gecko-dev/dom/canvas/CanvasUtils.cpp
Gabriele Svelto ace6d1063f Bug 1600545 - Remove useless inclusions of header files generated from IDL files in dom/ r=Ehsan
The inclusions were removed with the following very crude script and the
resulting breakage was fixed up by hand. The manual fixups did either
revert the changes done by the script, replace a generic header with a more
specific one or replace a header with a forward declaration.

find . -name "*.idl" | grep -v web-platform | grep -v third_party | while read path; do
    interfaces=$(grep "^\(class\|interface\).*:.*" "$path" | cut -d' ' -f2)
    if [ -n "$interfaces" ]; then
        if [[ "$interfaces" == *$'\n'* ]]; then
          regexp="\("
          for i in $interfaces; do regexp="$regexp$i\|"; done
          regexp="${regexp%%\\\|}\)"
        else
          regexp="$interfaces"
        fi
        interface=$(basename "$path")
        rg -l "#include.*${interface%%.idl}.h" . | while read path2; do
            hits=$(grep -v "#include.*${interface%%.idl}.h" "$path2" | grep -c "$regexp" )
            if [ $hits -eq 0 ]; then
                echo "Removing ${interface} from ${path2}"
                grep -v "#include.*${interface%%.idl}.h" "$path2" > "$path2".tmp
                mv -f "$path2".tmp "$path2"
            fi
        done
    fi
done

Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D55442

--HG--
extra : moz-landing-system : lando
2019-12-06 09:24:56 +00:00

320 lines
9.7 KiB
C++

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 20; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "nsICanvasRenderingContextInternal.h"
#include "nsIHTMLCollection.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/BrowserChild.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/HTMLCanvasElement.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/UserActivation.h"
#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_privacy.h"
#include "nsIPrincipal.h"
#include "nsGfxCIID.h"
#include "nsTArray.h"
#include "CanvasUtils.h"
#include "mozilla/gfx/Matrix.h"
#include "WebGL2Context.h"
#include "nsIScriptError.h"
#include "nsIScriptObjectPrincipal.h"
#include "nsIPermissionManager.h"
#include "nsIObserverService.h"
#include "mozilla/Services.h"
#include "mozIThirdPartyUtil.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsUnicharUtils.h"
#include "nsPrintfCString.h"
#include "jsapi.h"
#define TOPIC_CANVAS_PERMISSIONS_PROMPT "canvas-permissions-prompt"
#define TOPIC_CANVAS_PERMISSIONS_PROMPT_HIDE_DOORHANGER \
"canvas-permissions-prompt-hide-doorhanger"
#define PERMISSION_CANVAS_EXTRACT_DATA NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("canvas")
using namespace mozilla::gfx;
namespace mozilla {
namespace CanvasUtils {
bool IsImageExtractionAllowed(Document* aDocument, JSContext* aCx,
nsIPrincipal& aPrincipal) {
// Do the rest of the checks only if privacy.resistFingerprinting is on.
if (!nsContentUtils::ShouldResistFingerprinting(aDocument)) {
return true;
}
// Don't proceed if we don't have a document or JavaScript context.
if (!aDocument || !aCx) {
return false;
}
// The system principal can always extract canvas data.
if (aPrincipal.IsSystemPrincipal()) {
return true;
}
// Allow extension principals.
auto principal = BasePrincipal::Cast(&aPrincipal);
if (principal->AddonPolicy() || principal->ContentScriptAddonPolicy()) {
return true;
}
// Get the document URI and its spec.
nsIURI* docURI = aDocument->GetDocumentURI();
nsCString docURISpec;
docURI->GetSpec(docURISpec);
// Allow local files to extract canvas data.
if (docURI->SchemeIs("file")) {
return true;
}
// Don't show canvas prompt for PDF.js
JS::AutoFilename scriptFile;
if (JS::DescribeScriptedCaller(aCx, &scriptFile) && scriptFile.get() &&
strcmp(scriptFile.get(), "resource://pdf.js/build/pdf.js") == 0) {
return true;
}
Document* topLevelDocument = aDocument->GetTopLevelContentDocument();
nsIURI* topLevelDocURI =
topLevelDocument ? topLevelDocument->GetDocumentURI() : nullptr;
nsCString topLevelDocURISpec;
if (topLevelDocURI) {
topLevelDocURI->GetSpec(topLevelDocURISpec);
}
// Load Third Party Util service.
nsresult rv;
nsCOMPtr<mozIThirdPartyUtil> thirdPartyUtil =
do_GetService(THIRDPARTYUTIL_CONTRACTID, &rv);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
// Block all third-party attempts to extract canvas.
bool isThirdParty = true;
rv = thirdPartyUtil->IsThirdPartyURI(topLevelDocURI, docURI, &isThirdParty);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
if (isThirdParty) {
nsAutoString message;
message.AppendPrintf("Blocked third party %s from extracting canvas data.",
docURISpec.get());
nsContentUtils::ReportToConsoleNonLocalized(
message, nsIScriptError::warningFlag, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("Security"),
aDocument);
return false;
}
// Load Permission Manager service.
nsCOMPtr<nsIPermissionManager> permissionManager =
do_GetService(NS_PERMISSIONMANAGER_CONTRACTID, &rv);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
// Check if the site has permission to extract canvas data.
// Either permit or block extraction if a stored permission setting exists.
uint32_t permission;
rv = permissionManager->TestPermissionFromPrincipal(
principal, PERMISSION_CANVAS_EXTRACT_DATA, &permission);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
switch (permission) {
case nsIPermissionManager::ALLOW_ACTION:
return true;
case nsIPermissionManager::DENY_ACTION:
return false;
default:
break;
}
// At this point, permission is unknown
// (nsIPermissionManager::UNKNOWN_ACTION).
// Check if the request is in response to user input
bool isAutoBlockCanvas =
StaticPrefs::
privacy_resistFingerprinting_autoDeclineNoUserInputCanvasPrompts() &&
!UserActivation::IsHandlingUserInput();
if (isAutoBlockCanvas) {
nsAutoString message;
message.AppendPrintf(
"Blocked %s from extracting canvas data because no user input was "
"detected.",
docURISpec.get());
nsContentUtils::ReportToConsoleNonLocalized(
message, nsIScriptError::warningFlag, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("Security"),
aDocument);
} else {
// It was in response to user input, so log and display the prompt.
nsAutoString message;
message.AppendPrintf(
"Blocked %s from extracting canvas data, but prompting the user.",
docURISpec.get());
nsContentUtils::ReportToConsoleNonLocalized(
message, nsIScriptError::warningFlag, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("Security"),
aDocument);
}
// Prompt the user (asynchronous).
nsPIDOMWindowOuter* win = aDocument->GetWindow();
nsAutoCString origin;
rv = principal->GetOrigin(origin);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
if (XRE_IsContentProcess()) {
BrowserChild* browserChild = BrowserChild::GetFrom(win);
if (browserChild) {
browserChild->SendShowCanvasPermissionPrompt(origin, isAutoBlockCanvas);
}
} else {
nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> obs = mozilla::services::GetObserverService();
if (obs) {
obs->NotifyObservers(win,
isAutoBlockCanvas
? TOPIC_CANVAS_PERMISSIONS_PROMPT_HIDE_DOORHANGER
: TOPIC_CANVAS_PERMISSIONS_PROMPT,
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(origin).get());
}
}
// We don't extract the image for now -- user may override at prompt.
return false;
}
bool GetCanvasContextType(const nsAString& str,
dom::CanvasContextType* const out_type) {
if (str.EqualsLiteral("2d")) {
*out_type = dom::CanvasContextType::Canvas2D;
return true;
}
if (str.EqualsLiteral("webgl") || str.EqualsLiteral("experimental-webgl")) {
*out_type = dom::CanvasContextType::WebGL1;
return true;
}
if (WebGL2Context::IsSupported()) {
if (str.EqualsLiteral("webgl2")) {
*out_type = dom::CanvasContextType::WebGL2;
return true;
}
}
if (str.EqualsLiteral("bitmaprenderer")) {
*out_type = dom::CanvasContextType::ImageBitmap;
return true;
}
return false;
}
/**
* This security check utility might be called from an source that never taints
* others. For example, while painting a CanvasPattern, which is created from an
* ImageBitmap, onto a canvas. In this case, the caller could set the CORSUsed
* true in order to pass this check and leave the aPrincipal to be a nullptr
* since the aPrincipal is not going to be used.
*/
void DoDrawImageSecurityCheck(dom::HTMLCanvasElement* aCanvasElement,
nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, bool forceWriteOnly,
bool CORSUsed) {
// Callers should ensure that mCanvasElement is non-null before calling this
if (!aCanvasElement) {
NS_WARNING("DoDrawImageSecurityCheck called without canvas element!");
return;
}
if (aCanvasElement->IsWriteOnly() && !aCanvasElement->mExpandedReader) {
return;
}
// If we explicitly set WriteOnly just do it and get out
if (forceWriteOnly) {
aCanvasElement->SetWriteOnly();
return;
}
// No need to do a security check if the image used CORS for the load
if (CORSUsed) return;
MOZ_ASSERT(aPrincipal, "Must have a principal here");
if (aCanvasElement->NodePrincipal()->Subsumes(aPrincipal)) {
// This canvas has access to that image anyway
return;
}
if (BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal)->AddonPolicy()) {
// This is a resource from an extension content script principal.
if (aCanvasElement->mExpandedReader &&
aCanvasElement->mExpandedReader->Subsumes(aPrincipal)) {
// This canvas already allows reading from this principal.
return;
}
if (!aCanvasElement->mExpandedReader) {
// Allow future reads from this same princial only.
aCanvasElement->SetWriteOnly(aPrincipal);
return;
}
// If we got here, this must be the *second* extension tainting
// the canvas. Fall through to mark it WriteOnly for everyone.
}
aCanvasElement->SetWriteOnly();
}
bool CoerceDouble(const JS::Value& v, double* d) {
if (v.isDouble()) {
*d = v.toDouble();
} else if (v.isInt32()) {
*d = double(v.toInt32());
} else if (v.isUndefined()) {
*d = 0.0;
} else {
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool HasDrawWindowPrivilege(JSContext* aCx, JSObject* /* unused */) {
return nsContentUtils::CallerHasPermission(aCx,
nsGkAtoms::all_urlsPermission);
}
bool CheckWriteOnlySecurity(bool aCORSUsed, nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
bool aHadCrossOriginRedirects) {
if (!aPrincipal) {
return true;
}
if (!aCORSUsed) {
if (aHadCrossOriginRedirects) {
return true;
}
nsIGlobalObject* incumbentSettingsObject = dom::GetIncumbentGlobal();
if (!incumbentSettingsObject) {
return true;
}
nsIPrincipal* principal = incumbentSettingsObject->PrincipalOrNull();
if (NS_WARN_IF(!principal) || !(principal->Subsumes(aPrincipal))) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
} // namespace CanvasUtils
} // namespace mozilla