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290 lines
10 KiB
JavaScript
290 lines
10 KiB
JavaScript
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,
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* You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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/* global Components, Services, dump, AppsUtils, NetUtil, XPCOMUtils */
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"use strict";
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const Cu = Components.utils;
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const Cc = Components.classes;
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const Ci = Components.interfaces;
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const Cr = Components.results;
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const signatureFileExtension = ".sig";
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this.EXPORTED_SYMBOLS = ["TrustedHostedAppsUtils"];
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Cu.import("resource://gre/modules/AppsUtils.jsm");
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Cu.import("resource://gre/modules/Promise.jsm");
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Cu.import("resource://gre/modules/Services.jsm");
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Cu.import("resource://gre/modules/XPCOMUtils.jsm");
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XPCOMUtils.defineLazyModuleGetter(this, "NetUtil",
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"resource://gre/modules/NetUtil.jsm");
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#ifdef MOZ_WIDGET_ANDROID
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// On Android, define the "debug" function as a binding of the "d" function
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// from the AndroidLog module so it gets the "debug" priority and a log tag.
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// We always report debug messages on Android because it's unnecessary
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// to restrict reporting, per bug 1003469.
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let debug = Cu
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.import("resource://gre/modules/AndroidLog.jsm", {})
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.AndroidLog.d.bind(null, "TrustedHostedAppsUtils");
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#else
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// Elsewhere, report debug messages only if dom.mozApps.debug is set to true.
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// The pref is only checked once, on startup, so restart after changing it.
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let debug = Services.prefs.getBoolPref("dom.mozApps.debug") ?
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aMsg => dump("-*- TrustedHostedAppsUtils.jsm : " + aMsg + "\n") :
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() => {};
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#endif
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/**
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* Verification functions for Trusted Hosted Apps.
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*/
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this.TrustedHostedAppsUtils = {
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/**
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* Check if the given host is pinned in the CA pinning database.
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*/
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isHostPinned: function (aUrl) {
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let uri;
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try {
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uri = Services.io.newURI(aUrl, null, null);
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} catch(e) {
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debug("Host parsing failed: " + e);
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return false;
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}
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// TODO: use nsSiteSecurityService.isSecureURI()
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if (!uri.host || "https" != uri.scheme) {
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return false;
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}
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// Check certificate pinning
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let siteSecurityService;
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try {
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siteSecurityService = Cc["@mozilla.org/ssservice;1"]
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.getService(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService);
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} catch (e) {
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debug("nsISiteSecurityService error: " + e);
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// unrecoverable error, don't bug the user
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throw "CERTDB_ERROR";
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}
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if (siteSecurityService.isSecureHost(Ci.nsISiteSecurityService.HEADER_HPKP,
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uri.host, 0)) {
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debug("\tvalid certificate pinning for host: " + uri.host + "\n");
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return true;
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}
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debug("\tHost NOT pinned: " + uri.host + "\n");
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return false;
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},
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/**
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* Take a CSP policy string as input and ensure that it contains at
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* least the directives that are required ('script-src' and
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* 'style-src'). If the CSP policy string is 'undefined' or does
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* not contain some of the required csp directives the function will
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* return empty list with status set to false. Otherwise a parsed
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* list of the unique sources listed from the required csp
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* directives is returned.
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*/
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getCSPWhiteList: function(aCsp) {
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let isValid = false;
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let whiteList = [];
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let requiredDirectives = [ "script-src", "style-src" ];
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if (aCsp) {
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let validDirectives = [];
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let directives = aCsp.split(";");
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// TODO: Use nsIContentSecurityPolicy
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directives
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.map(aDirective => aDirective.trim().split(" "))
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.filter(aList => aList.length > 1)
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// we only restrict on requiredDirectives
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.filter(aList => (requiredDirectives.indexOf(aList[0]) != -1))
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.forEach(aList => {
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// aList[0] contains the directive name.
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// aList[1..n] contains sources.
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let directiveName = aList.shift();
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let sources = aList;
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if ((-1 == validDirectives.indexOf(directiveName))) {
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validDirectives.push(directiveName);
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}
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whiteList.push(...sources.filter(
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// 'self' is checked separately during manifest check
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aSource => (aSource !="'self'" && whiteList.indexOf(aSource) == -1)
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));
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});
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// Check if all required directives are present.
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isValid = requiredDirectives.length === validDirectives.length;
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if (!isValid) {
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debug("White list doesn't contain all required directives!");
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whiteList = [];
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}
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}
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debug("White list contains " + whiteList.length + " hosts");
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return { list: whiteList, valid: isValid };
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},
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/**
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* Verify that the given csp is valid:
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* 1. contains required directives "script-src" and "style-src"
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* 2. required directives contain only "https" URLs
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* 3. domains of the restricted sources exist in the CA pinning database
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*/
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verifyCSPWhiteList: function(aCsp) {
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let domainWhitelist = this.getCSPWhiteList(aCsp);
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if (!domainWhitelist.valid) {
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debug("TRUSTED_APPLICATION_WHITELIST_PARSING_FAILED");
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return false;
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}
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if (!domainWhitelist.list.every(aUrl => this.isHostPinned(aUrl))) {
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debug("TRUSTED_APPLICATION_WHITELIST_VALIDATION_FAILED");
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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},
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_verifySignedFile: function(aManifestStream, aSignatureStream, aCertDb) {
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let deferred = Promise.defer();
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let root = Ci.nsIX509CertDB.TrustedHostedAppPublicRoot;
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try {
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// Check if we should use the test certificates.
