mirror of
https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev.git
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958 lines
28 KiB
C++
958 lines
28 KiB
C++
/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#include "nsIDNService.h"
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#include "nsReadableUtils.h"
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#include "nsCRT.h"
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#include "nsUnicharUtils.h"
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#include "nsUnicodeProperties.h"
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#include "nsUnicodeScriptCodes.h"
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#include "harfbuzz/hb.h"
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#include "nsIServiceManager.h"
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#include "nsIPrefService.h"
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#include "nsIPrefBranch.h"
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#include "nsIObserverService.h"
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#include "nsISupportsPrimitives.h"
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#include "punycode.h"
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#ifdef IDNA2008
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// Currently we use the non-transitional processing option -- see
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// http://unicode.org/reports/tr46/
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// To switch to transitional processing, change the value of this flag
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// and kTransitionalProcessing in netwerk/test/unit/test_idna2008.js to true
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// (revert bug 1218179).
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const bool kIDNA2008_TransitionalProcessing = false;
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#include "ICUUtils.h"
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#endif
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using namespace mozilla::unicode;
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//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// RFC 1034 - 3.1. Name space specifications and terminology
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static const uint32_t kMaxDNSNodeLen = 63;
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// RFC 3490 - 5. ACE prefix
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static const char kACEPrefix[] = "xn--";
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#define kACEPrefixLen 4
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//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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#define NS_NET_PREF_IDNBLACKLIST "network.IDN.blacklist_chars"
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#define NS_NET_PREF_SHOWPUNYCODE "network.IDN_show_punycode"
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#define NS_NET_PREF_IDNWHITELIST "network.IDN.whitelist."
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#define NS_NET_PREF_IDNUSEWHITELIST "network.IDN.use_whitelist"
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#define NS_NET_PREF_IDNRESTRICTION "network.IDN.restriction_profile"
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inline bool isOnlySafeChars(const nsAFlatString& in,
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const nsAFlatString& blacklist)
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{
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return (blacklist.IsEmpty() ||
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in.FindCharInSet(blacklist) == kNotFound);
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}
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//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// nsIDNService
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//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/* Implementation file */
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NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsIDNService,
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nsIIDNService,
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nsIObserver,
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nsISupportsWeakReference)
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nsresult nsIDNService::Init()
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{
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nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefService> prefs(do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID));
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if (prefs)
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prefs->GetBranch(NS_NET_PREF_IDNWHITELIST, getter_AddRefs(mIDNWhitelistPrefBranch));
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nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefInternal(do_QueryInterface(prefs));
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if (prefInternal) {
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prefInternal->AddObserver(NS_NET_PREF_IDNBLACKLIST, this, true);
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prefInternal->AddObserver(NS_NET_PREF_SHOWPUNYCODE, this, true);
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prefInternal->AddObserver(NS_NET_PREF_IDNRESTRICTION, this, true);
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prefInternal->AddObserver(NS_NET_PREF_IDNUSEWHITELIST, this, true);
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prefsChanged(prefInternal, nullptr);
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP nsIDNService::Observe(nsISupports *aSubject,
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const char *aTopic,
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const char16_t *aData)
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{
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if (!strcmp(aTopic, NS_PREFBRANCH_PREFCHANGE_TOPIC_ID)) {
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nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefBranch( do_QueryInterface(aSubject) );
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if (prefBranch)
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prefsChanged(prefBranch, aData);
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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void nsIDNService::prefsChanged(nsIPrefBranch *prefBranch, const char16_t *pref)
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{
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if (!pref || NS_LITERAL_STRING(NS_NET_PREF_IDNBLACKLIST).Equals(pref)) {
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nsCOMPtr<nsISupportsString> blacklist;
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nsresult rv = prefBranch->GetComplexValue(NS_NET_PREF_IDNBLACKLIST,
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NS_GET_IID(nsISupportsString),
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getter_AddRefs(blacklist));
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if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv))
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blacklist->ToString(getter_Copies(mIDNBlacklist));
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else
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mIDNBlacklist.Truncate();
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}
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if (!pref || NS_LITERAL_STRING(NS_NET_PREF_SHOWPUNYCODE).Equals(pref)) {
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bool val;
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if (NS_SUCCEEDED(prefBranch->GetBoolPref(NS_NET_PREF_SHOWPUNYCODE, &val)))
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mShowPunycode = val;
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}
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if (!pref || NS_LITERAL_STRING(NS_NET_PREF_IDNUSEWHITELIST).Equals(pref)) {
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bool val;
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if (NS_SUCCEEDED(prefBranch->GetBoolPref(NS_NET_PREF_IDNUSEWHITELIST,
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&val)))
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mIDNUseWhitelist = val;
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}
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if (!pref || NS_LITERAL_STRING(NS_NET_PREF_IDNRESTRICTION).Equals(pref)) {
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nsXPIDLCString profile;
