gecko-dev/caps/nsIScriptSecurityManager.idl

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
 * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
 * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */

#include "nsISupports.idl"
#include "nsIPrincipal.idl"
interface nsIURI;
interface nsIChannel;
interface nsIClassInfo;
interface nsIDocShell;
interface nsIDomainPolicy;
interface nsILoadContext;

%{ C++
#include "jspubtd.h"

namespace mozilla {
namespace dom {
class DomainPolicyClone;
}
}
%}

[ptr] native JSContextPtr(JSContext);
[ptr] native JSObjectPtr(JSObject);
[ptr] native DomainPolicyClonePtr(mozilla::dom::DomainPolicyClone);

[scriptable, uuid(51daad87-3a0c-44cc-b620-7356801c9022)]
interface nsIScriptSecurityManager : nsISupports
{
    /**
     * For each of these hooks returning NS_OK means 'let the action continue'.
     * Returning an error code means 'veto the action'. XPConnect will return
     * false to the js engine if the action is vetoed. The implementor of this
     * interface is responsible for setting a JS exception into the JSContext
     * if that is appropriate.
     */
    [noscript] void canCreateWrapper(in JSContextPtr aJSContext,
                                     in nsIIDRef aIID,
                                     in nsISupports aObj,
                                     in nsIClassInfo aClassInfo);

    [noscript] void canCreateInstance(in JSContextPtr aJSContext,
                                      in nsCIDRef aCID);

    [noscript] void canGetService(in JSContextPtr aJSContext,
                                  in nsCIDRef aCID);

    /**
     * Check that the script currently running in context "cx" can load "uri".
     *
     * Will return error code NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI if the load request
     * should be denied.
     *
     * @param cx the JSContext of the script causing the load
     * @param uri the URI that is being loaded
     */
    [noscript] void checkLoadURIFromScript(in JSContextPtr cx, in nsIURI uri);

    /**
     * Default CheckLoadURI permissions
     */
    // Default permissions
    const unsigned long STANDARD = 0;

    // Indicate that the load is a load of a new document that is not
    // user-triggered.  Here "user-triggered" could be broadly interpreted --
    // for example, scripted sets of window.location.href might be treated as
    // "user-triggered" in some circumstances.  A typical example of a load
    // that is not user-triggered is a <meta> refresh load.  If this flag is
    // set, the load will be denied if the originating principal's URI has the
    // nsIProtocolHandler::URI_FORBIDS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT flag set.
    const unsigned long LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT = 1 << 0;

    // Allow the loading of chrome URLs by non-chrome URLs.  Use with great
    // care!  This will actually allow the loading of any URI which has the
    // nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE protocol handler flag set.  Ths
    // probably means at least chrome: and resource:.
    const unsigned long ALLOW_CHROME = 1 << 1;

    // Don't allow URLs which would inherit the caller's principal (such as
    // javascript: or data:) to load.  See
    // nsIProtocolHandler::URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT.
    const unsigned long DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL = 1 << 2;

    // Alias for DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL for backwards compat with
    // JS-implemented extensions.
    const unsigned long DISALLOW_SCRIPT_OR_DATA = DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL;

    // Don't allow javascript: URLs to load
    //   WARNING: Support for this value was added in Mozilla 1.7.8 and
    //   Firefox 1.0.4.  Use in prior versions WILL BE IGNORED.
    // When using this, make sure that you actually want DISALLOW_SCRIPT, not
    // DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL
    const unsigned long DISALLOW_SCRIPT = 1 << 3;

    // Do not report errors if we just want to check if a principal can load
    // a URI to not unnecessarily spam the error console.
    const unsigned long DONT_REPORT_ERRORS = 1 << 4;

    /**
     * Check that content with principal aPrincipal can load "uri".
     *
     * Will return error code NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI if the load request
     * should be denied.
     *
     * @param aPrincipal the principal identifying the actor causing the load
     * @param uri the URI that is being loaded
     * @param flags the permission set, see above
     */
    void checkLoadURIWithPrincipal(in nsIPrincipal aPrincipal,
                                   in nsIURI uri,
                                   in unsigned long flags);

    /**
     * Similar to checkLoadURIWithPrincipal but there are two differences:
     *
     * 1) The URI is a string, not a URI object.
     * 2) This function assumes that the URI may still be subject to fixup (and
     * hence will check whether fixed-up versions of the URI are allowed to
     * load as well); if any of the versions of this URI is not allowed, this
     * function will return error code NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI.
     */
    void checkLoadURIStrWithPrincipal(in nsIPrincipal aPrincipal,
                                      in AUTF8String uri,
                                      in unsigned long flags);

