gecko-dev/caps/nsIScriptSecurityManager.idl
Jonathan Hao 525c086187 Bug 1259871 - Replace getSimpleCodebasePrincipal with createCodebasePrincipal. r=sicking
MozReview-Commit-ID: Frx0CjBzuve

--HG--
extra : histedit_source : 036eb321d9ccb20e0e071ba588b0a1249eb34bdd
2016-05-24 18:01:34 +08:00

328 lines
13 KiB
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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "nsISupports.idl"
#include "nsIPrincipal.idl"
interface nsIURI;
interface nsIChannel;
interface nsIClassInfo;
interface nsIDocShell;
interface nsIDomainPolicy;
interface nsILoadContext;
%{ C++
#include "jspubtd.h"
namespace mozilla {
namespace dom {
class DomainPolicyClone;
}
}
%}
[ptr] native JSContextPtr(JSContext);
[ptr] native JSObjectPtr(JSObject);
[ptr] native DomainPolicyClonePtr(mozilla::dom::DomainPolicyClone);
[scriptable, uuid(da831650-4241-4892-806c-cce8465a2ba8)]
interface nsIScriptSecurityManager : nsISupports
{
/**
* For each of these hooks returning NS_OK means 'let the action continue'.
* Returning an error code means 'veto the action'. XPConnect will return
* false to the js engine if the action is vetoed. The implementor of this
* interface is responsible for setting a JS exception into the JSContext
* if that is appropriate.
*/
[noscript] void canCreateWrapper(in JSContextPtr aJSContext,
in nsIIDRef aIID,
in nsISupports aObj,
in nsIClassInfo aClassInfo);
[noscript] void canCreateInstance(in JSContextPtr aJSContext,
in nsCIDRef aCID);
[noscript] void canGetService(in JSContextPtr aJSContext,
in nsCIDRef aCID);
/**
* Check that the script currently running in context "cx" can load "uri".
*
* Will return error code NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI if the load request
* should be denied.
*
* @param cx the JSContext of the script causing the load
* @param uri the URI that is being loaded
*/
[noscript] void checkLoadURIFromScript(in JSContextPtr cx, in nsIURI uri);
/**
* Default CheckLoadURI permissions
*/
// Default permissions
const unsigned long STANDARD = 0;
// Indicate that the load is a load of a new document that is not
// user-triggered. Here "user-triggered" could be broadly interpreted --
// for example, scripted sets of window.location.href might be treated as
// "user-triggered" in some circumstances. A typical example of a load
// that is not user-triggered is a <meta> refresh load. If this flag is
// set, the load will be denied if the originating principal's URI has the
// nsIProtocolHandler::URI_FORBIDS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT flag set.
const unsigned long LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT = 1 << 0;
// Allow the loading of chrome URLs by non-chrome URLs. Use with great
// care! This will actually allow the loading of any URI which has the
// nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE protocol handler flag set. Ths
// probably means at least chrome: and resource:.
const unsigned long ALLOW_CHROME = 1 << 1;
// Don't allow URLs which would inherit the caller's principal (such as
// javascript: or data:) to load. See
// nsIProtocolHandler::URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT.
const unsigned long DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL = 1 << 2;
// Alias for DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL for backwards compat with
// JS-implemented extensions.
const unsigned long DISALLOW_SCRIPT_OR_DATA = DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL;
// Don't allow javascript: URLs to load
// WARNING: Support for this value was added in Mozilla 1.7.8 and
// Firefox 1.0.4. Use in prior versions WILL BE IGNORED.
// When using this, make sure that you actually want DISALLOW_SCRIPT, not
// DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL
const unsigned long DISALLOW_SCRIPT = 1 << 3;
// Do not report errors if we just want to check if a principal can load
// a URI to not unnecessarily spam the error console.
const unsigned long DONT_REPORT_ERRORS = 1 << 4;
/**
* Check that content with principal aPrincipal can load "uri".
*
* Will return error code NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI if the load request
* should be denied.
