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gecko-dev/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
relyea%netscape.com 0a88feb486 Implement PKCS #11 2.11 DSA PQG Parameter generation.
2002-03-02 00:52:05 +00:00

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/*
* The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public
* License Version 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file
* except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of
* the License at http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
*
* Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS
* IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or
* implied. See the License for the specific language governing
* rights and limitations under the License.
*
* The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries.
*
* The Initial Developer of the Original Code is Netscape
* Communications Corporation. Portions created by Netscape are
* Copyright (C) 1994-2000 Netscape Communications Corporation. All
* Rights Reserved.
*
* Contributor(s):
* Dr Stephen Henson <stephen.henson@gemplus.com>
*
* Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the
* terms of the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the
* "GPL"), in which case the provisions of the GPL are applicable
* instead of those above. If you wish to allow use of your
* version of this file only under the terms of the GPL and not to
* allow others to use your version of this file under the MPL,
* indicate your decision by deleting the provisions above and
* replace them with the notice and other provisions required by
* the GPL. If you do not delete the provisions above, a recipient
* may use your version of this file under either the MPL or the
* GPL.
*/
/*
* This file implements PKCS 11 on top of our existing security modules
*
* For more information about PKCS 11 See PKCS 11 Token Inteface Standard.
* This implementation has two slots:
* slot 1 is our generic crypto support. It does not require login.
* It supports Public Key ops, and all they bulk ciphers and hashes.
* It can also support Private Key ops for imported Private keys. It does
* not have any token storage.
* slot 2 is our private key support. It requires a login before use. It
* can store Private Keys and Certs as token objects. Currently only private
* keys and their associated Certificates are saved on the token.
*
* In this implementation, session objects are only visible to the session
* that created or generated them.
*/
#include "seccomon.h"
#include "secitem.h"
#include "secport.h"
#include "blapi.h"
#include "pkcs11.h"
#include "pkcs11i.h"
#include "lowkeyi.h"
#include "pcert.h"
#include "sechash.h"
#include "secder.h"
#include "secdig.h"
#include "lowpbe.h" /* We do PBE below */
#include "pkcs11t.h"
#include "secoid.h"
#include "alghmac.h"
#include "softoken.h"
#include "secasn1.h"
/*#include "secmodi.h" */
#include "pcert.h"
#include "ssl3prot.h" /* for SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH */
#define __PASTE(x,y) x##y
/*
* we renamed all our internal functions, get the correct
* definitions for them...
*/
#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
#define CK_EXTERN extern
#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(func) \
CK_RV __PASTE(NS,func)
#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1
#include "pkcs11f.h"
/* forward static declaration. */
static SECStatus pk11_PRF(const SECItem *secret, const char *label,
SECItem *seed, SECItem *result);
#define PK11_OFFSETOF(str, memb) ((PRPtrdiff)(&(((str *)0)->memb)))
static void pk11_Null(void *data, PRBool freeit)
{
return;
}
/*
* free routines.... Free local type allocated data, and convert
* other free routines to the destroy signature.
*/
static void
pk11_FreePrivKey(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, PRBool freeit)
{
nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(key);
}
static void
pk11_HMAC_Destroy(HMACContext *context, PRBool freeit)
{
HMAC_Destroy(context);
}
static void
pk11_Space(void *data, PRBool freeit)
{
PORT_Free(data);
}
/*
* turn a CDMF key into a des key. CDMF is an old IBM scheme to export DES by
* Deprecating a full des key to 40 bit key strenth.
*/
static CK_RV
pk11_cdmf2des(unsigned char *cdmfkey, unsigned char *deskey)
{
unsigned char key1[8] = { 0xc4, 0x08, 0xb0, 0x54, 0x0b, 0xa1, 0xe0, 0xae };
unsigned char key2[8] = { 0xef, 0x2c, 0x04, 0x1c, 0xe6, 0x38, 0x2f, 0xe6 };
unsigned char enc_src[8];
unsigned char enc_dest[8];
unsigned int leng,i;
DESContext *descx;
SECStatus rv;
/* zero the parity bits */
for (i=0; i < 8; i++) {
enc_src[i] = cdmfkey[i] & 0xfe;
}
/* encrypt with key 1 */
descx = DES_CreateContext(key1, NULL, NSS_DES, PR_TRUE);
if (descx == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
rv = DES_Encrypt(descx, enc_dest, &leng, 8, enc_src, 8);
DES_DestroyContext(descx,PR_TRUE);
if (rv != SECSuccess) return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
/* xor source with des, zero the parity bits and depricate the key*/
for (i=0; i < 8; i++) {
if (i & 1) {
enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0xfe;
} else {
enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0x0e;
}
}
/* encrypt with key 2 */
descx = DES_CreateContext(key2, NULL, NSS_DES, PR_TRUE);
if (descx == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
rv = DES_Encrypt(descx, deskey, &leng, 8, enc_src, 8);
DES_DestroyContext(descx,PR_TRUE);
if (rv != SECSuccess) return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
/* set the corret parity on our new des key */
pk11_FormatDESKey(deskey, 8);
return CKR_OK;
}
static CK_RV
pk11_CryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE etype,
PK11ContextType contextType, PRBool isEncrypt);
/*
* Calculate a Lynx checksum for CKM_LYNX_WRAP mechanism.
*/
static CK_RV
pk11_calcLynxChecksum(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrapKey,
unsigned char *checksum, unsigned char *key, CK_ULONG len)
{
CK_BYTE E[10];
CK_ULONG Elen = sizeof (E);
CK_BYTE C[8];
CK_ULONG Clen = sizeof (C);
unsigned short sum1 = 0, sum2 = 0;
CK_MECHANISM mech = { CKM_DES_ECB, NULL, 0 };
int i;
CK_RV crv;
if (len != 8) return CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE;
/* zero the parity bits */
for (i=0; i < 8; i++) {
sum1 = sum1 + key[i];
sum2 = sum2 + sum1;
}
/* encrypt with key 1 */
crv = pk11_CryptInit(hSession,&mech,hWrapKey,CKA_WRAP, PK11_ENCRYPT,
PR_TRUE);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession,key,len,E,&Elen);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
E[8] = (sum2 >> 8) & 0xff;
E[9] = sum2 & 0xff;
crv = pk11_CryptInit(hSession,&mech,hWrapKey,CKA_WRAP, PK11_ENCRYPT,
PR_TRUE);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession,&E[2],len,C,&Clen);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
checksum[0] = C[6];
checksum[1] = C[7];
return CKR_OK;
}
/* NSC_DestroyObject destroys an object. */
CK_RV
NSC_DestroyObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject)
{
PK11Slot *slot = pk11_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
PK11Session *session;
PK11Object *object;
PK11FreeStatus status;
/*
* This whole block just makes sure we really can destroy the
* requested object.
*/
session = pk11_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) {
return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
object = pk11_ObjectFromHandle(hObject,session);
if (object == NULL) {
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
/* don't destroy a private object if we aren't logged in */
if ((!slot->isLoggedIn) && (slot->needLogin) &&
(pk11_isTrue(object,CKA_PRIVATE))) {
pk11_FreeSession(session);
pk11_FreeObject(object);
return CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN;
}
/* don't destroy a token object if we aren't in a rw session */
if (((session->info.flags & CKF_RW_SESSION) == 0) &&
(pk11_isTrue(object,CKA_TOKEN))) {
pk11_FreeSession(session);
pk11_FreeObject(object);
return CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY;
}
pk11_DeleteObject(session,object);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
/*
* get some indication if the object is destroyed. Note: this is not
* 100%. Someone may have an object reference outstanding (though that
* should not be the case by here. Also note that the object is "half"
* destroyed. Our internal representation is destroyed, but it may still
* be in the data base.
*/
status = pk11_FreeObject(object);
return (status != PK11_DestroyFailure) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
/*
************** Crypto Functions: Utilities ************************
*/
/*
* return a context based on the PK11Context type.
*/
PK11SessionContext *
pk11_ReturnContextByType(PK11Session *session, PK11ContextType type)
{
switch (type) {
case PK11_ENCRYPT:
case PK11_DECRYPT:
return session->enc_context;
case PK11_HASH:
return session->hash_context;
case PK11_SIGN:
case PK11_SIGN_RECOVER:
case PK11_VERIFY:
case PK11_VERIFY_RECOVER:
return session->hash_context;
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* change a context based on the PK11Context type.
*/
void
pk11_SetContextByType(PK11Session *session, PK11ContextType type,
PK11SessionContext *context)
{
switch (type) {
case PK11_ENCRYPT:
case PK11_DECRYPT:
session->enc_context = context;
break;
case PK11_HASH:
session->hash_context = context;
break;
case PK11_SIGN:
case PK11_SIGN_RECOVER:
case PK11_VERIFY:
case PK11_VERIFY_RECOVER:
session->hash_context = context;
break;
}
return;
}
/*
* code to grab the context. Needed by every C_XXXUpdate, C_XXXFinal,
* and C_XXX function. The function takes a session handle, the context type,
* and wether or not the session needs to be multipart. It returns the context,
* and optionally returns the session pointer (if sessionPtr != NULL) if session
* pointer is returned, the caller is responsible for freeing it.
*/
static CK_RV
pk11_GetContext(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle,PK11SessionContext **contextPtr,
PK11ContextType type, PRBool needMulti, PK11Session **sessionPtr)
{
PK11Session *session;
PK11SessionContext *context;
session = pk11_SessionFromHandle(handle);
if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
context = pk11_ReturnContextByType(session,type);
/* make sure the context is valid */
if((context==NULL)||(context->type!=type)||(needMulti&&!(context->multi))){
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
}
*contextPtr = context;
if (sessionPtr != NULL) {
*sessionPtr = session;
} else {
pk11_FreeSession(session);
}
return CKR_OK;
}
/*
************** Crypto Functions: Encrypt ************************
*/
/*
* All the NSC_InitXXX functions have a set of common checks and processing they
* all need to do at the beginning. This is done here.
*/
static CK_RV
pk11_InitGeneric(PK11Session *session,PK11SessionContext **contextPtr,
PK11ContextType ctype,PK11Object **keyPtr,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_KEY_TYPE *keyTypePtr,
CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubKeyType, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation)
{
PK11Object *key = NULL;
PK11Attribute *att;
PK11SessionContext *context;
/* We can only init if there is not current context active */
if (pk11_ReturnContextByType(session,ctype) != NULL) {
return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
}
/* find the key */
if (keyPtr) {
unsigned int size;
key = pk11_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session);
if (key == NULL) {
return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
/* make sure it's a valid key for this operation */
if (((key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) && (key->objclass != pubKeyType))
|| !pk11_isTrue(key,operation)) {
pk11_FreeObject(key);
return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
}
/* get the key type */
att = pk11_FindAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
PORT_Assert(att != NULL);
size = sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE);
if (att->attrib.ulValueLen < size) {
CK_KEY_TYPE kt;
int i;
int shift;
#ifdef IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN
shift = 0;
#else
shift = (att->attrib.ulValueLen - 1) * 8;
#endif
kt = 0;
for (i=att->attrib.ulValueLen - 1; i>=0; i--) {
kt |= ((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue)[i] << shift;
#ifdef IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN
shift += 8;
#else
shift -= 8;
#endif
}
*keyTypePtr = kt;
} else {
*keyTypePtr = *((CK_KEY_TYPE *)att->attrib.pValue);
}
pk11_FreeAttribute(att);
*keyPtr = key;
}
/* allocate the context structure */
context = (PK11SessionContext *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(PK11SessionContext));
if (context == NULL) {
if (key) pk11_FreeObject(key);
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
context->type = ctype;
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
context->cipherInfo = NULL;
context->hashInfo = NULL;
context->doPad = PR_FALSE;
context->padDataLength = 0;
context->key = key;
*contextPtr = context;
return CKR_OK;
}
/* NSC_CryptInit initializes an encryption/Decryption operation. */
/* This function is used by NSC_EncryptInit and NSC_WrapKey. The only difference
* in their uses if whether or not etype is CKA_ENCRYPT or CKA_WRAP */
static CK_RV
pk11_CryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE etype,
PK11ContextType contextType, PRBool isEncrypt)
{
PK11Session *session;
PK11Object *key;
PK11SessionContext *context;
PK11Attribute *att;
CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *rc2_param;
#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *rc5_param;
SECItem rc5Key;
#endif
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
unsigned effectiveKeyLength;
unsigned char newdeskey[8];
PRBool useNewKey=PR_FALSE;
int t;
session = pk11_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
crv = pk11_InitGeneric(session,&context,contextType,&key,hKey,&key_type,
isEncrypt ?CKO_PUBLIC_KEY:CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, etype);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
context->doPad = PR_FALSE;
switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
case CKM_RSA_X_509:
if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
context->multi = PR_FALSE;
context->cipherInfo = isEncrypt ?
