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4b56704437
Reorganize the SSL Socket structure contents to obviate ssl3 pointer. Move much of the ECC code from ssl3con to new file ssl3ecc.c. derive.c implements derivation of the SSL/TLS master secret and the encryption and MAC keys and IVs without using PKCS11. Bug 305147. r=rrelyea. Modified Files: ssl/config.mk ssl/manifest.mn ssl/ssl.h ssl/ssl3con.c ssl/ssl3gthr.c ssl/sslauth.c ssl/sslcon.c ssl/ssldef.c ssl/sslgathr.c ssl/sslimpl.h ssl/sslinfo.c ssl/sslnonce.c ssl/sslsecur.c ssl/sslsnce.c ssl/sslsock.c Added Files: ssl/derive.c ssl/ssl3ecc.c
484 lines
15 KiB
C
484 lines
15 KiB
C
/*
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* Gather (Read) entire SSL2 records from socket into buffer.
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*
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* ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK *****
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* Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1
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*
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* The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version
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* 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
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* the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
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* http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
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*
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* Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,
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* WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License
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* for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the
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* License.
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*
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* The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries.
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*
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* The Initial Developer of the Original Code is
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* Netscape Communications Corporation.
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* Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 1994-2000
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* the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Contributor(s):
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*
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* Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of
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* either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or
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* the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"),
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* in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead
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* of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only
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* under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to
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* use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your
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* decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice
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* and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete
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* the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under
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* the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL.
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*
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* ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */
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/* $Id: sslgathr.c,v 1.8 2005/09/09 03:02:16 nelsonb%netscape.com Exp $ */
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#include "cert.h"
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#include "ssl.h"
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#include "sslimpl.h"
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#include "sslproto.h"
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/* Forward static declarations */
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static SECStatus ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(sslSocket *ss);
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/*
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** Gather a single record of data from the receiving stream. This code
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** first gathers the header (2 or 3 bytes long depending on the value of
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** the most significant bit in the first byte) then gathers up the data
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** for the record into gs->buf. This code handles non-blocking I/O
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** and is to be called multiple times until ss->sec.recordLen != 0.
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** This function decrypts the gathered record in place, in gs_buf.
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*
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* Caller must hold RecvBufLock.
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*
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* Returns +1 when it has gathered a complete SSLV2 record.
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* Returns 0 if it hits EOF.
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* Returns -1 (SECFailure) on any error
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* Returns -2 (SECWouldBlock) when it gathers an SSL v3 client hello header.
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**
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** The SSL2 Gather State machine has 4 states:
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** GS_INIT - Done reading in previous record. Haven't begun to read in
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** next record. When ssl2_GatherData is called with the machine
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** in this state, the machine will attempt to read the first 3
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** bytes of the SSL2 record header, and will advance the state
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** to GS_HEADER.
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**
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** GS_HEADER - The machine is in this state while waiting for the completion
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** of the first 3 bytes of the SSL2 record. When complete, the
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** machine will compute the remaining unread length of this record
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** and will initiate a read of that many bytes. The machine will
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** advance to one of two states, depending on whether the record
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** is encrypted (GS_MAC), or unencrypted (GS_DATA).
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**
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** GS_MAC - The machine is in this state while waiting for the remainder
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** of the SSL2 record to be read in. When the read is completed,
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** the machine checks the record for valid length, decrypts it,
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** and checks and discards the MAC, then advances to GS_INIT.
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**
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** GS_DATA - The machine is in this state while waiting for the remainder
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** of the unencrypted SSL2 record to be read in. Upon completion,
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** the machine advances to the GS_INIT state and returns the data.
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*/
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int
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ssl2_GatherData(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, int flags)
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{
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unsigned char * bp;
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unsigned char * pBuf;
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int nb, err, rv;
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PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
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if (gs->state == GS_INIT) {
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/* Initialize gathering engine */
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gs->state = GS_HEADER;
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gs->remainder = 3;
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gs->count = 3;
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gs->offset = 0;
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gs->recordLen = 0;
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gs->recordPadding = 0;
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gs->hdr[2] = 0;
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gs->writeOffset = 0;
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gs->readOffset = 0;
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}
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if (gs->encrypted) {
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PORT_Assert(ss->sec.hash != 0);
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}
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pBuf = gs->buf.buf;
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for (;;) {
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SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL[%d]: gather state %d (need %d more)",
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SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->state, gs->remainder));
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bp = ((gs->state != GS_HEADER) ? pBuf : gs->hdr) + gs->offset;
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nb = ssl_DefRecv(ss, bp, gs->remainder, flags);
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if (nb > 0) {
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PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "raw gather data:", bp, nb));
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}
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if (nb == 0) {
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/* EOF */
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SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL[%d]: EOF", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
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rv = 0;
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break;
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}
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if (nb < 0) {
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SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: recv error %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
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PR_GetError()));
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rv = SECFailure;
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break;
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}
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gs->offset += nb;
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gs->remainder -= nb;
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if (gs->remainder > 0) {
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continue;
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}
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/* Probably finished this piece */
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switch (gs->state) {
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case GS_HEADER:
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if ((ss->opt.enableSSL3 || ss->opt.enableTLS) && !ss->firstHsDone) {
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PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
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/* If this looks like an SSL3 handshake record,
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** and we're expecting an SSL2 Hello message from our peer,
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** handle it here.
