gecko-dev/dom/base/nsIDroppedLinkHandler.idl
2019-05-15 20:58:08 +00:00

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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "nsISupports.idl"
#include "nsIPrincipal.idl"
#include "nsIContentSecurityPolicy.idl"
webidl DragEvent;
webidl DataTransfer;
[scriptable, uuid(69E14F91-2E09-4CA6-A511-A715C99A2804)]
interface nsIDroppedLinkItem : nsISupports
{
/**
* Returns the URL of the link.
*/
readonly attribute AString url;
/**
* Returns the link name.
*/
readonly attribute AString name;
/**
* Returns the MIME-Type.
*/
readonly attribute AString type;
};
[scriptable, uuid(21B5C25A-28A9-47BD-8431-FA9116305DED)]
interface nsIDroppedLinkHandler : nsISupports
{
/**
* Determines if a link being dragged can be dropped and returns true if so.
* aEvent should be a dragenter or dragover event.
*
* If aAllowSameDocument is false, drops are only allowed if the document
* of the source of the drag is different from the destination. This check
* includes any parent, sibling and child frames in the same content tree.
* If true, the source is not checked.
*/
boolean canDropLink(in DragEvent aEvent, in boolean aAllowSameDocument);
/**
* Given a drop event aEvent, determines the link being dragged and returns
* it. If a uri is returned the caller can, for instance, load it. If null
* is returned, there is no valid link to be dropped.
*
* A NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR error will be thrown and the event cancelled if
* the receiving target should not load the uri for security reasons. This
* will occur if any of the following conditions are true:
* - the source of the drag initiated a link for dragging that
* it itself cannot access. This prevents a source document from tricking
* the user into a dragging a chrome url, for example.
* - aDisallowInherit is true, and the URI being dropped would inherit the
* current document's security context (URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT).
*
* aName is filled in with the link title if it exists, or an empty string
* otherwise.
*/
AString dropLink(in DragEvent aEvent, out AString aName,
[optional] in boolean aDisallowInherit);
/**
* Given a drop event aEvent, determines links being dragged and returns
* them. If links are returned the caller can, for instance, load them. If
* the returned array is empty, there is no valid link to be dropped.
*
* A NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR error will be thrown and the event cancelled if
* the receiving target should not load the uri for security reasons. This
* will occur if any of the following conditions are true:
* - the source of the drag initiated a link for dragging that
* it itself cannot access. This prevents a source document from tricking
* the user into a dragging a chrome url, for example.
* - aDisallowInherit is true, and the URI being dropped would inherit the
* current document's security context (URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT).
*/
Array<nsIDroppedLinkItem> dropLinks(in DragEvent aEvent,
[optional] in boolean aDisallowInherit);
/**
* Given a drop event aEvent, validate the extra URIs for the event,
* this is used when the caller extracts yet another URIs from the dropped
* text, like home button that splits the text with "|".
*/
void validateURIsForDrop(in DragEvent aEvent,
in Array<AString> aURIs,
[optional] in boolean aDisallowInherit);
/**
* Given a dataTransfer, allows caller to determine and verify links being
* dragged. Since drag/drop performs a roundtrip of parent, child, parent,
* it allows the parent to verify that the child did not modify links
* being dropped.
*/
Array<nsIDroppedLinkItem> queryLinks(in DataTransfer aDataTransfer);
/**
* Given a drop event aEvent, determines the triggering principal for the
* event and returns it.
*/
nsIPrincipal getTriggeringPrincipal(in DragEvent aEvent);
/**
* Given a drop event aEvent, determines the CSP for the event and returns it.
*/
nsIContentSecurityPolicy getCSP(in DragEvent aEvent);
};