(void *)pk11_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA) :
(void *)pk11_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA);
if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
if (isEncrypt) {
context->update = (PK11Cipher)
(pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
? RSA_EncryptRaw : RSA_EncryptBlock);
} else {
context->update = (PK11Cipher)
(pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
? RSA_DecryptRaw : RSA_DecryptBlock);
}
context->destroy = pk11_Null;
break;
case CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD:
context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
context->blockSize = 8;
/* fall thru */
case CKM_RC2_ECB:
case CKM_RC2_CBC:
if (key_type != CKK_RC2) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
att = pk11_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
if (att == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
rc2_param = (CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
effectiveKeyLength = (rc2_param->ulEffectiveBits+7)/8;
context->cipherInfo =
RC2_CreateContext((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen, rc2_param->iv,
pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC2_ECB ? NSS_RC2 :
NSS_RC2_CBC,effectiveKeyLength);
pk11_FreeAttribute(att);
if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
context->update = (PK11Cipher) (isEncrypt ? RC2_Encrypt : RC2_Decrypt);
context->destroy = (PK11Destroy) RC2_DestroyContext;
break;
#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
case CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD:
context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
/* fall thru */
case CKM_RC5_ECB:
case CKM_RC5_CBC:
if (key_type != CKK_RC5) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
att = pk11_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
if (att == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
rc5_param = (CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
if (context->doPad) {
context->blockSize = rc5_param->ulWordsize*2;
}
rc5Key.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue;
rc5Key.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
context->cipherInfo = RC5_CreateContext(&rc5Key,rc5_param->ulRounds,
rc5_param->ulWordsize,rc5_param->pIv,
pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC5_ECB ? NSS_RC5 : NSS_RC5_CBC);
pk11_FreeAttribute(att);
if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
context->update = (PK11Cipher) (isEncrypt ? RC5_Encrypt : RC5_Decrypt);
context->destroy = (PK11Destroy) RC5_DestroyContext;
break;
#endif
case CKM_RC4:
if (key_type != CKK_RC4) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
att = pk11_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
if (att == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
context->cipherInfo =
RC4_CreateContext((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
pk11_FreeAttribute(att);
if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; /* WRONG !!! */
break;
}
context->update = (PK11Cipher) (isEncrypt ? RC4_Encrypt : RC4_Decrypt);
context->destroy = (PK11Destroy) RC4_DestroyContext;
break;
case CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD:
context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
context->blockSize = 8;
/* fall thru */
case CKM_CDMF_ECB:
case CKM_CDMF_CBC:
if (key_type != CKK_CDMF) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
t = (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_CDMF_ECB) ? NSS_DES : NSS_DES_CBC;
useNewKey=PR_TRUE;
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
goto finish_des;
case CKM_DES_ECB:
if (key_type != CKK_DES) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
t = NSS_DES;
goto finish_des;
case CKM_DES_CBC_PAD:
context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
context->blockSize = 8;
/* fall thru */
case CKM_DES_CBC:
if (key_type != CKK_DES) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
t = NSS_DES_CBC;
goto finish_des;
case CKM_DES3_ECB:
if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
t = NSS_DES_EDE3;
goto finish_des;
case CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD:
context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
context->blockSize = 8;
/* fall thru */
case CKM_DES3_CBC:
if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
t = NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC;
finish_des:
att = pk11_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
if (att == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
if (useNewKey) {
crv = pk11_cdmf2des((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,newdeskey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeAttribute(att);
break;
}
}
context->cipherInfo = DES_CreateContext(
useNewKey ? newdeskey : (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
(unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,t, isEncrypt);
pk11_FreeAttribute(att);
if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
context->update = (PK11Cipher) (isEncrypt ? DES_Encrypt : DES_Decrypt);
context->destroy = (PK11Destroy) DES_DestroyContext;
break;
case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
context->blockSize = 16;
/* fall thru */
case CKM_AES_ECB:
case CKM_AES_CBC:
if (key_type != CKK_AES) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
att = pk11_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
if (att == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
context->cipherInfo = AES_CreateContext(
(unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
(unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,
pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_AES_ECB ? NSS_AES : NSS_AES_CBC,
isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen, 16);
pk11_FreeAttribute(att);
if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
context->update = (PK11Cipher) (isEncrypt ? AES_Encrypt : AES_Decrypt);
context->destroy = (PK11Destroy) AES_DestroyContext;
break;
default:
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeContext(context);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
pk11_SetContextByType(session, contextType, context);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OK;
}
/* NSC_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */
CK_RV NSC_EncryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
{
return pk11_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_ENCRYPT,
PK11_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
}
/* NSC_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption operation. */
CK_RV NSC_EncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
{
PK11SessionContext *context;
unsigned int outlen,i;
unsigned int padoutlen = 0;
unsigned int maxout = *pulEncryptedPartLen;
CK_RV crv;
SECStatus rv;
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = pk11_GetContext(hSession,&context,PK11_ENCRYPT,PR_TRUE,NULL);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
/* do padding */
if (context->doPad) {
/* deal with previous buffered data */
if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
/* fill in the padded to a full block size */
for (i=context->padDataLength;
(ulPartLen != 0) && i < context->blockSize; i++) {
context->padBuf[i] = *pPart++;
ulPartLen--;
context->padDataLength++;
}
/* not enough data to encrypt yet? then return */
if (context->padDataLength != context->blockSize) {
*pulEncryptedPartLen = 0;
return CKR_OK;
}
/* encrypt the current padded data */
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pEncryptedPart,
&outlen,context->blockSize,context->padBuf,context->blockSize);
if (rv != SECSuccess) return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
pEncryptedPart += padoutlen;
maxout -= padoutlen;
}
/* save the residual */
context->padDataLength = ulPartLen % context->blockSize;
if (context->padDataLength) {
PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf,
&pPart[ulPartLen-context->padDataLength],
context->padDataLength);
ulPartLen -= context->padDataLength;
}
/* if we've exhausted our new buffer, we're done */
if (ulPartLen == 0) {
*pulEncryptedPartLen = padoutlen;
return CKR_OK;
}
}
/* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pEncryptedPart,
&outlen, maxout, pPart, ulPartLen);
*pulEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG) (outlen + padoutlen);
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
/* NSC_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption operation. */
CK_RV NSC_EncryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen)
{
PK11Session *session;
PK11SessionContext *context;
unsigned int outlen,i;
unsigned int maxout = *pulLastEncryptedPartLen;
CK_RV crv;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = pk11_GetContext(hSession,&context,PK11_ENCRYPT,PR_TRUE,&session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
*pulLastEncryptedPartLen = 0;
/* do padding */
if (context->doPad) {
unsigned char padbyte = (unsigned char)
(context->blockSize - context->padDataLength);
/* fill out rest of pad buffer with pad magic*/
for (i=context->padDataLength; i < context->blockSize; i++) {
context->padBuf[i] = padbyte;
}
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pLastEncryptedPart,
&outlen, maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
if (rv == SECSuccess) *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
}
/* do it */
pk11_SetContextByType(session, PK11_ENCRYPT, NULL);
pk11_FreeContext(context);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
/* NSC_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */
CK_RV NSC_Encrypt (CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen)
{
PK11Session *session;
PK11SessionContext *context;
unsigned int outlen;
unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulEncryptedDataLen;
CK_RV crv;
CK_RV crv2;
SECStatus rv;
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = pk11_GetContext(hSession,&context,PK11_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,&session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
if (context->doPad) {
CK_ULONG finalLen;
/* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final
* code deal with it */
pk11_FreeSession(session);
crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession,pData,ulDataLen,pEncryptedData,
pulEncryptedDataLen);
if (crv != CKR_OK) *pulEncryptedDataLen = 0;
maxoutlen -= *pulEncryptedDataLen;
pEncryptedData += *pulEncryptedDataLen;
finalLen = maxoutlen;
crv2 = NSC_EncryptFinal(hSession, pEncryptedData, &finalLen);
if (crv2 == CKR_OK) { *pulEncryptedDataLen += finalLen; }
return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 :crv;
}
/* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size is big enough. */
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedData,
&outlen, maxoutlen, pData, ulDataLen);
*pulEncryptedDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
pk11_FreeContext(context);
pk11_SetContextByType(session, PK11_ENCRYPT, NULL);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
/*
************** Crypto Functions: Decrypt ************************
*/
/* NSC_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */
CK_RV NSC_DecryptInit( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
{
return pk11_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_DECRYPT,
PK11_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE);
}
/* NSC_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption operation. */
CK_RV NSC_DecryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen)
{
PK11SessionContext *context;
unsigned int padoutlen = 0;
unsigned int outlen;
unsigned int maxout = *pulPartLen;
CK_RV crv;
SECStatus rv;
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = pk11_GetContext(hSession,&context,PK11_DECRYPT,PR_TRUE,NULL);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
if (context->doPad) {
/* first decrypt our saved buffer */
if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, &padoutlen,
maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
if (rv != SECSuccess) return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
pPart += padoutlen;
maxout -= padoutlen;
}
/* now save the final block for the next decrypt or the final */
PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf,&pEncryptedPart[ulEncryptedPartLen -
context->blockSize], context->blockSize);
context->padDataLength = context->blockSize;
ulEncryptedPartLen -= context->padDataLength;
}
/* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pPart, &outlen,
maxout, pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen);
*pulPartLen = (CK_ULONG) (outlen + padoutlen);
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
/* NSC_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption operation. */
CK_RV NSC_DecryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen)
{
PK11Session *session;
PK11SessionContext *context;
unsigned int outlen;
unsigned int maxout = *pulLastPartLen;
CK_RV crv;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = pk11_GetContext(hSession,&context,PK11_DECRYPT,PR_TRUE,&session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
*pulLastPartLen = 0;
if (context->doPad) {
/* decrypt our saved buffer */
if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
/* this assumes that pLastPart is big enough to hold the *whole*
* buffer!!! */
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pLastPart, &outlen,
maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
unsigned int padSize =
(unsigned int) pLastPart[context->blockSize-1];
if ((padSize > context->blockSize) || (padSize == 0)) {
rv = SECFailure;
} else {
*pulLastPartLen = outlen - padSize;
}
}
}
}
/* do it */
pk11_SetContextByType(session, PK11_DECRYPT, NULL);
pk11_FreeContext(context);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
/* NSC_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */
CK_RV NSC_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
{
PK11Session *session;
PK11SessionContext *context;
unsigned int outlen;
unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulDataLen;
CK_RV crv;
CK_RV crv2;
SECStatus rv;
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = pk11_GetContext(hSession,&context,PK11_DECRYPT,PR_FALSE,&session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
if (context->doPad) {
CK_ULONG finalLen;
/* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final
* code deal with it */
pk11_FreeSession(session);
crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedData,ulEncryptedDataLen,
pData, pulDataLen);
if (crv != CKR_OK) *pulDataLen = 0;
maxoutlen -= *pulDataLen;
pData += *pulDataLen;
finalLen = maxoutlen;
crv2 = NSC_DecryptFinal(hSession, pData, &finalLen);
if (crv2 == CKR_OK) { *pulDataLen += finalLen; }
return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 :crv;
}
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen,
pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen);
*pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
pk11_FreeContext(context);
pk11_SetContextByType(session, PK11_DECRYPT, NULL);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
/*
************** Crypto Functions: Digest (HASH) ************************
*/
/* NSC_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */
CK_RV NSC_DigestInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism)
{
PK11Session *session;
PK11SessionContext *context;
MD2Context *md2_context;
MD5Context *md5_context;
SHA1Context *sha1_context;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
session = pk11_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
crv = pk11_InitGeneric(session,&context,PK11_HASH,NULL,0,NULL, 0, 0);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_MD2:
md2_context = MD2_NewContext();
context->cipherInfo = (void *)md2_context;
context->cipherInfoLen = MD2_FlattenSize(md2_context);
context->currentMech = CKM_MD2;
if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
crv= CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
context->hashUpdate = (PK11Hash) MD2_Update;
context->end = (PK11End) MD2_End;
context->destroy = (PK11Destroy) MD2_DestroyContext;
MD2_Begin(md2_context);
break;
case CKM_MD5:
md5_context = MD5_NewContext();
context->cipherInfo = (void *)md5_context;
context->cipherInfoLen = MD5_FlattenSize(md5_context);
context->currentMech = CKM_MD5;
if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
crv= CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
context->hashUpdate = (PK11Hash) MD5_Update;
context->end = (PK11End) MD5_End;
context->destroy = (PK11Destroy) MD5_DestroyContext;
MD5_Begin(md5_context);
break;
case CKM_SHA_1:
sha1_context = SHA1_NewContext();
context->cipherInfo = (void *)sha1_context;
context->cipherInfoLen = SHA1_FlattenSize(sha1_context);
context->currentMech = CKM_SHA_1;
if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
crv= CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
context->hashUpdate = (PK11Hash) SHA1_Update;
context->end = (PK11End) SHA1_End;
context->destroy = (PK11Destroy) SHA1_DestroyContext;
SHA1_Begin(sha1_context);
break;
default:
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeContext(context);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
pk11_SetContextByType(session, PK11_HASH, context);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OK;
}
/* NSC_Digest digests data in a single part. */
CK_RV NSC_Digest(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen)
{
PK11Session *session;
PK11SessionContext *context;
unsigned int digestLen;
unsigned int maxout = *pulDigestLen;
CK_RV crv;
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = pk11_GetContext(hSession,&context,PK11_HASH,PR_FALSE,&session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
/* do it: */
(*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pData, ulDataLen);
/* NOTE: this assumes buf size is bigenough for the algorithm */
(*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen,maxout);
*pulDigestLen = digestLen;
pk11_SetContextByType(session, PK11_HASH, NULL);
pk11_FreeContext(context);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OK;
}
/* NSC_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */
CK_RV NSC_DigestUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
{
PK11SessionContext *context;
CK_RV crv;
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = pk11_GetContext(hSession,&context,PK11_HASH,PR_TRUE,NULL);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
/* do it: */
(*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, ulPartLen);
return CKR_OK;
}
/* NSC_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */
CK_RV NSC_DigestFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen)
{
PK11Session *session;
PK11SessionContext *context;
unsigned int maxout = *pulDigestLen;
unsigned int digestLen;
CK_RV crv;
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = pk11_GetContext(hSession, &context, PK11_HASH, PR_TRUE, &session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
if (pDigest != NULL) {
(*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen, maxout);
*pulDigestLen = digestLen;
} else {
*pulDigestLen = 0;
}
pk11_SetContextByType(session, PK11_HASH, NULL);
pk11_FreeContext(context);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OK;
}
/*
* this helper functions are used by Generic Macing and Signing functions
* that use hashes as part of their operations.
*/
static CK_RV
pk11_doSubMD2(PK11SessionContext *context) {
MD2Context *md2_context = MD2_NewContext();
context->hashInfo = (void *)md2_context;
if (context->hashInfo == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
context->hashUpdate = (PK11Hash) MD2_Update;
context->end = (PK11End) MD2_End;
context->hashdestroy = (PK11Destroy) MD2_DestroyContext;
MD2_Begin(md2_context);
return CKR_OK;
}
static CK_RV
pk11_doSubMD5(PK11SessionContext *context) {
MD5Context *md5_context = MD5_NewContext();
context->hashInfo = (void *)md5_context;
if (context->hashInfo == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
context->hashUpdate = (PK11Hash) MD5_Update;
context->end = (PK11End) MD5_End;
context->hashdestroy = (PK11Destroy) MD5_DestroyContext;
MD5_Begin(md5_context);
return CKR_OK;
}
static CK_RV
pk11_doSubSHA1(PK11SessionContext *context) {
SHA1Context *sha1_context = SHA1_NewContext();
context->hashInfo = (void *)sha1_context;
if (context->hashInfo == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
context->hashUpdate = (PK11Hash) SHA1_Update;
context->end = (PK11End) SHA1_End;
context->hashdestroy = (PK11Destroy) SHA1_DestroyContext;
SHA1_Begin(sha1_context);
return CKR_OK;
}
/*
* HMAC General copies only a portion of the result. This update routine likes
* the final HMAC output with the signature.
