gecko-dev/dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp
Christoph Kerschbaumer d65faafb09 Bug 1509738: CSP snapshot nonce at load start time. r=baku
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : ea232b7a3aeae9c18895e885d1536ca58c8de1bd
extra : amend_source : b0c351f8c0c1a5eb7865a735f8dc5bafb42384f1
2019-02-13 20:45:29 +01:00

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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include <string>
#include <unordered_set>
#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
#include "nsContentPolicyUtils.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsCSPContext.h"
#include "nsCSPParser.h"
#include "nsCSPService.h"
#include "nsError.h"
#include "nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback.h"
#include "nsIClassInfoImpl.h"
#include "nsIDocShell.h"
#include "nsIDocShellTreeItem.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
#include "nsIHttpChannel.h"
#include "nsIInterfaceRequestor.h"
#include "nsIInterfaceRequestorUtils.h"
#include "nsIObjectInputStream.h"
#include "nsIObjectOutputStream.h"
#include "nsIObserver.h"
#include "nsIObserverService.h"
#include "nsIStringStream.h"
#include "nsISupportsPrimitives.h"
#include "nsIUploadChannel.h"
#include "nsIURIMutator.h"
#include "nsIScriptError.h"
#include "nsIWebNavigation.h"
#include "nsMimeTypes.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
#include "nsIContentPolicy.h"
#include "nsSupportsPrimitives.h"
#include "nsThreadUtils.h"
#include "nsString.h"
#include "nsScriptSecurityManager.h"
#include "nsStringStream.h"
#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/CSPReportBinding.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/CSPDictionariesBinding.h"
#include "mozilla/ipc/PBackgroundSharedTypes.h"
#include "mozilla/net/ReferrerPolicy.h"
#include "nsINetworkInterceptController.h"
#include "nsSandboxFlags.h"
#include "nsIScriptElement.h"
#include "nsIEventTarget.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/DocGroup.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Element.h"
#include "nsXULAppAPI.h"
using namespace mozilla;
using namespace mozilla::dom;
static LogModule* GetCspContextLog() {
static LazyLogModule gCspContextPRLog("CSPContext");
return gCspContextPRLog;
}
#define CSPCONTEXTLOG(args) \
MOZ_LOG(GetCspContextLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, args)
#define CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED() \
MOZ_LOG_TEST(GetCspContextLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug)
static const uint32_t CSP_CACHE_URI_CUTOFF_SIZE = 512;
#ifdef DEBUG
/**
* This function is only used for verification purposes within
* GatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData.
*/
static bool ValidateDirectiveName(const nsAString& aDirective) {
static const auto directives = []() {
std::unordered_set<std::string> directives;
constexpr size_t dirLen =
sizeof(CSPStrDirectives) / sizeof(CSPStrDirectives[0]);
for (size_t i = 0; i < dirLen; ++i) {
directives.insert(CSPStrDirectives[i]);
}
return directives;
}();
nsAutoString directive(aDirective);
auto itr = directives.find(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(directive).get());
return itr != directives.end();
}
#endif // DEBUG
static void BlockedContentSourceToString(
nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource aSource, nsACString& aString) {
switch (aSource) {
case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eUnknown:
aString.Truncate();
break;
case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eInline:
aString.AssignLiteral("inline");
break;
case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eEval:
aString.AssignLiteral("eval");
break;
case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eSelf:
aString.AssignLiteral("self");
break;
}
}
/* ===== nsIContentSecurityPolicy impl ====== */
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad(nsContentPolicyType aContentType,
nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsIURI* aRequestOrigin,
nsISupports* aRequestContext,
const nsACString& aMimeTypeGuess,
nsIURI* aOriginalURIIfRedirect,
bool aSendViolationReports, const nsAString& aNonce,
int16_t* outDecision) {
if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) {
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad, aContentLocation: %s",
aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
CSPCONTEXTLOG((">>>> aContentType: %d", aContentType));
}
bool isPreload = nsContentUtils::IsPreloadType(aContentType);
// Since we know whether we are dealing with a preload, we have to convert
// the internal policytype ot the external policy type before moving on.
// We still need to know if this is a worker so child-src can handle that
// case correctly.
aContentType =
nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternalOrWorker(aContentType);
// This ShouldLoad function is called from nsCSPService::ShouldLoad,
// which already checked a number of things, including:
// * aContentLocation is not null; we can consume this without further checks
// * scheme is not a whitelisted scheme (about: chrome:, etc).
// * CSP is enabled
// * Content Type is not whitelisted (CSP Reports, TYPE_DOCUMENT, etc).
// * Fast Path for Apps
// Default decision, CSP can revise it if there's a policy to enforce
*outDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
// If the content type doesn't map to a CSP directive, there's nothing for
// CSP to do.
CSPDirective dir = CSP_ContentTypeToDirective(aContentType);
if (dir == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::NO_DIRECTIVE) {
return NS_OK;
}
bool parserCreated = false;
if (!isPreload) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptElement> script = do_QueryInterface(aRequestContext);
if (script && script->GetParserCreated() != mozilla::dom::NOT_FROM_PARSER) {
parserCreated = true;
}
}
bool permitted =
permitsInternal(dir,
nullptr, // aTriggeringElement
aCSPEventListener, aContentLocation,
aOriginalURIIfRedirect, aNonce, isPreload,
false, // allow fallback to default-src
aSendViolationReports,
true, // send blocked URI in violation reports
parserCreated);
*outDecision =
permitted ? nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT : nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_SERVER;
if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) {
CSPCONTEXTLOG(
("nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad, decision: %s, "
"aContentLocation: %s",
*outDecision > 0 ? "load" : "deny",
aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
}
return NS_OK;
}
bool nsCSPContext::permitsInternal(
CSPDirective aDir, Element* aTriggeringElement,
nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, nsIURI* aContentLocation,
nsIURI* aOriginalURIIfRedirect, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aIsPreload,
bool aSpecific, bool aSendViolationReports,
bool aSendContentLocationInViolationReports, bool aParserCreated) {
bool permits = true;
nsAutoString violatedDirective;
for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) {
if (!mPolicies[p]->permits(aDir, aContentLocation, aNonce,
!!aOriginalURIIfRedirect, aSpecific,
aParserCreated, violatedDirective)) {
// If the policy is violated and not report-only, reject the load and
// report to the console
if (!mPolicies[p]->getReportOnlyFlag()) {
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::permitsInternal, false"));
permits = false;
}
// Do not send a report or notify observers if this is a preload - the
// decision may be wrong due to the inability to get the nonce, and will
// incorrectly fail the unit tests.
