint16_t status = nsIPrincipal::APP_STATUS_INSTALLED;
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(app->GetAppStatus(&status),
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nsIPrincipal::APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED);
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nsString appOrigin;
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(app->GetOrigin(appOrigin),
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nsIPrincipal::APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED);
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> appURI;
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(appURI), appOrigin),
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nsIPrincipal::APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED);
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// The app could contain a cross-origin iframe - make sure that the content
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// is actually same-origin with the app.
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MOZ_ASSERT(inIsolatedMozBrowser == false, "Checked this above");
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nsAutoCString suffix;
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PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs;
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NS_ENSURE_TRUE(attrs.PopulateFromOrigin(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(appOrigin), suffix),
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nsIPrincipal::APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED);
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attrs.mAppId = appId;
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attrs.mInIsolatedMozBrowser = false;
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nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> appPrin = BasePrincipal::CreateCodebasePrincipal(appURI, attrs);
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NS_ENSURE_TRUE(appPrin, nsIPrincipal::APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED);
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return aPrin->Equals(appPrin) ? status
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: nsIPrincipal::APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED;
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}
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/*
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* GetChannelResultPrincipal will return the principal that the resource
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* returned by this channel will use. For example, if the resource is in
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* a sandbox, it will return the nullprincipal. If the resource is forced
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* to inherit principal, it will return the principal of its parent. If
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* the load doesn't require sandboxing or inheriting, it will return the same
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* principal as GetChannelURIPrincipal. Namely the principal of the URI
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* that is being loaded.
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*/
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultPrincipal(nsIChannel* aChannel,
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nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
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{
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return GetChannelResultPrincipal(aChannel, aPrincipal,
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/*aIgnoreSandboxing*/ false);
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}
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nsresult
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nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultPrincipalIfNotSandboxed(nsIChannel* aChannel,
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nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
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{
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return GetChannelResultPrincipal(aChannel, aPrincipal,
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/*aIgnoreSandboxing*/ true);
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}
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nsresult
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nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultPrincipal(nsIChannel* aChannel,
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nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal,
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bool aIgnoreSandboxing)
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{
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NS_PRECONDITION(aChannel, "Must have channel!");
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nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> owner;
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aChannel->GetOwner(getter_AddRefs(owner));
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if (owner) {
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CallQueryInterface(owner, aPrincipal);
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if (*aPrincipal) {
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return NS_OK;
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}
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}
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// Check whether we have an nsILoadInfo that says what we should do.
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nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo;
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aChannel->GetLoadInfo(getter_AddRefs(loadInfo));
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if (loadInfo) {
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if (!aIgnoreSandboxing && loadInfo->GetLoadingSandboxed()) {
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RefPtr<nsNullPrincipal> prin;
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if (loadInfo->LoadingPrincipal()) {
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prin =
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nsNullPrincipal::CreateWithInheritedAttributes(loadInfo->LoadingPrincipal());
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} else {
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NeckoOriginAttributes nAttrs;
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loadInfo->GetOriginAttributes(&nAttrs);
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PrincipalOriginAttributes pAttrs;
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pAttrs.InheritFromNecko(nAttrs);
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prin = nsNullPrincipal::Create(pAttrs);
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}
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prin.forget(aPrincipal);
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return NS_OK;
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}
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bool forceInterit = loadInfo->GetForceInheritPrincipal();
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if (aIgnoreSandboxing && !forceInterit) {
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// Check if SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL was dropped because of
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// sandboxing:
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if (loadInfo->GetLoadingSandboxed() &&
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(loadInfo->GetSecurityFlags() &
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nsILoadInfo::SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL_WAS_DROPPED)) {
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forceInterit = true;
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}
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}
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if (forceInterit) {
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NS_ADDREF(*aPrincipal = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal());
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return NS_OK;
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}
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nsSecurityFlags securityFlags = loadInfo->GetSecurityMode();
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if (securityFlags == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS ||
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securityFlags == nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS ||
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securityFlags == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS) {
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
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nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> triggeringPrincipal = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
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bool inheritForAboutBlank = loadInfo->GetAboutBlankInherits();
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if (nsContentUtils::ChannelShouldInheritPrincipal(triggeringPrincipal,
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uri,
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inheritForAboutBlank,
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false)) {
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triggeringPrincipal.forget(aPrincipal);
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return NS_OK;
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}
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}
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}
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return GetChannelURIPrincipal(aChannel, aPrincipal);
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}
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nsresult
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nsScriptSecurityManager::MaybeSetAddonIdFromURI(PrincipalOriginAttributes& aAttrs, nsIURI* aURI)
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{
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nsAutoCString scheme;
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nsresult rv = aURI->GetScheme(scheme);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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if (scheme.EqualsLiteral("moz-extension") && GetAddonPolicyService()) {
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rv = GetAddonPolicyService()->ExtensionURIToAddonId(aURI, aAttrs.mAddonId);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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/* The principal of the URI that this channel is loading. This is never
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* affected by things like sandboxed loads, or loads where we forcefully
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* inherit the principal. Think of this as the principal of the server
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* which this channel is loading from. Most callers should use
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* GetChannelResultPrincipal instead of GetChannelURIPrincipal. Only
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* call GetChannelURIPrincipal if you are sure that you want the
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* principal that matches the uri, even in cases when the load is
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* sandboxed or when the load could be a blob or data uri (i.e even when
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* you encounter loads that may or may not be sandboxed and loads
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* that may or may not inherit)."
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*/
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelURIPrincipal(nsIChannel* aChannel,
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nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
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{
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NS_PRECONDITION(aChannel, "Must have channel!");
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// Get the principal from the URI. Make sure this does the same thing
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// as nsDocument::Reset and XULDocument::StartDocumentLoad.
