gecko-dev/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp
Kate McKinley c57d400961 Bug 1246540 - HSTS Priming Proof of Concept. r=ckerschb, r=mayhemer, r=jld, r=smaug, r=dkeeler, r=jmaher, p=ally
HSTS priming changes the order of mixed-content blocking and HSTS
upgrades, and adds a priming request to check if a mixed-content load is
accesible over HTTPS and the server supports upgrading via the
Strict-Transport-Security header.

Every call site that uses AsyncOpen2 passes through the mixed-content
blocker, and has a LoadInfo. If the mixed-content blocker marks the load as
needing HSTS priming, nsHttpChannel will build and send an HSTS priming
request on the same URI with the scheme upgraded to HTTPS. If the server
allows the upgrade, then channel performs an internal redirect to the HTTPS URI,
otherwise use the result of mixed-content blocker to allow or block the
load.

nsISiteSecurityService adds an optional boolean out parameter to
determine if the HSTS state is already cached for negative assertions.
If the host has been probed within the previous 24 hours, no HSTS
priming check will be sent.

MozReview-Commit-ID: ES1JruCtDdX

--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 2ac6c93c49f2862fc0b9e595eb0598cd1ea4bedf
2016-09-27 11:27:00 -04:00

903 lines
27 KiB
C++

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "mozilla/LoadInfo.h"
#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/ToJSValue.h"
#include "mozIThirdPartyUtil.h"
#include "nsFrameLoader.h"
#include "nsIContentSecurityPolicy.h"
#include "nsIDocShell.h"
#include "nsIDocument.h"
#include "nsIDOMDocument.h"
#include "nsIFrameLoader.h"
#include "nsIInterfaceRequestorUtils.h"
#include "nsISupportsImpl.h"
#include "nsISupportsUtils.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsDocShell.h"
#include "nsGlobalWindow.h"
using namespace mozilla::dom;
namespace mozilla {
namespace net {
static void
InheritOriginAttributes(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal, NeckoOriginAttributes& aAttrs)
{
const PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs =
BasePrincipal::Cast(aLoadingPrincipal)->OriginAttributesRef();
aAttrs.InheritFromDocToNecko(attrs);
}
LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal,
nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal,
nsINode* aLoadingContext,
nsSecurityFlags aSecurityFlags,
nsContentPolicyType aContentPolicyType)
: mLoadingPrincipal(aLoadingContext ?
aLoadingContext->NodePrincipal() : aLoadingPrincipal)
, mTriggeringPrincipal(aTriggeringPrincipal ?
aTriggeringPrincipal : mLoadingPrincipal.get())
, mPrincipalToInherit(mTriggeringPrincipal)
, mLoadingContext(do_GetWeakReference(aLoadingContext))
, mSecurityFlags(aSecurityFlags)
, mInternalContentPolicyType(aContentPolicyType)
, mTainting(LoadTainting::Basic)
, mUpgradeInsecureRequests(false)
, mVerifySignedContent(false)
, mEnforceSRI(false)
, mForceInheritPrincipalDropped(false)
, mInnerWindowID(0)
, mOuterWindowID(0)
, mParentOuterWindowID(0)
, mFrameOuterWindowID(0)
, mEnforceSecurity(false)
, mInitialSecurityCheckDone(false)
, mIsThirdPartyContext(false)
, mForcePreflight(false)
, mIsPreflight(false)
, mForceHSTSPriming(false)
, mMixedContentWouldBlock(false)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(mLoadingPrincipal);
MOZ_ASSERT(mTriggeringPrincipal);
MOZ_ASSERT(mPrincipalToInherit);
#ifdef DEBUG
// TYPE_DOCUMENT loads initiated by javascript tests will go through
// nsIOService and use the wrong constructor. Don't enforce the
// !TYPE_DOCUMENT check in those cases
bool skipContentTypeCheck = false;
skipContentTypeCheck = Preferences::GetBool("network.loadinfo.skip_type_assertion");
#endif
// This constructor shouldn't be used for TYPE_DOCUMENT loads that don't
// have a loadingPrincipal
MOZ_ASSERT(skipContentTypeCheck ||
mInternalContentPolicyType != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT);
// TODO(bug 1259873): Above, we initialize mIsThirdPartyContext to false meaning
// that consumers of LoadInfo that don't pass a context or pass a context from
// which we can't find a window will default to assuming that they're 1st
// party. It would be nice if we could default "safe" and assume that we are
// 3rd party until proven otherwise.