if (!aIsPreload && aSendViolationReports) {
AsyncReportViolation(
aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener,
(aSendContentLocationInViolationReports ? aContentLocation
: nullptr),
BlockedContentSource::eUnknown, /* a BlockedContentSource */
aOriginalURIIfRedirect, /* in case of redirect originalURI is not
null */
violatedDirective, p, /* policy index */
EmptyString(), /* no observer subject */
EmptyString(), /* no source file */
EmptyString(), /* no script sample */
0, /* no line number */
0); /* no column number */
}
}
}
return permits;
}
/* ===== nsISupports implementation ========== */
NS_IMPL_CLASSINFO(nsCSPContext, nullptr, nsIClassInfo::MAIN_THREAD_ONLY,
NS_CSPCONTEXT_CID)
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS_CI(nsCSPContext, nsIContentSecurityPolicy, nsISerializable)
nsCSPContext::nsCSPContext()
: mInnerWindowID(0),
mLoadingContext(nullptr),
mLoadingPrincipal(nullptr),
mQueueUpMessages(true) {
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::nsCSPContext"));
}
nsCSPContext::~nsCSPContext() {
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::~nsCSPContext"));
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
delete mPolicies[i];
}
}
nsresult nsCSPContext::InitFromOther(nsCSPContext* aOtherContext,
Document* aDoc, nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) {
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aOtherContext);
nsresult rv = SetRequestContext(aDoc, aPrincipal);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
for (auto policy : aOtherContext->mPolicies) {
nsAutoString policyStr;
policy->toString(policyStr);
AppendPolicy(policyStr, policy->getReportOnlyFlag(),
policy->getDeliveredViaMetaTagFlag());
}
mIPCPolicies = aOtherContext->mIPCPolicies;
return NS_OK;
}
void nsCSPContext::SetIPCPolicies(
const nsTArray<mozilla::ipc::ContentSecurityPolicy>& aPolicies) {
mIPCPolicies = aPolicies;
}
void nsCSPContext::EnsureIPCPoliciesRead() {
if (mIPCPolicies.Length() > 0) {
nsresult rv;
for (auto& policy : mIPCPolicies) {
rv = AppendPolicy(policy.policy(), policy.reportOnlyFlag(),
policy.deliveredViaMetaTagFlag());
Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
}
mIPCPolicies.Clear();
}
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::GetPolicyString(uint32_t aIndex, nsAString& outStr) {
outStr.Truncate();
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
if (aIndex >= mPolicies.Length()) {
return NS_ERROR_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
}
mPolicies[aIndex]->toString(outStr);
return NS_OK;
}
const nsCSPPolicy* nsCSPContext::GetPolicy(uint32_t aIndex) {
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
if (aIndex >= mPolicies.Length()) {
return nullptr;
}
return mPolicies[aIndex];
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::GetPolicyCount(uint32_t* outPolicyCount) {
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
*outPolicyCount = mPolicies.Length();
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::GetUpgradeInsecureRequests(bool* outUpgradeRequest) {
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
*outUpgradeRequest = false;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
if (mPolicies[i]->hasDirective(
nsIContentSecurityPolicy::UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE)) {
*outUpgradeRequest = true;
return NS_OK;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::GetBlockAllMixedContent(bool* outBlockAllMixedContent) {
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
*outBlockAllMixedContent = false;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag() &&
mPolicies[i]->hasDirective(
nsIContentSecurityPolicy::BLOCK_ALL_MIXED_CONTENT)) {
*outBlockAllMixedContent = true;
return NS_OK;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::GetEnforcesFrameAncestors(bool* outEnforcesFrameAncestors) {
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
*outEnforcesFrameAncestors = false;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag() &&
mPolicies[i]->hasDirective(
nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_ANCESTORS_DIRECTIVE)) {
*outEnforcesFrameAncestors = true;
return NS_OK;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::AppendPolicy(const nsAString& aPolicyString, bool aReportOnly,
bool aDeliveredViaMetaTag) {
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::AppendPolicy: %s",
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPolicyString).get()));
// Use the mSelfURI from setRequestContext, see bug 991474
NS_ASSERTION(mSelfURI, "mSelfURI required for AppendPolicy, but not set");
nsCSPPolicy* policy = nsCSPParser::parseContentSecurityPolicy(
aPolicyString, mSelfURI, aReportOnly, this, aDeliveredViaMetaTag);
if (policy) {
if (policy->hasDirective(
nsIContentSecurityPolicy::UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE)) {
nsAutoCString selfURIspec, referrer;
if (mSelfURI) {
mSelfURI->GetAsciiSpec(selfURIspec);
}
referrer = NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mReferrer);
CSPCONTEXTLOG(
("nsCSPContext::AppendPolicy added UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE "
"self-uri=%s referrer=%s",
selfURIspec.get(), referrer.get()));
}
mPolicies.AppendElement(policy);
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::GetAllowsEval(bool* outShouldReportViolation,
bool* outAllowsEval) {
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
*outShouldReportViolation = false;
*outAllowsEval = true;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
if (!mPolicies[i]->allows(nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT, CSP_UNSAFE_EVAL,
EmptyString(), false)) {
// policy is violated: must report the violation and allow the inline
// script if the policy is report-only.
*outShouldReportViolation = true;
if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) {
*outAllowsEval = false;
}
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
// Helper function to report inline violations
void nsCSPContext::reportInlineViolation(
nsContentPolicyType aContentType, Element* aTriggeringElement,
nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, const nsAString& aNonce,
const nsAString& aContent, const nsAString& aViolatedDirective,
uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex, // TODO, use report only flag for that
uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber) {
nsString observerSubject;
// if the nonce is non empty, then we report the nonce error, otherwise
// let's report the hash error; no need to report the unsafe-inline error
// anymore.
if (!aNonce.IsEmpty()) {
observerSubject =
(aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT)
? NS_LITERAL_STRING(SCRIPT_NONCE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC)
: NS_LITERAL_STRING(STYLE_NONCE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
} else {
observerSubject =
(aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT)
? NS_LITERAL_STRING(SCRIPT_HASH_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC)
: NS_LITERAL_STRING(STYLE_HASH_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
}
// use selfURI as the sourceFile
nsAutoCString sourceFile;
if (mSelfURI) {
mSelfURI->GetSpec(sourceFile);
}
AsyncReportViolation(aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener,
nullptr, // aBlockedURI
BlockedContentSource::eInline, // aBlockedSource
mSelfURI, // aOriginalURI
aViolatedDirective, // aViolatedDirective
aViolatedPolicyIndex, // aViolatedPolicyIndex
observerSubject, // aObserverSubject
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(sourceFile), // aSourceFile
aContent, // aScriptSample
aLineNumber, // aLineNum
aColumnNumber); // aColumnNum
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::GetAllowsInline(nsContentPolicyType aContentType,
const nsAString& aNonce, bool aParserCreated,
Element* aTriggeringElement,
nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
const nsAString& aContentOfPseudoScript,
uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber,
bool* outAllowsInline) {
*outAllowsInline = true;
MOZ_ASSERT(
aContentType ==
nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternal(aContentType),
"We should only see external content policy types here.");
if (aContentType != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT &&
aContentType != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET) {
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "can only allow inline for script or style");
return NS_OK;
}
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
nsAutoString content(EmptyString());
// always iterate all policies, otherwise we might not send out all reports
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
bool allowed =
mPolicies[i]->allows(aContentType, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE, EmptyString(),
aParserCreated) ||
mPolicies[i]->allows(aContentType, CSP_NONCE, aNonce, aParserCreated);
// If the inlined script or style is allowed by either unsafe-inline or the
// nonce, go ahead and shortcut this loop so we can avoid allocating
// unecessary strings
if (allowed) {
continue;
}
// Check the content length to ensure the content is not allocated more than
// once. Even though we are in a for loop, it is probable that there is only
// one policy, so this check may be unnecessary.