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
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nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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nsCOMPtr<nsILoadContext> loadContext;
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NS_QueryNotificationCallbacks(aChannel, loadContext);
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nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo;
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aChannel->GetLoadInfo(getter_AddRefs(loadInfo));
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nsContentPolicyType contentPolicyType = nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INVALID;
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if (loadInfo) {
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contentPolicyType = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
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}
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PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs;
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if (nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT == contentPolicyType ||
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nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT == contentPolicyType) {
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// If it's document or sub-document, inherit originAttributes from
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// the document.
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if (loadContext) {
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DocShellOriginAttributes docShellAttrs;
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loadContext->GetOriginAttributes(docShellAttrs);
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attrs.InheritFromDocShellToDoc(docShellAttrs, uri);
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}
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} else {
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// Inherit origin attributes from loading principal if any.
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nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> loadingPrincipal;
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if (loadInfo) {
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loadInfo->GetLoadingPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(loadingPrincipal));
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}
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if (loadingPrincipal) {
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attrs = BasePrincipal::Cast(loadingPrincipal)->OriginAttributesRef();
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}
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}
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rv = MaybeSetAddonIdFromURI(attrs, uri);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = BasePrincipal::CreateCodebasePrincipal(uri, attrs);
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prin.forget(aPrincipal);
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return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsScriptSecurityManager::IsSystemPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
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bool* aIsSystem)
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{
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*aIsSystem = (aPrincipal == mSystemPrincipal);
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return NS_OK;
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}
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/////////////////////////////
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// nsScriptSecurityManager //
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/////////////////////////////
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////////////////////////////////////
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// Methods implementing ISupports //
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////////////////////////////////////
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NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsScriptSecurityManager,
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nsIScriptSecurityManager,
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nsIObserver)
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///////////////////////////////////////////////////
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// Methods implementing nsIScriptSecurityManager //
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///////////////////////////////////////////////////
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///////////////// Security Checks /////////////////
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bool
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nsScriptSecurityManager::ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction(JSContext *cx)
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{
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MOZ_ASSERT(cx == nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext());
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nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> subjectPrincipal = nsContentUtils::SubjectPrincipal();
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nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp;
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nsresult rv = subjectPrincipal->GetCsp(getter_AddRefs(csp));
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NS_ASSERTION(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv), "CSP: Failed to get CSP from principal.");
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// don't do anything unless there's a CSP
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if (!csp)
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return true;
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bool evalOK = true;
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bool reportViolation = false;
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rv = csp->GetAllowsEval(&reportViolation, &evalOK);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv))
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{
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NS_WARNING("CSP: failed to get allowsEval");
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return true; // fail open to not break sites.
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}
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if (reportViolation) {
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nsAutoString fileName;
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unsigned lineNum = 0;
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NS_NAMED_LITERAL_STRING(scriptSample, "call to eval() or related function blocked by CSP");
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JS::AutoFilename scriptFilename;
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if (JS::DescribeScriptedCaller(cx, &scriptFilename, &lineNum)) {
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if (const char *file = scriptFilename.get()) {
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CopyUTF8toUTF16(nsDependentCString(file), fileName);
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}
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} else {
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MOZ_ASSERT(!JS_IsExceptionPending(cx));
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}
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csp->LogViolationDetails(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_EVAL,
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fileName,
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scriptSample,
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lineNum,
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EmptyString(),
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EmptyString());
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}
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return evalOK;
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}
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// static
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bool
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nsScriptSecurityManager::JSPrincipalsSubsume(JSPrincipals *first,
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JSPrincipals *second)
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{
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return nsJSPrincipals::get(first)->Subsumes(nsJSPrincipals::get(second));
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckSameOriginURI(nsIURI* aSourceURI,
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nsIURI* aTargetURI,
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bool reportError)
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{
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if (!SecurityCompareURIs(aSourceURI, aTargetURI))
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{
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if (reportError) {
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ReportError(nullptr, NS_LITERAL_STRING("CheckSameOriginError"),
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aSourceURI, aTargetURI);
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}
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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/*static*/ uint32_t
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nsScriptSecurityManager::HashPrincipalByOrigin(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal)
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{
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
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aPrincipal->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(uri));
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if (!uri)
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aPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
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return SecurityHashURI(uri);
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIFromScript(JSContext *cx, nsIURI *aURI)
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{
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// Get principal of currently executing script.
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MOZ_ASSERT(cx == nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext());
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nsIPrincipal* principal = nsContentUtils::SubjectPrincipal();
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nsresult rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(principal, aURI,
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nsIScriptSecurityManager::STANDARD);
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if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
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// OK to load
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return NS_OK;
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}
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// See if we're attempting to load a file: URI. If so, let a
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// UniversalXPConnect capability trump the above check.
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bool isFile = false;
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bool isRes = false;
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if (NS_FAILED(aURI->SchemeIs("file", &isFile)) ||
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NS_FAILED(aURI->SchemeIs("resource", &isRes)))
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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if (isFile || isRes)
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{
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if (nsContentUtils::IsCallerChrome())
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return NS_OK;
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}
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// Report error.
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nsAutoCString spec;
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if (NS_FAILED(aURI->GetAsciiSpec(spec)))
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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nsAutoCString msg("Access to '");
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msg.Append(spec);
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msg.AppendLiteral("' from script denied");
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SetPendingException(cx, msg.get());
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
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}
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/**
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* Helper method to handle cases where a flag passed to
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* CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal means denying loading if the given URI has certain
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* nsIProtocolHandler flags set.
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* @return if success, access is allowed. Otherwise, deny access
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*/
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static nsresult
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DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(nsIURI* aURI, uint32_t aURIFlags)
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{
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NS_PRECONDITION(aURI, "Must have URI!");
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bool uriHasFlags;
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nsresult rv =
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NS_URIChainHasFlags(aURI, aURIFlags, &uriHasFlags);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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if (uriHasFlags) {
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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static bool
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EqualOrSubdomain(nsIURI* aProbeArg, nsIURI* aBase)
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{
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// Make a clone of the incoming URI, because we're going to mutate it.