*/
static SECStatus
pk11_HMACCopy(CK_ULONG *copyLen,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int *sigLen,
unsigned int maxLen,unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
{
if (maxLen < *copyLen) return SECFailure;
PORT_Memcpy(sig,hash,*copyLen);
*sigLen = *copyLen;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Verify is just a compare for HMAC */
static SECStatus
pk11_HMACCmp(CK_ULONG *copyLen,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int sigLen,
unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
{
return PORT_Memcmp(sig,hash,*copyLen) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure ;
}
/*
* common HMAC initalization routine
*/
static CK_RV
pk11_doHMACInit(PK11SessionContext *context,HASH_HashType hash,
PK11Object *key, CK_ULONG mac_size)
{
PK11Attribute *keyval;
HMACContext *HMACcontext;
CK_ULONG *intpointer;
const SECHashObject *hashObj = &SECRawHashObjects[hash];
keyval = pk11_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
if (keyval == NULL) return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
HMACcontext = HMAC_Create(hashObj,
(const unsigned char*)keyval->attrib.pValue,
keyval->attrib.ulValueLen);
context->hashInfo = HMACcontext;
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
pk11_FreeAttribute(keyval);
if (context->hashInfo == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
context->hashUpdate = (PK11Hash) HMAC_Update;
context->end = (PK11End) HMAC_Finish;
context->hashdestroy = (PK11Destroy) pk11_HMAC_Destroy;
intpointer = (CK_ULONG *) PORT_Alloc(sizeof(CK_ULONG));
if (intpointer == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
*intpointer = mac_size;
context->cipherInfo = (void *) intpointer;
context->destroy = (PK11Destroy) pk11_Space;
context->update = (PK11Cipher) pk11_HMACCopy;
context->verify = (PK11Verify) pk11_HMACCmp;
HMAC_Begin(HMACcontext);
return CKR_OK;
}
/*
* SSL Macing support. SSL Macs are inited, then update with the base
* hashing algorithm, then finalized in sign and verify
*/
/*
* FROM SSL:
* 60 bytes is 3 times the maximum length MAC size that is supported.
* We probably should have one copy of this table. We still need this table
* in ssl to 'sign' the handshake hashes.
*/
static unsigned char ssl_pad_1 [60] = {
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
};
static unsigned char ssl_pad_2 [60] = {
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
};
static SECStatus
pk11_SSLMACSign(PK11SSLMACInfo *info,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int *sigLen,
unsigned int maxLen,unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
{
unsigned char tmpBuf[PK11_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
unsigned int out;
info->begin(info->hashContext);
info->update(info->hashContext,info->key,info->keySize);
info->update(info->hashContext,ssl_pad_2,info->padSize);
info->update(info->hashContext,hash,hashLen);
info->end(info->hashContext,tmpBuf,&out,PK11_MAX_MAC_LENGTH);
PORT_Memcpy(sig,tmpBuf,info->macSize);
*sigLen = info->macSize;
return SECSuccess;
}
static SECStatus
pk11_SSLMACVerify(PK11SSLMACInfo *info,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int sigLen,
unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
{
unsigned char tmpBuf[PK11_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
unsigned int out;
info->begin(info->hashContext);
info->update(info->hashContext,info->key,info->keySize);
info->update(info->hashContext,ssl_pad_2,info->padSize);
info->update(info->hashContext,hash,hashLen);
info->end(info->hashContext,tmpBuf,&out,PK11_MAX_MAC_LENGTH);
return (PORT_Memcmp(sig,tmpBuf,info->macSize) == 0) ?
SECSuccess : SECFailure;
}
/*
* common HMAC initalization routine
*/
static CK_RV
pk11_doSSLMACInit(PK11SessionContext *context,SECOidTag oid,
PK11Object *key, CK_ULONG mac_size)
{
PK11Attribute *keyval;
PK11Begin begin;
int padSize;
PK11SSLMACInfo *sslmacinfo;
CK_RV crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
if (oid == SEC_OID_SHA1) {
crv = pk11_doSubSHA1(context);
begin = (PK11Begin) SHA1_Begin;
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
padSize = 40;
} else {
crv = pk11_doSubMD5(context);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
begin = (PK11Begin) MD5_Begin;
padSize = 48;
}
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
keyval = pk11_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
if (keyval == NULL) return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo,keyval->attrib.pValue,
keyval->attrib.ulValueLen);
context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo,ssl_pad_1,padSize);
sslmacinfo = (PK11SSLMACInfo *) PORT_Alloc(sizeof(PK11SSLMACInfo));
if (sslmacinfo == NULL) {
pk11_FreeAttribute(keyval);
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
sslmacinfo->macSize = mac_size;
sslmacinfo->hashContext = context->hashInfo;
PORT_Memcpy(sslmacinfo->key,keyval->attrib.pValue,
keyval->attrib.ulValueLen);
sslmacinfo->keySize = keyval->attrib.ulValueLen;
sslmacinfo->begin = begin;
sslmacinfo->end = context->end;
sslmacinfo->update = context->hashUpdate;
sslmacinfo->padSize = padSize;
pk11_FreeAttribute(keyval);
context->cipherInfo = (void *) sslmacinfo;
context->destroy = (PK11Destroy) pk11_Space;
context->update = (PK11Cipher) pk11_SSLMACSign;
context->verify = (PK11Verify) pk11_SSLMACVerify;
return CKR_OK;
}
typedef struct {
PRUint32 cxSize; /* size of allocated block, in bytes. */
PRUint32 cxKeyLen; /* number of bytes of cxBuf containing key. */
PRUint32 cxDataLen; /* number of bytes of cxBuf containing data. */
SECStatus cxRv; /* records failure of void functions. */
unsigned char cxBuf[512]; /* actual size may be larger than 512. */
} TLSPRFContext;
static void
pk11_TLSPRFHashUpdate(TLSPRFContext *cx, const unsigned char *data,
unsigned int data_len)
{
PRUint32 bytesUsed = PK11_OFFSETOF(TLSPRFContext, cxBuf) +
cx->cxKeyLen + cx->cxDataLen;
if (cx->cxRv != SECSuccess) /* function has previously failed. */
return;
if (bytesUsed + data_len > cx->cxSize) {
/* We don't use realloc here because
** (a) realloc doesn't zero out the old block, and
** (b) if realloc fails, we lose the old block.
*/
PRUint32 blockSize = bytesUsed + data_len + 512;
TLSPRFContext *new_cx = (TLSPRFContext *)PORT_Alloc(blockSize);
if (!new_cx) {
cx->cxRv = SECFailure;
return;
}
PORT_Memcpy(new_cx, cx, cx->cxSize);
new_cx->cxSize = blockSize;
PORT_ZFree(cx, cx->cxSize);
cx = new_cx;
}
PORT_Memcpy(cx->cxBuf + cx->cxKeyLen + cx->cxDataLen, data, data_len);
cx->cxDataLen += data_len;
}
static void
pk11_TLSPRFEnd(TLSPRFContext *ctx, unsigned char *hashout,
unsigned int *pDigestLen, unsigned int maxDigestLen)
{
*pDigestLen = 0; /* tells Verify that no data has been input yet. */
}
/* Compute the PRF values from the data previously input. */
static SECStatus
pk11_TLSPRFUpdate(TLSPRFContext *cx,
unsigned char *sig, /* output goes here. */
unsigned int * sigLen, /* how much output. */
unsigned int maxLen, /* output buffer size */
unsigned char *hash, /* unused. */
unsigned int hashLen) /* unused. */
{
SECStatus rv;
SECItem sigItem;
SECItem seedItem;
SECItem secretItem;
if (cx->cxRv != SECSuccess)
return cx->cxRv;
secretItem.data = cx->cxBuf;
secretItem.len = cx->cxKeyLen;
seedItem.data = cx->cxBuf + cx->cxKeyLen;
seedItem.len = cx->cxDataLen;
sigItem.data = sig;
sigItem.len = maxLen;
rv = pk11_PRF(&secretItem, NULL, &seedItem, &sigItem);
if (rv == SECSuccess && sigLen != NULL)
*sigLen = sigItem.len;
return rv;
}
static SECStatus
pk11_TLSPRFVerify(TLSPRFContext *cx,
unsigned char *sig, /* input, for comparison. */
unsigned int sigLen, /* length of sig. */
unsigned char *hash, /* data to be verified. */
unsigned int hashLen) /* size of hash data. */
{
unsigned char * tmp = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(sigLen);
unsigned int tmpLen = sigLen;
SECStatus rv;
if (!tmp)
return SECFailure;
if (hashLen) {
/* hashLen is non-zero when the user does a one-step verify.
** In this case, none of the data has been input yet.
*/
pk11_TLSPRFHashUpdate(cx, hash, hashLen);
}
rv = pk11_TLSPRFUpdate(cx, tmp, &tmpLen, sigLen, NULL, 0);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
rv = (SECStatus)(1 - !PORT_Memcmp(tmp, sig, sigLen));
}
PORT_ZFree(tmp, sigLen);
return rv;
}
static void
pk11_TLSPRFHashDestroy(TLSPRFContext *cx, PRBool freeit)
{
if (freeit)
PORT_ZFree(cx, cx->cxSize);
}
static CK_RV
pk11_TLSPRFInit(PK11SessionContext *context,
PK11Object * key,
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type)
{
PK11Attribute * keyVal;
TLSPRFContext * prf_cx;
CK_RV crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
PRUint32 keySize;
PRUint32 blockSize;
if (key_type != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)
return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; /* CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED */
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
keyVal = pk11_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
keySize = (!keyVal) ? 0 : keyVal->attrib.ulValueLen;
blockSize = keySize + sizeof(TLSPRFContext);
prf_cx = (TLSPRFContext *)PORT_Alloc(blockSize);
if (!prf_cx)
goto done;
prf_cx->cxSize = blockSize;
prf_cx->cxKeyLen = keySize;
prf_cx->cxDataLen = 0;
prf_cx->cxRv = SECSuccess;
if (keySize)
PORT_Memcpy(prf_cx->cxBuf, keyVal->attrib.pValue, keySize);
context->hashInfo = (void *) prf_cx;
context->cipherInfo = (void *) prf_cx;
context->hashUpdate = (PK11Hash) pk11_TLSPRFHashUpdate;
context->end = (PK11End) pk11_TLSPRFEnd;
context->update = (PK11Cipher) pk11_TLSPRFUpdate;
context->verify = (PK11Verify) pk11_TLSPRFVerify;
context->destroy = (PK11Destroy) pk11_Null;
context->hashdestroy = (PK11Destroy) pk11_TLSPRFHashDestroy;
crv = CKR_OK;
done:
if (keyVal)
pk11_FreeAttribute(keyVal);
return crv;
}
/*
************** Crypto Functions: Sign ************************
*/
/*
* Check if We're using CBCMacing and initialize the session context if we are.
*/
static CK_RV
pk11_InitCBCMac(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyUsage,
PK11ContextType contextType)
{
CK_MECHANISM cbc_mechanism;
CK_ULONG mac_bytes = PK11_INVALID_MAC_SIZE;
CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS rc2_params;
#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS rc5_params;
CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *rc5_mac;
#endif
unsigned char ivBlock[PK11_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
PK11SessionContext *context;
CK_RV crv;
int blockSize;
switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL:
mac_bytes =
((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength;
/* fall through */
case CKM_RC2_MAC:
/* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the
* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS */
rc2_params.ulEffectiveBits = ((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)
pMechanism->pParameter)->ulEffectiveBits;
PORT_Memset(rc2_params.iv,0,sizeof(rc2_params.iv));
cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC2_CBC;
cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc2_params;
cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc2_params);
blockSize = 8;
break;
#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
case CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL:
mac_bytes =
((CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength;
/* fall through */
case CKM_RC5_MAC:
/* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the
* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS */
rc5_mac = (CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
rc5_params.ulWordsize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize;
rc5_params.ulRounds = rc5_mac->ulRounds;
rc5_params.pIv = ivBlock;
blockSize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize*2;
rc5_params.ulIvLen = blockSize;
PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC5_CBC;
cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc5_params;
cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc5_params);
break;
#endif
/* add cast and idea later */
case CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL:
mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
/* fall through */
case CKM_DES_MAC:
blockSize = 8;
PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES_CBC;
cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
break;
case CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL:
mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
/* fall through */
case CKM_DES3_MAC:
blockSize = 8;
PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES3_CBC;
cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
break;
case CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL:
mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
/* fall through */
case CKM_CDMF_MAC:
blockSize = 8;
PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_CDMF_CBC;
cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
break;
case CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL:
mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
/* fall through */
case CKM_AES_MAC:
blockSize = 16;
PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_AES_CBC;
cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
break;
default:
return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
crv = pk11_CryptInit(hSession, &cbc_mechanism, hKey, keyUsage,
contextType, PR_TRUE);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
crv = pk11_GetContext(hSession,&context,contextType,PR_TRUE,NULL);
/* this shouldn't happen! */
PORT_Assert(crv == CKR_OK);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
context->blockSize = blockSize;
if (mac_bytes == PK11_INVALID_MAC_SIZE) mac_bytes = blockSize/2;
context->macSize = mac_bytes;
return CKR_OK;
}
/*
* encode RSA PKCS #1 Signature data before signing...