if (content.IsEmpty() && aTriggeringElement) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptElement> element =
do_QueryInterface(aTriggeringElement);
if (element) {
element->GetScriptText(content);
}
}
if (content.IsEmpty()) {
content = aContentOfPseudoScript;
}
allowed =
mPolicies[i]->allows(aContentType, CSP_HASH, content, aParserCreated);
if (!allowed) {
// policy is violoated: deny the load unless policy is report only and
// report the violation.
if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) {
*outAllowsInline = false;
}
nsAutoString violatedDirective;
bool reportSample = false;
mPolicies[i]->getDirectiveStringAndReportSampleForContentType(
aContentType, violatedDirective, &reportSample);
reportInlineViolation(aContentType, aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener,
aNonce, reportSample ? content : EmptyString(),
violatedDirective, i, aLineNumber, aColumnNumber);
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
/**
* Reduces some code repetition for the various logging situations in
* LogViolationDetails.
*
* Call-sites for the eval/inline checks recieve two return values: allows
* and violates. Based on those, they must choose whether to call
* LogViolationDetails or not. Policies that are report-only allow the
* loads/compilations but violations should still be reported. Not all
* policies in this nsIContentSecurityPolicy instance will be violated,
* which is why we must check allows() again here.
*
* Note: This macro uses some parameters from its caller's context:
* p, mPolicies, this, aSourceFile, aScriptSample, aLineNum, aColumnNum,
* blockedContentSource
*
* @param violationType: the VIOLATION_TYPE_* constant (partial symbol)
* such as INLINE_SCRIPT
* @param contentPolicyType: a constant from nsIContentPolicy such as
* TYPE_STYLESHEET
* @param nonceOrHash: for NONCE and HASH violations, it's the nonce or content
* string. For other violations, it is an empty string.
* @param keyword: the keyword corresponding to violation (UNSAFE_INLINE for
* most)
* @param observerTopic: the observer topic string to send with the CSP
* observer notifications.
*
* Please note that inline violations for scripts are reported within
* GetAllowsInline() and do not call this macro, hence we can pass 'false'
* as the argument _aParserCreated_ to allows().
*/
#define CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(violationType, contentPolicyType, nonceOrHash, \
keyword, observerTopic) \
case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_##violationType: \
PR_BEGIN_MACRO \
if (!mPolicies[p]->allows(nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_##contentPolicyType, \
keyword, nonceOrHash, false)) { \
nsAutoString violatedDirective; \
bool reportSample = false; \
mPolicies[p]->getDirectiveStringAndReportSampleForContentType( \
nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_##contentPolicyType, violatedDirective, \
&reportSample); \
AsyncReportViolation(aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener, nullptr, \
blockedContentSource, nullptr, violatedDirective, \
p, NS_LITERAL_STRING(observerTopic), aSourceFile, \
reportSample ? aScriptSample : EmptyString(), \
aLineNum, aColumnNum); \
} \
PR_END_MACRO; \
break
/**
* For each policy, log any violation on the Error Console and send a report
* if a report-uri is present in the policy
*
* @param aViolationType
* one of the VIOLATION_TYPE_* constants, e.g. inline-script or eval
* @param aSourceFile
* name of the source file containing the violation (if available)
* @param aContentSample
* sample of the violating content (to aid debugging)
* @param aLineNum
* source line number of the violation (if available)
* @param aColumnNum
* source column number of the violation (if available)
* @param aNonce
* (optional) If this is a nonce violation, include the nonce so we can
* recheck to determine which policies were violated and send the
* appropriate reports.
* @param aContent
* (optional) If this is a hash violation, include contents of the inline
* resource in the question so we can recheck the hash in order to
* determine which policies were violated and send the appropriate
* reports.
*/
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::LogViolationDetails(
uint16_t aViolationType, Element* aTriggeringElement,
nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, const nsAString& aSourceFile,
const nsAString& aScriptSample, int32_t aLineNum, int32_t aColumnNum,
const nsAString& aNonce, const nsAString& aContent) {
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) {
NS_ASSERTION(mPolicies[p], "null pointer in nsTArray<nsCSPPolicy>");
BlockedContentSource blockedContentSource = BlockedContentSource::eUnknown;
if (aViolationType == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_EVAL) {
blockedContentSource = BlockedContentSource::eEval;
} else if (aViolationType ==
nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_INLINE_SCRIPT ||
aViolationType ==
nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_INLINE_STYLE) {
blockedContentSource = BlockedContentSource::eInline;
} else {
// All the other types should have a URL, but just in case, let's use
// 'self' here.
blockedContentSource = BlockedContentSource::eSelf;
}
switch (aViolationType) {
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(EVAL, SCRIPT, NS_LITERAL_STRING(""),
CSP_UNSAFE_EVAL, EVAL_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(INLINE_STYLE, STYLESHEET, NS_LITERAL_STRING(""),
CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
INLINE_STYLE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(INLINE_SCRIPT, SCRIPT, NS_LITERAL_STRING(""),
CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
INLINE_SCRIPT_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(NONCE_SCRIPT, SCRIPT, aNonce, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
SCRIPT_NONCE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(NONCE_STYLE, STYLESHEET, aNonce, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
STYLE_NONCE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(HASH_SCRIPT, SCRIPT, aContent, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
SCRIPT_HASH_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(HASH_STYLE, STYLESHEET, aContent, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
STYLE_HASH_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(REQUIRE_SRI_FOR_STYLE, STYLESHEET,
NS_LITERAL_STRING(""), CSP_REQUIRE_SRI_FOR,
REQUIRE_SRI_STYLE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(REQUIRE_SRI_FOR_SCRIPT, SCRIPT,
NS_LITERAL_STRING(""), CSP_REQUIRE_SRI_FOR,
REQUIRE_SRI_SCRIPT_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
default:
NS_ASSERTION(false, "LogViolationDetails with invalid type");
break;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
#undef CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::SetRequestContext(Document* aDocument, nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) {
MOZ_ASSERT(aDocument || aPrincipal,
"Can't set context without doc or principal");
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aDocument || aPrincipal);
if (aDocument) {
mLoadingContext = do_GetWeakReference(aDocument);
mSelfURI = aDocument->GetDocumentURI();
mLoadingPrincipal = aDocument->NodePrincipal();
aDocument->GetReferrer(mReferrer);
mInnerWindowID = aDocument->InnerWindowID();
// the innerWindowID is not available for CSPs delivered through the
// header at the time setReqeustContext is called - let's queue up
// console messages until it becomes available, see flushConsoleMessages
mQueueUpMessages = !mInnerWindowID;
mCallingChannelLoadGroup = aDocument->GetDocumentLoadGroup();
// set the flag on the document for CSP telemetry
aDocument->SetHasCSP(true);
mEventTarget = aDocument->EventTargetFor(TaskCategory::Other);
} else {
CSPCONTEXTLOG(
("No Document in SetRequestContext; can not query loadgroup; sending "
"reports may fail."));
mLoadingPrincipal = aPrincipal;
mLoadingPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(mSelfURI));
// if no document is available, then it also does not make sense to queue
// console messages sending messages to the browser conolse instead of the
// web console in that case.