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> probe;
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nsresult rv = aProbeArg->Clone(getter_AddRefs(probe));
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
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nsCOMPtr<nsIEffectiveTLDService> tldService = do_GetService(NS_EFFECTIVETLDSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
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NS_ENSURE_TRUE(tldService, false);
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while (true) {
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if (nsScriptSecurityManager::SecurityCompareURIs(probe, aBase)) {
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return true;
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}
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nsAutoCString host, newHost;
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rv = probe->GetHost(host);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
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rv = tldService->GetNextSubDomain(host, newHost);
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if (rv == NS_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DOMAIN_LEVELS) {
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return false;
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}
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
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rv = probe->SetHost(newHost);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
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}
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}
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static bool
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AllSchemesMatch(nsIURI* aURI, nsIURI* aOtherURI)
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{
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nsCOMPtr<nsINestedURI> nestedURI = do_QueryInterface(aURI);
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nsCOMPtr<nsINestedURI> nestedOtherURI = do_QueryInterface(aOtherURI);
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auto stringComparator = nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator();
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if (!nestedURI && !nestedOtherURI) {
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// Neither of the URIs is nested, compare their schemes directly:
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nsAutoCString scheme, otherScheme;
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aURI->GetScheme(scheme);
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aOtherURI->GetScheme(otherScheme);
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return scheme.Equals(otherScheme, stringComparator);
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}
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while (nestedURI && nestedOtherURI) {
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> currentURI = do_QueryInterface(nestedURI);
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> currentOtherURI = do_QueryInterface(nestedOtherURI);
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nsAutoCString scheme, otherScheme;
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currentURI->GetScheme(scheme);
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currentOtherURI->GetScheme(otherScheme);
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if (!scheme.Equals(otherScheme, stringComparator)) {
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return false;
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}
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nestedURI->GetInnerURI(getter_AddRefs(currentURI));
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nestedOtherURI->GetInnerURI(getter_AddRefs(currentOtherURI));
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nestedURI = do_QueryInterface(currentURI);
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nestedOtherURI = do_QueryInterface(currentOtherURI);
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}
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if (!!nestedURI != !!nestedOtherURI) {
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// If only one of the scheme chains runs out at one point, clearly the chains
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// aren't of the same length, so we bail:
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
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nsIURI *aTargetURI,
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uint32_t aFlags)
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{
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NS_PRECONDITION(aPrincipal, "CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal must have a principal");
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// If someone passes a flag that we don't understand, we should
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// fail, because they may need a security check that we don't
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// provide.
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NS_ENSURE_FALSE(aFlags & ~(nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT |
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nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME |
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nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT |
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nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL |
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nsIScriptSecurityManager::DONT_REPORT_ERRORS),
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NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
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NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aPrincipal);
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NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aTargetURI);
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// If DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL is set, we prevent loading of URIs which
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// would do such inheriting. That would be URIs that do not have their own
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// security context. We do this even for the system principal.
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if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL) {
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nsresult rv =
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DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(aTargetURI,
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nsIProtocolHandler::URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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}
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if (aPrincipal == mSystemPrincipal) {
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// Allow access
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return NS_OK;
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}
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> sourceURI;
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aPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(sourceURI));
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if (!sourceURI) {
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nsCOMPtr<nsIExpandedPrincipal> expanded = do_QueryInterface(aPrincipal);
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if (expanded) {
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nsTArray< nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> > *whiteList;
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expanded->GetWhiteList(&whiteList);
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < whiteList->Length(); ++i) {
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nsresult rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal((*whiteList)[i],
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aTargetURI,
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aFlags);
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if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
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// Allow access if it succeeded with one of the white listed principals
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return NS_OK;
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}
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}
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// None of our whitelisted principals worked.
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
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}
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NS_ERROR("Non-system principals or expanded principal passed to CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal "
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"must have a URI!");
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return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
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}
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// Automatic loads are not allowed from certain protocols.
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if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT) {
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nsresult rv =
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DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(sourceURI,
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nsIProtocolHandler::URI_FORBIDS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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}
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// If either URI is a nested URI, get the base URI
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> sourceBaseURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(sourceURI);
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> targetBaseURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(aTargetURI);
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//-- get the target scheme
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nsAutoCString targetScheme;
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nsresult rv = targetBaseURI->GetScheme(targetScheme);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
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//-- Some callers do not allow loading javascript:
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if ((aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT) &&
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targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("javascript"))
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{
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
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}
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NS_NAMED_LITERAL_STRING(errorTag, "CheckLoadURIError");
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bool reportErrors = !(aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DONT_REPORT_ERRORS);
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// Check for uris that are only loadable by principals that subsume them
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bool hasFlags;
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rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(targetBaseURI,
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nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS,
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&hasFlags);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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if (hasFlags) {
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return aPrincipal->CheckMayLoad(targetBaseURI, true, false);
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}
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//-- get the source scheme
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nsAutoCString sourceScheme;
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rv = sourceBaseURI->GetScheme(sourceScheme);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
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// When comparing schemes, if the relevant pref is set, view-source URIs
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// are reachable from same-protocol (so e.g. file: can link to
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// view-source:file). This is required for reftests.
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static bool sViewSourceReachableFromInner = false;
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static bool sCachedViewSourcePref = false;
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if (!sCachedViewSourcePref) {
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sCachedViewSourcePref = true;
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mozilla::Preferences::AddBoolVarCache(&sViewSourceReachableFromInner,
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"security.view-source.reachable-from-inner-protocol");
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}
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bool targetIsViewSource = false;
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if (sourceScheme.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral(NS_NULLPRINCIPAL_SCHEME)) {
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// A null principal can target its own URI.