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if (NS_FAILED(prefBranch->GetCharPref(NS_NET_PREF_IDNRESTRICTION,
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getter_Copies(profile)))) {
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profile.Truncate();
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}
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if (profile.EqualsLiteral("moderate")) {
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mRestrictionProfile = eModeratelyRestrictiveProfile;
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} else if (profile.EqualsLiteral("high")) {
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mRestrictionProfile = eHighlyRestrictiveProfile;
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} else {
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mRestrictionProfile = eASCIIOnlyProfile;
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}
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}
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}
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nsIDNService::nsIDNService()
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: mShowPunycode(false)
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, mIDNUseWhitelist(false)
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{
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#ifdef IDNA2008
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uint32_t IDNAOptions = UIDNA_CHECK_BIDI | UIDNA_CHECK_CONTEXTJ;
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if (!kIDNA2008_TransitionalProcessing) {
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IDNAOptions |= UIDNA_NONTRANSITIONAL_TO_UNICODE;
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}
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UErrorCode errorCode = U_ZERO_ERROR;
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mIDNA = uidna_openUTS46(IDNAOptions, &errorCode);
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#else
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if (idn_success != idn_nameprep_create(nullptr, &mNamePrepHandle))
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mNamePrepHandle = nullptr;
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mNormalizer = do_GetService(NS_UNICODE_NORMALIZER_CONTRACTID);
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/* member initializers and constructor code */
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#endif
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}
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nsIDNService::~nsIDNService()
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{
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#ifdef IDNA2008
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uidna_close(mIDNA);
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#else
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idn_nameprep_destroy(mNamePrepHandle);
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#endif
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}
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#ifdef IDNA2008
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nsresult
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nsIDNService::IDNA2008ToUnicode(const nsACString& input, nsAString& output)
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{
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NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 inputStr(input);
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UIDNAInfo info = UIDNA_INFO_INITIALIZER;
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UErrorCode errorCode = U_ZERO_ERROR;
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int32_t inLen = inputStr.Length();
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int32_t outMaxLen = kMaxDNSNodeLen + 1;
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UChar outputBuffer[kMaxDNSNodeLen + 1];
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int32_t outLen = uidna_labelToUnicode(mIDNA, (const UChar*)inputStr.get(),
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inLen, outputBuffer, outMaxLen,
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&info, &errorCode);
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if (info.errors != 0) {
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return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
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}
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if (U_SUCCESS(errorCode)) {
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ICUUtils::AssignUCharArrayToString(outputBuffer, outLen, output);
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}
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nsresult rv = ICUUtils::UErrorToNsResult(errorCode);
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if (rv == NS_ERROR_FAILURE) {
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rv = NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
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}
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return rv;
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}
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nsresult
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nsIDNService::IDNA2008StringPrep(const nsAString& input,
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nsAString& output,
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stringPrepFlag flag)
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{
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UIDNAInfo info = UIDNA_INFO_INITIALIZER;
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UErrorCode errorCode = U_ZERO_ERROR;
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int32_t inLen = input.Length();
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int32_t outMaxLen = kMaxDNSNodeLen + 1;
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UChar outputBuffer[kMaxDNSNodeLen + 1];
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int32_t outLen =
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uidna_labelToUnicode(mIDNA, (const UChar*)PromiseFlatString(input).get(),
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inLen, outputBuffer, outMaxLen, &info, &errorCode);
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nsresult rv = ICUUtils::UErrorToNsResult(errorCode);
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if (rv == NS_ERROR_FAILURE) {
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rv = NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
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}
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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// Output the result of nameToUnicode even if there were errors
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ICUUtils::AssignUCharArrayToString(outputBuffer, outLen, output);
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if (flag == eStringPrepIgnoreErrors) {
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return NS_OK;
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}
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if (info.errors != 0) {
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if (flag == eStringPrepForDNS) {
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output.Truncate();
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}
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rv = NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
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}
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return rv;
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}
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#endif
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NS_IMETHODIMP nsIDNService::ConvertUTF8toACE(const nsACString & input, nsACString & ace)
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{
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return UTF8toACE(input, ace, eStringPrepForDNS);
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}
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nsresult nsIDNService::UTF8toACE(const nsACString & input, nsACString & ace,
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stringPrepFlag flag)
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{
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nsresult rv;
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NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 ustr(input);
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// map ideographic period to ASCII period etc.