mQueueUpMessages = false;
}
NS_ASSERTION(
mSelfURI,
"mSelfURI not available, can not translate 'self' into actual URI");
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::EnsureEventTarget(nsIEventTarget* aEventTarget) {
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aEventTarget);
// Don't bother if we did have a valid event target (if the csp object is
// tied to a document in SetRequestContext)
if (mEventTarget) {
return NS_OK;
}
mEventTarget = aEventTarget;
return NS_OK;
}
struct ConsoleMsgQueueElem {
nsString mMsg;
nsString mSourceName;
nsString mSourceLine;
uint32_t mLineNumber;
uint32_t mColumnNumber;
uint32_t mSeverityFlag;
nsCString mCategory;
};
void nsCSPContext::flushConsoleMessages() {
bool privateWindow = false;
// should flush messages even if doc is not available
nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
if (doc) {
mInnerWindowID = doc->InnerWindowID();
privateWindow =
!!doc->NodePrincipal()->OriginAttributesRef().mPrivateBrowsingId;
}
mQueueUpMessages = false;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mConsoleMsgQueue.Length(); i++) {
ConsoleMsgQueueElem& elem = mConsoleMsgQueue[i];
CSP_LogMessage(elem.mMsg, elem.mSourceName, elem.mSourceLine,
elem.mLineNumber, elem.mColumnNumber, elem.mSeverityFlag,
elem.mCategory, mInnerWindowID, privateWindow);
}
mConsoleMsgQueue.Clear();
}
void nsCSPContext::logToConsole(const char* aName, const char16_t** aParams,
uint32_t aParamsLength,
const nsAString& aSourceName,
const nsAString& aSourceLine,
uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber,
uint32_t aSeverityFlag) {
// we are passing aName as the category so we can link to the
// appropriate MDN docs depending on the specific error.
nsDependentCString category(aName);
// let's check if we have to queue up console messages
if (mQueueUpMessages) {
nsAutoString msg;
CSP_GetLocalizedStr(aName, aParams, aParamsLength, msg);
ConsoleMsgQueueElem& elem = *mConsoleMsgQueue.AppendElement();
elem.mMsg = msg;
elem.mSourceName = PromiseFlatString(aSourceName);
elem.mSourceLine = PromiseFlatString(aSourceLine);
elem.mLineNumber = aLineNumber;
elem.mColumnNumber = aColumnNumber;
elem.mSeverityFlag = aSeverityFlag;
elem.mCategory = category;
return;
}
bool privateWindow = false;
nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
if (doc) {
privateWindow =
!!doc->NodePrincipal()->OriginAttributesRef().mPrivateBrowsingId;
}
CSP_LogLocalizedStr(aName, aParams, aParamsLength, aSourceName, aSourceLine,
aLineNumber, aColumnNumber, aSeverityFlag, category,
mInnerWindowID, privateWindow);
}
/**
* Strip URI for reporting according to:
* http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP/#violation-reports
*
* @param aURI
* The uri to be stripped for reporting
* @param aSelfURI
* The uri of the protected resource
* which is needed to enforce the SOP.
* @return ASCII serialization of the uri to be reported.
*/
void StripURIForReporting(nsIURI* aURI, nsIURI* aSelfURI,
nsACString& outStrippedURI) {
// 1) If the origin of uri is a globally unique identifier (for example,
// aURI has a scheme of data, blob, or filesystem), then return the
// ASCII serialization of uris scheme.
bool isHttpFtpOrWs =
(NS_SUCCEEDED(aURI->SchemeIs("http", &isHttpFtpOrWs)) && isHttpFtpOrWs) ||
(NS_SUCCEEDED(aURI->SchemeIs("https", &isHttpFtpOrWs)) &&
isHttpFtpOrWs) ||
(NS_SUCCEEDED(aURI->SchemeIs("ftp", &isHttpFtpOrWs)) && isHttpFtpOrWs) ||
(NS_SUCCEEDED(aURI->SchemeIs("ws", &isHttpFtpOrWs)) && isHttpFtpOrWs) ||
(NS_SUCCEEDED(aURI->SchemeIs("wss", &isHttpFtpOrWs)) && isHttpFtpOrWs);
if (!isHttpFtpOrWs) {
// not strictly spec compliant, but what we really care about is
// http/https and also ftp. If it's not http/https or ftp, then treat aURI
// as if it's a globally unique identifier and just return the scheme.
aURI->GetScheme(outStrippedURI);
return;
}
// Return uri, with any fragment component removed.
aURI->GetSpecIgnoringRef(outStrippedURI);
}
nsresult nsCSPContext::GatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData(
nsIURI* aBlockedURI, const nsACString& aBlockedString, nsIURI* aOriginalURI,
nsAString& aViolatedDirective, uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex,
nsAString& aSourceFile, nsAString& aScriptSample, uint32_t aLineNum,
uint32_t aColumnNum,
mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& aViolationEventInit) {
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
NS_ENSURE_ARG_MAX(aViolatedPolicyIndex, mPolicies.Length() - 1);
MOZ_ASSERT(ValidateDirectiveName(aViolatedDirective),
"Invalid directive name");
nsresult rv;
// document-uri
nsAutoCString reportDocumentURI;
StripURIForReporting(mSelfURI, mSelfURI, reportDocumentURI);
aViolationEventInit.mDocumentURI = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(reportDocumentURI);
// referrer
aViolationEventInit.mReferrer = mReferrer;
// blocked-uri
if (aBlockedURI) {
nsAutoCString reportBlockedURI;
StripURIForReporting(aOriginalURI ? aOriginalURI : aBlockedURI, mSelfURI,
reportBlockedURI);
aViolationEventInit.mBlockedURI = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(reportBlockedURI);
} else {
aViolationEventInit.mBlockedURI = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(aBlockedString);
}
// effective-directive
// The name of the policy directive that was violated.