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if (sourceURI == aTargetURI) {
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return NS_OK;
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}
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}
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else if (AllSchemesMatch(sourceURI, aTargetURI) ||
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(sViewSourceReachableFromInner &&
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sourceScheme.EqualsIgnoreCase(targetScheme.get()) &&
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NS_SUCCEEDED(aTargetURI->SchemeIs("view-source", &targetIsViewSource)) &&
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targetIsViewSource))
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{
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// every scheme can access another URI from the same scheme,
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// as long as they don't represent null principals...
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// Or they don't require an special permission to do so
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// See bug#773886
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rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(targetBaseURI,
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nsIProtocolHandler::URI_CROSS_ORIGIN_NEEDS_WEBAPPS_PERM,
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&hasFlags);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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if (hasFlags) {
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// Let apps load the whitelisted theme resources even if they don't
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// have the webapps-manage permission but have the themeable one.
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// Resources from the theme origin are also allowed to load from
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// the theme origin (eg. stylesheets using images from the theme).
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auto themeOrigin = Preferences::GetCString("b2g.theme.origin");
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if (themeOrigin) {
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nsAutoCString targetOrigin;
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nsPrincipal::GetOriginForURI(targetBaseURI, targetOrigin);
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if (targetOrigin.Equals(themeOrigin)) {
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nsAutoCString pOrigin;
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aPrincipal->GetOrigin(pOrigin);
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return nsContentUtils::IsExactSitePermAllow(aPrincipal, "themeable") ||
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pOrigin.Equals(themeOrigin)
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? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
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}
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}
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// In this case, we allow opening only if the source and target URIS
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// are on the same domain, or the opening URI has the webapps
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// permision granted
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if (!SecurityCompareURIs(sourceBaseURI, targetBaseURI) &&
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!nsContentUtils::IsExactSitePermAllow(aPrincipal, WEBAPPS_PERM_NAME)) {
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
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}
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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// If the schemes don't match, the policy is specified by the protocol
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// flags on the target URI. Note that the order of policy checks here is
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// very important! We start from most restrictive and work our way down.
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// Note that since we're working with the innermost URI, we can just use
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// the methods that work on chains of nested URIs and they will only look
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// at the flags for our one URI.
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// Check for system target URI
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rv = DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(aTargetURI,
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nsIProtocolHandler::URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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// Deny access, since the origin principal is not system
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if (reportErrors) {
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ReportError(nullptr, errorTag, sourceURI, aTargetURI);
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}
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return rv;
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}
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// Check for chrome target URI
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rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(targetBaseURI,
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nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE,
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&hasFlags);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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if (hasFlags) {
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if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME) {
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// For now, don't change behavior for resource:// or moz-icon:// and
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// just allow them.
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if (!targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("chrome")) {
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return NS_OK;
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}
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// Allow a URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE source to link to a URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE
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// target if ALLOW_CHROME is set.
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//
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// ALLOW_CHROME is a flag that we pass on all loads _except_ docshell
|
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// loads (since docshell loads run the loaded content with its origin
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// principal). So we're effectively allowing resource://, chrome://,
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// and moz-icon:// source URIs to load resource://, chrome://, and
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// moz-icon:// files, so long as they're not loading it as a document.
|
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bool sourceIsUIResource;
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rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(sourceBaseURI,
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nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE,
|
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&sourceIsUIResource);
|
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
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if (sourceIsUIResource) {
|
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return NS_OK;
|
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}
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|
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// Allow the load only if the chrome package is whitelisted.
|
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nsCOMPtr<nsIXULChromeRegistry> reg(do_GetService(
|
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NS_CHROMEREGISTRY_CONTRACTID));
|
|
if (reg) {
|
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bool accessAllowed = false;
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reg->AllowContentToAccess(targetBaseURI, &accessAllowed);
|
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if (accessAllowed) {
|
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return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
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}
|
|
}
|
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|
|
// Special-case the hidden window: it's allowed to load
|
|
// URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE no matter what. Bug 1145470 tracks removing this.
|
|
nsAutoCString sourceSpec;
|
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if (NS_SUCCEEDED(sourceBaseURI->GetSpec(sourceSpec)) &&
|
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sourceSpec.EqualsLiteral("resource://gre-resources/hiddenWindow.html")) {
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return NS_OK;
|
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}
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|
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if (reportErrors) {
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ReportError(nullptr, errorTag, sourceURI, aTargetURI);
|
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}
|
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
|
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}
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|
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// Check for target URI pointing to a file
|
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rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetURI,
|
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nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE,
|
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&hasFlags);
|
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
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if (hasFlags) {
|
|
// Allow domains that were whitelisted in the prefs. In 99.9% of cases,
|
|
// this array is empty.
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < mFileURIWhitelist.Length(); ++i) {
|
|
if (EqualOrSubdomain(sourceURI, mFileURIWhitelist[i])) {
|
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return NS_OK;
|
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}
|
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}
|
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|
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// Allow chrome://
|
|
if (sourceScheme.EqualsLiteral("chrome")) {
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
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|
|
// Nothing else.
|
|
if (reportErrors) {
|
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ReportError(nullptr, errorTag, sourceURI, aTargetURI);
|
|
}
|
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
|
|
}
|
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|
|
// OK, everyone is allowed to load this, since unflagged handlers are
|
|
// deprecated but treated as URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE. But check whether we
|
|
// need to warn. At some point we'll want to make this warning into an
|
|
// error and treat unflagged handlers as URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD.