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normalizeFullStops(ustr);
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uint32_t len, offset;
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len = 0;
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offset = 0;
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nsAutoCString encodedBuf;
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nsAString::const_iterator start, end;
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ustr.BeginReading(start);
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ustr.EndReading(end);
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ace.Truncate();
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// encode nodes if non ASCII
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while (start != end) {
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len++;
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if (*start++ == (char16_t)'.') {
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rv = stringPrepAndACE(Substring(ustr, offset, len - 1), encodedBuf, flag);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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ace.Append(encodedBuf);
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ace.Append('.');
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offset += len;
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len = 0;
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}
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}
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// encode the last node if non ASCII
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if (len) {
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rv = stringPrepAndACE(Substring(ustr, offset, len), encodedBuf, flag);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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ace.Append(encodedBuf);
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP nsIDNService::ConvertACEtoUTF8(const nsACString & input, nsACString & _retval)
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{
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return ACEtoUTF8(input, _retval, eStringPrepForDNS);
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}
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nsresult nsIDNService::ACEtoUTF8(const nsACString & input, nsACString & _retval,
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stringPrepFlag flag)
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{
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// RFC 3490 - 4.2 ToUnicode
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// ToUnicode never fails. If any step fails, then the original input
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// sequence is returned immediately in that step.
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uint32_t len = 0, offset = 0;
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nsAutoCString decodedBuf;
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nsACString::const_iterator start, end;
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input.BeginReading(start);
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input.EndReading(end);
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_retval.Truncate();
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// loop and decode nodes
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while (start != end) {
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len++;
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if (*start++ == '.') {
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if (NS_FAILED(decodeACE(Substring(input, offset, len - 1), decodedBuf,
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flag))) {
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_retval.Assign(input);
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return NS_OK;
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}
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_retval.Append(decodedBuf);
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_retval.Append('.');
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offset += len;
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len = 0;
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}
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}
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// decode the last node
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if (len) {
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if (NS_FAILED(decodeACE(Substring(input, offset, len), decodedBuf,
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flag)))
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_retval.Assign(input);
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else
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_retval.Append(decodedBuf);
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP nsIDNService::IsACE(const nsACString & input, bool *_retval)
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{
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const char *data = input.BeginReading();
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uint32_t dataLen = input.Length();
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// look for the ACE prefix in the input string. it may occur
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// at the beginning of any segment in the domain name. for
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// example: "www.xn--ENCODED.com"
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const char *p = PL_strncasestr(data, kACEPrefix, dataLen);
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*_retval = p && (p == data || *(p - 1) == '.');
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP nsIDNService::Normalize(const nsACString & input,
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nsACString & output)
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{
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// protect against bogus input
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NS_ENSURE_TRUE(IsUTF8(input), NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
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NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 inUTF16(input);
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normalizeFullStops(inUTF16);
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// pass the domain name to stringprep label by label
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nsAutoString outUTF16, outLabel;
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uint32_t len = 0, offset = 0;
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nsresult rv;
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nsAString::const_iterator start, end;
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inUTF16.BeginReading(start);
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inUTF16.EndReading(end);
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while (start != end) {
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len++;
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if (*start++ == char16_t('.')) {
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rv = stringPrep(Substring(inUTF16, offset, len - 1), outLabel,
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eStringPrepIgnoreErrors);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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outUTF16.Append(outLabel);
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outUTF16.Append(char16_t('.'));
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offset += len;
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len = 0;
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}
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}
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if (len) {
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rv = stringPrep(Substring(inUTF16, offset, len), outLabel,
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eStringPrepIgnoreErrors);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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outUTF16.Append(outLabel);
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}
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CopyUTF16toUTF8(outUTF16, output);
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP nsIDNService::ConvertToDisplayIDN(const nsACString & input, bool * _isASCII, nsACString & _retval)
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{
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// If host is ACE, then convert to UTF-8 if the host is in the IDN whitelist.