*
* @param aPrincipal the principal identifying the actor causing the load
* @param uri the URI that is being loaded
* @param flags the permission set, see above
*/
void checkLoadURIWithPrincipal(in nsIPrincipal aPrincipal,
in nsIURI uri,
in unsigned long flags);
/**
* Similar to checkLoadURIWithPrincipal but there are two differences:
*
* 1) The URI is a string, not a URI object.
* 2) This function assumes that the URI may still be subject to fixup (and
* hence will check whether fixed-up versions of the URI are allowed to
* load as well); if any of the versions of this URI is not allowed, this
* function will return error code NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI.
*/
void checkLoadURIStrWithPrincipal(in nsIPrincipal aPrincipal,
in AUTF8String uri,
in unsigned long flags);
///////////////// Principals ///////////////////////
/**
* Return the all-powerful system principal.
*/
nsIPrincipal getSystemPrincipal();
/**
* Returns a principal that has the given information.
* @param appId is the app id of the principal. It can't be UNKNOWN_APP_ID.
* @param inMozBrowser is true if the principal has to be considered as
* inside a mozbrowser frame.
*
* @deprecated use createCodebasePrincipal instead.
*/
[deprecated] nsIPrincipal getAppCodebasePrincipal(in nsIURI uri,
in unsigned long appId,
in boolean inMozBrowser);
/**
* Returns a principal that has the appId and inMozBrowser of the load
* context.
* @param loadContext to get appId/inMozBrowser from.
*/
nsIPrincipal getLoadContextCodebasePrincipal(in nsIURI uri,
in nsILoadContext loadContext);
/**
* Returns a principal that has the appId and inMozBrowser of the docshell
* inside a mozbrowser frame.
* @param docShell to get appId/inMozBrowser from.
*/
nsIPrincipal getDocShellCodebasePrincipal(in nsIURI uri,
in nsIDocShell docShell);
/**
* Returns a principal with that has the same origin as uri and is not part
* of an appliction.
* The returned principal will have appId = NO_APP_ID.
*
* @deprecated use createCodebasePrincipal instead.
*/
[deprecated] nsIPrincipal getNoAppCodebasePrincipal(in nsIURI uri);
/**
* Legacy method for getting a principal with no origin attributes.
*
* @deprecated use createCodebasePrincipal instead.
*/
[deprecated] nsIPrincipal getCodebasePrincipal(in nsIURI uri);
/**
* Returns a principal whose origin is composed of |uri| and |originAttributes|.
* See nsIPrincipal.idl for a description of origin attributes, and
* ChromeUtils.webidl for a list of origin attributes and their defaults.
*/
[implicit_jscontext]
nsIPrincipal createCodebasePrincipal(in nsIURI uri, in jsval originAttributes);
/**
* Returns a principal whose origin is the one we pass in.
* See nsIPrincipal.idl for a description of origin attributes, and
* ChromeUtils.webidl for a list of origin attributes and their defaults.
*/
nsIPrincipal createCodebasePrincipalFromOrigin(in ACString origin);
/**
* Returns a unique nonce principal with |originAttributes|.
* See nsIPrincipal.idl for a description of origin attributes, and
* ChromeUtils.webidl for a list of origin attributes and their defaults.
*/
[implicit_jscontext]
nsIPrincipal createNullPrincipal(in jsval originAttributes);
/**
* Creates an expanded principal whose capabilities are the union of the
* given principals. An expanded principal has an asymmetric privilege
* relationship with its sub-principals (that is to say, it subsumes the
* sub-principals, but the sub-principals do not subsume it), even if
* there's only one. This presents a legitimate use-case for making an
* expanded principal around a single sub-principal, which we do frequently.
*
* Expanded principals cannot have origin attributes themselves, but rather
* have them through their sub-principals - so we don't accept them here.
*/
nsIPrincipal createExpandedPrincipal([array, size_is(aLength)] in nsIPrincipal aPrincipalArray,
[optional] in unsigned long aLength);
/**
* Returns OK if aSourceURI and target have the same "origin"
* (scheme, host, and port).