|
|
rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(targetBaseURI,
|
|
nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE,
|
|
&hasFlags);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
if (!hasFlags) {
|
|
nsXPIDLString message;
|
|
NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 ucsTargetScheme(targetScheme);
|
|
const char16_t* formatStrings[] = { ucsTargetScheme.get() };
|
|
rv = sStrBundle->
|
|
FormatStringFromName(MOZ_UTF16("ProtocolFlagError"),
|
|
formatStrings,
|
|
ArrayLength(formatStrings),
|
|
getter_Copies(message));
|
|
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(
|
|
do_GetService("@mozilla.org/consoleservice;1"));
|
|
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(console, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
console->LogStringMessage(message.get());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsresult
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::ReportError(JSContext* cx, const nsAString& messageTag,
|
|
nsIURI* aSource, nsIURI* aTarget)
|
|
{
|
|
nsresult rv;
|
|
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aSource && aTarget, NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER);
|
|
|
|
// Get the source URL spec
|
|
nsAutoCString sourceSpec;
|
|
rv = aSource->GetAsciiSpec(sourceSpec);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
|
|
// Get the target URL spec
|
|
nsAutoCString targetSpec;
|
|
rv = aTarget->GetAsciiSpec(targetSpec);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
|
|
// Localize the error message
|
|
nsXPIDLString message;
|
|
NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 ucsSourceSpec(sourceSpec);
|
|
NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 ucsTargetSpec(targetSpec);
|
|
const char16_t *formatStrings[] = { ucsSourceSpec.get(), ucsTargetSpec.get() };
|
|
rv = sStrBundle->FormatStringFromName(PromiseFlatString(messageTag).get(),
|
|
formatStrings,
|
|
ArrayLength(formatStrings),
|
|
getter_Copies(message));
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
|
|
// If a JS context was passed in, set a JS exception.
|
|
// Otherwise, print the error message directly to the JS console
|
|
// and to standard output
|
|
if (cx)
|
|
{
|
|
SetPendingException(cx, message.get());
|
|
}
|
|
else // Print directly to the console
|
|
{
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(
|
|
do_GetService("@mozilla.org/consoleservice;1"));
|
|
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(console, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
console->LogStringMessage(message.get());
|
|
}
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIStrWithPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
|
|
const nsACString& aTargetURIStr,
|
|
uint32_t aFlags)
|
|
{
|
|
nsresult rv;
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> target;
|
|
rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(target), aTargetURIStr,
|
|
nullptr, nullptr, sIOService);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
|
|
rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(aPrincipal, target, aFlags);
|
|
if (rv == NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI) {
|
|
// Don't warn because NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI is one of the expected
|
|
// return values.
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
|
|
// Now start testing fixup -- since aTargetURIStr is a string, not
|
|
// an nsIURI, we may well end up fixing it up before loading.
|
|
// Note: This needs to stay in sync with the nsIURIFixup api.
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIURIFixup> fixup = do_GetService(NS_URIFIXUP_CONTRACTID);
|
|
if (!fixup) {
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t flags[] = {
|
|
nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_NONE,
|
|
nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_FIX_SCHEME_TYPOS,
|
|
nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_ALLOW_KEYWORD_LOOKUP,
|
|
nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAGS_MAKE_ALTERNATE_URI,
|
|
nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_ALLOW_KEYWORD_LOOKUP |
|
|
nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAGS_MAKE_ALTERNATE_URI
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < ArrayLength(flags); ++i) {
|
|
rv = fixup->CreateFixupURI(aTargetURIStr, flags[i], nullptr,
|
|
getter_AddRefs(target));
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
|
|
rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(aPrincipal, target, aFlags);
|
|
if (rv == NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI) {
|
|
// Don't warn because NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI is one of the expected
|
|
// return values.
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
///////////////// Principals ///////////////////////
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetSystemPrincipal(nsIPrincipal **result)
|
|
{
|
|
NS_ADDREF(*result = mSystemPrincipal);
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetSimpleCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI* aURI,
|
|
nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
|
|
{
|
|
PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs(UNKNOWN_APP_ID, false);
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = BasePrincipal::CreateCodebasePrincipal(aURI, attrs);
|
|
prin.forget(aPrincipal);
|
|
return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetNoAppCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI* aURI,
|
|
nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
|
|
{
|
|
PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs(NO_APP_ID, false);
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = BasePrincipal::CreateCodebasePrincipal(aURI, attrs);
|
|
prin.forget(aPrincipal);
|
|
return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI* aURI,
|
|
nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
|
|
{
|
|
return GetNoAppCodebasePrincipal(aURI, aPrincipal);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::CreateCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI* aURI, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aOriginAttributes,
|
|
JSContext* aCx, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
|
|
{
|
|
PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs;
|
|
if (!aOriginAttributes.isObject() || !attrs.Init(aCx, aOriginAttributes)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
|
|
}
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = BasePrincipal::CreateCodebasePrincipal(aURI, attrs);
|
|
prin.forget(aPrincipal);
|
|
return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::CreateCodebasePrincipalFromOrigin(const nsACString& aOrigin,
|
|
nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