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// Else, if host is already UTF-8, then make sure it is normalized per IDN.
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nsresult rv = NS_OK;
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// Even if the hostname is not ASCII, individual labels may still be ACE, so
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// test IsACE before testing IsASCII
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bool isACE;
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IsACE(input, &isACE);
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if (IsASCII(input)) {
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// first, canonicalize the host to lowercase, for whitelist lookup
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_retval = input;
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ToLowerCase(_retval);
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if (isACE && !mShowPunycode) {
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// ACEtoUTF8() can't fail, but might return the original ACE string
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nsAutoCString temp(_retval);
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// If the domain is in the whitelist, return the host in UTF-8.
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// Otherwise convert from ACE to UTF8 only those labels which are
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// considered safe for display
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ACEtoUTF8(temp, _retval, isInWhitelist(temp) ?
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eStringPrepIgnoreErrors : eStringPrepForUI);
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*_isASCII = IsASCII(_retval);
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} else {
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*_isASCII = true;
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}
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} else {
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// We have to normalize the hostname before testing against the domain
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// whitelist (see bug 315411), and to ensure the entire string gets
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// normalized.
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//
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// Normalization and the tests for safe display below, assume that the
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// input is Unicode, so first convert any ACE labels to UTF8
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if (isACE) {
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nsAutoCString temp;
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ACEtoUTF8(input, temp, eStringPrepIgnoreErrors);
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rv = Normalize(temp, _retval);
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} else {
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rv = Normalize(input, _retval);
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}
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
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if (mShowPunycode && NS_SUCCEEDED(UTF8toACE(_retval, _retval,
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eStringPrepIgnoreErrors))) {
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*_isASCII = true;
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return NS_OK;
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}
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// normalization could result in an ASCII-only hostname. alternatively, if
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// the host is converted to ACE by the normalizer, then the host may contain
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// unsafe characters, so leave it ACE encoded. see bug 283016, bug 301694, and bug 309311.
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*_isASCII = IsASCII(_retval);
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if (!*_isASCII && !isInWhitelist(_retval)) {
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// UTF8toACE with eStringPrepForUI may return a domain name where
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// some labels are in UTF-8 and some are in ACE, depending on
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// whether they are considered safe for display
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rv = UTF8toACE(_retval, _retval, eStringPrepForUI);
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*_isASCII = IsASCII(_retval);
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return rv;
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}
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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static nsresult utf16ToUcs4(const nsAString& in,