aViolationEventInit.mEffectiveDirective = aViolatedDirective;
// violated-directive
// In CSP2, the policy directive that was violated, as it appears in the
// policy. In CSP3, the same as effective-directive.
aViolationEventInit.mViolatedDirective = aViolatedDirective;
// original-policy
nsAutoString originalPolicy;
rv = this->GetPolicyString(aViolatedPolicyIndex, originalPolicy);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
aViolationEventInit.mOriginalPolicy = originalPolicy;
// source-file
if (!aSourceFile.IsEmpty()) {
// if aSourceFile is a URI, we have to make sure to strip fragments
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> sourceURI;
NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(sourceURI), aSourceFile);
if (sourceURI) {
nsAutoCString spec;
sourceURI->GetSpecIgnoringRef(spec);
aSourceFile = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(spec);
}
aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile = aSourceFile;
}
// sample, max 40 chars.
aViolationEventInit.mSample = aScriptSample;
uint32_t length = aViolationEventInit.mSample.Length();
if (length > ScriptSampleMaxLength()) {
uint32_t desiredLength = ScriptSampleMaxLength();
// Don't cut off right before a low surrogate. Just include it.
if (NS_IS_LOW_SURROGATE(aViolationEventInit.mSample[desiredLength])) {
desiredLength++;
}
aViolationEventInit.mSample.Replace(ScriptSampleMaxLength(),
length - desiredLength,
nsContentUtils::GetLocalizedEllipsis());
}
// disposition
aViolationEventInit.mDisposition =
mPolicies[aViolatedPolicyIndex]->getReportOnlyFlag()
? mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventDisposition::Report
: mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventDisposition::Enforce;
// status-code
uint16_t statusCode = 0;
{
nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
if (doc) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> channel = do_QueryInterface(doc->GetChannel());
if (channel) {
uint32_t responseStatus = 0;
nsresult rv = channel->GetResponseStatus(&responseStatus);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && (responseStatus <= UINT16_MAX)) {
statusCode = static_cast<uint16_t>(responseStatus);
}
}
}
}
aViolationEventInit.mStatusCode = statusCode;
// line-number
aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber = aLineNum;
// column-number
aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber = aColumnNum;
aViolationEventInit.mBubbles = true;
aViolationEventInit.mComposed = true;
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult nsCSPContext::SendReports(
const mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& aViolationEventInit,
uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex) {
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
NS_ENSURE_ARG_MAX(aViolatedPolicyIndex, mPolicies.Length() - 1);
dom::CSPReport report;
// blocked-uri
report.mCsp_report.mBlocked_uri = aViolationEventInit.mBlockedURI;
// document-uri
report.mCsp_report.mDocument_uri = aViolationEventInit.mDocumentURI;
// original-policy
report.mCsp_report.mOriginal_policy = aViolationEventInit.mOriginalPolicy;
// referrer
report.mCsp_report.mReferrer = aViolationEventInit.mReferrer;
// violated-directive
report.mCsp_report.mViolated_directive =
aViolationEventInit.mViolatedDirective;
// source-file
if (!aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile.IsEmpty()) {
report.mCsp_report.mSource_file.Construct();
report.mCsp_report.mSource_file.Value() = aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile;
}
// script-sample
if (!aViolationEventInit.mSample.IsEmpty()) {
report.mCsp_report.mScript_sample.Construct();
report.mCsp_report.mScript_sample.Value() = aViolationEventInit.mSample;
}
// line-number
if (aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber != 0) {
report.mCsp_report.mLine_number.Construct();
report.mCsp_report.mLine_number.Value() = aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber;
}
if (aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber != 0) {
report.mCsp_report.mColumn_number.Construct();
report.mCsp_report.mColumn_number.Value() =
aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber;
}
nsString csp_report;
if (!report.ToJSON(csp_report)) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
// ---------- Assembled, now send it to all the report URIs ----------- //
nsTArray<nsString> reportURIs;
mPolicies[aViolatedPolicyIndex]->getReportURIs(reportURIs);
nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> reportURI;
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> reportChannel;
nsresult rv;
for (uint32_t r = 0; r < reportURIs.Length(); r++) {
nsAutoCString reportURICstring = NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(reportURIs[r]);
// try to create a new uri from every report-uri string
rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(reportURI), reportURIs[r]);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
const char16_t* params[] = {reportURIs[r].get()};
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("Could not create nsIURI for report URI %s",
reportURICstring.get()));
logToConsole("triedToSendReport", params, ArrayLength(params),
aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile, aViolationEventInit.mSample,
aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber,
aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber,
nsIScriptError::errorFlag);
continue; // don't return yet, there may be more URIs
}
// try to create a new channel for every report-uri
nsLoadFlags loadFlags =
nsIRequest::LOAD_NORMAL | nsIChannel::LOAD_CLASSIFY_URI;
if (doc) {
rv = NS_NewChannel(getter_AddRefs(reportChannel), reportURI, doc,
nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_NULL,
nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT,
nullptr, // aPerformanceStorage
nullptr, // aLoadGroup
nullptr, // aCallbacks
loadFlags);
} else {
rv = NS_NewChannel(getter_AddRefs(reportChannel), reportURI,
mLoadingPrincipal,
nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_NULL,
nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT,
nullptr, // PerformanceStorage
nullptr, // aLoadGroup
nullptr, // aCallbacks
loadFlags);
}
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("Could not create new channel for report URI %s",
reportURICstring.get()));
continue; // don't return yet, there may be more URIs
}
// log a warning to console if scheme is not http or https
bool isHttpScheme =
(NS_SUCCEEDED(reportURI->SchemeIs("http", &isHttpScheme)) &&
isHttpScheme) ||
(NS_SUCCEEDED(reportURI->SchemeIs("https", &isHttpScheme)) &&
isHttpScheme);
if (!isHttpScheme) {
const char16_t* params[] = {reportURIs[r].get()};
logToConsole("reportURInotHttpsOrHttp2", params, ArrayLength(params),
aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile, aViolationEventInit.mSample,
aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber,
aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber,
nsIScriptError::errorFlag);
continue;
}
// make sure this is an anonymous request (no cookies) so in case the
// policy URI is injected, it can't be abused for CSRF.
nsLoadFlags flags;
rv = reportChannel->GetLoadFlags(&flags);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
flags |= nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS;
rv = reportChannel->SetLoadFlags(flags);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// we need to set an nsIChannelEventSink on the channel object
// so we can tell it to not follow redirects when posting the reports
RefPtr<CSPReportRedirectSink> reportSink = new CSPReportRedirectSink();
if (doc && doc->GetDocShell()) {
nsCOMPtr<nsINetworkInterceptController> interceptController =
do_QueryInterface(doc->GetDocShell());
reportSink->SetInterceptController(interceptController);
}
reportChannel->SetNotificationCallbacks(reportSink);
// apply the loadgroup from the channel taken by setRequestContext. If
// there's no loadgroup, AsyncOpen will fail on process-split necko (since
// the channel cannot query the iTabChild).