*/
static SECStatus
pk11_HashSign(PK11HashSignInfo *info,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int *sigLen,
unsigned int maxLen,unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
{
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
SECItem digder;
PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
SGNDigestInfo *di = NULL;
digder.data = NULL;
arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
if ( !arena ) { goto loser; }
/* Construct digest info */
di = SGN_CreateDigestInfo(info->hashOid, hash, hashLen);
if (!di) { goto loser; }
/* Der encode the digest as a DigestInfo */
rv = DER_Encode(arena, &digder, SGNDigestInfoTemplate, di);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
/*
** Encrypt signature after constructing appropriate PKCS#1 signature
** block
*/
rv = RSA_Sign(info->key,sig,sigLen,maxLen,digder.data,digder.len);
loser:
SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di);
if (arena != NULL) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
}
return rv;
}
static SECStatus
nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen,
void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
{
SECItem signature, digest;
NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)ctx;
signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
signature.len = sigLen;
digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
digest.len = dataLen;
return DSA_VerifyDigest(&(key->u.dsa), &signature, &digest);
}
static SECStatus
nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf,
unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxSigLen,
void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
{
SECItem signature = { 0 }, digest;
SECStatus rv;
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)ctx;
(void)SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &signature, maxSigLen);
digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
digest.len = dataLen;
rv = DSA_SignDigest(&(key->u.dsa), &signature, &digest);
*sigLen = signature.len;
PORT_Memcpy(sigBuf, signature.data, signature.len);
SECITEM_FreeItem(&signature, PR_FALSE);
return rv;
}
/* NSC_SignInit setups up the signing operations. There are three basic
* types of signing:
* (1) the tradition single part, where "Raw RSA" or "Raw DSA" is applied
* to data in a single Sign operation (which often looks a lot like an
* encrypt, with data coming in and data going out).
* (2) Hash based signing, where we continually hash the data, then apply
* some sort of signature to the end.
* (3) Block Encryption CBC MAC's, where the Data is encrypted with a key,
* and only the final block is part of the mac.
*
* For case number 3, we initialize a context much like the Encryption Context
* (in fact we share code). We detect case 3 in C_SignUpdate, C_Sign, and
* C_Final by the following method... if it's not multi-part, and it's doesn't
* have a hash context, it must be a block Encryption CBC MAC.
*
* For case number 2, we initialize a hash structure, as well as make it
* multi-part. Updates are simple calls to the hash update function. Final
* calls the hashend, then passes the result to the 'update' function (which
* operates as a final signature function). In some hash based MAC'ing (as
* opposed to hash base signatures), the update function is can be simply a
* copy (as is the case with HMAC).
*/
CK_RV NSC_SignInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
{
PK11Session *session;
PK11Object *key;
PK11SessionContext *context;
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
PK11HashSignInfo *info = NULL;
/* Block Cipher MACing Algorithms use a different Context init method..*/
crv = pk11_InitCBCMac(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_SIGN, PK11_SIGN);
if (crv != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) return crv;
/* we're not using a block cipher mac */
session = pk11_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
crv = pk11_InitGeneric(session,&context,PK11_SIGN,&key,hKey,&key_type,
CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,CKA_SIGN);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
context->multi = PR_FALSE;
switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS:
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
crv = pk11_doSubMD5(context);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
context->update = (PK11Cipher) pk11_HashSign;
info = (PK11HashSignInfo *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(PK11HashSignInfo));
if (info == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
info->hashOid = SEC_OID_MD5;
goto finish_rsa;
case CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS:
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
crv = pk11_doSubMD2(context);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
context->update = (PK11Cipher) pk11_HashSign;
info = (PK11HashSignInfo *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(PK11HashSignInfo));
if (info == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
info->hashOid = SEC_OID_MD2;
goto finish_rsa;
case CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS:
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
crv = pk11_doSubSHA1(context);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
context->update = (PK11Cipher) pk11_HashSign;
info = (PK11HashSignInfo *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(PK11HashSignInfo));
if (info == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
info->hashOid = SEC_OID_SHA1;
goto finish_rsa;
case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
context->update = (PK11Cipher) RSA_Sign;
goto finish_rsa;
case CKM_RSA_X_509:
context->update = (PK11Cipher) RSA_SignRaw;
finish_rsa:
if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
if (info) PORT_Free(info);
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
context->multi = PR_FALSE;
privKey = pk11_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA);
if (privKey == NULL) {
if (info) PORT_Free(info);
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
/* OK, info is allocated only if we're doing hash and sign mechanism.
* It's necessary to be able to set the correct OID in the final
* signature.
*/
if (info) {
info->key = privKey;
context->cipherInfo = info;
context->destroy = (PK11Destroy)pk11_Space;
} else {
context->cipherInfo = privKey;
context->destroy = (PK11Destroy)pk11_Null;
}
break;
case CKM_DSA_SHA1:
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
crv = pk11_doSubSHA1(context);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
/* fall through */
case CKM_DSA:
if (key_type != CKK_DSA) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
privKey = pk11_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_DSA);
if (privKey == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
context->cipherInfo = privKey;
context->update = (PK11Cipher) nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub;
context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ?
(PK11Destroy) pk11_Null:(PK11Destroy)pk11_FreePrivKey;
break;
case CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL:
crv = pk11_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgMD2,key,
*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
break;
case CKM_MD2_HMAC:
crv = pk11_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgMD2,key,MD2_LENGTH);
break;
case CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL:
crv = pk11_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgMD5,key,
*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
break;
case CKM_MD5_HMAC:
crv = pk11_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgMD5,key,MD5_LENGTH);
break;
case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
crv = pk11_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,
*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
break;
case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
crv = pk11_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,SHA1_LENGTH);
break;
case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC:
crv = pk11_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_MD5,key,
*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
break;
case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC:
crv = pk11_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_SHA1,key,
*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
break;
case CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL:
crv = pk11_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type);
break;
default:
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeContext(context);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
pk11_SetContextByType(session, PK11_SIGN, context);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OK;
}
/* MACUpdate is the common implementation for SignUpdate and VerifyUpdate.
* (sign and verify only very in their setup and final operations) */
static CK_RV
pk11_MACUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
CK_ULONG ulPartLen,PK11ContextType type)
{
unsigned int outlen;
PK11SessionContext *context;
CK_RV crv;
SECStatus rv;
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = pk11_GetContext(hSession,&context,type,PR_FALSE,NULL);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
if (context->hashInfo) {
(*context->hashUpdate)(context->hashInfo, pPart, ulPartLen);
return CKR_OK;
}
/* must be block cipher macing */
/* deal with previous buffered data */
if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
int i;
/* fill in the padded to a full block size */
for (i=context->padDataLength; (ulPartLen != 0) &&
i < (int)context->blockSize; i++) {
context->padBuf[i] = *pPart++;
ulPartLen--;
context->padDataLength++;
}
/* not enough data to encrypt yet? then return */
if (context->padDataLength != context->blockSize) return CKR_OK;
/* encrypt the current padded data */
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,context->macBuf,&outlen,
PK11_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE,context->padBuf,context->blockSize);
if (rv != SECSuccess) return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
/* save the residual */
context->padDataLength = ulPartLen % context->blockSize;
if (context->padDataLength) {
PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf,
&pPart[ulPartLen-context->padDataLength],
context->padDataLength);
ulPartLen -= context->padDataLength;
}
/* if we've exhausted our new buffer, we're done */
if (ulPartLen == 0) { return CKR_OK; }
/* run the data through out encrypter */
while (ulPartLen) {
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, context->padBuf, &outlen,
PK11_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, pPart, context->blockSize);
if (rv != SECSuccess) return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
/* paranoia.. make sure we exit the loop */
PORT_Assert(ulPartLen >= context->blockSize);
if (ulPartLen < context->blockSize) break;
ulPartLen -= context->blockSize;
}
return CKR_OK;
}
/* NSC_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation,
* where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data,
* and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */
CK_RV NSC_SignUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
{
return pk11_MACUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, PK11_SIGN);
}
/* NSC_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation,
* returning the signature. */
CK_RV NSC_SignFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
{
PK11Session *session;
PK11SessionContext *context;
unsigned int outlen;
unsigned int digestLen;
unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulSignatureLen;
unsigned char tmpbuf[PK11_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
CK_RV crv;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
/* make sure we're legal */
*pulSignatureLen = 0;
crv = pk11_GetContext(hSession,&context,PK11_SIGN,PR_TRUE,&session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
if (context->hashInfo) {
(*context->end)(context->hashInfo, tmpbuf, &digestLen, sizeof(tmpbuf));
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
&outlen, maxoutlen, tmpbuf, digestLen);
*pulSignatureLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
} else {
/* deal with the last block if any residual */
if (context->padDataLength) {
/* fill out rest of pad buffer with pad magic*/
int i;
for (i=context->padDataLength; i < (int)context->blockSize; i++) {
context->padBuf[i] = 0;
}
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,context->macBuf,
&outlen,PK11_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE,context->padBuf,context->blockSize);
}
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
PORT_Memcpy(pSignature,context->macBuf,context->macSize);
*pulSignatureLen = context->macSize;
}
}
pk11_FreeContext(context);
pk11_SetContextByType(session, PK11_SIGN, NULL);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
/* NSC_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single part,
* where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data,
* and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */
CK_RV NSC_Sign(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pData,CK_ULONG ulDataLen,CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
{
PK11Session *session;
PK11SessionContext *context;
unsigned int outlen;
unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulSignatureLen;
CK_RV crv,crv2;
SECStatus rv;
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = pk11_GetContext(hSession,&context,PK11_SIGN,PR_FALSE,&session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
/* multi part Signing are completely implemented by SignUpdate and
* sign Final */
if (context->multi) {
pk11_FreeSession(session);
crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession,pData,ulDataLen);
if (crv != CKR_OK) *pulSignatureLen = 0;
crv2 = NSC_SignFinal(hSession, pSignature, pulSignatureLen);
return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 :crv;
}
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
&outlen, maxoutlen, pData, ulDataLen);
*pulSignatureLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
pk11_FreeContext(context);
pk11_SetContextByType(session, PK11_SIGN, NULL);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
/*
************** Crypto Functions: Sign Recover ************************
*/
/* NSC_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation,
* where the (digest) data can be recovered from the signature.
* E.g. encryption with the user's private key */
CK_RV NSC_SignRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
{
switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
case CKM_RSA_X_509:
return NSC_SignInit(hSession,pMechanism,hKey);
default:
break;
}
return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
}
/* NSC_SignRecover signs data in a single operation
* where the (digest) data can be recovered from the signature.
* E.g. encryption with the user's private key */
CK_RV NSC_SignRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
{
return NSC_Sign(hSession,pData,ulDataLen,pSignature,pulSignatureLen);
}
/*
************** Crypto Functions: verify ************************
*/
/* Handle RSA Signature formating */
static SECStatus
pk11_hashCheckSign(PK11HashVerifyInfo *info, unsigned char *sig,
unsigned int sigLen, unsigned char *digest, unsigned int digestLen)
{
SECItem it;
SGNDigestInfo *di = NULL;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
it.data = NULL;
if (info->key == NULL) goto loser;
it.len = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(info->key);
if (!it.len) goto loser;
it.data = (unsigned char *) PORT_Alloc(it.len);
if (it.data == NULL) goto loser;
/* decrypt the block */
rv = RSA_CheckSignRecover(info->key, it.data, &it.len, it.len, sig, sigLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
di = SGN_DecodeDigestInfo(&it);
if (di == NULL) goto loser;
if (di->digest.len != digestLen) goto loser;
/* make sure the tag is OK */
if (SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&di->digestAlgorithm) != info->hashOid) {
goto loser;
}
/* Now check the signature */
if (PORT_Memcmp(digest, di->digest.data, di->digest.len) == 0) {
goto done;
}
loser:
rv = SECFailure;
done:
if (it.data != NULL) PORT_Free(it.data);
if (di != NULL) SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di);
return rv;
}
/* NSC_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation,
* where the signature is an appendix to the data,
* and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA) */
CK_RV NSC_VerifyInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
{
PK11Session *session;
PK11Object *key;
PK11SessionContext *context;
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
PK11HashVerifyInfo *info = NULL;
/* Block Cipher MACing Algorithms use a different Context init method..*/
crv = pk11_InitCBCMac(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_VERIFY, PK11_VERIFY);
if (crv != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) return crv;
session = pk11_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
crv = pk11_InitGeneric(session,&context,PK11_VERIFY,&key,hKey,&key_type,
CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,CKA_VERIFY);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
context->multi = PR_FALSE;
switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS:
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
crv = pk11_doSubMD5(context);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
context->verify = (PK11Verify) pk11_hashCheckSign;
info = (PK11HashVerifyInfo *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(PK11HashVerifyInfo));
if (info == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
info->hashOid = SEC_OID_MD5;
goto finish_rsa;
case CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS:
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
crv = pk11_doSubMD2(context);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
context->verify = (PK11Verify) pk11_hashCheckSign;
info = (PK11HashVerifyInfo *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(PK11HashVerifyInfo));
if (info == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
info->hashOid = SEC_OID_MD2;
goto finish_rsa;
case CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS:
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
crv = pk11_doSubSHA1(context);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
context->verify = (PK11Verify) pk11_hashCheckSign;
info = (PK11HashVerifyInfo *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(PK11HashVerifyInfo));
if (info == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
info->hashOid = SEC_OID_SHA1;
goto finish_rsa;
case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
context->verify = (PK11Verify) RSA_CheckSign;
goto finish_rsa;
case CKM_RSA_X_509:
context->verify = (PK11Verify) RSA_CheckSignRaw;
finish_rsa:
if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
pubKey = pk11_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA);
if (pubKey == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
if (info) {
info->key = pubKey;
context->cipherInfo = info;
context->destroy = pk11_Space;
} else {
context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
context->destroy = pk11_Null;
}
break;
case CKM_DSA_SHA1:
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
crv = pk11_doSubSHA1(context);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
/* fall through */
case CKM_DSA:
if (key_type != CKK_DSA) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
context->multi = PR_FALSE;
pubKey = pk11_GetPubKey(key,CKK_DSA);
if (pubKey == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
context->verify = (PK11Verify) nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub;
context->destroy = pk11_Null;
break;
case CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL:
crv = pk11_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgMD2,key,
*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
break;
case CKM_MD2_HMAC:
crv = pk11_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgMD2,key,MD2_LENGTH);
break;
case CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL:
crv = pk11_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgMD5,key,
*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
break;
case CKM_MD5_HMAC:
crv = pk11_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgMD5,key,MD5_LENGTH);
break;
case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
crv = pk11_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,
*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
break;
case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
crv = pk11_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,SHA1_LENGTH);
break;
case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC:
crv = pk11_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_MD5,key,
*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
break;
case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC:
crv = pk11_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_SHA1,key,
*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
break;
case CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL:
crv = pk11_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type);
default:
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(context);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
pk11_SetContextByType(session, PK11_VERIFY, context);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OK;
}
/* NSC_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation,
* where the signature is an appendix to the data,
* and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */
CK_RV NSC_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen)
{
PK11Session *session;
PK11SessionContext *context;
CK_RV crv;
SECStatus rv;
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = pk11_GetContext(hSession,&context,PK11_VERIFY,PR_FALSE,&session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
rv = (*context->verify)(context->cipherInfo,pSignature, ulSignatureLen,
pData, ulDataLen);
pk11_FreeContext(context);
pk11_SetContextByType(session, PK11_VERIFY, NULL);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
}
/* NSC_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification operation,
* where the signature is an appendix to the data,
* and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */
CK_RV NSC_VerifyUpdate( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
{
return pk11_MACUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, PK11_VERIFY);
}
/* NSC_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification operation,
* checking the signature. */
CK_RV NSC_VerifyFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen)
{
PK11Session *session;
PK11SessionContext *context;
unsigned int outlen;
unsigned int digestLen;
unsigned char tmpbuf[PK11_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
CK_RV crv;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = pk11_GetContext(hSession,&context,PK11_VERIFY,PR_TRUE,&session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
if (context->hashInfo) {
(*context->end)(context->hashInfo, tmpbuf, &digestLen, sizeof(tmpbuf));
rv = (*context->verify)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
ulSignatureLen, tmpbuf, digestLen);
} else {
if (context->padDataLength) {
/* fill out rest of pad buffer with pad magic*/
int i;
for (i=context->padDataLength; i < (int)context->blockSize; i++) {
context->padBuf[i] = 0;
}
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,context->macBuf,
&outlen,PK11_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE,context->padBuf,context->blockSize);
}
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
rv =(PORT_Memcmp(pSignature,context->macBuf,context->macSize) == 0)
? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
}
}
pk11_FreeContext(context);
pk11_SetContextByType(session, PK11_VERIFY, NULL);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
}
/*
************** Crypto Functions: Verify Recover ************************
*/
/* NSC_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification operation,
* where the data is recovered from the signature.