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uint32_t *out,
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uint32_t outBufLen,
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uint32_t *outLen)
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{
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uint32_t i = 0;
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nsAString::const_iterator start, end;
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in.BeginReading(start);
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in.EndReading(end);
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while (start != end) {
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char16_t curChar;
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curChar= *start++;
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if (start != end &&
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NS_IS_HIGH_SURROGATE(curChar) &&
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NS_IS_LOW_SURROGATE(*start)) {
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out[i] = SURROGATE_TO_UCS4(curChar, *start);
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++start;
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}
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else
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out[i] = curChar;
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i++;
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if (i >= outBufLen)
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return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
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}
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out[i] = (uint32_t)'\0';
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*outLen = i;
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return NS_OK;
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}
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#ifndef IDNA2008
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static void ucs4toUtf16(const uint32_t *in, nsAString& out)
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{
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while (*in) {
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if (!IS_IN_BMP(*in)) {
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out.Append((char16_t) H_SURROGATE(*in));
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out.Append((char16_t) L_SURROGATE(*in));
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}
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else
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out.Append((char16_t) *in);
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in++;
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}
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}
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#endif
|
|
|
|
static nsresult punycode(const nsAString& in, nsACString& out)
|
|
{
|
|
uint32_t ucs4Buf[kMaxDNSNodeLen + 1];
|
|
uint32_t ucs4Len = 0u;
|
|
nsresult rv = utf16ToUcs4(in, ucs4Buf, kMaxDNSNodeLen, &ucs4Len);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
|
|
// need maximum 20 bits to encode 16 bit Unicode character
|
|
// (include null terminator)
|
|
const uint32_t kEncodedBufSize = kMaxDNSNodeLen * 20 / 8 + 1 + 1;
|
|
char encodedBuf[kEncodedBufSize];
|
|
punycode_uint encodedLength = kEncodedBufSize;
|
|
|
|
enum punycode_status status = punycode_encode(ucs4Len,
|
|
ucs4Buf,
|
|
nullptr,
|
|
&encodedLength,
|
|
encodedBuf);
|
|
|
|
if (punycode_success != status ||
|
|
encodedLength >= kEncodedBufSize)
|
|
return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
|
|
|
|
encodedBuf[encodedLength] = '\0';
|
|
out.Assign(nsDependentCString(kACEPrefix) + nsDependentCString(encodedBuf));
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RFC 3454
|
|
//
|
|
// 1) Map -- For each character in the input, check if it has a mapping
|
|
// and, if so, replace it with its mapping. This is described in section 3.
|
|
//
|
|
// 2) Normalize -- Possibly normalize the result of step 1 using Unicode
|
|
// normalization. This is described in section 4.
|
|
//
|
|
// 3) Prohibit -- Check for any characters that are not allowed in the
|
|
// output. If any are found, return an error. This is described in section
|
|
// 5.
|
|
//
|
|
// 4) Check bidi -- Possibly check for right-to-left characters, and if any
|
|
// are found, make sure that the whole string satisfies the requirements
|
|
// for bidirectional strings. If the string does not satisfy the requirements
|
|
// for bidirectional strings, return an error. This is described in section 6.
|
|
//
|
|
// 5) Check unassigned code points -- If allowUnassigned is false, check for
|
|
// any unassigned Unicode points and if any are found return an error.
|
|
// This is described in section 7.
|
|
//
|
|
nsresult nsIDNService::stringPrep(const nsAString& in, nsAString& out,
|
|