|
|
{
|
|
if (StringBeginsWith(aOrigin, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("["))) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (StringBeginsWith(aOrigin, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(NS_NULLPRINCIPAL_SCHEME ":"))) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = BasePrincipal::CreateCodebasePrincipal(aOrigin);
|
|
prin.forget(aPrincipal);
|
|
return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::CreateNullPrincipal(JS::Handle<JS::Value> aOriginAttributes,
|
|
JSContext* aCx, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
|
|
{
|
|
PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs;
|
|
if (!aOriginAttributes.isObject() || !attrs.Init(aCx, aOriginAttributes)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
|
|
}
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = nsNullPrincipal::Create(attrs);
|
|
prin.forget(aPrincipal);
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::CreateExpandedPrincipal(nsIPrincipal** aPrincipalArray, uint32_t aLength,
|
|
nsIPrincipal** aResult)
|
|
{
|
|
nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>> principals;
|
|
principals.SetCapacity(aLength);
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aLength; ++i) {
|
|
principals.AppendElement(aPrincipalArray[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> p = new nsExpandedPrincipal(principals);
|
|
p.forget(aResult);
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetAppCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI* aURI,
|
|
uint32_t aAppId,
|
|
bool aInIsolatedMozBrowser,
|
|
nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
|
|
{
|
|
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aAppId != nsIScriptSecurityManager::UNKNOWN_APP_ID,
|
|
NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG);
|
|
|
|
PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs(aAppId, aInIsolatedMozBrowser);
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = BasePrincipal::CreateCodebasePrincipal(aURI, attrs);
|
|
prin.forget(aPrincipal);
|
|
return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::
|
|
GetLoadContextCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI* aURI,
|
|
nsILoadContext* aLoadContext,
|
|
nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
|
|
{
|
|
DocShellOriginAttributes docShellAttrs;
|
|
bool result = aLoadContext->GetOriginAttributes(docShellAttrs);;
|
|
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(result, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs;
|
|
attrs.InheritFromDocShellToDoc(docShellAttrs, aURI);
|
|
|
|
nsresult rv = MaybeSetAddonIdFromURI(attrs, aURI);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = BasePrincipal::CreateCodebasePrincipal(aURI, attrs);
|
|
prin.forget(aPrincipal);
|
|
return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetDocShellCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI* aURI,
|
|
nsIDocShell* aDocShell,
|
|
nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
|
|
{
|
|
PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs;
|
|
attrs.InheritFromDocShellToDoc(nsDocShell::Cast(aDocShell)->GetOriginAttributes(), aURI);
|
|
|
|
nsresult rv = MaybeSetAddonIdFromURI(attrs, aURI);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = BasePrincipal::CreateCodebasePrincipal(aURI, attrs);
|
|
prin.forget(aPrincipal);
|
|
return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// static
|
|
nsIPrincipal*
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::doGetObjectPrincipal(JSObject *aObj)
|
|
{
|
|
JSCompartment *compartment = js::GetObjectCompartment(aObj);
|
|
JSPrincipals *principals = JS_GetCompartmentPrincipals(compartment);
|
|
return nsJSPrincipals::get(principals);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::CanCreateWrapper(JSContext *cx,
|
|
const nsIID &aIID,
|
|
nsISupports *aObj,
|
|
nsIClassInfo *aClassInfo)
|
|
{
|
|
// XXX Special case for nsIXPCException ?
|
|
ClassInfoData objClassInfo = ClassInfoData(aClassInfo, nullptr);
|
|
if (objClassInfo.IsDOMClass())
|
|
{
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We give remote-XUL whitelisted domains a free pass here. See bug 932906.
|
|
if (!xpc::AllowContentXBLScope(js::GetContextCompartment(cx)))
|
|
{
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (nsContentUtils::IsCallerChrome())
|
|
{
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//-- Access denied, report an error
|
|
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 strName("CreateWrapperDenied");
|
|
nsAutoCString origin;
|
|
nsIPrincipal* subjectPrincipal = nsContentUtils::SubjectPrincipal();
|
|
GetPrincipalDomainOrigin(subjectPrincipal, origin);
|
|
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 originUnicode(origin);
|
|
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 classInfoName(objClassInfo.GetName());
|
|
const char16_t* formatStrings[] = {
|
|
classInfoName.get(),
|
|
originUnicode.get()
|
|
};
|
|
uint32_t length = ArrayLength(formatStrings);
|
|
if (originUnicode.IsEmpty()) {
|
|
--length;
|
|
} else {
|
|
strName.AppendLiteral("ForOrigin");
|
|
}
|
|
nsXPIDLString errorMsg;
|
|
nsresult rv = sStrBundle->FormatStringFromName(strName.get(),
|
|
formatStrings,
|
|
length,
|
|
getter_Copies(errorMsg));
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
|
|
SetPendingException(cx, errorMsg.get());
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_XPCONNECT_ACCESS_DENIED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::CanCreateInstance(JSContext *cx,
|
|
const nsCID &aCID)
|
|
{
|
|
if (nsContentUtils::IsCallerChrome()) {
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//-- Access denied, report an error
|
|
nsAutoCString errorMsg("Permission denied to create instance of class. CID=");
|
|
char cidStr[NSID_LENGTH];
|
|
aCID.ToProvidedString(cidStr);
|
|
errorMsg.Append(cidStr);
|
|
SetPendingException(cx, errorMsg.get());
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_XPCONNECT_ACCESS_DENIED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::CanGetService(JSContext *cx,
|
|
const nsCID &aCID)
|
|
{
|
|
if (nsContentUtils::IsCallerChrome()) {
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//-- Access denied, report an error
|
|
nsAutoCString errorMsg("Permission denied to get service. CID=");
|
|
char cidStr[NSID_LENGTH];
|
|
aCID.ToProvidedString(cidStr);
|
|
errorMsg.Append(cidStr);
|
|
SetPendingException(cx, errorMsg.get());
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_XPCONNECT_ACCESS_DENIED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/////////////////////////////////////
|
|
// Method implementing nsIObserver //
|
|
/////////////////////////////////////
|
|
const char sJSEnabledPrefName[] = "javascript.enabled";
|
|
const char sFileOriginPolicyPrefName[] =