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*/
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if (gs->hdr[0] == content_handshake) {
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if ((ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage) ||
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(ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage)) {
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rv = ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(ss);
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if (rv == SECFailure) {
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return SECFailure;
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}
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}
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/* XXX_1 The call stack to here is:
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* ssl_Do1stHandshake -> ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake ->
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* ssl2_GatherRecord -> here.
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* We want to return all the way out to ssl_Do1stHandshake,
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* and have it call ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake again.
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* ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake will call
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* ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake when it is called again.
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*
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* Returning SECWouldBlock here causes
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* ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake to return without clearing
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* ss->handshake, ensuring that ssl_Do1stHandshake will
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* call it again immediately.
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*
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* If we return 1 here, ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake will
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* clear ss->handshake before returning, and thus will not
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* be called again by ssl_Do1stHandshake.
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*/
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return SECWouldBlock;
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} else if (gs->hdr[0] == content_alert) {
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if (ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage) {
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/* XXX This is a hack. We're assuming that any failure
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* XXX on the client hello is a failure to match
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* XXX ciphers.
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*/
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PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
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return SECFailure;
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}
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}
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} /* ((ss->opt.enableSSL3 || ss->opt.enableTLS) && !ss->firstHsDone) */
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/* we've got the first 3 bytes. The header may be two or three. */
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if (gs->hdr[0] & 0x80) {
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/* This record has a 2-byte header, and no padding */
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gs->count = ((gs->hdr[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | gs->hdr[1];
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gs->recordPadding = 0;
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} else {
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/* This record has a 3-byte header that is all read in now. */
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gs->count = ((gs->hdr[0] & 0x3f) << 8) | gs->hdr[1];
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/* is_escape = (gs->hdr[0] & 0x40) != 0; */
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gs->recordPadding = gs->hdr[2];
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}
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if (!gs->count) {
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PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
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goto cleanup;
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}
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if (gs->count > gs->buf.space) {
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err = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, gs->count);
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if (err) {
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return err;
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}
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pBuf = gs->buf.buf;
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}
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if (gs->hdr[0] & 0x80) {
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/* we've already read in the first byte of the body.
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** Put it into the buffer.
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*/
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pBuf[0] = gs->hdr[2];
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gs->offset = 1;
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gs->remainder = gs->count - 1;
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} else {
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gs->offset = 0;
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gs->remainder = gs->count;
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}
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if (gs->encrypted) {
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gs->state = GS_MAC;
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gs->recordLen = gs->count - gs->recordPadding
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- ss->sec.hash->length;
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} else {
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gs->state = GS_DATA;
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gs->recordLen = gs->count;
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}
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break;
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case GS_MAC:
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/* Have read in entire rest of the ciphertext.
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** Check for valid length.
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** Decrypt it.
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** Check the MAC.
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*/
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PORT_Assert(gs->encrypted);
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{
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unsigned int macLen;
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int nout;
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unsigned char mac[SSL_MAX_MAC_BYTES];
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ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /**********************************/
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/* If this is a stream cipher, blockSize will be 1,
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* and this test will always be false.
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* If this is a block cipher, this will detect records
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* that are not a multiple of the blocksize in length.
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*/
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if (gs->count & (ss->sec.blockSize - 1)) {
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/* This is an error. Sender is misbehaving */
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SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: sender, count=%d blockSize=%d",
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SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->count,
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ss->sec.blockSize));
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PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING);
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rv = SECFailure;
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goto spec_locked_done;
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}
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PORT_Assert(gs->count == gs->offset);
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if (gs->offset == 0) {
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rv = 0; /* means EOF. */
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goto spec_locked_done;
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}
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/* Decrypt the portion of data that we just recieved.
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** Decrypt it in place.