stringPrepFlag flag)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef IDNA2008
|
|
return IDNA2008StringPrep(in, out, flag);
|
|
#else
|
|
if (!mNamePrepHandle || !mNormalizer)
|
|
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t ucs4Buf[kMaxDNSNodeLen + 1];
|
|
uint32_t ucs4Len;
|
|
nsresult rv = utf16ToUcs4(in, ucs4Buf, kMaxDNSNodeLen, &ucs4Len);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
|
|
// map
|
|
idn_result_t idn_err;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t namePrepBuf[kMaxDNSNodeLen * 3]; // map up to three characters
|
|
idn_err = idn_nameprep_map(mNamePrepHandle, (const uint32_t *) ucs4Buf,
|
|
(uint32_t *) namePrepBuf, kMaxDNSNodeLen * 3);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(idn_err == idn_success, NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI);
|
|
|
|
nsAutoString namePrepStr;
|
|
ucs4toUtf16(namePrepBuf, namePrepStr);
|
|
if (namePrepStr.Length() >= kMaxDNSNodeLen)
|
|
return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
|
|
|
|
// normalize
|
|
nsAutoString normlizedStr;
|
|
rv = mNormalizer->NormalizeUnicodeNFKC(namePrepStr, normlizedStr);
|
|
if (normlizedStr.Length() >= kMaxDNSNodeLen)
|
|
return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
|
|
|
|
// set the result string
|
|
out.Assign(normlizedStr);
|
|
|
|
if (flag == eStringPrepIgnoreErrors) {
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// prohibit
|
|
const uint32_t *found = nullptr;
|
|
idn_err = idn_nameprep_isprohibited(mNamePrepHandle,
|
|
(const uint32_t *) ucs4Buf, &found);
|
|
if (idn_err != idn_success || found) {
|
|
rv = NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
|
|
} else {
|
|
// check bidi
|
|
idn_err = idn_nameprep_isvalidbidi(mNamePrepHandle,
|
|
(const uint32_t *) ucs4Buf, &found);
|
|
if (idn_err != idn_success || found) {
|
|
rv = NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
|
|
} else if (flag == eStringPrepForUI) {
|
|
// check unassigned code points
|
|
idn_err = idn_nameprep_isunassigned(mNamePrepHandle,
|
|
(const uint32_t *) ucs4Buf, &found);
|
|
if (idn_err != idn_success || found) {
|
|
rv = NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (flag == eStringPrepForDNS && NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
out.Truncate();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsresult nsIDNService::stringPrepAndACE(const nsAString& in, nsACString& out,
|
|
stringPrepFlag flag)
|
|
{
|
|
nsresult rv = NS_OK;
|
|
|
|
out.Truncate();
|
|
|
|
if (in.Length() > kMaxDNSNodeLen) {
|
|
NS_WARNING("IDN node too large");
|
|
return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (IsASCII(in)) {
|
|
LossyCopyUTF16toASCII(in, out);
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsAutoString strPrep;
|
|
rv = stringPrep(in, strPrep, flag);
|
|
if (flag == eStringPrepForDNS) {
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (IsASCII(strPrep)) {
|
|
LossyCopyUTF16toASCII(strPrep, out);
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (flag == eStringPrepForUI && NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && isLabelSafe(in)) {
|
|
CopyUTF16toUTF8(strPrep, out);
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rv = punycode(strPrep, out);
|
|
// Check that the encoded output isn't larger than the maximum length
|
|
// of a DNS node per RFC 1034.
|
|
// This test isn't necessary in the code paths above where the input
|
|
// is ASCII (since the output will be the same length as the input) or
|
|
// where we convert to UTF-8 (since the output is only used for
|
|
// display in the UI and not passed to DNS and can legitimately be
|
|
// longer than the limit).
|
|
if (out.Length() > kMaxDNSNodeLen) {
|
|
NS_WARNING("IDN node too large");
|
|
return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RFC 3490
|
|
// 1) Whenever dots are used as label separators, the following characters
|
|
// MUST be recognized as dots: U+002E (full stop), U+3002 (ideographic full
|
|
// stop), U+FF0E (fullwidth full stop), U+FF61 (halfwidth ideographic full
|
|
// stop).
|
|
|
|
void nsIDNService::normalizeFullStops(nsAString& s)
|
|
{
|
|
nsAString::const_iterator start, end;
|
|
s.BeginReading(start);
|
|
s.EndReading(end);
|
|
int32_t index = 0;
|
|
|
|
while (start != end) {
|
|
switch (*start) {
|
|
case 0x3002:
|
|
case 0xFF0E:
|
|
case 0xFF61:
|
|
s.Replace(index, 1, NS_LITERAL_STRING("."));
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
start++;
|
|
index++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsresult nsIDNService::decodeACE(const nsACString& in, nsACString& out,
|
|
stringPrepFlag flag)
|
|
{
|
|
bool isAce;
|
|
IsACE(in, &isAce);
|
|
if (!isAce) {
|
|
out.Assign(in);
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsAutoString utf16;
|
|
#ifdef IDNA2008
|
|
nsresult result = IDNA2008ToUnicode(in, utf16);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result, result);
|
|
#else
|
|
// RFC 3490 - 4.2 ToUnicode
|
|
// The ToUnicode output never contains more code points than its input.