* E.g. Decryption with the user's public key */
CK_RV NSC_VerifyRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
{
PK11Session *session;
PK11Object *key;
PK11SessionContext *context;
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
session = pk11_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
crv = pk11_InitGeneric(session,&context,PK11_VERIFY_RECOVER,
&key,hKey,&key_type,CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
case CKM_RSA_X_509:
if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
context->multi = PR_FALSE;
pubKey = pk11_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA);
if (pubKey == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
context->update = (PK11Cipher) (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
? RSA_CheckSignRecoverRaw : RSA_CheckSignRecover);
context->destroy = pk11_Null;
break;
default:
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(context);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
pk11_SetContextByType(session, PK11_VERIFY_RECOVER, context);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OK;
}
/* NSC_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part operation,
* where the data is recovered from the signature.
* E.g. Decryption with the user's public key */
CK_RV NSC_VerifyRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pData,CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
{
PK11Session *session;
PK11SessionContext *context;
unsigned int outlen;
unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulDataLen;
CK_RV crv;
SECStatus rv;
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = pk11_GetContext(hSession,&context,PK11_VERIFY_RECOVER,
PR_FALSE,&session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen,
pSignature, ulSignatureLen);
*pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
pk11_FreeContext(context);
pk11_SetContextByType(session, PK11_VERIFY_RECOVER, NULL);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
/*
**************************** Random Functions: ************************
*/
/* NSC_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's random number
* generator. */
CK_RV NSC_SeedRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed,
CK_ULONG ulSeedLen)
{
SECStatus rv;
rv = RNG_RandomUpdate(pSeed, ulSeedLen);
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
/* NSC_GenerateRandom generates random data. */
CK_RV NSC_GenerateRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomData, CK_ULONG ulRandomLen)
{
SECStatus rv;
rv = RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(pRandomData, ulRandomLen);
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
/*
**************************** Key Functions: ************************
*/
/*
* generate a password based encryption key. This code uses
* PKCS5 to do the work.
*/
static CK_RV
nsc_pbe_key_gen(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pkcs5_pbe, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
char *buf, CK_ULONG *key_length, PRBool faulty3DES)
{
SECItem *pbe_key = NULL, iv, pwitem;
CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL;
*key_length = 0;
iv.data = NULL; iv.len = 0;
pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
pwitem.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pPassword;
pwitem.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulPasswordLen;
pbe_key = nsspkcs5_ComputeKeyAndIV(pkcs5_pbe, &pwitem, &iv, faulty3DES);
if (pbe_key == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
PORT_Memcpy(buf, pbe_key->data, pbe_key->len);
*key_length = pbe_key->len;
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(pbe_key, PR_TRUE);
pbe_key = NULL;
if (iv.data && pbe_params->pInitVector != NULL) {
PORT_Memcpy(pbe_params->pInitVector, iv.data, iv.len);
}
return CKR_OK;
}
static CK_RV
nsc_parameter_gen(CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11Object *key)
{
PK11Attribute *attribute;
CK_ULONG counter;
unsigned int seedBits = 0;
unsigned int primeBits;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
PQGParams *params = NULL;
PQGVerify *vfy = NULL;
SECStatus rv;
attribute = pk11_FindAttribute(key, CKA_PRIME_BITS);
if (attribute == NULL) {
return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
}
primeBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
pk11_FreeAttribute(attribute);
attribute = pk11_FindAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED_BITS);
if (attribute != NULL) {
seedBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
pk11_FreeAttribute(attribute);
}
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_PRIME_BITS);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED_BITS);
if (seedBits == 0) {
rv = PQG_ParamGen(primeBits, &params, &vfy);
} else {
rv = PQG_ParamGenSeedLen(primeBits,seedBits/8, &params, &vfy);
}
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_PRIME,
params->prime.data, params->prime.len);
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_SUBPRIME,
params->subPrime.data, params->subPrime.len);
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_BASE,
params->base.data, params->base.len);
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
counter = vfy->counter;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_COUNTER,
&counter, sizeof(counter));
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED,
vfy->seed.data, vfy->seed.len);
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_H,
vfy->h.data, vfy->h.len);
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
loser:
if (params) {
PQG_DestroyParams(params);
}
if (vfy) {
PQG_DestroyVerify(vfy);
}
return crv;
}
static CK_RV
nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism, CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type,
CK_ULONG *key_length)
{
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
switch (mechanism) {
case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN:
*key_type = CKK_RC2;
if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
break;
#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
case CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN:
*key_type = CKK_RC5;
if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
break;
#endif
case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN:
*key_type = CKK_RC4;
if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
break;
case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN:
*key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
break;
case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
*key_type = CKK_CDMF;
*key_length = 8;
break;
case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
*key_type = CKK_DES;
*key_length = 8;
break;
case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
*key_type = CKK_DES2;
*key_length = 16;
break;
case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
*key_type = CKK_DES3;
*key_length = 24;
break;
case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
*key_type = CKK_AES;
if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
break;
default:
PORT_Assert(0);
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
break;
}
return crv;
}
CK_RV
nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter **pbe)
{
SECItem salt;
CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL;
NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *params;
PRArenaPool *arena = NULL;
SECStatus rv;
*pbe = NULL;
arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
if (arena == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
params = (NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *) PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
sizeof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter));
if (params == NULL) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE);
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
params->poolp = arena;
params->ivLen = 0;
params->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PKCS12_V2;
params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
params->encAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1; /* any invalid value */
params->is2KeyDES = PR_FALSE;
params->keyID = pbeBitGenIntegrityKey;
pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
params->iter = pbe_params->ulIteration;
salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pSalt;
salt.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulSaltLen;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena,&params->salt,&salt);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE);
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC:
params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
params->keyLen = 20;
break;
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD5;
params->keyLen = 16;
break;
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD2;
params->keyLen = 16;
break;
default:
PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE);
return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
}
*pbe = params;
return CKR_OK;
}
/* maybe this should be table driven? */
static CK_RV
nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter **pbe,
CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type)
{
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
SECOidData *oid;
CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params;
NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *params;
SECItem salt;
*pbe = NULL;
oid = SECOID_FindOIDByMechanism(pMechanism->mechanism);
if (oid == NULL) {
return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
}
pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pSalt;
salt.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulSaltLen;
params=nsspkcs5_NewParam(oid->offset, &salt, pbe_params->ulIteration);
if (params == NULL) {
return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
}
switch (params->encAlg) {
case SEC_OID_DES_CBC:
*key_type = CKK_DES;
break;
case SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC:
*key_type = params->is2KeyDES ? CKK_DES2 : CKK_DES3;
break;
case SEC_OID_RC2_CBC:
*key_type = CKK_RC2;
break;
case SEC_OID_RC4:
*key_type = CKK_RC4;
break;
default:
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(params);
break;
}
if (crv == CKR_OK) {
*pbe = params;
}
return crv;
}
/* NSC_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key object. */
CK_RV NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,CK_ULONG ulCount,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
{
PK11Object *key;
PK11Session *session;
PRBool checkWeak = PR_FALSE;
CK_ULONG key_length = 0;
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS objclass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
int i;
PK11Slot *slot = pk11_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
char buf[MAX_KEY_LEN];
enum {nsc_pbe, nsc_ssl, nsc_bulk, nsc_param} key_gen_type;
NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param;
SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *rsa_pms;
CK_VERSION *version;
/* in very old versions of NSS, there were implementation errors with key
* generation methods. We want to beable to read these, but not
* produce them any more. The affected algorithm was 3DES.
*/
PRBool faultyPBE3DES = PR_FALSE;
/*
* now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
*/
key = pk11_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
if (key == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
/*
* load the template values into the object
*/
for (i=0; i < (int) ulCount; i++) {
if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
continue;
}
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key,pk11_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeObject(key);
return crv;
}
/* make sure we don't have any class, key_type, or value fields */
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_CLASS);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE);
/* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
key_gen_type = nsc_bulk; /* bulk key by default */
switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
checkWeak = PR_TRUE;
case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
case CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN:
#endif
crv = nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(pMechanism->mechanism,&key_type,&key_length);
break;
case CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN:
key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
key_length = 48;
key_gen_type = nsc_ssl;
break;
case CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC:
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
key_gen_type = nsc_pbe;
key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
crv = nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(pMechanism, &pbe_param);
break;
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_FAULTY_3DES_CBC:
faultyPBE3DES = PR_TRUE;
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC:
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC2_CBC:
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC:
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC2_CBC:
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC4:
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC4:
case CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC:
case CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC:
case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC:
case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC:
case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128:
case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40:
case CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC:
case CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC:
key_gen_type = nsc_pbe;
crv = nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(pMechanism,&pbe_param, &key_type);
break;
case CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN:
key_gen_type = nsc_param;
key_type = CKK_DSA;
objclass = CKO_KG_PARAMETERS;
crv = CKR_OK;
break;
default:
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
break;
}
/* make sure we aren't going to overflow the buffer */
if (sizeof(buf) < key_length) {
/* someone is getting pretty optimistic about how big their key can
* be... */
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) { pk11_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
/* if there was no error,
* key_type *MUST* be set in the switch statement above */
PORT_Assert( key_type != CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE );
/*
* now to the actual key gen.
