gecko-dev/security/certverifier/OCSPCache.cpp
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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This code is made available to you under your choice of the following sets
* of licensing terms:
*/
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
*/
/* Copyright 2013 Mozilla Contributors
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include "OCSPCache.h"
#include <limits>
#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h"
#include "pk11pub.h"
#include "pkix/pkixnss.h"
#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
#include "secerr.h"
extern PRLogModuleInfo* gCertVerifierLog;
using namespace mozilla::pkix;
namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
// Let derIssuer be the DER encoding of the issuer of aCert.
// Let derPublicKey be the DER encoding of the public key of aIssuerCert.
// Let serialNumber be the bytes of the serial number of aCert.
// The value calculated is SHA384(derIssuer || derPublicKey || serialNumber).
// Because the DER encodings include the length of the data encoded,
// there do not exist A(derIssuerA, derPublicKeyA, serialNumberA) and
// B(derIssuerB, derPublicKeyB, serialNumberB) such that the concatenation of
// each triplet results in the same string of bytes but where each part in A is
// not equal to its counterpart in B. This is important because as a result it
// is computationally infeasible to find collisions that would subvert this
// cache (given that SHA384 is a cryptographically-secure hash function).
static SECStatus
CertIDHash(SHA384Buffer& buf, const CertID& certID)
{
ScopedPK11Context context(PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA384));
if (!context) {
return SECFailure;
}
SECStatus rv = PK11_DigestBegin(context.get());
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
SECItem certIDIssuer = UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(certID.issuer);
rv = PK11_DigestOp(context.get(), certIDIssuer.data, certIDIssuer.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
SECItem certIDIssuerSubjectPublicKeyInfo =
UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(certID.issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfo);
rv = PK11_DigestOp(context.get(), certIDIssuerSubjectPublicKeyInfo.data,
certIDIssuerSubjectPublicKeyInfo.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
SECItem certIDSerialNumber =
UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(certID.serialNumber);
rv = PK11_DigestOp(context.get(), certIDSerialNumber.data,
certIDSerialNumber.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
uint32_t outLen = 0;
rv = PK11_DigestFinal(context.get(), buf, &outLen, SHA384_LENGTH);
if (outLen != SHA384_LENGTH) {
return SECFailure;
}
return rv;
}
Result
OCSPCache::Entry::Init(const CertID& aCertID)
{
SECStatus srv = CertIDHash(mIDHash, aCertID);
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
}
return Success;
}
OCSPCache::OCSPCache()
: mMutex("OCSPCache-mutex")
{
}
OCSPCache::~OCSPCache()
{
Clear();
}
// Returns false with index in an undefined state if no matching entry was
// found.
bool
OCSPCache::FindInternal(const CertID& aCertID, /*out*/ size_t& index,
const MutexAutoLock& /* aProofOfLock */)
{
if (mEntries.length() == 0) {
return false;
}
SHA384Buffer idHash;
SECStatus rv = CertIDHash(idHash, aCertID);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return false;
}
// mEntries is sorted with the most-recently-used entry at the end.
// Thus, searching from the end will often be fastest.
index = mEntries.length();
while (index > 0) {
--index;
if (memcmp(mEntries[index]->mIDHash, idHash, SHA384_LENGTH) == 0) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
static inline void
LogWithCertID(const char* aMessage, const CertID& aCertID)
{
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, (aMessage, &aCertID));
}
void
OCSPCache::MakeMostRecentlyUsed(size_t aIndex,
const MutexAutoLock& /* aProofOfLock */)
{
Entry* entry = mEntries[aIndex];
// Since mEntries is sorted with the most-recently-used entry at the end,
// aIndex is likely to be near the end, so this is likely to be fast.
mEntries.erase(mEntries.begin() + aIndex);
mEntries.append(entry);
}
bool
OCSPCache::Get(const CertID& aCertID, Result& aResult, Time& aValidThrough)
{
MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);
size_t index;
if (!FindInternal(aCertID, index, lock)) {
LogWithCertID("OCSPCache::Get(%p) not in cache", aCertID);
return false;
}
LogWithCertID("OCSPCache::Get(%p) in cache", aCertID);
aResult = mEntries[index]->mResult;
aValidThrough = mEntries[index]->mValidThrough;
MakeMostRecentlyUsed(index, lock);
return true;
}
Result
OCSPCache::Put(const CertID& aCertID, Result aResult,
Time aThisUpdate, Time aValidThrough)
{
MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);
size_t index;
if (FindInternal(aCertID, index, lock)) {
// Never replace an entry indicating a revoked certificate.
if (mEntries[index]->mResult == Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) {
LogWithCertID("OCSPCache::Put(%p) already in cache as revoked - "
"not replacing", aCertID);
MakeMostRecentlyUsed(index, lock);
return Success;
}
// Never replace a newer entry with an older one unless the older entry
// indicates a revoked certificate, which we want to remember.
if (mEntries[index]->mThisUpdate > aThisUpdate &&
aResult != Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) {
LogWithCertID("OCSPCache::Put(%p) already in cache with more recent "
"validity - not replacing", aCertID);
MakeMostRecentlyUsed(index, lock);
return Success;
}
// Only known good responses or responses indicating an unknown
// or revoked certificate should replace previously known responses.
if (aResult != Success &&
aResult != Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT &&
aResult != Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) {
LogWithCertID("OCSPCache::Put(%p) already in cache - not replacing "
"with less important status", aCertID);
MakeMostRecentlyUsed(index, lock);
return Success;
}
LogWithCertID("OCSPCache::Put(%p) already in cache - replacing", aCertID);
mEntries[index]->mResult = aResult;
mEntries[index]->mThisUpdate = aThisUpdate;
mEntries[index]->mValidThrough = aValidThrough;
MakeMostRecentlyUsed(index, lock);
return Success;
}
if (mEntries.length() == MaxEntries) {
LogWithCertID("OCSPCache::Put(%p) too full - evicting an entry", aCertID);
for (Entry** toEvict = mEntries.begin(); toEvict != mEntries.end();
toEvict++) {
// Never evict an entry that indicates a revoked or unknokwn certificate,
// because revoked responses are more security-critical to remember.
if ((*toEvict)->mResult != Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE &&
(*toEvict)->mResult != Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
delete *toEvict;
mEntries.erase(toEvict);
break;
}
}
// Well, we tried, but apparently everything is revoked or unknown.
// We don't want to remove a cached revoked or unknown response. If we're
// trying to insert a good response, we can just return "successfully"
// without doing so. This means we'll lose some speed, but it's not a
// security issue. If we're trying to insert a revoked or unknown response,
// we can't. We should return with an error that causes the current
// verification to fail.
if (mEntries.length() == MaxEntries) {
return aResult;
}
}
Entry* newEntry = new (std::nothrow) Entry(aResult, aThisUpdate,
aValidThrough);
// Normally we don't have to do this in Gecko, because OOM is fatal.
// However, if we want to embed this in another project, OOM might not
// be fatal, so handle this case.
if (!newEntry) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
Result rv = newEntry->Init(aCertID);
if (rv != Success) {
delete newEntry;
return rv;
}
mEntries.append(newEntry);
LogWithCertID("OCSPCache::Put(%p) added to cache", aCertID);
return Success;
}
void
OCSPCache::Clear()
{
MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("OCSPCache::Clear: clearing cache"));
// First go through and delete the memory being pointed to by the pointers
// in the vector.
for (Entry** entry = mEntries.begin(); entry < mEntries.end();
entry++) {
delete *entry;
}
// Then remove the pointers themselves.
mEntries.clearAndFree();
}
} } // namespace mozilla::psm