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// Please note that this should be changed if we ever allow chages to the
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// prefs since that would create a way for an attacker to use the test
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// root for real apps.
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let useTrustedAppTestCerts = Services.prefs
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.getBoolPref("dom.mozApps.use_trustedapp_test_certs");
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if (useTrustedAppTestCerts) {
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root = Ci.nsIX509CertDB.TrustedHostedAppTestRoot;
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}
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} catch (ex) { }
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aCertDb.verifySignedManifestAsync(
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root, aManifestStream, aSignatureStream,
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function(aRv, aCert) {
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debug("Signature verification returned code, cert & root: " + aRv + " " + aCert + " " + root);
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if (Components.isSuccessCode(aRv)) {
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deferred.resolve(aCert);
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} else if (aRv == Cr.NS_ERROR_FILE_CORRUPTED ||
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aRv == Cr.NS_ERROR_SIGNED_MANIFEST_FILE_INVALID) {
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deferred.reject("MANIFEST_SIGNATURE_FILE_INVALID");
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} else {
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deferred.reject("MANIFEST_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERROR");
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}
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}
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);
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return deferred.promise;
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},
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verifySignedManifest: function(aApp, aAppId) {
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let deferred = Promise.defer();
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let certDb;
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try {
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certDb = Cc["@mozilla.org/security/x509certdb;1"]
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.getService(Ci.nsIX509CertDB);
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} catch (e) {
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debug("nsIX509CertDB error: " + e);
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// unrecoverable error, don't bug the user
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throw "CERTDB_ERROR";
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}
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let principal = Services.scriptSecurityManager.getAppCodebasePrincipal(
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aApp.origin, aApp.localId, false);
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let mRequestChannel = NetUtil.newChannel2(aApp.manifestURL,
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null,
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null,
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null, // aLoadingNode
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principal,
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null, // aTriggeringPrincipal
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Ci.nsILoadInfo.SEC_NORMAL,
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Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_OTHER)
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.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIHttpChannel);
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mRequestChannel.loadFlags |= Ci.nsIRequest.INHIBIT_CACHING;
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mRequestChannel.notificationCallbacks =
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AppsUtils.createLoadContext(aAppId, false);
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// The manifest signature must be located at the same path as the
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// manifest and have the same file name, only the file extension
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// should differ. Any fragment or query parameter will be ignored.
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let signatureURL;
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try {
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let mURL = Cc["@mozilla.org/network/io-service;1"]
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.getService(Ci.nsIIOService)
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.newURI(aApp.manifestURL, null, null)
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.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIURL);
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signatureURL = mURL.prePath +
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mURL.directory + mURL.fileBaseName + signatureFileExtension;
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} catch(e) {
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deferred.reject("SIGNATURE_PATH_INVALID");
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return;
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}
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let sRequestChannel = NetUtil.newChannel2(signatureURL,
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null,
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null,
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null, // aLoadingNode
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principal,
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null, // aTriggeringPrincipal
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Ci.nsILoadInfo.SEC_NORMAL,
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Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_OTHER)
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.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIHttpChannel);
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sRequestChannel.loadFlags |= Ci.nsIRequest.INHIBIT_CACHING;
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sRequestChannel.notificationCallbacks =
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AppsUtils.createLoadContext(aAppId, false);
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let getAsyncFetchCallback = (resolve, reject) =>
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(aInputStream, aResult) => {
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if (!Components.isSuccessCode(aResult)) {
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debug("Failed to download file");
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reject("MANIFEST_FILE_UNAVAILABLE");
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return;
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}
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resolve(aInputStream);
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};
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Promise.all([
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new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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NetUtil.asyncFetch2(mRequestChannel,
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getAsyncFetchCallback(resolve, reject));
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}),
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new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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NetUtil.asyncFetch2(sRequestChannel,
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getAsyncFetchCallback(resolve, reject));
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})
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]).then(([aManifestStream, aSignatureStream]) => {
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this._verifySignedFile(aManifestStream, aSignatureStream, certDb)
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.then(deferred.resolve, deferred.reject);
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}, deferred.reject);
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return deferred.promise;
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},
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verifyManifest: function(aApp, aAppId, aManifest) {
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return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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// sanity check on manifest host's CA (proper CA check with
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// pinning is done by regular networking code)
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if (!this.isHostPinned(aApp.manifestURL)) {
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reject("TRUSTED_APPLICATION_HOST_CERTIFICATE_INVALID");
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return;
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}
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if (!this.verifyCSPWhiteList(aManifest.csp)) {
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reject("TRUSTED_APPLICATION_WHITELIST_VALIDATION_FAILED");
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return;
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}
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this.verifySignedManifest(aApp, aAppId).then(resolve, reject);
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});
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}
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};
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