*/
switch (key_gen_type) {
case nsc_pbe:
crv = nsc_pbe_key_gen(pbe_param, pMechanism, buf, &key_length,
faultyPBE3DES);
nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(pbe_param);
break;
case nsc_ssl:
rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *)buf;
version = (CK_VERSION *)pMechanism->pParameter;
rsa_pms->client_version[0] = version->major;
rsa_pms->client_version[1] = version->minor;
crv =
NSC_GenerateRandom(0,&rsa_pms->random[0], sizeof(rsa_pms->random));
break;
case nsc_bulk:
/* get the key, check for weak keys and repeat if found */
do {
crv = NSC_GenerateRandom(0, (unsigned char *)buf, key_length);
} while (crv == CKR_OK && checkWeak &&
pk11_IsWeakKey((unsigned char *)buf,key_type));
break;
case nsc_param:
/* generate parameters */
*buf = 0;
crv = nsc_parameter_gen(key_type,key);
break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) { pk11_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
/* Add the class, key_type, and value */
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_CLASS,&objclass,sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
if (crv != CKR_OK) { pk11_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type,sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
if (crv != CKR_OK) { pk11_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
if (key_length != 0) {
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE,buf,key_length);
if (crv != CKR_OK) { pk11_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
}
/* get the session */
session = pk11_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) {
pk11_FreeObject(key);
return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
/*
* handle the base object stuff
*/
crv = pk11_handleObject(key,session);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
if (pk11_isTrue(key,CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
pk11_forceAttribute(key,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
if (!pk11_isTrue(key,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
pk11_forceAttribute(key,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
*phKey = key->handle;
pk11_FreeObject(key);
return crv;
}
/* NSC_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair,
* creating new key objects. */
CK_RV NSC_GenerateKeyPair (CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate,
CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate,
CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey)
{
PK11Object * publicKey,*privateKey;
PK11Session * session;
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
SECStatus rv;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS privClass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
int i;
PK11Slot * slot = pk11_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
/* RSA */
int public_modulus_bits = 0;
SECItem pubExp;
RSAPrivateKey * rsaPriv;
/* DSA */
PQGParams pqgParam;
DHParams dhParam;
DSAPrivateKey * dsaPriv;
/* Diffie Hellman */
int private_value_bits = 0;
DHPrivateKey * dhPriv;
/*
* now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
*/
publicKey = pk11_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
if (publicKey == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
/*
* load the template values into the publicKey
*/
for (i=0; i < (int) ulPublicKeyAttributeCount; i++) {
if (pPublicKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_MODULUS_BITS) {
public_modulus_bits = *(CK_ULONG *)pPublicKeyTemplate[i].pValue;
continue;
}
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(publicKey,
pk11_attr_expand(&pPublicKeyTemplate[i]));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeObject(publicKey);
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
privateKey = pk11_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
if (privateKey == NULL) {
pk11_FreeObject(publicKey);
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
/*
* now load the private key template
*/
for (i=0; i < (int) ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount; i++) {
if (pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_BITS) {
private_value_bits = *(CK_ULONG *)pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].pValue;
continue;
}
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(privateKey,
pk11_attr_expand(&pPrivateKeyTemplate[i]));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeObject(publicKey);
pk11_FreeObject(privateKey);
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_CLASS);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_CLASS);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE);
/* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
/* format the keys */
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_MODULUS);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_MODULUS);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_1);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_2);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_1);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_2);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_COEFFICIENT);
key_type = CKK_RSA;
if (public_modulus_bits == 0) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
break;
}
/* extract the exponent */
crv=pk11_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pubExp,publicKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
pk11_item_expand(&pubExp));
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(pubExp.data);
break;
}
rsaPriv = RSA_NewKey(public_modulus_bits, &pubExp);
PORT_Free(pubExp.data);
if (rsaPriv == NULL) {
crv = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
break;
}
/* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the public key */
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_MODULUS,
pk11_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
/* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the private key */
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
pk11_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_MODULUS,
pk11_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT,
pk11_item_expand(&rsaPriv->privateExponent));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_1,
pk11_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime1));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_2,
pk11_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime2));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_1,
pk11_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent1));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_2,
pk11_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent2));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_COEFFICIENT,
pk11_item_expand(&rsaPriv->coefficient));
kpg_done:
/* Should zeroize the contents first, since this func doesn't. */
PORT_FreeArena(rsaPriv->arena, PR_TRUE);
break;
case CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_SUBPRIME);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE);
key_type = CKK_DSA;
/* extract the necessary paramters and copy them to the private key */
crv=pk11_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.prime,publicKey,CKA_PRIME);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv=pk11_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.subPrime,publicKey,
CKA_SUBPRIME);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
break;
}
crv=pk11_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.base,publicKey,CKA_BASE);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
break;
}
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME,
pk11_item_expand(&pqgParam.prime));
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
break;
}
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_SUBPRIME,
pk11_item_expand(&pqgParam.subPrime));
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
break;
}
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE,
pk11_item_expand(&pqgParam.base));
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
break;
}
/* Generate the key */
rv = DSA_NewKey(&pqgParam, &dsaPriv);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
if (rv != SECSuccess) { crv = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; break; }
/* store the generated key into the attributes */
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE,
pk11_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dsagn_done;
/* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the private key */
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
pk11_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dsagn_done;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE,
pk11_item_expand(&dsaPriv->privateValue));
dsagn_done:
/* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */
PORT_FreeArena(dsaPriv->params.arena, PR_TRUE);
break;
case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE);
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE);
key_type = CKK_DH;
/* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */
crv = pk11_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.prime, publicKey,
CKA_PRIME);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.base, publicKey, CKA_BASE);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
break;
}
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME,
pk11_item_expand(&dhParam.prime));
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
break;
}
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_BASE,
pk11_item_expand(&dhParam.base));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dhgn_done;
rv = DH_NewKey(&dhParam, &dhPriv);
PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
crv = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
break;
}
crv=pk11_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE,
pk11_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dhgn_done;
crv=pk11_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE,
pk11_item_expand(&dhPriv->privateValue));
dhgn_done:
/* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */
PORT_FreeArena(dhPriv->arena, PR_TRUE);
break;
default:
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeObject(privateKey);
pk11_FreeObject(publicKey);
return crv;
}
/* Add the class, key_type The loop lets us check errors blow out
* on errors and clean up at the bottom */
session = NULL; /* make pedtantic happy... session cannot leave the*/
/* loop below NULL unless an error is set... */
do {
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_CLASS,&privClass,
sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_CLASS,&pubClass,
sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type,
sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type,
sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
session = pk11_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
} while (0);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeObject(privateKey);
pk11_FreeObject(publicKey);
return crv;
}
/*
* handle the base object cleanup for the public Key
*/
crv = pk11_handleObject(privateKey,session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeSession(session);
pk11_FreeObject(privateKey);
pk11_FreeObject(publicKey);
return crv;
}
/*
* handle the base object cleanup for the private Key
* If we have any problems, we destroy the public Key we've
* created and linked.
*/
crv = pk11_handleObject(publicKey,session);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeObject(publicKey);
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,privateKey->handle);
pk11_FreeObject(privateKey);
return crv;
}
if (pk11_isTrue(privateKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
pk11_forceAttribute(privateKey,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,
&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
if (pk11_isTrue(publicKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
pk11_forceAttribute(publicKey,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,
&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
if (!pk11_isTrue(privateKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
pk11_forceAttribute(privateKey,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
if (!pk11_isTrue(publicKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
pk11_forceAttribute(publicKey,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
*phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
*phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
pk11_FreeObject(publicKey);
pk11_FreeObject(privateKey);
return CKR_OK;
}
static SECItem *pk11_PackagePrivateKey(PK11Object *key)
{
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lk = NULL;
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL;
PK11Attribute *attribute = NULL;
PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
SECOidTag algorithm = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
void *dummy, *param = NULL;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
SECItem *encodedKey = NULL;
if(!key) {
return NULL;
}
attribute = pk11_FindAttribute(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
if(!attribute) {
return NULL;
}
lk = pk11_GetPrivKey(key, *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)attribute->attrib.pValue);
pk11_FreeAttribute(attribute);
if(!lk) {
return NULL;
}
arena = PORT_NewArena(2048); /* XXX different size? */
if(!arena) {
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
pki = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo));
if(!pki) {
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
pki->arena = arena;
param = NULL;
switch(lk->keyType) {
case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey:
prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lk);
dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk,
nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate);
algorithm = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
break;
case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey:
prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lk);
dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk,
nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate);
prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lk->u.dsa.params);
param = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &(lk->u.dsa.params),
nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate);
algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE;
break;
case NSSLOWKEYDHKey:
default:
dummy = NULL;
break;
}
if(!dummy || ((lk->keyType == NSSLOWKEYDSAKey) && !param)) {
goto loser;
}
rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, &pki->algorithm, algorithm,
(SECItem*)param);
if(rv != SECSuccess) {
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(arena, &pki->version,
NSSLOWKEY_PRIVATE_KEY_INFO_VERSION);
if(!dummy) {
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
encodedKey = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, pki,
nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate);
loser:
if(arena) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
}
if(lk && (lk != key->objectInfo)) {
nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lk);
}
if(param) {
SECITEM_ZfreeItem((SECItem*)param, PR_TRUE);
}
if(rv != SECSuccess) {
return NULL;
}
return encodedKey;
}
/* it doesn't matter yet, since we colapse error conditions in the
* level above, but we really should map those few key error differences */
CK_RV pk11_mapWrap(CK_RV crv) { return crv; }
/* NSC_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */
CK_RV NSC_WrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen)
{
PK11Session *session;
PK11Attribute *attribute;
PK11Object *key;
CK_RV crv;
PRBool isLynks = PR_FALSE;
CK_ULONG len = 0;
session = pk11_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) {
return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
key = pk11_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
if (key == NULL) {
return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
switch(key->objclass) {
case CKO_SECRET_KEY:
attribute = pk11_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
if (attribute == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS) {
isLynks = PR_TRUE;
pMechanism->mechanism = CKM_DES_ECB;
len = *pulWrappedKeyLen;
}
crv = pk11_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey,
CKA_WRAP, PK11_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeAttribute(attribute);
break;
}
crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, (CK_BYTE_PTR)attribute->attrib.pValue,
attribute->attrib.ulValueLen,pWrappedKey,pulWrappedKeyLen);
if (isLynks && (crv == CKR_OK)) {
unsigned char buf[2];
crv = pk11_calcLynxChecksum(hSession,hWrappingKey,buf,
(unsigned char*)attribute->attrib.pValue,
attribute->attrib.ulValueLen);
if (len >= 10) {
pWrappedKey[8] = buf[0];
pWrappedKey[9] = buf[1];
*pulWrappedKeyLen = 10;
}
}
pk11_FreeAttribute(attribute);
break;
case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY:
{
SECItem *bpki = pk11_PackagePrivateKey(key);
if(!bpki) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
crv = pk11_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey,
CKA_WRAP, PK11_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
if(crv != CKR_OK) {
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE);
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, bpki->data, bpki->len,
pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen);
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE);
break;
}
default:
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
pk11_FreeObject(key);
return pk11_mapWrap(crv);
}
/*
* import a pprivate key info into the desired slot
*/
static SECStatus
pk11_unwrapPrivateKey(PK11Object *key, SECItem *bpki)
{
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_RSA;
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
const SEC_ASN1Template *keyTemplate, *paramTemplate;
void *paramDest = NULL;
PLArenaPool *arena;
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lpk = NULL;
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL;
SECItem *ck_id = NULL;
CK_RV crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
arena = PORT_NewArena(2048);
if(!arena) {
return SECFailure;
}
pki = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo));
if(!pki) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
return SECFailure;
}
if(SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(arena, pki, nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate, bpki)
!= SECSuccess) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
return SECFailure;
}
lpk = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey));
if(lpk == NULL) {
goto loser;
}
lpk->arena = arena;
switch(SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&pki->algorithm)) {
case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
keyTemplate = nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate;
paramTemplate = NULL;
paramDest = NULL;
lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYRSAKey;
prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk);
break;
case SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE:
keyTemplate = nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate;
paramTemplate = nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate;
paramDest = &(lpk->u.dsa.params);
lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYDSAKey;
prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lpk);
prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lpk->u.dsa.params);
break;
/* case NSSLOWKEYDHKey: */
default:
keyTemplate = NULL;
paramTemplate = NULL;
paramDest = NULL;
break;
}
if(!keyTemplate) {
goto loser;
}
/* decode the private key and any algorithm parameters */
rv = SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(arena, lpk, keyTemplate, &pki->privateKey);
if(rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
if(paramDest && paramTemplate) {
rv = SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(arena, paramDest, paramTemplate,
&(pki->algorithm.parameters));
if(rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
}
rv = SECFailure;
switch (lpk->keyType) {
case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey:
keyType = CKK_RSA;
if(pk11_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) {
pk11_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
}
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
sizeof(keyType));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_UNWRAP, &cktrue,
sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DECRYPT, &cktrue,
sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,
sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue,
sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_MODULUS,
pk11_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.modulus));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
pk11_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.publicExponent));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT,
pk11_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.privateExponent));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_1,
pk11_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime1));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_2,
pk11_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime2));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_1,
pk11_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent1));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_2,
pk11_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent2));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_COEFFICIENT,
pk11_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.coefficient));
break;
case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey:
keyType = CKK_DSA;
crv = (pk11_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) ? CKR_OK :
CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
sizeof(keyType));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,
sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue,
sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME,
pk11_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.prime));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SUBPRIME,
pk11_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.subPrime));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_BASE,
pk11_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.base));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE,
pk11_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.privateValue));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
break;
#ifdef notdef
case NSSLOWKEYDHKey:
template = dhTemplate;
templateCount = sizeof(dhTemplate)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE);
keyType = CKK_DH;
break;
#endif
/* what about fortezza??? */
default:
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
loser:
if(ck_id) {
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(ck_id, PR_TRUE);
}
if(lpk) {
nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lpk);
}
if(crv != CKR_OK) {
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/* NSC_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new key object. */
CK_RV NSC_UnwrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey,
CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
{
PK11Object *key = NULL;
PK11Session *session;
int key_length = 0;
unsigned char * buf = NULL;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
int i;
CK_ULONG bsize = ulWrappedKeyLen;
PK11Slot *slot = pk11_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
SECItem bpki;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS target_type = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
PRBool isLynks = PR_FALSE;
/*
* now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
*/
key = pk11_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
if (key == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
/*
* load the template values into the object
*/
for (i=0; i < (int) ulAttributeCount; i++) {
if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
continue;
}
if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_CLASS) {
target_type = *(CK_OBJECT_CLASS *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
}
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key,pk11_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeObject(key);
return crv;
}
/* LYNKS is a special key wrapping mechanism */
if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS) {
isLynks = PR_TRUE;
pMechanism->mechanism = CKM_DES_ECB;
ulWrappedKeyLen -= 2; /* don't decrypt the checksum */
}
crv = pk11_CryptInit(hSession,pMechanism,hUnwrappingKey,CKA_UNWRAP,
PK11_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeObject(key);
return pk11_mapWrap(crv);
}
/* allocate the buffer to decrypt into
* this assumes the unwrapped key is never larger than the
* wrapped key. For all the mechanisms we support this is true */
buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc( ulWrappedKeyLen);
bsize = ulWrappedKeyLen;
crv = NSC_Decrypt(hSession, pWrappedKey, ulWrappedKeyLen, buf, &bsize);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeObject(key);
PORT_Free(buf);
return pk11_mapWrap(crv);
}
switch(target_type) {
case CKO_SECRET_KEY:
if (!pk11_hasAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE)) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
break;
}
/* verify the Lynx checksum */
if (isLynks) {
unsigned char checkSum[2];
crv = pk11_calcLynxChecksum(hSession,hUnwrappingKey,checkSum,
buf,bsize);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
if ((ulWrappedKeyLen != 8) || (pWrappedKey[8] != checkSum[0])
|| (pWrappedKey[9] != checkSum[1])) {
crv = CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID;
break;
}
}
if(key_length == 0) {
key_length = bsize;
}
if (key_length > MAX_KEY_LEN) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
/* add the value */
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE,buf,key_length);
break;
case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY:
bpki.data = (unsigned char *)buf;
bpki.len = bsize;
crv = CKR_OK;
if(pk11_unwrapPrivateKey(key, &bpki) != SECSuccess) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
}
break;
default:
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
PORT_ZFree(buf, bsize);
if (crv != CKR_OK) { pk11_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
/* get the session */
session = pk11_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) {
pk11_FreeObject(key);
return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
/*
* handle the base object stuff
*/
crv = pk11_handleObject(key,session);
*phKey = key->handle;
pk11_FreeSession(session);
pk11_FreeObject(key);
return crv;
}
/*
* The SSL key gen mechanism create's lots of keys. This function handles the
* details of each of these key creation.