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*/
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rv = (*ss->sec.dec)(ss->sec.readcx, pBuf, &nout, gs->offset,
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pBuf, gs->offset);
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if (rv != SECSuccess) {
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goto spec_locked_done;
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}
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/* Have read in all the MAC portion of record
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**
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** Prepare MAC by resetting it and feeding it the shared secret
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*/
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macLen = ss->sec.hash->length;
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if (gs->offset >= macLen) {
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uint32 sequenceNumber = ss->sec.rcvSequence++;
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unsigned char seq[4];
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seq[0] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber >> 24);
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seq[1] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber >> 16);
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seq[2] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber >> 8);
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seq[3] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber);
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(*ss->sec.hash->begin)(ss->sec.hashcx);
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(*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, ss->sec.rcvSecret.data,
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ss->sec.rcvSecret.len);
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(*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, pBuf + macLen,
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gs->offset - macLen);
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(*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, seq, 4);
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(*ss->sec.hash->end)(ss->sec.hashcx, mac, &macLen, macLen);
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}
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PORT_Assert(macLen == ss->sec.hash->length);
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ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /******************************/
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if (PORT_Memcmp(mac, pBuf, macLen) != 0) {
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/* MAC's didn't match... */
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SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: mac check failed, seq=%d",
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SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.rcvSequence));
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PRINT_BUF(1, (ss, "computed mac:", mac, macLen));
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PRINT_BUF(1, (ss, "received mac:", pBuf, macLen));
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PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
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rv = SECFailure;
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goto cleanup;
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}
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PORT_Assert(gs->recordPadding + macLen <= gs->offset);
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if (gs->recordPadding + macLen <= gs->offset) {
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gs->recordOffset = macLen;
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gs->readOffset = macLen;
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gs->writeOffset = gs->offset - gs->recordPadding;
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rv = 1;
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} else {
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PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING);
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cleanup:
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/* nothing in the buffer any more. */
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gs->recordOffset = 0;
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gs->readOffset = 0;
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gs->writeOffset = 0;
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rv = SECFailure;
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}
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gs->recordLen = gs->writeOffset - gs->readOffset;
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gs->recordPadding = 0; /* forget we did any padding. */
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gs->state = GS_INIT;
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if (rv > 0) {
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PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "recv clear record:",
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pBuf + gs->recordOffset, gs->recordLen));
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}
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return rv;
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spec_locked_done:
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ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
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return rv;
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}
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case GS_DATA:
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/* Have read in all the DATA portion of record */
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gs->recordOffset = 0;
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gs->readOffset = 0;
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gs->writeOffset = gs->offset;
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PORT_Assert(gs->recordLen == gs->writeOffset - gs->readOffset);
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gs->recordLen = gs->offset;
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gs->recordPadding = 0;
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gs->state = GS_INIT;
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++ss->sec.rcvSequence;
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PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "recv clear record:",
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pBuf + gs->recordOffset, gs->recordLen));
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return 1;
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} /* end switch gs->state */
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} /* end gather loop. */
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return rv;
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}
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/*
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** Gather a single record of data from the receiving stream. This code
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** first gathers the header (2 or 3 bytes long depending on the value of
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** the most significant bit in the first byte) then gathers up the data
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** for the record into the readBuf. This code handles non-blocking I/O
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** and is to be called multiple times until ss->sec.recordLen != 0.
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*
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* Returns +1 when it has gathered a complete SSLV2 record.
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* Returns 0 if it hits EOF.
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* Returns -1 (SECFailure) on any error
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* Returns -2 (SECWouldBlock)
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*
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* Called by ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake in sslcon.c,
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* and by DoRecv in sslsecur.c
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* Caller must hold RecvBufLock.
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*/
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int
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ssl2_GatherRecord(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
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{
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return ssl2_GatherData(ss, &ss->gs, flags);
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}
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/*
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* Returns +1 when it has gathered a complete SSLV2 record.
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* Returns 0 if it hits EOF.
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* Returns -1 (SECFailure) on any error
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* Returns -2 (SECWouldBlock)
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*
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* Called from SocksStartGather in sslsocks.c
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* Caller must hold RecvBufLock.
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*/
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int
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ssl2_StartGatherBytes(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, unsigned int count)
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{
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int rv;
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PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
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gs->state = GS_DATA;
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gs->remainder = count;
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gs->count = count;
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gs->offset = 0;
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if (count > gs->buf.space) {
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rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, count);
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if (rv) {
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return rv;
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}
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}
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return ssl2_GatherData(ss, gs, 0);
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}
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/* Caller should hold RecvBufLock. */
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SECStatus
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ssl_InitGather(sslGather *gs)
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{
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SECStatus status;
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gs->state = GS_INIT;
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gs->writeOffset = 0;
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gs->readOffset = 0;
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status = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, 4096);
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return status;
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}
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/* Caller must hold RecvBufLock. */
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void
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ssl_DestroyGather(sslGather *gs)
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{
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if (gs) { /* the PORT_*Free functions check for NULL pointers. */
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PORT_ZFree(gs->buf.buf, gs->buf.space);
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PORT_Free(gs->inbuf.buf);
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}
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}
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/* Caller must hold RecvBufLock. */
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static SECStatus
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ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(sslSocket *ss)
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{
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SECStatus rv;
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SSL3ProtocolVersion version = (ss->gs.hdr[1] << 8) | ss->gs.hdr[2];
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PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
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PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
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/* We've read in 3 bytes, there are 2 more to go in an ssl3 header. */
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ss->gs.remainder = 2;
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ss->gs.count = 0;
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/* Clearing these handshake pointers ensures that
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* ssl_Do1stHandshake won't call ssl2_HandleMessage when we return.
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*/
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ss->nextHandshake = 0;
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ss->securityHandshake = 0;
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/* Setting ss->version to an SSL 3.x value will cause
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** ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake to invoke ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake()
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** the next time it is called.
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**/
|
|
rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version);
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ss->sec.send = ssl3_SendApplicationData;
|
|
|
|
return SECSuccess;
|
|
}
|