|
|
punycode_uint output_length = in.Length() - kACEPrefixLen + 1;
|
|
auto *output = new punycode_uint[output_length];
|
|
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(output, NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
|
|
|
|
enum punycode_status status = punycode_decode(in.Length() - kACEPrefixLen,
|
|
PromiseFlatCString(in).get() + kACEPrefixLen,
|
|
&output_length,
|
|
output,
|
|
nullptr);
|
|
if (status != punycode_success) {
|
|
delete [] output;
|
|
return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UCS4 -> UTF8
|
|
output[output_length] = 0;
|
|
ucs4toUtf16(output, utf16);
|
|
delete [] output;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (flag != eStringPrepForUI || isLabelSafe(utf16)) {
|
|
CopyUTF16toUTF8(utf16, out);
|
|
} else {
|
|
out.Assign(in);
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validation: encode back to ACE and compare the strings
|
|
nsAutoCString ace;
|
|
nsresult rv = UTF8toACE(out, ace, flag);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
|
|
if (flag == eStringPrepForDNS &&
|
|
!ace.Equals(in, nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator())) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool nsIDNService::isInWhitelist(const nsACString &host)
|
|
{
|
|
if (mIDNUseWhitelist && mIDNWhitelistPrefBranch) {
|
|
nsAutoCString tld(host);
|
|
// make sure the host is ACE for lookup and check that there are no
|
|
// unassigned codepoints
|
|
if (!IsASCII(tld) && NS_FAILED(UTF8toACE(tld, tld, eStringPrepForDNS))) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// truncate trailing dots first
|
|
tld.Trim(".");
|
|
int32_t pos = tld.RFind(".");
|
|
if (pos == kNotFound)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
tld.Cut(0, pos + 1);
|
|
|
|
bool safe;
|
|
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mIDNWhitelistPrefBranch->GetBoolPref(tld.get(), &safe)))
|
|
return safe;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool nsIDNService::isLabelSafe(const nsAString &label)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!isOnlySafeChars(PromiseFlatString(label), mIDNBlacklist)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We should never get here if the label is ASCII
|
|
NS_ASSERTION(!IsASCII(label), "ASCII label in IDN checking");
|
|
if (mRestrictionProfile == eASCIIOnlyProfile) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsAString::const_iterator current, end;
|
|
label.BeginReading(current);
|
|
label.EndReading(end);
|
|
|
|
Script lastScript = Script::INVALID;
|
|
uint32_t previousChar = 0;
|
|
uint32_t savedNumberingSystem = 0;
|
|
// Simplified/Traditional Chinese check temporarily disabled -- bug 857481
|
|
#if 0
|
|
HanVariantType savedHanVariant = HVT_NotHan;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int32_t savedScript = -1;
|
|
|
|
while (current != end) {
|
|
uint32_t ch = *current++;
|
|
|
|
if (NS_IS_HIGH_SURROGATE(ch) && current != end &&
|
|
NS_IS_LOW_SURROGATE(*current)) {
|
|
ch = SURROGATE_TO_UCS4(ch, *current++);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check for restricted characters; aspirational scripts are permitted
|
|
IdentifierType idType = GetIdentifierType(ch);
|
|
if (idType == IDTYPE_RESTRICTED) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(idType == IDTYPE_ALLOWED || idType == IDTYPE_ASPIRATIONAL);
|
|
|
|
// Check for mixed script
|
|
Script script = GetScriptCode(ch);
|
|
if (script != Script::COMMON &&
|
|
script != Script::INHERITED &&
|
|
script != lastScript) {
|
|
if (illegalScriptCombo(script, savedScript)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
lastScript = script;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check for mixed numbering systems
|
|
if (GetGeneralCategory(ch) ==
|
|
HB_UNICODE_GENERAL_CATEGORY_DECIMAL_NUMBER) {
|
|
uint32_t zeroCharacter = ch - GetNumericValue(ch);
|
|
if (savedNumberingSystem == 0) {
|
|
// If we encounter a decimal number, save the zero character from that
|
|
// numbering system.