*/
static CK_RV
pk11_buildSSLKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, PK11Object *baseKey,
PRBool isMacKey, unsigned char *keyBlock, unsigned int keySize,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *keyHandle)
{
PK11Object *key;
PK11Session *session;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
CK_RV crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
/*
* now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
*/
*keyHandle = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
key = pk11_NewObject(baseKey->slot);
if (key == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
pk11_narrowToSessionObject(key)->wasDerived = PR_TRUE;
crv = pk11_CopyObject(key,baseKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
if (isMacKey) {
crv = pk11_forceAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&keyType,sizeof(keyType));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
crv = pk11_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DERIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
crv = pk11_forceAttribute(key,CKA_ENCRYPT,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
crv = pk11_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DECRYPT,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
crv = pk11_forceAttribute(key,CKA_SIGN,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
crv = pk11_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VERIFY,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
crv = pk11_forceAttribute(key,CKA_WRAP,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
crv = pk11_forceAttribute(key,CKA_UNWRAP,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
}
crv = pk11_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,keyBlock,keySize);
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
/* get the session */
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
session = pk11_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) { goto loser; }
crv = pk11_handleObject(key,session);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
*keyHandle = key->handle;
loser:
if (key) pk11_FreeObject(key);
return crv;
}
/*
* if there is an error, we need to free the keys we already created in SSL
* This is the routine that will do it..
*/
static void
pk11_freeSSLKeys(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT *returnedMaterial ) {
if (returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
NSC_DestroyObject(session,returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret);
}
if (returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret);
}
if (returnedMaterial->hClientKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hClientKey);
}
if (returnedMaterial->hServerKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerKey);
}
}
/*
* when deriving from sensitive and extractable keys, we need to preserve some
* of the semantics in the derived key. This helper routine maintains these
* semantics.
*/
static CK_RV
pk11_DeriveSensitiveCheck(PK11Object *baseKey,PK11Object *destKey) {
PRBool hasSensitive;
PRBool sensitive = PR_FALSE;
PRBool hasExtractable;
PRBool extractable = PR_TRUE;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
PK11Attribute *att;
hasSensitive = PR_FALSE;
att = pk11_FindAttribute(destKey,CKA_SENSITIVE);
if (att) {
hasSensitive = PR_TRUE;
sensitive = (PRBool) *(CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue;
pk11_FreeAttribute(att);
}
hasExtractable = PR_FALSE;
att = pk11_FindAttribute(destKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE);
if (att) {
hasExtractable = PR_TRUE;
extractable = (PRBool) *(CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue;
pk11_FreeAttribute(att);
}
/* don't make a key more accessible */
if (pk11_isTrue(baseKey,CKA_SENSITIVE) && hasSensitive &&
(sensitive == PR_FALSE)) {
return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
}
if (!pk11_isTrue(baseKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE) && hasExtractable &&
(extractable == PR_TRUE)) {
return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
}
/* inherit parent's sensitivity */
if (!hasSensitive) {
att = pk11_FindAttribute(baseKey,CKA_SENSITIVE);
if (att == NULL) return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
crv = pk11_defaultAttribute(destKey,pk11_attr_expand(&att->attrib));
pk11_FreeAttribute(att);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
}
if (!hasExtractable) {
att = pk11_FindAttribute(baseKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE);
if (att == NULL) return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
crv = pk11_defaultAttribute(destKey,pk11_attr_expand(&att->attrib));
pk11_FreeAttribute(att);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
}
/* we should inherit the parent's always extractable/ never sensitive info,
* but handleObject always forces this attributes, so we would need to do
* something special. */
return CKR_OK;
}
/*
* make known fixed PKCS #11 key types to their sizes in bytes
*/
static unsigned long
pk11_MapKeySize(CK_KEY_TYPE keyType) {
switch (keyType) {
case CKK_CDMF:
return 8;
case CKK_DES:
return 8;
case CKK_DES2:
return 16;
case CKK_DES3:
return 24;
/* IDEA and CAST need to be added */
default:
break;
}
return 0;
}
#define PHASH_STATE_MAX_LEN 20
/* TLS P_hash function */
static SECStatus
pk11_P_hash(HASH_HashType hashType, const SECItem *secret, const char *label,
SECItem *seed, SECItem *result)
{
unsigned char state[PHASH_STATE_MAX_LEN];
unsigned char outbuf[PHASH_STATE_MAX_LEN];
unsigned int state_len = 0, label_len = 0, outbuf_len = 0, chunk_size;
unsigned int remaining;
unsigned char *res;
SECStatus status;
HMACContext *cx;
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
const SECHashObject *hashObj = &SECRawHashObjects[hashType];
PORT_Assert((secret != NULL) && (secret->data != NULL || !secret->len));
PORT_Assert((seed != NULL) && (seed->data != NULL));
PORT_Assert((result != NULL) && (result->data != NULL));
remaining = result->len;
res = result->data;
if (label != NULL)
label_len = PORT_Strlen(label);
cx = HMAC_Create(hashObj, secret->data, secret->len);
if (cx == NULL)
goto loser;
/* initialize the state = A(1) = HMAC_hash(secret, seed) */
HMAC_Begin(cx);
HMAC_Update(cx, (unsigned char *)label, label_len);
HMAC_Update(cx, seed->data, seed->len);
status = HMAC_Finish(cx, state, &state_len, PHASH_STATE_MAX_LEN);
if (status != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* generate a block at a time until we're done */
while (remaining > 0) {
HMAC_Begin(cx);
HMAC_Update(cx, state, state_len);
if (label_len)
HMAC_Update(cx, (unsigned char *)label, label_len);
HMAC_Update(cx, seed->data, seed->len);
status = HMAC_Finish(cx, outbuf, &outbuf_len, PHASH_STATE_MAX_LEN);
if (status != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* Update the state = A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) */
HMAC_Begin(cx);
HMAC_Update(cx, state, state_len);
status = HMAC_Finish(cx, state, &state_len, PHASH_STATE_MAX_LEN);
if (status != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
chunk_size = PR_MIN(outbuf_len, remaining);
PORT_Memcpy(res, &outbuf, chunk_size);
res += chunk_size;
remaining -= chunk_size;
}
rv = SECSuccess;
loser:
/* if (cx) HMAC_Destroy(cx); */
/* clear out state so it's not left on the stack */
if (cx) HMAC_Destroy(cx);
PORT_Memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));
PORT_Memset(outbuf, 0, sizeof(outbuf));
return rv;
}
static SECStatus
pk11_PRF(const SECItem *secret, const char *label, SECItem *seed,
SECItem *result)
{
SECStatus rv = SECFailure, status;
unsigned int i;
SECItem tmp = { siBuffer, NULL, 0};
SECItem S1;
SECItem S2;
PORT_Assert((secret != NULL) && (secret->data != NULL || !secret->len));
PORT_Assert((seed != NULL) && (seed->data != NULL));
PORT_Assert((result != NULL) && (result->data != NULL));
S1.type = siBuffer;
S1.len = (secret->len / 2) + (secret->len & 1);
S1.data = secret->data;
S2.type = siBuffer;
S2.len = S1.len;
S2.data = secret->data + (secret->len - S2.len);
tmp.data = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(result->len);
if (tmp.data == NULL)
goto loser;
tmp.len = result->len;
status = pk11_P_hash(HASH_AlgMD5, &S1, label, seed, result);
if (status != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
status = pk11_P_hash(HASH_AlgSHA1, &S2, label, seed, &tmp);
if (status != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
for (i = 0; i < result->len; i++)
result->data[i] ^= tmp.data[i];
rv = SECSuccess;
loser:
if (tmp.data != NULL)
PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
return rv;
}
/*
* SSL Key generation given pre master secret
*/
#define NUM_MIXERS 9
static const char * const mixers[NUM_MIXERS] = {
"A",
"BB",
"CCC",
"DDDD",
"EEEEE",
"FFFFFF",
"GGGGGGG",
"HHHHHHHH",
"IIIIIIIII" };
#define SSL3_PMS_LENGTH 48
#define SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH 48
/* NSC_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key object. */
CK_RV NSC_DeriveKey( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
{
PK11Session * session;
PK11Slot * slot = pk11_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
PK11Object * key;
PK11Object * sourceKey;
PK11Attribute * att;
PK11Attribute * att2;
unsigned char * buf;
SHA1Context * sha;
MD5Context * md5;
MD2Context * md2;
CK_ULONG macSize;
CK_ULONG tmpKeySize;
CK_ULONG IVSize;
CK_ULONG keySize = 0;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS classType = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *stringPtr;
PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE;
PRBool isDH = PR_FALSE;
SECStatus rv;
int i;
unsigned int outLen;
unsigned char sha_out[SHA1_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_block[NUM_MIXERS * MD5_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_block2[MD5_LENGTH];
/*
* now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
*/
if (phKey) *phKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
key = pk11_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
if (key == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
/*
* load the template values into the object
*/
for (i=0; i < (int) ulAttributeCount; i++) {
crv = pk11_AddAttributeType(key,pk11_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) {
keyType = *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
}
if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
keySize = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
}
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) { pk11_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
if (keySize == 0) {
keySize = pk11_MapKeySize(keyType);
}
/* Derive can only create SECRET KEY's currently... */
classType = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
crv = pk11_forceAttribute (key,CKA_CLASS,&classType,sizeof(classType));
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeObject(key);
return crv;
}
/* look up the base key we're deriving with */
session = pk11_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) {
pk11_FreeObject(key);
return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
sourceKey = pk11_ObjectFromHandle(hBaseKey,session);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
if (sourceKey == NULL) {
pk11_FreeObject(key);
return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
/* don't use key derive to expose sensitive keys */
crv = pk11_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeObject(key);
pk11_FreeObject(sourceKey);
return crv;
}
/* get the value of the base key */
att = pk11_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_VALUE);
if (att == NULL) {
pk11_FreeObject(key);
pk11_FreeObject(sourceKey);
return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
/*
* generate the master secret
*/
case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
isTLS = PR_TRUE;
/* fall thru */
case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
{
CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *ssl3_master;
SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *rsa_pms;
if ((pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH) ||
(pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH))
isDH = PR_TRUE;
/* first do the consistancy checks */
if (!isDH && (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_PMS_LENGTH)) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
att2 = pk11_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue !=
CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) {
if (att2) pk11_FreeAttribute(att2);
crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
break;
}
pk11_FreeAttribute(att2);
if (keyType != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) {
crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
break;
}
if ((keySize != 0) && (keySize != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) {
crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
break;
}
/* finally do the key gen */
ssl3_master = (CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *)
pMechanism->pParameter;
if (ssl3_master->pVersion) {
PK11SessionObject *sessKey = pk11_narrowToSessionObject(key);
rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *) att->attrib.pValue;
/* don't leak more key material then necessary for SSL to work */
if ((sessKey == NULL) || sessKey->wasDerived) {
ssl3_master->pVersion->major = 0xff;
ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = 0xff;
} else {
ssl3_master->pVersion->major = rsa_pms->client_version[0];
ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = rsa_pms->client_version[1];
}
}
if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
if (isTLS) {
unsigned char crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
SECItem crsr = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
SECItem pms = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
SECStatus status;
pms.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue;
pms.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
master.data = key_block;
master.len = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH;
crsr.data = crsrdata;
crsr.len = sizeof(crsrdata);
PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata, ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pClientRandom,
SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH,
ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
status = pk11_PRF(&pms, "master secret", &crsr, &master);
if (status != SECSuccess) {
crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
break;
}
} else {
/* now allocate the hash contexts */
md5 = MD5_NewContext();
if (md5 == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
sha = SHA1_NewContext();
if (sha == NULL) {
PORT_Free(md5);
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
SHA1_Begin(sha);
SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char*) mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i]));
SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
SHA1_Update(sha, ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pClientRandom,
ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen);
SHA1_Update(sha, ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pServerRandom,
ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen);
SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH);
PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH);
MD5_Begin(md5);
MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen);
MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i*MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH);
}
PORT_Free(md5);
PORT_Free(sha);
}
/* store the results */
crv = pk11_forceAttribute
(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
crv = pk11_forceAttribute (key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&keyType,sizeof(keyType));
if (isTLS) {
/* TLS's master secret is used to "sign" finished msgs with PRF. */
/* XXX This seems like a hack. But PK11_Derive only accepts
* one "operation" argument. */
crv = pk11_forceAttribute(key,CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VERIFY,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
/* While we're here, we might as well force this, too. */
crv = pk11_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DERIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
}
break;
}
case CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
isTLS = PR_TRUE;
/* fall thru */
case CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
{
CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *ssl3_keys;
CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT * ssl3_keys_out;
CK_ULONG effKeySize;
crv = pk11_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH) {
crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
break;
}
att2 = pk11_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue !=
CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) {
if (att2) pk11_FreeAttribute(att2);
crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
break;
}
pk11_FreeAttribute(att2);
md5 = MD5_NewContext();
if (md5 == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
sha = SHA1_NewContext();
if (sha == NULL) {
PORT_Free(md5);
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
ssl3_keys = (CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter;
/*
* clear out our returned keys so we can recover on failure
*/
ssl3_keys_out = ssl3_keys->pReturnedKeyMaterial;
ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
/*
* generate the key material: This looks amazingly similar to the
* PMS code, and is clearly crying out for a function to provide it.
*/
if (isTLS) {
SECStatus status;
SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
SECItem srcr = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
SECItem keyblk = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
unsigned char srcrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
master.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue;
master.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
srcr.data = srcrdata;
srcr.len = sizeof srcrdata;
keyblk.data = key_block;
keyblk.len = sizeof key_block;
PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata,
ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom,
SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH,
ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom,
SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
status = pk11_PRF(&master, "key expansion", &srcr, &keyblk);
if (status != SECSuccess) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
} else {
/* key_block =
* MD5(master_secret + SHA('A' + master_secret +
* ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
* MD5(master_secret + SHA('BB' + master_secret +
* ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
* MD5(master_secret + SHA('CCC' + master_secret +
* ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
* [...];
*/
for (i = 0; i < NUM_MIXERS; i++) {
SHA1_Begin(sha);
SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char*) mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i]));
SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
SHA1_Update(sha, ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom,
ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen);
SHA1_Update(sha, ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom,
ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen);
SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH);
PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH);
MD5_Begin(md5);
MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen);
MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i*MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH);
}
}
/*
* Put the key material where it goes.