rv = reportChannel->SetLoadGroup(mCallingChannelLoadGroup);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// wire in the string input stream to send the report
nsCOMPtr<nsIStringInputStream> sis(
do_CreateInstance(NS_STRINGINPUTSTREAM_CONTRACTID));
NS_ASSERTION(sis,
"nsIStringInputStream is needed but not available to send CSP "
"violation reports");
nsAutoCString utf8CSPReport = NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(csp_report);
rv = sis->SetData(utf8CSPReport.get(), utf8CSPReport.Length());
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
nsCOMPtr<nsIUploadChannel> uploadChannel(do_QueryInterface(reportChannel));
if (!uploadChannel) {
// It's possible the URI provided can't be uploaded to, in which case
// we skip this one. We'll already have warned about a non-HTTP URI
// earlier.
continue;
}
rv = uploadChannel->SetUploadStream(
sis, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("application/csp-report"), -1);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// if this is an HTTP channel, set the request method to post
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel(do_QueryInterface(reportChannel));
if (httpChannel) {
rv = httpChannel->SetRequestMethod(NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("POST"));
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
}
RefPtr<CSPViolationReportListener> listener =
new CSPViolationReportListener();
rv = reportChannel->AsyncOpen(listener);
// AsyncOpen should not fail, but could if there's no load group (like if
// SetRequestContext is not given a channel). This should fail quietly and
// not return an error since it's really ok if reports don't go out, but
// it's good to log the error locally.
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
const char16_t* params[] = {reportURIs[r].get()};
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("AsyncOpen failed for report URI %s",
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(params[0]).get()));
logToConsole("triedToSendReport", params, ArrayLength(params),
aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile, aViolationEventInit.mSample,
aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber,
aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber,
nsIScriptError::errorFlag);
} else {
CSPCONTEXTLOG(
("Sent violation report to URI %s", reportURICstring.get()));
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult nsCSPContext::FireViolationEvent(
Element* aTriggeringElement, nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
const mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& aViolationEventInit) {
if (aCSPEventListener) {
nsAutoString json;
if (aViolationEventInit.ToJSON(json)) {
aCSPEventListener->OnCSPViolationEvent(json);
}
}
// 1. If target is not null, and global is a Window, and targets
// shadow-including root is not globals associated Document, set target to
// null.
RefPtr<EventTarget> eventTarget = aTriggeringElement;
nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
if (doc && aTriggeringElement &&
aTriggeringElement->GetComposedDoc() != doc) {
eventTarget = nullptr;
}
if (!eventTarget) {
// If target is a Window, set target to targets associated Document.
eventTarget = doc;
}
if (!eventTarget) {
// If we are here, we are probably dealing with workers. Those are handled
// via nsICSPEventListener. Nothing to do here.
return NS_OK;
}
RefPtr<mozilla::dom::Event> event =
mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEvent::Constructor(
eventTarget, NS_LITERAL_STRING("securitypolicyviolation"),
aViolationEventInit);
event->SetTrusted(true);
ErrorResult rv;
eventTarget->DispatchEvent(*event, rv);
return rv.StealNSResult();
}
/**
* Dispatched from the main thread to send reports for one CSP violation.
*/
class CSPReportSenderRunnable final : public Runnable {
public:
CSPReportSenderRunnable(
Element* aTriggeringElement, nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
nsIURI* aBlockedURI,
nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource aBlockedContentSource,
nsIURI* aOriginalURI, uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex, bool aReportOnlyFlag,
const nsAString& aViolatedDirective, const nsAString& aObserverSubject,
const nsAString& aSourceFile, const nsAString& aScriptSample,
uint32_t aLineNum, uint32_t aColumnNum, nsCSPContext* aCSPContext)
: mozilla::Runnable("CSPReportSenderRunnable"),
mTriggeringElement(aTriggeringElement),
mCSPEventListener(aCSPEventListener),
mBlockedURI(aBlockedURI),
mBlockedContentSource(aBlockedContentSource),
mOriginalURI(aOriginalURI),
mViolatedPolicyIndex(aViolatedPolicyIndex),
mReportOnlyFlag(aReportOnlyFlag),
mViolatedDirective(aViolatedDirective),
mSourceFile(aSourceFile),
mScriptSample(aScriptSample),
mLineNum(aLineNum),
mColumnNum(aColumnNum),
mCSPContext(aCSPContext) {
NS_ASSERTION(!aViolatedDirective.IsEmpty(),
"Can not send reports without a violated directive");
// the observer subject is an nsISupports: either an nsISupportsCString
// from the arg passed in directly, or if that's empty, it's the blocked
// source.
if (aObserverSubject.IsEmpty() && mBlockedURI) {
mObserverSubject = aBlockedURI;
return;
}
nsAutoCString subject;
if (aObserverSubject.IsEmpty()) {
BlockedContentSourceToString(aBlockedContentSource, subject);
} else {
CopyUTF16toUTF8(aObserverSubject, subject);
}
nsCOMPtr<nsISupportsCString> supportscstr =
do_CreateInstance(NS_SUPPORTS_CSTRING_CONTRACTID);
if (supportscstr) {
supportscstr->SetData(subject);
mObserverSubject = do_QueryInterface(supportscstr);
}
}
NS_IMETHOD Run() override {
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
nsresult rv;
// 0) prepare violation data
mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit init;
nsAutoCString blockedContentSource;
BlockedContentSourceToString(mBlockedContentSource, blockedContentSource);
rv = mCSPContext->GatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData(
mBlockedURI, blockedContentSource, mOriginalURI, mViolatedDirective,
mViolatedPolicyIndex, mSourceFile, mScriptSample, mLineNum, mColumnNum,
init);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// 1) notify observers
nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> observerService =
mozilla::services::GetObserverService();
if (mObserverSubject && observerService) {
rv = observerService->NotifyObservers(
mObserverSubject, CSP_VIOLATION_TOPIC, mViolatedDirective.get());
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
// 2) send reports for the policy that was violated
mCSPContext->SendReports(init, mViolatedPolicyIndex);
// 3) log to console (one per policy violation)
if (mBlockedURI) {
mBlockedURI->GetSpec(blockedContentSource);
if (blockedContentSource.Length() >
nsCSPContext::ScriptSampleMaxLength()) {
bool isData = false;
rv = mBlockedURI->SchemeIs("data", &isData);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && isData &&
blockedContentSource.Length() >
nsCSPContext::ScriptSampleMaxLength()) {
blockedContentSource.Truncate(nsCSPContext::ScriptSampleMaxLength());
blockedContentSource.Append(
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(nsContentUtils::GetLocalizedEllipsis()));
}
}
}
if (blockedContentSource.Length() > 0) {
nsString blockedContentSource16 =
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(blockedContentSource);
const char16_t* params[] = {mViolatedDirective.get(),
blockedContentSource16.get()};
mCSPContext->logToConsole(
mReportOnlyFlag ? "CSPROViolationWithURI" : "CSPViolationWithURI",
params, ArrayLength(params), mSourceFile, mScriptSample, mLineNum,
mColumnNum, nsIScriptError::errorFlag);
}
// 4) fire violation event
mCSPContext->FireViolationEvent(mTriggeringElement, mCSPEventListener,
init);
return NS_OK;
}
private:
RefPtr<Element> mTriggeringElement;
nsCOMPtr<nsICSPEventListener> mCSPEventListener;
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> mBlockedURI;
nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource mBlockedContentSource;
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> mOriginalURI;
uint32_t mViolatedPolicyIndex;
bool mReportOnlyFlag;
nsString mViolatedDirective;
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> mObserverSubject;
nsString mSourceFile;
nsString mScriptSample;
uint32_t mLineNum;
uint32_t mColumnNum;
RefPtr<nsCSPContext> mCSPContext;
};
/**
* Asynchronously notifies any nsIObservers listening to the CSP violation
* topic that a violation occurred. Also triggers report sending and console
* logging. All asynchronous on the main thread.