// if consumers pass both, aLoadingContext and aLoadingPrincipal
// then the loadingPrincipal must be the same as the node's principal
MOZ_ASSERT(!aLoadingContext || !aLoadingPrincipal ||
aLoadingContext->NodePrincipal() == aLoadingPrincipal);
// if the load is sandboxed, we can not also inherit the principal
if (mSecurityFlags & nsILoadInfo::SEC_SANDBOXED) {
mSecurityFlags ^= nsILoadInfo::SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL;
mForceInheritPrincipalDropped = true;
}
if (aLoadingContext) {
nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowOuter> contextOuter = aLoadingContext->OwnerDoc()->GetWindow();
if (contextOuter) {
ComputeIsThirdPartyContext(contextOuter);
mOuterWindowID = contextOuter->WindowID();
nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowOuter> parent = contextOuter->GetScriptableParent();
mParentOuterWindowID = parent ? parent->WindowID() : mOuterWindowID;
}
mInnerWindowID = aLoadingContext->OwnerDoc()->InnerWindowID();
// When the element being loaded is a frame, we choose the frame's window
// for the window ID and the frame element's window as the parent
// window. This is the behavior that Chrome exposes to add-ons.
// NB: If the frameLoaderOwner doesn't have a frame loader, then the load
// must be coming from an object (such as a plugin) that's loaded into it
// instead of a document being loaded. In that case, treat this object like
// any other non-document-loading element.
nsCOMPtr<nsIFrameLoaderOwner> frameLoaderOwner =
do_QueryInterface(aLoadingContext);
nsCOMPtr<nsIFrameLoader> fl = frameLoaderOwner ?
frameLoaderOwner->GetFrameLoader() : nullptr;
if (fl) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell;
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(fl->GetDocShell(getter_AddRefs(docShell))) && docShell) {
nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowOuter> outerWindow = do_GetInterface(docShell);
if (outerWindow) {
mFrameOuterWindowID = outerWindow->WindowID();
}
}
}
// if the document forces all requests to be upgraded from http to https, then
// we should do that for all requests. If it only forces preloads to be upgraded
// then we should enforce upgrade insecure requests only for preloads.
mUpgradeInsecureRequests =
aLoadingContext->OwnerDoc()->GetUpgradeInsecureRequests(false) ||
(nsContentUtils::IsPreloadType(mInternalContentPolicyType) &&
aLoadingContext->OwnerDoc()->GetUpgradeInsecureRequests(true));
// if owner doc has content signature, we enforce SRI
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel = aLoadingContext->OwnerDoc()->GetChannel();
if (channel) {
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = channel->GetLoadInfo();
if (loadInfo) {
mEnforceSRI = loadInfo->GetVerifySignedContent();
}
}
}
// If CSP requires SRI (require-sri-for), then store that information
// in the loadInfo so we can enforce SRI before loading the subresource.
if (!mEnforceSRI) {
// do not look into the CSP if already true:
// a CSP saying that SRI isn't needed should not
// overrule GetVerifySignedContent
if (aLoadingPrincipal) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp;
aLoadingPrincipal->GetCsp(getter_AddRefs(csp));
uint32_t externalType =
nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternal(aContentPolicyType);
// csp could be null if loading principal is system principal
if (csp) {
csp->RequireSRIForType(externalType, &mEnforceSRI);
}
// if CSP is delivered via a meta tag, it's speculatively available
// as 'preloadCSP'. If we are preloading a script or style, we have
// to apply that speculative 'preloadCSP' for such loads.