* ReportError flag suppresses error reports for functions that
* don't need reporting.
*/
void checkSameOriginURI(in nsIURI aSourceURI,
in nsIURI aTargetURI,
in boolean reportError);
/**
* Get the principal for the given channel. This will typically be the
* channel owner if there is one, and the codebase principal for the
* channel's URI otherwise. aChannel must not be null.
*/
nsIPrincipal getChannelResultPrincipal(in nsIChannel aChannel);
/**
* Temporary API until bug 1220687 is fixed.
*
* Returns the same value as getChannelResultPrincipal, but ignoring
* sandboxing. Specifically, if sandboxing would have prevented the
* channel's triggering principal from being returned by
* getChannelResultPrincipal, the triggering principal will be returned
* by this method.
*
* Note that this method only ignores sandboxing of the channel in
* question, it does not ignore sandboxing of any channels further up a
* document chain. The triggering principal itself may still be the null
* principal due to sandboxing further up a document chain. In that regard
* the ignoring of sandboxing is limited.
*/
[noscript, nostdcall]
nsIPrincipal getChannelResultPrincipalIfNotSandboxed(in nsIChannel aChannel);
/**
* Get the codebase principal for the channel's URI.
* aChannel must not be null.
*/
nsIPrincipal getChannelURIPrincipal(in nsIChannel aChannel);
/**
* Check whether a given principal is a system principal. This allows us
* to avoid handing back the system principal to script while allowing
* script to check whether a given principal is system.
*/
boolean isSystemPrincipal(in nsIPrincipal aPrincipal);
%{C++
bool IsSystemPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) {
bool isSystem = false;
IsSystemPrincipal(aPrincipal, &isSystem);
return isSystem;
}
%}
const unsigned long NO_APP_ID = 0;
const unsigned long UNKNOWN_APP_ID = 4294967295; // UINT32_MAX
const unsigned long SAFEBROWSING_APP_ID = 4294967294; // UINT32_MAX - 1
const unsigned long DEFAULT_USER_CONTEXT_ID = 0;
/**
* Returns the jar prefix for the app.
* appId can be NO_APP_ID or a valid app id. appId should not be
* UNKNOWN_APP_ID.
* inMozBrowser has to be true if the app is inside a mozbrowser iframe.
*/
AUTF8String getJarPrefix(in unsigned long appId, in boolean inMozBrowser);
/**
* Per-domain controls to enable and disable script. This system is designed
* to be used by at most one consumer, and enforces this with its semantics.
*
* Initially, domainPolicyActive is false. When activateDomainPolicy() is
* invoked, domainPolicyActive becomes true, and subsequent calls to
* activateDomainPolicy() will fail until deactivate() is invoked on the
* nsIDomainPolicy returned from activateDomainPolicy(). At this point,
* domainPolicyActive becomes false again, and a new consumer may acquire
* control of the system by invoking activateDomainPolicy().
*/
nsIDomainPolicy activateDomainPolicy();
readonly attribute boolean domainPolicyActive;
/**
* Only the parent process can directly access domain policies, child
* processes only have a read-only mirror to the one in the parent.
* For child processes the mirror is updated via messages
* and ContentChild will hold the DomainPolicy by calling
* ActivateDomainPolicyInternal directly. New consumer to this
* function should not be addded.
*/
[noscript] nsIDomainPolicy activateDomainPolicyInternal();
/**
* This function is for internal use only. Every time a child process is spawned, we
* must clone any active domain policies in the parent to the new child.
*/
[noscript, notxpcom] void cloneDomainPolicy(in DomainPolicyClonePtr aClone);
/**
* Query mechanism for the above policy.
*
* If domainPolicyEnabled is false, this simply returns the current value
* of javascript.enabled. Otherwise, it returns the same value, but taking
* the various blacklist/whitelist exceptions into account.
*/
bool policyAllowsScript(in nsIURI aDomain);
};
%{C++
#define NS_SCRIPTSECURITYMANAGER_CONTRACTID "@mozilla.org/scriptsecuritymanager;1"
%}