*
* @param aTriggeringElement
* The element that triggered this report violation. It can be null.
* @param aBlockedContentSource
* Either a CSP Source (like 'self', as string) or nsIURI: the source
* of the violation.
* @param aOriginalUri
* The original URI if the blocked content is a redirect, else null
* @param aViolatedDirective
* the directive that was violated (string).
* @param aViolatedPolicyIndex
* the index of the policy that was violated (so we know where to send
* the reports).
* @param aObserverSubject
* optional, subject sent to the nsIObservers listening to the CSP
* violation topic.
* @param aSourceFile
* name of the file containing the inline script violation
* @param aScriptSample
* a sample of the violating inline script
* @param aLineNum
* source line number of the violation (if available)
* @param aColumnNum
* source column number of the violation (if available)
*/
nsresult nsCSPContext::AsyncReportViolation(
Element* aTriggeringElement, nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
nsIURI* aBlockedURI, BlockedContentSource aBlockedContentSource,
nsIURI* aOriginalURI, const nsAString& aViolatedDirective,
uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex, const nsAString& aObserverSubject,
const nsAString& aSourceFile, const nsAString& aScriptSample,
uint32_t aLineNum, uint32_t aColumnNum) {
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
NS_ENSURE_ARG_MAX(aViolatedPolicyIndex, mPolicies.Length() - 1);
nsCOMPtr<nsIRunnable> task = new CSPReportSenderRunnable(
aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener, aBlockedURI, aBlockedContentSource,
aOriginalURI, aViolatedPolicyIndex,
mPolicies[aViolatedPolicyIndex]->getReportOnlyFlag(), aViolatedDirective,
aObserverSubject, aSourceFile, aScriptSample, aLineNum, aColumnNum, this);
if (XRE_IsContentProcess()) {
if (mEventTarget) {
mEventTarget->Dispatch(task.forget(), NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL);
return NS_OK;
}
}
NS_DispatchToMainThread(task.forget());
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::RequireSRIForType(nsContentPolicyType aContentType,
bool* outRequiresSRIForType) {
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
*outRequiresSRIForType = false;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
if (mPolicies[i]->hasDirective(REQUIRE_SRI_FOR)) {
if (mPolicies[i]->requireSRIForType(aContentType)) {
*outRequiresSRIForType = true;
return NS_OK;
}
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
/**
* Based on the given docshell, determines if this CSP context allows the
* ancestry.
*
* In order to determine the URI of the parent document (one causing the load
* of this protected document), this function obtains the docShellTreeItem,
* then walks up the hierarchy until it finds a privileged (chrome) tree item.
* Getting the a tree item's URI looks like this in pseudocode:
*
* nsIDocShellTreeItem->GetDocument()->GetDocumentURI();
*
* aDocShell is the docShell for the protected document.
*/
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::PermitsAncestry(nsIDocShell* aDocShell,
bool* outPermitsAncestry) {
nsresult rv;
// Can't check ancestry without a docShell.
if (aDocShell == nullptr) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
*outPermitsAncestry = true;
// extract the ancestry as an array
nsCOMArray<nsIURI> ancestorsArray;
nsCOMPtr<nsIInterfaceRequestor> ir(do_QueryInterface(aDocShell));
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> treeItem(do_GetInterface(ir));
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> parentTreeItem;
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> currentURI;
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uriClone;
// iterate through each docShell parent item
while (NS_SUCCEEDED(treeItem->GetParent(getter_AddRefs(parentTreeItem))) &&
parentTreeItem != nullptr) {
// stop when reaching chrome
if (parentTreeItem->ItemType() == nsIDocShellTreeItem::typeChrome) {
break;
}
Document* doc = parentTreeItem->GetDocument();
NS_ASSERTION(doc,
"Could not get Document from nsIDocShellTreeItem in "
"nsCSPContext::PermitsAncestry");
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(doc, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
currentURI = doc->GetDocumentURI();
if (currentURI) {
// delete the userpass from the URI.
rv = NS_MutateURI(currentURI)
.SetRef(EmptyCString())
.SetUserPass(EmptyCString())
.Finalize(uriClone);
// If setUserPass fails for some reason, just return a clone of the
// current URI
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
rv = NS_GetURIWithoutRef(currentURI, getter_AddRefs(uriClone));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) {
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::PermitsAncestry, found ancestor: %s",
uriClone->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
}
ancestorsArray.AppendElement(uriClone);
}
// next ancestor
treeItem = parentTreeItem;
}
nsAutoString violatedDirective;
// Now that we've got the ancestry chain in ancestorsArray, time to check
// them against any CSP.
// NOTE: the ancestors are not allowed to be sent cross origin; this is a
// restriction not placed on subresource loads.
for (uint32_t a = 0; a < ancestorsArray.Length(); a++) {
if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) {
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::PermitsAncestry, checking ancestor: %s",
ancestorsArray[a]->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
}
// omit the ancestor URI in violation reports if cross-origin as per spec
// (it is a violation of the same-origin policy).
bool okToSendAncestor =
NS_SecurityCompareURIs(ancestorsArray[a], mSelfURI, true);
bool permits =
permitsInternal(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_ANCESTORS_DIRECTIVE,
nullptr, // triggering element
nullptr, // nsICSPEventListener
ancestorsArray[a],
nullptr, // no redirect here.