if (!mEnforceSRI && nsContentUtils::IsPreloadType(aContentPolicyType)) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> preloadCSP;
aLoadingPrincipal->GetPreloadCsp(getter_AddRefs(preloadCSP));
if (preloadCSP) {
preloadCSP->RequireSRIForType(externalType, &mEnforceSRI);
}
}
}
}
if (!(mSecurityFlags & nsILoadInfo::SEC_FORCE_PRIVATE_BROWSING)) {
if (aLoadingContext) {
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadContext> loadContext =
aLoadingContext->OwnerDoc()->GetLoadContext();
if (loadContext) {
bool usePrivateBrowsing;
nsresult rv = loadContext->GetUsePrivateBrowsing(&usePrivateBrowsing);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && usePrivateBrowsing) {
mSecurityFlags |= nsILoadInfo::SEC_FORCE_PRIVATE_BROWSING;
}
}
}
}
InheritOriginAttributes(mLoadingPrincipal, mOriginAttributes);
// For chrome docshell, the mPrivateBrowsingId remains 0 even its
// UsePrivateBrowsing() is true, so we only update the mPrivateBrowsingId in
// origin attributes if the type of the docshell is content.
if (aLoadingContext) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell = aLoadingContext->OwnerDoc()->GetDocShell();
if (docShell) {
if (docShell->ItemType() == nsIDocShellTreeItem::typeContent) {
mOriginAttributes.SyncAttributesWithPrivateBrowsing(GetUsePrivateBrowsing());
} else if (docShell->ItemType() == nsIDocShellTreeItem::typeChrome) {
MOZ_ASSERT(mOriginAttributes.mPrivateBrowsingId == 0,
"chrome docshell shouldn't have mPrivateBrowsingId set.");
}
}
}
}
/* Constructor takes an outer window, but no loadingNode or loadingPrincipal.
* This constructor should only be used for TYPE_DOCUMENT loads, since they
* have a null loadingNode and loadingPrincipal.
*/
LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsPIDOMWindowOuter* aOuterWindow,
nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal,
nsSecurityFlags aSecurityFlags)
: mLoadingPrincipal(nullptr)
, mTriggeringPrincipal(aTriggeringPrincipal)
, mPrincipalToInherit(mTriggeringPrincipal)
, mSecurityFlags(aSecurityFlags)
, mInternalContentPolicyType(nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT)
, mTainting(LoadTainting::Basic)
, mUpgradeInsecureRequests(false)
, mVerifySignedContent(false)
, mEnforceSRI(false)
, mForceInheritPrincipalDropped(false)
, mInnerWindowID(0)
, mOuterWindowID(0)
, mParentOuterWindowID(0)
, mFrameOuterWindowID(0)
, mEnforceSecurity(false)
, mInitialSecurityCheckDone(false)
, mIsThirdPartyContext(false) // NB: TYPE_DOCUMENT implies not third-party.
, mForcePreflight(false)
, mIsPreflight(false)
, mForceHSTSPriming(false)
, mMixedContentWouldBlock(false)
{
// Top-level loads are never third-party
// Grab the information we can out of the window.
MOZ_ASSERT(aOuterWindow);
MOZ_ASSERT(mTriggeringPrincipal);
MOZ_ASSERT(mPrincipalToInherit);
// if the load is sandboxed, we can not also inherit the principal
if (mSecurityFlags & nsILoadInfo::SEC_SANDBOXED) {
mSecurityFlags ^= nsILoadInfo::SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL;
mForceInheritPrincipalDropped = true;
}
// NB: Ignore the current inner window since we're navigating away from it.
mOuterWindowID = aOuterWindow->WindowID();
// TODO We can have a parent without a frame element in some cases dealing
// with the hidden window.
nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowOuter> parent = aOuterWindow->GetScriptableParent();
mParentOuterWindowID = parent ? parent->WindowID() : 0;
// get the docshell from the outerwindow, and then get the originattributes
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell = aOuterWindow->GetDocShell();
MOZ_ASSERT(docShell);
const DocShellOriginAttributes attrs =
nsDocShell::Cast(docShell)->GetOriginAttributes();
if (docShell->ItemType() == nsIDocShellTreeItem::typeContent) {
MOZ_ASSERT(GetUsePrivateBrowsing() == (attrs.mPrivateBrowsingId != 0),
"docshell and mSecurityFlags have different value for PrivateBrowsing().");
} else if (docShell->ItemType() == nsIDocShellTreeItem::typeChrome) {
MOZ_ASSERT(attrs.mPrivateBrowsingId == 0,
"chrome docshell shouldn't have mPrivateBrowsingId set.");
}
mOriginAttributes.InheritFromDocShellToNecko(attrs);
}
LoadInfo::LoadInfo(const LoadInfo& rhs)
: mLoadingPrincipal(rhs.mLoadingPrincipal)
, mTriggeringPrincipal(rhs.mTriggeringPrincipal)
, mPrincipalToInherit(rhs.mPrincipalToInherit)
, mLoadingContext(rhs.mLoadingContext)
, mSecurityFlags(rhs.mSecurityFlags)
, mInternalContentPolicyType(rhs.mInternalContentPolicyType)
, mTainting(rhs.mTainting)
, mUpgradeInsecureRequests(rhs.mUpgradeInsecureRequests)
, mVerifySignedContent(rhs.mVerifySignedContent)
, mEnforceSRI(rhs.mEnforceSRI)
, mForceInheritPrincipalDropped(rhs.mForceInheritPrincipalDropped)
, mInnerWindowID(rhs.mInnerWindowID)
, mOuterWindowID(rhs.mOuterWindowID)
, mParentOuterWindowID(rhs.mParentOuterWindowID)
, mFrameOuterWindowID(rhs.mFrameOuterWindowID)
, mEnforceSecurity(rhs.mEnforceSecurity)
, mInitialSecurityCheckDone(rhs.mInitialSecurityCheckDone)
, mIsThirdPartyContext(rhs.mIsThirdPartyContext)
, mOriginAttributes(rhs.mOriginAttributes)
, mRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects(
rhs.mRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects)
, mRedirectChain(rhs.mRedirectChain)
, mCorsUnsafeHeaders(rhs.mCorsUnsafeHeaders)
, mForcePreflight(rhs.mForcePreflight)
, mIsPreflight(rhs.mIsPreflight)
, mForceHSTSPriming(rhs.mForceHSTSPriming)
, mMixedContentWouldBlock(rhs.mMixedContentWouldBlock)
{
}
LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal,
nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal,
nsIPrincipal* aPrincipalToInherit,
nsSecurityFlags aSecurityFlags,
nsContentPolicyType aContentPolicyType,
LoadTainting aTainting,
bool aUpgradeInsecureRequests,
bool aVerifySignedContent,
bool aEnforceSRI,
bool aForceInheritPrincipalDropped,
uint64_t aInnerWindowID,
uint64_t aOuterWindowID,
uint64_t aParentOuterWindowID,
uint64_t aFrameOuterWindowID,
bool aEnforceSecurity,
bool aInitialSecurityCheckDone,
bool aIsThirdPartyContext,
const NeckoOriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes,
nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>>& aRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects,
nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>>& aRedirectChain,
const nsTArray<nsCString>& aCorsUnsafeHeaders,
bool aForcePreflight,
bool aIsPreflight,
bool aForceHSTSPriming,
bool aMixedContentWouldBlock)
: mLoadingPrincipal(aLoadingPrincipal)
, mTriggeringPrincipal(aTriggeringPrincipal)
, mPrincipalToInherit(aPrincipalToInherit)
, mSecurityFlags(aSecurityFlags)
, mInternalContentPolicyType(aContentPolicyType)
, mTainting(aTainting)
, mUpgradeInsecureRequests(aUpgradeInsecureRequests)
, mVerifySignedContent(aVerifySignedContent)
, mEnforceSRI(aEnforceSRI)
, mForceInheritPrincipalDropped(aForceInheritPrincipalDropped)
, mInnerWindowID(aInnerWindowID)
, mOuterWindowID(aOuterWindowID)
, mParentOuterWindowID(aParentOuterWindowID)
, mFrameOuterWindowID(aFrameOuterWindowID)
, mEnforceSecurity(aEnforceSecurity)
, mInitialSecurityCheckDone(aInitialSecurityCheckDone)
, mIsThirdPartyContext(aIsThirdPartyContext)
, mOriginAttributes(aOriginAttributes)
, mCorsUnsafeHeaders(aCorsUnsafeHeaders)
, mForcePreflight(aForcePreflight)
, mIsPreflight(aIsPreflight)
, mForceHSTSPriming (aForceHSTSPriming)
, mMixedContentWouldBlock(aMixedContentWouldBlock)
{
// Only top level TYPE_DOCUMENT loads can have a null loadingPrincipal
MOZ_ASSERT(mLoadingPrincipal || aContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT);
MOZ_ASSERT(mTriggeringPrincipal);
MOZ_ASSERT(mPrincipalToInherit);
mRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects.SwapElements(
aRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects);
mRedirectChain.SwapElements(aRedirectChain);
}
LoadInfo::~LoadInfo()
{
}
void
LoadInfo::ComputeIsThirdPartyContext(nsPIDOMWindowOuter* aOuterWindow)
{
nsContentPolicyType type =
nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternal(mInternalContentPolicyType);
if (type == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
// Top-level loads are never third-party.
