gecko-dev/security/apps/AppTrustDomain.cpp
Cykesiopka fa71c479fc Bug 1332636 - Remove PSM support for Firefox Marketplace apps and Trusted Hosted Apps. r=keeler
THA was removed in Bug 1196988.

After Bug 1235869 and Bug 1238079, Firefox Marketplace apps are at most
supported by B2G, and B2G only code doesn't need to be in m-c anymore.

MozReview-Commit-ID: DAx5lRdYQo0

--HG--
extra : rebase_source : e7fc32195def3acda2d53a6e3cb969f1e8a9a9a1
2017-02-06 23:43:38 +08:00

345 lines
11 KiB
C++

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "AppTrustDomain.h"
#include "MainThreadUtils.h"
#include "certdb.h"
#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
#include "nsIFile.h"
#include "nsIFileStreams.h"
#include "nsIX509CertDB.h"
#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
#include "pkix/pkixnss.h"
#include "prerror.h"
// Generated by gen_cert_header.py, which gets called by the build system.
#include "xpcshell.inc"
// Add-on signing Certificates
#include "addons-public.inc"
#include "addons-stage.inc"
// Privileged Package Certificates
#include "privileged-package-root.inc"
using namespace mozilla::pkix;
extern mozilla::LazyLogModule gPIPNSSLog;
static char kDevImportedDER[] =
"network.http.signed-packages.developer-root";
namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
StaticMutex AppTrustDomain::sMutex;
UniquePtr<unsigned char[]> AppTrustDomain::sDevImportedDERData;
unsigned int AppTrustDomain::sDevImportedDERLen = 0;
AppTrustDomain::AppTrustDomain(UniqueCERTCertList& certChain, void* pinArg)
: mCertChain(certChain)
, mPinArg(pinArg)
{
}
nsresult
AppTrustDomain::SetTrustedRoot(AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot)
{
SECItem trustedDER;
// Load the trusted certificate into the in-memory NSS database so that
// CERT_CreateSubjectCertList can find it.
switch (trustedRoot)
{
case nsIX509CertDB::AppXPCShellRoot:
trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(xpcshellRoot);
trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(xpcshellRoot);
break;
case nsIX509CertDB::AddonsPublicRoot:
trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(addonsPublicRoot);
trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(addonsPublicRoot);
break;
case nsIX509CertDB::AddonsStageRoot:
trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(addonsStageRoot);
trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(addonsStageRoot);
break;
case nsIX509CertDB::PrivilegedPackageRoot:
trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(privilegedPackageRoot);
trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(privilegedPackageRoot);
break;
case nsIX509CertDB::DeveloperImportedRoot: {
StaticMutexAutoLock lock(sMutex);
if (!sDevImportedDERData) {
MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread());
nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> file(do_CreateInstance("@mozilla.org/file/local;1"));
if (!file) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
nsresult rv = file->InitWithNativePath(
Preferences::GetCString(kDevImportedDER));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> inputStream;
rv = NS_NewLocalFileInputStream(getter_AddRefs(inputStream), file, -1,
-1, nsIFileInputStream::CLOSE_ON_EOF);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
uint64_t length;
rv = inputStream->Available(&length);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
auto data = MakeUnique<char[]>(length);
rv = inputStream->Read(data.get(), length, &sDevImportedDERLen);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
MOZ_ASSERT(length == sDevImportedDERLen);
sDevImportedDERData.reset(
BitwiseCast<unsigned char*, char*>(data.release()));
}
trustedDER.data = sDevImportedDERData.get();
trustedDER.len = sDevImportedDERLen;
break;
}
default:
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
}
mTrustedRoot.reset(CERT_NewTempCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
&trustedDER, nullptr, false, true));
if (!mTrustedRoot) {
return mozilla::psm::GetXPCOMFromNSSError(PR_GetError());
}
return NS_OK;
}
Result
AppTrustDomain::FindIssuer(Input encodedIssuerName, IssuerChecker& checker,
Time)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(mTrustedRoot);
if (!mTrustedRoot) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
}
// TODO(bug 1035418): If/when mozilla::pkix relaxes the restriction that
// FindIssuer must only pass certificates with a matching subject name to
// checker.Check, we can stop using CERT_CreateSubjectCertList and instead
// use logic like this:
//
// 1. First, try the trusted trust anchor.
// 2. Secondly, iterate through the certificates that were stored in the CMS
// message, passing each one to checker.Check.
SECItem encodedIssuerNameSECItem =
UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(encodedIssuerName);
UniqueCERTCertList
candidates(CERT_CreateSubjectCertList(nullptr, CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
&encodedIssuerNameSECItem, 0,
false));
if (candidates) {
for (CERTCertListNode* n = CERT_LIST_HEAD(candidates);