*/
i = 0; /* now shows how much consumed */
macSize = ssl3_keys->ulMacSizeInBits/8;
effKeySize = ssl3_keys->ulKeySizeInBits/8;
IVSize = ssl3_keys->ulIVSizeInBits/8;
if (keySize == 0) {
effKeySize = keySize;
}
/*
* The key_block is partitioned as follows:
* client_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size]
*/
crv = pk11_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_TRUE,&key_block[i],macSize,
&ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret);
if (crv != CKR_OK)
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
i += macSize;
/*
* server_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size]
*/
crv = pk11_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_TRUE,&key_block[i],macSize,
&ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
i += macSize;
if (keySize) {
if (!ssl3_keys->bIsExport) {
/*
** Generate Domestic write keys and IVs.
** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
*/
crv = pk11_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,&key_block[i],
keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
i += keySize;
/*
** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
*/
crv = pk11_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,&key_block[i],
keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
i += keySize;
/*
** client_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size]
*/
PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, &key_block[i], IVSize);
i += IVSize;
/*
** server_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size]
*/
PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, &key_block[i], IVSize);
i += IVSize;
PORT_Assert(i <= sizeof key_block);
} else if (!isTLS) {
/*
** Generate SSL3 Export write keys and IVs.
** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
** final_client_write_key = MD5(client_write_key +
** ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random);
*/
MD5_Begin(md5);
MD5_Update(md5, &key_block[i], effKeySize);
MD5_Update(md5, ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom,
ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen);
MD5_Update(md5, ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom,
ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen);
MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
i += effKeySize;
crv = pk11_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,key_block2,
keySize,&ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
/*
** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
** final_server_write_key = MD5(server_write_key +
** ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random);
*/
MD5_Begin(md5);
MD5_Update(md5, &key_block[i], effKeySize);
MD5_Update(md5, ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom,
ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen);
MD5_Update(md5, ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom,
ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen);
MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
i += effKeySize;
crv = pk11_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,key_block2,
keySize,&ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
/*
** client_write_IV =
** MD5(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random);
*/
MD5_Begin(md5);
MD5_Update(md5, ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom,
ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen);
MD5_Update(md5, ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom,
ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen);
MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, key_block2, IVSize);
/*
** server_write_IV =
** MD5(ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random);
*/
MD5_Begin(md5);
MD5_Update(md5, ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom,
ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen);
MD5_Update(md5, ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom,
ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen);
MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, key_block2, IVSize);
} else {
/*
** Generate TLS Export write keys and IVs.
*/
SECStatus status;
SECItem secret = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
SECItem crsr = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
SECItem keyblk = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
unsigned char crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
crsr.data = crsrdata;
crsr.len = sizeof crsrdata;
PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata,
ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom,
SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH,
ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom,
SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
/*
** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
** final_client_write_key = PRF(client_write_key,
** "client write key",
** client_random + server_random);
*/
secret.data = &key_block[i];
secret.len = effKeySize;
i += effKeySize;
keyblk.data = key_block2;
keyblk.len = sizeof key_block2;
status = pk11_PRF(&secret, "client write key", &crsr, &keyblk);
if (status != SECSuccess) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
crv = pk11_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, key_block2,
keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
/*
** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
** final_server_write_key = PRF(server_write_key,
** "server write key",
** client_random + server_random);
*/
secret.data = &key_block[i];
secret.len = effKeySize;
i += effKeySize;
keyblk.data = key_block2;
keyblk.len = sizeof key_block2;
status = pk11_PRF(&secret, "server write key", &crsr, &keyblk);
if (status != SECSuccess) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
crv = pk11_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, key_block2,
keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
/*
** iv_block = PRF("", "IV block",
** client_random + server_random);
** client_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size]
** server_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size]
*/
if (IVSize) {
secret.data = NULL;
secret.len = 0;
keyblk.data = &key_block[i];
keyblk.len = 2 * IVSize;
status = pk11_PRF(&secret, "IV block", &crsr, &keyblk);
if (status != SECSuccess) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, keyblk.data, IVSize);
PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, keyblk.data + IVSize,
IVSize);
}
}
}
crv = CKR_OK;
if (0) {
key_and_mac_derive_fail:
if (crv == CKR_OK)
crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
pk11_freeSSLKeys(hSession, ssl3_keys_out);
}
MD5_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE);
SHA1_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE);
pk11_FreeObject(key);
key = NULL;
break;
}
case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY:
{
PK11Object *newKey;
crv = pk11_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
session = pk11_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) {
crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
newKey = pk11_ObjectFromHandle(*(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *)
pMechanism->pParameter,session);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
if ( newKey == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
if (pk11_isTrue(newKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
crv = pk11_forceAttribute(newKey,CKA_SENSITIVE,&cktrue,
sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
pk11_FreeObject(newKey);
break;
}
}
att2 = pk11_FindAttribute(newKey,CKA_VALUE);
if (att2 == NULL) {
pk11_FreeObject(newKey);
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+att2->attrib.ulValueLen;
if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize;
if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
pk11_FreeObject(newKey);
pk11_FreeAttribute(att2);
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
if (buf == NULL) {
pk11_FreeAttribute(att2);
pk11_FreeObject(newKey);
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,att->attrib.ulValueLen);
PORT_Memcpy(buf+att->attrib.ulValueLen,
att2->attrib.pValue,att2->attrib.ulValueLen);
crv = pk11_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize);
pk11_FreeAttribute(att2);
pk11_FreeObject(newKey);
break;
}
case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA:
stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *) pMechanism->pParameter;
tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+stringPtr->ulLen;
if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize;
if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
if (buf == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,att->attrib.ulValueLen);
PORT_Memcpy(buf+att->attrib.ulValueLen,stringPtr->pData,
stringPtr->ulLen);
crv = pk11_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize);
break;
case CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE:
stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter;
tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+stringPtr->ulLen;
if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize;
if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
if (buf == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
PORT_Memcpy(buf,stringPtr->pData,stringPtr->ulLen);
PORT_Memcpy(buf+stringPtr->ulLen,att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
crv = pk11_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize);
break;
case CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA:
stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter;
tmpKeySize = PR_MIN(att->attrib.ulValueLen,stringPtr->ulLen);
if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize;
if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(keySize);
if (buf == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,keySize);
for (i=0; i < (int)keySize; i++) {
buf[i] ^= stringPtr->pData[i];
}
crv = pk11_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
PORT_ZFree(buf,keySize);
break;
case CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY:
{
/* the following assumes 8 bits per byte */
CK_ULONG extract = *(CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
CK_ULONG shift = extract & 0x7; /* extract mod 8 the fast way */
CK_ULONG offset = extract >> 3; /* extract div 8 the fast way */
if (keySize == 0) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
break;
}
/* make sure we have enough bits in the original key */
if (att->attrib.ulValueLen <
(offset + keySize + ((shift != 0)? 1 :0)) ) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(keySize);
if (buf == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
/* copy the bits we need into the new key */
for (i=0; i < (int)keySize; i++) {
unsigned char *value =
((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue)+offset+i;
if (shift) {
buf[i] = (value[0] << (shift)) | (value[1] >> (8 - shift));
} else {
buf[i] = value[0];
}
}
crv = pk11_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
PORT_ZFree(buf,keySize);
break;
}
case CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION:
if (keySize == 0) keySize = MD2_LENGTH;
if (keySize > MD2_LENGTH) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
/* now allocate the hash contexts */
md2 = MD2_NewContext();
if (md2 == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
MD2_Begin(md2);
MD2_Update(md2,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
MD2_End(md2,key_block,&outLen,MD2_LENGTH);
MD2_DestroyContext(md2, PR_TRUE);
crv = pk11_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
break;
case CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION:
if (keySize == 0) keySize = MD5_LENGTH;
if (keySize > MD5_LENGTH) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
/* now allocate the hash contexts */
md5 = MD5_NewContext();
if (md5 == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
MD5_Begin(md5);
MD5_Update(md5,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
MD5_End(md5,key_block,&outLen,MD5_LENGTH);
MD5_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE);
crv = pk11_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
break;
case CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION:
if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA1_LENGTH;
if (keySize > SHA1_LENGTH) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
/* now allocate the hash contexts */
sha = SHA1_NewContext();
if (sha == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
SHA1_Begin(sha);
SHA1_Update(sha,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
SHA1_End(sha,key_block,&outLen,SHA1_LENGTH);
SHA1_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE);
crv = pk11_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
break;
case CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE:
{
SECItem derived, dhPublic;
SECItem dhPrime, dhValue;
/* sourceKey - values for the local existing low key */
/* get prime and value attributes */
crv = pk11_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime, sourceKey, CKA_PRIME);
if (crv != SECSuccess) break;
crv = pk11_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhValue, sourceKey, CKA_VALUE);
if (crv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_Free(dhPrime.data);
break;
}
dhPublic.data = pMechanism->pParameter;
dhPublic.len = pMechanism->ulParameterLen;
/* calculate private value - oct */
rv = DH_Derive(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhValue, &derived, keySize);
PORT_Free(dhPrime.data);
PORT_Free(dhValue.data);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
pk11_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, derived.data, derived.len);
PORT_ZFree(derived.data, derived.len);
} else
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
default:
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
}
pk11_FreeAttribute(att);
pk11_FreeObject(sourceKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
if (key) pk11_FreeObject(key);
return crv;
}
/* link the key object into the list */
if (key) {
PK11SessionObject *sessKey = pk11_narrowToSessionObject(key);
PORT_Assert(sessKey);
/* get the session */
sessKey->wasDerived = PR_TRUE;
session = pk11_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) {
pk11_FreeObject(key);
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
crv = pk11_handleObject(key,session);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
*phKey = key->handle;
pk11_FreeObject(key);
}
return crv;
}
/* NSC_GetFunctionStatus obtains an updated status of a function running
* in parallel with an application. */
CK_RV NSC_GetFunctionStatus(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession)
{
return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL;
}
/* NSC_CancelFunction cancels a function running in parallel */
CK_RV NSC_CancelFunction(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession)
{
return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL;
}
/* NSC_GetOperationState saves the state of the cryptographic
*operation in a session.
* NOTE: This code only works for digest functions for now. eventually need
* to add full flatten/resurect to our state stuff so that all types of state
* can be saved */
CK_RV NSC_GetOperationState(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen)
{
PK11SessionContext *context;
PK11Session *session;
CK_RV crv;
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = pk11_GetContext(hSession, &context, PK11_HASH, PR_TRUE, &session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
*pulOperationStateLen = context->cipherInfoLen + sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)
+ sizeof(PK11ContextType);
if (pOperationState == NULL) {
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OK;
}
PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,&context->type,sizeof(PK11ContextType));
pOperationState += sizeof(PK11ContextType);
PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,&context->currentMech,
sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE);
PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,context->cipherInfo,context->cipherInfoLen);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OK;
}
#define pk11_Decrement(stateSize,len) \
stateSize = ((stateSize) > (CK_ULONG)(len)) ? \
((stateSize) - (CK_ULONG)(len)) : 0;
/* NSC_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic
* operation in a session. This is coded like it can restore lots of
* states, but it only works for truly flat cipher structures. */
CK_RV NSC_SetOperationState(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey)
{
PK11SessionContext *context;
PK11Session *session;
PK11ContextType type;
CK_MECHANISM mech;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
while (ulOperationStateLen != 0) {
/* get what type of state we're dealing with... */
PORT_Memcpy(&type,pOperationState, sizeof(PK11ContextType));
/* fix up session contexts based on type */
session = pk11_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
context = pk11_ReturnContextByType(session, type);
pk11_SetContextByType(session, type, NULL);
if (context) {
pk11_FreeContext(context);
}
pOperationState += sizeof(PK11ContextType);
pk11_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen,sizeof(PK11ContextType));
/* get the mechanism structure */
PORT_Memcpy(&mech.mechanism,pOperationState,sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE);
pk11_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen, sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
/* should be filled in... but not necessary for hash */
mech.pParameter = NULL;
mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
switch (type) {
case PK11_HASH:
crv = NSC_DigestInit(hSession,&mech);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = pk11_GetContext(hSession, &context, PK11_HASH, PR_TRUE,
NULL);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
PORT_Memcpy(context->cipherInfo,pOperationState,
context->cipherInfoLen);
pOperationState += context->cipherInfoLen;
pk11_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen,context->cipherInfoLen);
break;
default:
/* do sign/encrypt/decrypt later */
crv = CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID;
}
pk11_FreeSession(session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
}
return crv;
}
/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */
/* NSC_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting and encryption
* operation. */
CK_RV NSC_DigestEncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
{
CK_RV crv;
crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart,
pulEncryptedPartLen);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen);
return crv;
}
/* NSC_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
* digesting operation. */
CK_RV NSC_DecryptDigestUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen)
{
CK_RV crv;
crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen,
pPart, pulPartLen);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,pPart,*pulPartLen);
return crv;
}
/* NSC_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and
* encryption operation. */
CK_RV NSC_SignEncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
{
CK_RV crv;
crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart,
pulEncryptedPartLen);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen);
return crv;
}
/* NSC_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption
* and verify operation. */
CK_RV NSC_DecryptVerifyUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
{
CK_RV crv;
crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
pData, pulDataLen);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
crv = NSC_VerifyUpdate(hSession, pData, *pulDataLen);
return crv;
}
/* NSC_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting operation,
* by digesting the value of a secret key as part of the data already digested.
*/
CK_RV NSC_DigestKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
{
PK11Session *session = NULL;
PK11Object *key = NULL;
PK11Attribute *att;
CK_RV crv;
session = pk11_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
key = pk11_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session);
pk11_FreeSession(session);
if (key == NULL) return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
/* PUT ANY DIGEST KEY RESTRICTION CHECKS HERE */
/* make sure it's a valid key for this operation */
if (key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
pk11_FreeObject(key);
return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
}
/* get the key value */
att = pk11_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
pk11_FreeObject(key);
crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,(CK_BYTE_PTR)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
pk11_FreeAttribute(att);
return crv;
}
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