mIsThirdPartyContext = false;
return;
}
nsCOMPtr<mozIThirdPartyUtil> util(do_GetService(THIRDPARTYUTIL_CONTRACTID));
if (NS_WARN_IF(!util)) {
return;
}
util->IsThirdPartyWindow(aOuterWindow, nullptr, &mIsThirdPartyContext);
}
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(LoadInfo, nsILoadInfo)
already_AddRefed<nsILoadInfo>
LoadInfo::Clone() const
{
RefPtr<LoadInfo> copy(new LoadInfo(*this));
return copy.forget();
}
already_AddRefed<nsILoadInfo>
LoadInfo::CloneWithNewSecFlags(nsSecurityFlags aSecurityFlags) const
{
RefPtr<LoadInfo> copy(new LoadInfo(*this));
copy->mSecurityFlags = aSecurityFlags;
return copy.forget();
}
already_AddRefed<nsILoadInfo>
LoadInfo::CloneForNewRequest() const
{
RefPtr<LoadInfo> copy(new LoadInfo(*this));
copy->mEnforceSecurity = false;
copy->mInitialSecurityCheckDone = false;
copy->mRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects.Clear();
copy->mRedirectChain.Clear();
return copy.forget();
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetLoadingPrincipal(nsIPrincipal** aLoadingPrincipal)
{
NS_IF_ADDREF(*aLoadingPrincipal = mLoadingPrincipal);
return NS_OK;
}
nsIPrincipal*
LoadInfo::LoadingPrincipal()
{
return mLoadingPrincipal;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetTriggeringPrincipal(nsIPrincipal** aTriggeringPrincipal)
{
NS_ADDREF(*aTriggeringPrincipal = mTriggeringPrincipal);
return NS_OK;
}
nsIPrincipal*
LoadInfo::TriggeringPrincipal()
{
return mTriggeringPrincipal;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetPrincipalToInherit(nsIPrincipal** aPrincipalToInherit)
{
NS_ADDREF(*aPrincipalToInherit = mPrincipalToInherit);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::SetPrincipalToInherit(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipalToInherit)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(aPrincipalToInherit, "must be a valid principal to inherit");
mPrincipalToInherit = aPrincipalToInherit;
return NS_OK;
}
nsIPrincipal*
LoadInfo::PrincipalToInherit()
{
return mPrincipalToInherit;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetLoadingDocument(nsIDOMDocument** aResult)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
if (node) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMDocument> context = do_QueryInterface(node->OwnerDoc());
context.forget(aResult);
}
return NS_OK;
}
nsINode*
LoadInfo::LoadingNode()
{
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
return node;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetSecurityFlags(nsSecurityFlags* aResult)
{
*aResult = mSecurityFlags;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetSecurityMode(uint32_t* aFlags)
{
*aFlags = (mSecurityFlags &
(nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS |
nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED |
nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS |
nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_NULL |
nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS));
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetIsInThirdPartyContext(bool* aIsInThirdPartyContext)
{
*aIsInThirdPartyContext = mIsThirdPartyContext;
return NS_OK;
}
static const uint32_t sCookiePolicyMask =
nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_DEFAULT |
nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE |
nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN |
nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_OMIT;
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetCookiePolicy(uint32_t *aResult)
{
uint32_t policy = mSecurityFlags & sCookiePolicyMask;
if (policy == nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_DEFAULT) {
policy = (mSecurityFlags & SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS) ?
nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN : nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE;
}
*aResult = policy;
return NS_OK;
}
void
LoadInfo::SetIncludeCookiesSecFlag()
{
MOZ_ASSERT(!mEnforceSecurity,
"Request should not have been opened yet");
MOZ_ASSERT((mSecurityFlags & sCookiePolicyMask) ==
nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_DEFAULT);
mSecurityFlags = (mSecurityFlags & ~sCookiePolicyMask) |
nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetForceInheritPrincipal(bool* aInheritPrincipal)
{
*aInheritPrincipal =
(mSecurityFlags & nsILoadInfo::SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetLoadingSandboxed(bool* aLoadingSandboxed)
{
*aLoadingSandboxed = (mSecurityFlags & nsILoadInfo::SEC_SANDBOXED);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetAboutBlankInherits(bool* aResult)
{
*aResult =
(mSecurityFlags & nsILoadInfo::SEC_ABOUT_BLANK_INHERITS);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetAllowChrome(bool* aResult)
{
*aResult =
(mSecurityFlags & nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CHROME);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetDisallowScript(bool* aResult)
{
*aResult =
(mSecurityFlags & nsILoadInfo::SEC_DISALLOW_SCRIPT);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetDontFollowRedirects(bool* aResult)
{
*aResult =
(mSecurityFlags & nsILoadInfo::SEC_DONT_FOLLOW_REDIRECTS);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetUsePrivateBrowsing(bool* aUsePrivateBrowsing)
{
*aUsePrivateBrowsing = (mSecurityFlags &
nsILoadInfo::SEC_FORCE_PRIVATE_BROWSING);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetLoadErrorPage(bool* aResult)
{
*aResult =
(mSecurityFlags & nsILoadInfo::SEC_LOAD_ERROR_PAGE);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetExternalContentPolicyType(nsContentPolicyType* aResult)
{
*aResult = nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternal(mInternalContentPolicyType);
return NS_OK;
}
nsContentPolicyType
LoadInfo::InternalContentPolicyType()
{
return mInternalContentPolicyType;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetUpgradeInsecureRequests(bool* aResult)
{
*aResult = mUpgradeInsecureRequests;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::SetVerifySignedContent(bool aVerifySignedContent)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(mInternalContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT,
"can only verify content for TYPE_DOCUMENT");
mVerifySignedContent = aVerifySignedContent;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetVerifySignedContent(bool* aResult)
{
*aResult = mVerifySignedContent;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::SetEnforceSRI(bool aEnforceSRI)
{
mEnforceSRI = aEnforceSRI;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetEnforceSRI(bool* aResult)
{
*aResult = mEnforceSRI;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetForceInheritPrincipalDropped(bool* aResult)
{
*aResult = mForceInheritPrincipalDropped;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetInnerWindowID(uint64_t* aResult)
{
*aResult = mInnerWindowID;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetOuterWindowID(uint64_t* aResult)
{
*aResult = mOuterWindowID;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetParentOuterWindowID(uint64_t* aResult)
{
*aResult = mParentOuterWindowID;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetFrameOuterWindowID(uint64_t* aResult)
{
*aResult = mFrameOuterWindowID;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetScriptableOriginAttributes(JSContext* aCx,
JS::MutableHandle<JS::Value> aOriginAttributes)
{
if (NS_WARN_IF(!ToJSValue(aCx, mOriginAttributes, aOriginAttributes))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::SetScriptableOriginAttributes(JSContext* aCx,
JS::Handle<JS::Value> aOriginAttributes)
{
NeckoOriginAttributes attrs;
if (!aOriginAttributes.isObject() || !attrs.Init(aCx, aOriginAttributes)) {
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
}
mOriginAttributes = attrs;
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
LoadInfo::GetOriginAttributes(mozilla::NeckoOriginAttributes* aOriginAttributes)
{
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aOriginAttributes);
*aOriginAttributes = mOriginAttributes;
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
LoadInfo::SetOriginAttributes(const mozilla::NeckoOriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes)
{
mOriginAttributes = aOriginAttributes;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::SetEnforceSecurity(bool aEnforceSecurity)
{
// Indicates whether the channel was openend using AsyncOpen2. Once set
// to true, it must remain true throughout the lifetime of the channel.