!CERT_LIST_END(n, candidates); n = CERT_LIST_NEXT(n)) {
Input certDER;
Result rv = certDER.Init(n->cert->derCert.data, n->cert->derCert.len);
if (rv != Success) {
continue; // probably too big
}
bool keepGoing;
rv = checker.Check(certDER, nullptr/*additionalNameConstraints*/,
keepGoing);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
if (!keepGoing) {
break;
}
}
}
return Success;
}
Result
AppTrustDomain::GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
const CertPolicyId& policy,
Input candidateCertDER,
/*out*/ TrustLevel& trustLevel)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(policy.IsAnyPolicy());
MOZ_ASSERT(mTrustedRoot);
if (!policy.IsAnyPolicy()) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
}
if (!mTrustedRoot) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
}
// Handle active distrust of the certificate.
// XXX: This would be cleaner and more efficient if we could get the trust
// information without constructing a CERTCertificate here, but NSS doesn't
// expose it in any other easy-to-use fashion.
SECItem candidateCertDERSECItem =
UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(candidateCertDER);
UniqueCERTCertificate candidateCert(
CERT_NewTempCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &candidateCertDERSECItem,
nullptr, false, true));
if (!candidateCert) {
return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
}
CERTCertTrust trust;
if (CERT_GetCertTrust(candidateCert.get(), &trust) == SECSuccess) {
uint32_t flags = SEC_GET_TRUST_FLAGS(&trust, trustObjectSigning);
// For DISTRUST, we use the CERTDB_TRUSTED or CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit,
// because we can have active distrust for either type of cert. Note that
// CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD means "stop trying to inherit trust" so if the
// relevant trust bit isn't set then that means the cert must be considered
// distrusted.
uint32_t relevantTrustBit = endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA
? CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA
: CERTDB_TRUSTED;
if (((flags & (relevantTrustBit | CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD)))
== CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) {
trustLevel = TrustLevel::ActivelyDistrusted;
return Success;
}
}
// mTrustedRoot is the only trust anchor for this validation.
if (CERT_CompareCerts(mTrustedRoot.get(), candidateCert.get())) {
trustLevel = TrustLevel::TrustAnchor;
return Success;
}
trustLevel = TrustLevel::InheritsTrust;
return Success;
}
Result
AppTrustDomain::DigestBuf(Input item,
DigestAlgorithm digestAlg,
/*out*/ uint8_t* digestBuf,
size_t digestBufLen)
{
return DigestBufNSS(item, digestAlg, digestBuf, digestBufLen);
}
Result
AppTrustDomain::CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA, const CertID&, Time, Duration,
/*optional*/ const Input*,
/*optional*/ const Input*)
{
// We don't currently do revocation checking. If we need to distrust an Apps
// certificate, we will use the active distrust mechanism.
return Success;
}
Result
AppTrustDomain::IsChainValid(const DERArray& certChain, Time time)
{
SECStatus srv = ConstructCERTCertListFromReversedDERArray(certChain,
mCertChain);
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
}
return Success;
}
Result
AppTrustDomain::CheckSignatureDigestAlgorithm(DigestAlgorithm,
EndEntityOrCA,
Time)
{
// TODO: We should restrict signatures to SHA-256 or better.
return Success;
}
Result
AppTrustDomain::CheckRSAPublicKeyModulusSizeInBits(
EndEntityOrCA /*endEntityOrCA*/, unsigned int modulusSizeInBits)
{
if (modulusSizeInBits < 2048u) {
return Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_SIZE;
}
return Success;
}
Result
AppTrustDomain::VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDigest(const SignedDigest& signedDigest,
Input subjectPublicKeyInfo)
{
// TODO: We should restrict signatures to SHA-256 or better.
return VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDigestNSS(signedDigest, subjectPublicKeyInfo,
mPinArg);
}
Result
AppTrustDomain::CheckECDSACurveIsAcceptable(EndEntityOrCA /*endEntityOrCA*/,
NamedCurve curve)
{
switch (curve) {
case NamedCurve::secp256r1: // fall through
case NamedCurve::secp384r1: // fall through
case NamedCurve::secp521r1:
return Success;
}
return Result::ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE;
}
Result
AppTrustDomain::VerifyECDSASignedDigest(const SignedDigest& signedDigest,
Input subjectPublicKeyInfo)
{
return VerifyECDSASignedDigestNSS(signedDigest, subjectPublicKeyInfo,
mPinArg);
}
Result
AppTrustDomain::CheckValidityIsAcceptable(Time /*notBefore*/, Time /*notAfter*/,
EndEntityOrCA /*endEntityOrCA*/,
KeyPurposeId /*keyPurpose*/)
{
return Success;
}
Result
AppTrustDomain::NetscapeStepUpMatchesServerAuth(Time /*notBefore*/,
/*out*/ bool& matches)
{
matches = false;
return Success;
}
void
AppTrustDomain::NoteAuxiliaryExtension(AuxiliaryExtension /*extension*/,
Input /*extensionData*/)
{
}
} } // namespace mozilla::psm