EmptyString(), // no nonce
false, // not a preload.
true, // specific, do not use default-src
true, // send violation reports
okToSendAncestor,
false); // not parser created
if (!permits) {
*outPermitsAncestry = false;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::Permits(Element* aTriggeringElement,
nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, nsIURI* aURI,
CSPDirective aDir, bool aSpecific, bool* outPermits) {
// Can't perform check without aURI
if (aURI == nullptr) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
*outPermits =
permitsInternal(aDir, aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener, aURI,
nullptr, // no original (pre-redirect) URI
EmptyString(), // no nonce
false, // not a preload.
aSpecific,
true, // send violation reports
true, // send blocked URI in violation reports
false); // not parser created
if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) {
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::Permits, aUri: %s, aDir: %d, isAllowed: %s",
aURI->GetSpecOrDefault().get(), aDir,
*outPermits ? "allow" : "deny"));
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::ToJSON(nsAString& outCSPinJSON) {
outCSPinJSON.Truncate();
dom::CSPPolicies jsonPolicies;
jsonPolicies.mCsp_policies.Construct();
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) {
dom::CSP jsonCSP;
mPolicies[p]->toDomCSPStruct(jsonCSP);
jsonPolicies.mCsp_policies.Value().AppendElement(jsonCSP, fallible);
}
// convert the gathered information to JSON
if (!jsonPolicies.ToJSON(outCSPinJSON)) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::GetCSPSandboxFlags(uint32_t* aOutSandboxFlags) {
if (!aOutSandboxFlags) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
*aOutSandboxFlags = SANDBOXED_NONE;
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
uint32_t flags = mPolicies[i]->getSandboxFlags();
// current policy doesn't have sandbox flag, check next policy
if (!flags) {
continue;
}
// current policy has sandbox flags, if the policy is in enforcement-mode
// (i.e. not report-only) set these flags and check for policies with more
// restrictions
if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) {
*aOutSandboxFlags |= flags;
} else {
// sandbox directive is ignored in report-only mode, warn about it and
// continue the loop checking for an enforcement policy.
nsAutoString policy;
mPolicies[i]->toString(policy);
CSPCONTEXTLOG(
("nsCSPContext::GetCSPSandboxFlags, report only policy, ignoring "
"sandbox in: %s",
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(policy).get()));
const char16_t* params[] = {policy.get()};
logToConsole("ignoringReportOnlyDirective", params, ArrayLength(params),
EmptyString(), EmptyString(), 0, 0,
nsIScriptError::warningFlag);
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
/* ========== CSPViolationReportListener implementation ========== */
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(CSPViolationReportListener, nsIStreamListener,
nsIRequestObserver, nsISupports);
CSPViolationReportListener::CSPViolationReportListener() {}
CSPViolationReportListener::~CSPViolationReportListener() {}
nsresult AppendSegmentToString(nsIInputStream* aInputStream, void* aClosure,
const char* aRawSegment, uint32_t aToOffset,
uint32_t aCount, uint32_t* outWrittenCount) {
nsCString* decodedData = static_cast<nsCString*>(aClosure);
decodedData->Append(aRawSegment, aCount);
*outWrittenCount = aCount;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
CSPViolationReportListener::OnDataAvailable(nsIRequest* aRequest,
nsISupports* aContext,
nsIInputStream* aInputStream,
uint64_t aOffset, uint32_t aCount) {
uint32_t read;
nsCString decodedData;
return aInputStream->ReadSegments(AppendSegmentToString, &decodedData, aCount,
&read);
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
CSPViolationReportListener::OnStopRequest(nsIRequest* aRequest,
nsISupports* aContext,
nsresult aStatus) {
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
CSPViolationReportListener::OnStartRequest(nsIRequest* aRequest,
nsISupports* aContext) {
return NS_OK;
}
/* ========== CSPReportRedirectSink implementation ========== */
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(CSPReportRedirectSink, nsIChannelEventSink,
nsIInterfaceRequestor);
CSPReportRedirectSink::CSPReportRedirectSink() {}
CSPReportRedirectSink::~CSPReportRedirectSink() {}
NS_IMETHODIMP
CSPReportRedirectSink::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(
nsIChannel* aOldChannel, nsIChannel* aNewChannel, uint32_t aRedirFlags,
nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback* aCallback) {
if (aRedirFlags & nsIChannelEventSink::REDIRECT_INTERNAL) {
aCallback->OnRedirectVerifyCallback(NS_OK);
return NS_OK;
}
// cancel the old channel so XHR failure callback happens
nsresult rv = aOldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_ABORT);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// notify an observer that we have blocked the report POST due to a redirect,
// used in testing, do this async since we're in an async call now to begin
// with
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
rv = aOldChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> observerService =
mozilla::services::GetObserverService();
NS_ASSERTION(observerService,
"Observer service required to log CSP violations");
observerService->NotifyObservers(
uri, CSP_VIOLATION_TOPIC,
u"denied redirect while sending violation report");
return NS_BINDING_REDIRECTED;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
CSPReportRedirectSink::GetInterface(const nsIID& aIID, void** aResult) {
if (aIID.Equals(NS_GET_IID(nsINetworkInterceptController)) &&
mInterceptController) {
nsCOMPtr<nsINetworkInterceptController> copy(mInterceptController);
*aResult = copy.forget().take();
return NS_OK;
}
return QueryInterface(aIID, aResult);
}
void CSPReportRedirectSink::SetInterceptController(
nsINetworkInterceptController* aInterceptController) {
mInterceptController = aInterceptController;
}
/* ===== nsISerializable implementation ====== */
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::Read(nsIObjectInputStream* aStream) {
nsresult rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> supports;
rv = NS_ReadOptionalObject(aStream, true, getter_AddRefs(supports));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
mSelfURI = do_QueryInterface(supports);
NS_ASSERTION(mSelfURI, "need a self URI to de-serialize");
uint32_t numPolicies;
rv = aStream->Read32(&numPolicies);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
nsAutoString policyString;
while (numPolicies > 0) {
numPolicies--;
rv = aStream->ReadString(policyString);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
bool reportOnly = false;
rv = aStream->ReadBoolean(&reportOnly);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
bool deliveredViaMetaTag = false;
rv = aStream->ReadBoolean(&deliveredViaMetaTag);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
mIPCPolicies.AppendElement(mozilla::ipc::ContentSecurityPolicy(
policyString, reportOnly, deliveredViaMetaTag));
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCSPContext::Write(nsIObjectOutputStream* aStream) {
nsresult rv = NS_WriteOptionalCompoundObject(aStream, mSelfURI,
NS_GET_IID(nsIURI), true);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Serialize all the policies.
aStream->Write32(mPolicies.Length() + mIPCPolicies.Length());
nsAutoString polStr;
for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) {
polStr.Truncate();
mPolicies[p]->toString(polStr);
aStream->WriteWStringZ(polStr.get());
aStream->WriteBoolean(mPolicies[p]->getReportOnlyFlag());
aStream->WriteBoolean(mPolicies[p]->getDeliveredViaMetaTagFlag());
}
for (auto& policy : mIPCPolicies) {
aStream->WriteWStringZ(policy.policy().get());
aStream->WriteBoolean(policy.reportOnlyFlag());
aStream->WriteBoolean(policy.deliveredViaMetaTagFlag());
}
return NS_OK;
}