|
|
"security.fileuri.strict_origin_policy";
|
|
|
|
static const char* kObservedPrefs[] = {
|
|
sJSEnabledPrefName,
|
|
sFileOriginPolicyPrefName,
|
|
"capability.policy.",
|
|
nullptr
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::Observe(nsISupports* aObject, const char* aTopic,
|
|
const char16_t* aMessage)
|
|
{
|
|
ScriptSecurityPrefChanged();
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/////////////////////////////////////////////
|
|
// Constructor, Destructor, Initialization //
|
|
/////////////////////////////////////////////
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::nsScriptSecurityManager(void)
|
|
: mPrefInitialized(false)
|
|
, mIsJavaScriptEnabled(false)
|
|
{
|
|
static_assert(sizeof(intptr_t) == sizeof(void*),
|
|
"intptr_t and void* have different lengths on this platform. "
|
|
"This may cause a security failure with the SecurityLevel union.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::Init()
|
|
{
|
|
nsresult rv = CallGetService(NS_IOSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &sIOService);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
|
|
InitPrefs();
|
|
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundleService> bundleService =
|
|
mozilla::services::GetStringBundleService();
|
|
if (!bundleService)
|
|
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
|
|
|
rv = bundleService->CreateBundle("chrome://global/locale/security/caps.properties", &sStrBundle);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
|
|
// Create our system principal singleton
|
|
RefPtr<nsSystemPrincipal> system = new nsSystemPrincipal();
|
|
|
|
mSystemPrincipal = system;
|
|
|
|
//-- Register security check callback in the JS engine
|
|
// Currently this is used to control access to function.caller
|
|
sRuntime = xpc::GetJSRuntime();
|
|
|
|
static const JSSecurityCallbacks securityCallbacks = {
|
|
ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction,
|
|
JSPrincipalsSubsume,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(!JS_GetSecurityCallbacks(sRuntime));
|
|
JS_SetSecurityCallbacks(sRuntime, &securityCallbacks);
|
|
JS_InitDestroyPrincipalsCallback(sRuntime, nsJSPrincipals::Destroy);
|
|
|
|
JS_SetTrustedPrincipals(sRuntime, system);
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static StaticRefPtr<nsScriptSecurityManager> gScriptSecMan;
|
|
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::~nsScriptSecurityManager(void)
|
|
{
|
|
Preferences::RemoveObservers(this, kObservedPrefs);
|
|
if (mDomainPolicy) {
|
|
mDomainPolicy->Deactivate();
|
|
}
|
|
// ContentChild might hold a reference to the domain policy,
|
|
// and it might release it only after the security manager is
|
|
// gone. But we can still assert this for the main process.
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT_IF(XRE_IsParentProcess(),
|
|
!mDomainPolicy);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::Shutdown()
|
|
{
|
|
if (sRuntime) {
|
|
JS_SetSecurityCallbacks(sRuntime, nullptr);
|
|
JS_SetTrustedPrincipals(sRuntime, nullptr);
|
|
sRuntime = nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IF_RELEASE(sIOService);
|
|
NS_IF_RELEASE(sStrBundle);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager *
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetScriptSecurityManager()
|
|
{
|
|
return gScriptSecMan;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* static */ void
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::InitStatics()
|
|
{
|
|
RefPtr<nsScriptSecurityManager> ssManager = new nsScriptSecurityManager();
|
|
nsresult rv = ssManager->Init();
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
MOZ_CRASH();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ClearOnShutdown(&gScriptSecMan);
|
|
gScriptSecMan = ssManager;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Currently this nsGenericFactory constructor is used only from FastLoad
|
|
// (XPCOM object deserialization) code, when "creating" the system principal
|
|
// singleton.
|
|
nsSystemPrincipal *
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::SystemPrincipalSingletonConstructor()
|
|
{
|
|
nsIPrincipal *sysprin = nullptr;
|
|
if (gScriptSecMan)
|
|
NS_ADDREF(sysprin = gScriptSecMan->mSystemPrincipal);
|
|
return static_cast<nsSystemPrincipal*>(sysprin);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct IsWhitespace {
|
|
static bool Test(char aChar) { return NS_IsAsciiWhitespace(aChar); };
|
|
};
|
|
struct IsWhitespaceOrComma {
|
|
static bool Test(char aChar) { return aChar == ',' || NS_IsAsciiWhitespace(aChar); };
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
template <typename Predicate>
|
|
uint32_t SkipPast(const nsCString& str, uint32_t base)
|
|
{
|
|
while (base < str.Length() && Predicate::Test(str[base])) {
|
|
++base;
|
|
}
|
|
return base;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
template <typename Predicate>
|
|
uint32_t SkipUntil(const nsCString& str, uint32_t base)
|
|
{
|
|
while (base < str.Length() && !Predicate::Test(str[base])) {
|
|
++base;
|
|
}
|
|
return base;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
inline void
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::ScriptSecurityPrefChanged()
|
|
{
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(mPrefInitialized);
|
|
mIsJavaScriptEnabled =
|
|
Preferences::GetBool(sJSEnabledPrefName, mIsJavaScriptEnabled);
|
|
sStrictFileOriginPolicy =
|
|
Preferences::GetBool(sFileOriginPolicyPrefName, false);
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
// Rebuild the set of principals for which we allow file:// URI loads. This
|
|
// implements a small subset of an old pref-based CAPS people that people
|
|
// have come to depend on. See bug 995943.
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
mFileURIWhitelist.Clear();
|
|
auto policies = mozilla::Preferences::GetCString("capability.policy.policynames");
|
|
for (uint32_t base = SkipPast<IsWhitespaceOrComma>(policies, 0), bound = 0;
|
|
base < policies.Length();
|
|
base = SkipPast<IsWhitespaceOrComma>(policies, bound))
|
|
{
|
|
// Grab the current policy name.
|
|
bound = SkipUntil<IsWhitespaceOrComma>(policies, base);
|
|
auto policyName = Substring(policies, base, bound - base);
|
|
|
|
// Figure out if this policy allows loading file:// URIs. If not, we can skip it.
|
|
nsCString checkLoadURIPrefName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("capability.policy.") +
|
|
policyName +
|
|
NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(".checkloaduri.enabled");
|
|
if (!Preferences::GetString(checkLoadURIPrefName.get()).LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("allaccess")) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Grab the list of domains associated with this policy.