|
|
savedNumberingSystem = zeroCharacter;
|
|
} else if (zeroCharacter != savedNumberingSystem) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check for consecutive non-spacing marks
|
|
if (previousChar != 0 &&
|
|
previousChar == ch &&
|
|
GetGeneralCategory(ch) == HB_UNICODE_GENERAL_CATEGORY_NON_SPACING_MARK) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Simplified/Traditional Chinese check temporarily disabled -- bug 857481
|
|
#if 0
|
|
|
|
// Check for both simplified-only and traditional-only Chinese characters
|
|
HanVariantType hanVariant = GetHanVariant(ch);
|
|
if (hanVariant == HVT_SimplifiedOnly || hanVariant == HVT_TraditionalOnly) {
|
|
if (savedHanVariant == HVT_NotHan) {
|
|
savedHanVariant = hanVariant;
|
|
} else if (hanVariant != savedHanVariant) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
previousChar = ch;
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Scripts that we care about in illegalScriptCombo
|
|
static const Script scriptTable[] = {
|
|
Script::BOPOMOFO, Script::CYRILLIC, Script::GREEK,
|
|
Script::HANGUL, Script::HAN, Script::HIRAGANA,
|
|
Script::KATAKANA, Script::LATIN };
|
|
|
|
#define BOPO 0
|
|
#define CYRL 1
|
|
#define GREK 2
|
|
#define HANG 3
|
|
#define HANI 4
|
|
#define HIRA 5
|
|
#define KATA 6
|
|
#define LATN 7
|
|
#define OTHR 8
|
|
#define JPAN 9 // Latin + Han + Hiragana + Katakana
|
|
#define CHNA 10 // Latin + Han + Bopomofo
|
|
#define KORE 11 // Latin + Han + Hangul
|
|
#define HNLT 12 // Latin + Han (could be any of the above combinations)
|
|
#define FAIL 13
|
|
|
|
static inline int32_t findScriptIndex(Script aScript)
|
|
{
|
|
int32_t tableLength = sizeof(scriptTable) / sizeof(int32_t);
|
|
for (int32_t index = 0; index < tableLength; ++index) {
|
|
if (aScript == scriptTable[index]) {
|
|
return index;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return OTHR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const int32_t scriptComboTable[13][9] = {
|
|
/* thisScript: BOPO CYRL GREK HANG HANI HIRA KATA LATN OTHR
|
|
* savedScript */
|
|
/* BOPO */ { BOPO, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, CHNA, FAIL, FAIL, CHNA, FAIL },
|
|
/* CYRL */ { FAIL, CYRL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL },
|
|
/* GREK */ { FAIL, FAIL, GREK, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL },
|
|
/* HANG */ { FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, HANG, KORE, FAIL, FAIL, KORE, FAIL },
|
|
/* HANI */ { CHNA, FAIL, FAIL, KORE, HANI, JPAN, JPAN, HNLT, FAIL },
|
|
/* HIRA */ { FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, JPAN, HIRA, JPAN, JPAN, FAIL },
|
|
/* KATA */ { FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, JPAN, JPAN, KATA, JPAN, FAIL },
|
|
/* LATN */ { CHNA, FAIL, FAIL, KORE, HNLT, JPAN, JPAN, LATN, OTHR },
|
|
/* OTHR */ { FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, OTHR, FAIL },
|
|
/* JPAN */ { FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, JPAN, JPAN, JPAN, JPAN, FAIL },
|
|
/* CHNA */ { CHNA, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, CHNA, FAIL, FAIL, CHNA, FAIL },
|
|
/* KORE */ { FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, KORE, KORE, FAIL, FAIL, KORE, FAIL },
|
|
/* HNLT */ { CHNA, FAIL, FAIL, KORE, HNLT, JPAN, JPAN, HNLT, FAIL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
bool nsIDNService::illegalScriptCombo(Script script, int32_t& savedScript)
|
|
{
|
|
if (savedScript == -1) {
|
|
savedScript = findScriptIndex(script);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
savedScript = scriptComboTable[savedScript] [findScriptIndex(script)];
|
|
/*
|
|
* Special case combinations that depend on which profile is in use
|
|
* In the Highly Restrictive profile Latin is not allowed with any
|
|
* other script
|
|
*
|
|
* In the Moderately Restrictive profile Latin mixed with any other
|
|
* single script is allowed.
|
|
*/
|
|
return ((savedScript == OTHR &&
|
|
mRestrictionProfile == eHighlyRestrictiveProfile) ||
|
|
savedScript == FAIL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#undef BOPO
|
|
#undef CYRL
|
|
#undef GREK
|
|
#undef HANG
|
|
#undef HANI
|
|
#undef HIRA
|
|
#undef KATA
|
|
#undef LATN
|
|
#undef OTHR
|
|
#undef JPAN
|
|
#undef CHNA
|
|
#undef KORE
|
|
#undef HNLT
|
|
#undef FAIL
|