// Setting it to anything else than true will be discarded.
MOZ_ASSERT(aEnforceSecurity, "aEnforceSecurity must be true");
mEnforceSecurity = mEnforceSecurity || aEnforceSecurity;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetEnforceSecurity(bool* aResult)
{
*aResult = mEnforceSecurity;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::SetInitialSecurityCheckDone(bool aInitialSecurityCheckDone)
{
// Indicates whether the channel was ever evaluated by the
// ContentSecurityManager. Once set to true, this flag must
// remain true throughout the lifetime of the channel.
// Setting it to anything else than true will be discarded.
MOZ_ASSERT(aInitialSecurityCheckDone, "aInitialSecurityCheckDone must be true");
mInitialSecurityCheckDone = mInitialSecurityCheckDone || aInitialSecurityCheckDone;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetInitialSecurityCheckDone(bool* aResult)
{
*aResult = mInitialSecurityCheckDone;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::AppendRedirectedPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, bool aIsInternalRedirect)
{
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aPrincipal);
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
mRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects.AppendElement(aPrincipal);
if (!aIsInternalRedirect) {
mRedirectChain.AppendElement(aPrincipal);
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects(JSContext* aCx, JS::MutableHandle<JS::Value> aChain)
{
if (!ToJSValue(aCx, mRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects, aChain)) {
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
return NS_OK;
}
const nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>>&
LoadInfo::RedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects()
{
return mRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetRedirectChain(JSContext* aCx, JS::MutableHandle<JS::Value> aChain)
{
if (!ToJSValue(aCx, mRedirectChain, aChain)) {
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
return NS_OK;
}
const nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>>&
LoadInfo::RedirectChain()
{
return mRedirectChain;
}
void
LoadInfo::SetCorsPreflightInfo(const nsTArray<nsCString>& aHeaders,
bool aForcePreflight)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(GetSecurityMode() == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS);
MOZ_ASSERT(!mInitialSecurityCheckDone);
mCorsUnsafeHeaders = aHeaders;
mForcePreflight = aForcePreflight;
}
const nsTArray<nsCString>&
LoadInfo::CorsUnsafeHeaders()
{
return mCorsUnsafeHeaders;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetForcePreflight(bool* aForcePreflight)
{
*aForcePreflight = mForcePreflight;
return NS_OK;
}
void
LoadInfo::SetIsPreflight()
{
MOZ_ASSERT(GetSecurityMode() == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS);
MOZ_ASSERT(!mInitialSecurityCheckDone);
mIsPreflight = true;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetIsPreflight(bool* aIsPreflight)
{
*aIsPreflight = mIsPreflight;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetForceHSTSPriming(bool* aForceHSTSPriming)
{
*aForceHSTSPriming = mForceHSTSPriming;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetMixedContentWouldBlock(bool *aMixedContentWouldBlock)
{
*aMixedContentWouldBlock = mMixedContentWouldBlock;
return NS_OK;
}
void
LoadInfo::SetHSTSPriming(bool aMixedContentWouldBlock)
{
mForceHSTSPriming = true;
mMixedContentWouldBlock = aMixedContentWouldBlock;
}
void
LoadInfo::ClearHSTSPriming()
{
mForceHSTSPriming = false;
mMixedContentWouldBlock = false;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetTainting(uint32_t* aTaintingOut)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(aTaintingOut);
*aTaintingOut = static_cast<uint32_t>(mTainting);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::MaybeIncreaseTainting(uint32_t aTainting)
{
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aTainting <= TAINTING_OPAQUE);
LoadTainting tainting = static_cast<LoadTainting>(aTainting);
if (tainting > mTainting) {
mTainting = tainting;
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetIsTopLevelLoad(bool *aResult)
{
*aResult = mFrameOuterWindowID ? mFrameOuterWindowID == mOuterWindowID
: mParentOuterWindowID == mOuterWindowID;
return NS_OK;
}
} // namespace net
} // namespace mozilla