|
|
nsCString domainPrefName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("capability.policy.") +
|
|
policyName +
|
|
NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(".sites");
|
|
auto siteList = Preferences::GetCString(domainPrefName.get());
|
|
AddSitesToFileURIWhitelist(siteList);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::AddSitesToFileURIWhitelist(const nsCString& aSiteList)
|
|
{
|
|
for (uint32_t base = SkipPast<IsWhitespace>(aSiteList, 0), bound = 0;
|
|
base < aSiteList.Length();
|
|
base = SkipPast<IsWhitespace>(aSiteList, bound))
|
|
{
|
|
// Grab the current site.
|
|
bound = SkipUntil<IsWhitespace>(aSiteList, base);
|
|
nsAutoCString site(Substring(aSiteList, base, bound - base));
|
|
|
|
// Check if the URI is schemeless. If so, add both http and https.
|
|
nsAutoCString unused;
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(sIOService->ExtractScheme(site, unused))) {
|
|
AddSitesToFileURIWhitelist(NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("http://") + site);
|
|
AddSitesToFileURIWhitelist(NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("https://") + site);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Convert it to a URI and add it to our list.
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
|
|
nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), site, nullptr, nullptr, sIOService);
|
|
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
|
|
mFileURIWhitelist.AppendElement(uri);
|
|
} else {
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(do_GetService("@mozilla.org/consoleservice;1"));
|
|
if (console) {
|
|
nsAutoString msg = NS_LITERAL_STRING("Unable to to add site to file:// URI whitelist: ") +
|
|
NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16(site);
|
|
console->LogStringMessage(msg.get());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsresult
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::InitPrefs()
|
|
{
|
|
nsIPrefBranch* branch = Preferences::GetRootBranch();
|
|
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(branch, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
mPrefInitialized = true;
|
|
|
|
// Set the initial value of the "javascript.enabled" prefs
|
|
ScriptSecurityPrefChanged();
|
|
|
|
// set observer callbacks in case the value of the prefs change
|
|
Preferences::AddStrongObservers(this, kObservedPrefs);
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
namespace mozilla {
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
GetJarPrefix(uint32_t aAppId, bool aInIsolatedMozBrowser, nsACString& aJarPrefix)
|
|
{
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(aAppId != nsIScriptSecurityManager::UNKNOWN_APP_ID);
|
|
|
|
if (aAppId == nsIScriptSecurityManager::UNKNOWN_APP_ID) {
|
|
aAppId = nsIScriptSecurityManager::NO_APP_ID;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
aJarPrefix.Truncate();
|
|
|
|
// Fallback.
|
|
if (aAppId == nsIScriptSecurityManager::NO_APP_ID && !aInIsolatedMozBrowser) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// aJarPrefix = appId + "+" + { 't', 'f' } + "+";
|
|
aJarPrefix.AppendInt(aAppId);
|
|
aJarPrefix.Append('+');
|
|
aJarPrefix.Append(aInIsolatedMozBrowser ? 't' : 'f');
|
|
aJarPrefix.Append('+');
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} // namespace mozilla
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetJarPrefix(uint32_t aAppId,
|
|
bool aInIsolatedMozBrowser,
|
|
nsACString& aJarPrefix)
|
|
{
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(aAppId != nsIScriptSecurityManager::UNKNOWN_APP_ID);
|
|
|
|
mozilla::GetJarPrefix(aAppId, aInIsolatedMozBrowser, aJarPrefix);
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetDomainPolicyActive(bool *aRv)
|
|
{
|
|
*aRv = !!mDomainPolicy;
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::ActivateDomainPolicy(nsIDomainPolicy** aRv)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ActivateDomainPolicyInternal(aRv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::ActivateDomainPolicyInternal(nsIDomainPolicy** aRv)
|
|
{
|
|
// We only allow one domain policy at a time. The holder of the previous
|
|
// policy must explicitly deactivate it first.
|
|
if (mDomainPolicy) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mDomainPolicy = new DomainPolicy();
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIDomainPolicy> ptr = mDomainPolicy;
|
|
ptr.forget(aRv);
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Intentionally non-scriptable. Script must have a reference to the
|
|
// nsIDomainPolicy to deactivate it.
|
|
void
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::DeactivateDomainPolicy()
|
|
{
|
|
mDomainPolicy = nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::CloneDomainPolicy(DomainPolicyClone* aClone)
|
|
{
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(aClone);
|
|
if (mDomainPolicy) {
|
|
mDomainPolicy->CloneDomainPolicy(aClone);
|
|
} else {
|
|
aClone->active() = false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsScriptSecurityManager::PolicyAllowsScript(nsIURI* aURI, bool *aRv)
|
|
{
|
|
nsresult rv;
|
|
|
|
// Compute our rule. If we don't have any domain policy set up that might
|
|
// provide exceptions to this rule, we're done.
|
|
*aRv = mIsJavaScriptEnabled;
|
|
if (!mDomainPolicy) {
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We have a domain policy. Grab the appropriate set of exceptions to the
|
|
// rule (either the blacklist or the whitelist, depending on whether script
|
|
// is enabled or disabled by default).
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIDomainSet> exceptions;
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIDomainSet> superExceptions;
|
|
if (*aRv) {
|
|
mDomainPolicy->GetBlacklist(getter_AddRefs(exceptions));
|
|
mDomainPolicy->GetSuperBlacklist(getter_AddRefs(superExceptions));
|
|
} else {
|
|
mDomainPolicy->GetWhitelist(getter_AddRefs(exceptions));
|
|
mDomainPolicy->GetSuperWhitelist(getter_AddRefs(superExceptions));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool contains;
|
|
rv = exceptions->Contains(aURI, &contains);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
if (contains) {
|
|
*aRv = !*aRv;
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
rv = superExceptions->ContainsSuperDomain(aURI, &contains);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
if (contains) {
|
|
*aRv = !*aRv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|