    /**
     * Returns true if the URI is from a domain that is allow-listed through
     * prefs to be allowed to use file:// URIs.
     * @param aUri the URI to be tested
     */
    bool inFileURIAllowlist(in nsIURI aUri);

    ///////////////// Principals ///////////////////////

    /**
     * Return the all-powerful system principal.
     */
    nsIPrincipal getSystemPrincipal();

    /**
     * Returns a principal that has the OriginAttributes of the load context.
     * @param loadContext to get the OriginAttributes from.
     */
    nsIPrincipal getLoadContextCodebasePrincipal(in nsIURI uri,
                                                 in nsILoadContext loadContext);

    /**
     * Returns a principal that has the OriginAttributes of the docshell.
     * @param docShell to get the OriginAttributes from.
     */
    nsIPrincipal getDocShellCodebasePrincipal(in nsIURI uri,
                                              in nsIDocShell docShell);

    /**
     * If this is a codebase principal, return a copy with different
     * origin attributes.
     */
    [implicit_jscontext]
    nsIPrincipal principalWithOA(in nsIPrincipal principal,
                                 in jsval originAttributes);

    /**
     * Returns a principal whose origin is composed of |uri| and |originAttributes|.
     * See nsIPrincipal.idl for a description of origin attributes, and
     * ChromeUtils.webidl for a list of origin attributes and their defaults.
     */
    [implicit_jscontext]
    nsIPrincipal createCodebasePrincipal(in nsIURI uri, in jsval originAttributes);

    /**
     * Returns a principal whose origin is the one we pass in.
     * See nsIPrincipal.idl for a description of origin attributes, and
     * ChromeUtils.webidl for a list of origin attributes and their defaults.
     */
    nsIPrincipal createCodebasePrincipalFromOrigin(in ACString origin);

    /**
     * Returns a unique nonce principal with |originAttributes|.
     * See nsIPrincipal.idl for a description of origin attributes, and
     * ChromeUtils.webidl for a list of origin attributes and their defaults.
     */
    [implicit_jscontext]
    nsIPrincipal createNullPrincipal(in jsval originAttributes);

    /**
     * Returns OK if aSourceURI and target have the same "origin"
     * (scheme, host, and port).
     * ReportError flag suppresses error reports for functions that
     * don't need reporting.
     * FromPrivateWindow indicates whether the error occurs in a private
     * window or not.
     */
    void checkSameOriginURI(in nsIURI aSourceURI,
                            in nsIURI aTargetURI,
                            in boolean reportError,
                            in boolean fromPrivateWindow);
    /**
     * Get the principal for the given channel.  This will typically be the
     * channel owner if there is one, and the codebase principal for the
     * channel's URI otherwise.  aChannel must not be null.
     */
    nsIPrincipal getChannelResultPrincipal(in nsIChannel aChannel);

    /**
     * Temporary API until bug 1220687 is fixed.
     *
     * Returns the same value as getChannelResultPrincipal, but ignoring
     * sandboxing.  Specifically, if sandboxing would have prevented the
     * channel's triggering principal from being returned by
     * getChannelResultPrincipal, the triggering principal will be returned
     * by this method.
     *
     * Note that this method only ignores sandboxing of the channel in
     * question, it does not ignore sandboxing of any channels further up a
     * document chain.  The triggering principal itself may still be the null
     * principal due to sandboxing further up a document chain.  In that regard
     * the ignoring of sandboxing is limited.
     */
    [noscript, nostdcall]
    nsIPrincipal getChannelResultPrincipalIfNotSandboxed(in nsIChannel aChannel);

    /**
     * Get the codebase principal for the channel's URI.
     * aChannel must not be null.
     */
    nsIPrincipal getChannelURIPrincipal(in nsIChannel aChannel);

    const unsigned long NO_APP_ID = 0;
    const unsigned long UNKNOWN_APP_ID = 4294967295; // UINT32_MAX

    const unsigned long DEFAULT_USER_CONTEXT_ID = 0;

    /**
     * Per-domain controls to enable and disable script. This system is designed
     * to be used by at most one consumer, and enforces this with its semantics.
     *
     * Initially, domainPolicyActive is false. When activateDomainPolicy() is
     * invoked, domainPolicyActive becomes true, and subsequent calls to
     * activateDomainPolicy() will fail until deactivate() is invoked on the
     * nsIDomainPolicy returned from activateDomainPolicy(). At this point,
     * domainPolicyActive becomes false again, and a new consumer may acquire
     * control of the system by invoking activateDomainPolicy().
     */
    nsIDomainPolicy activateDomainPolicy();
    readonly attribute boolean domainPolicyActive;

    /**
     * Only the parent process can directly access domain policies, child
     * processes only have a read-only mirror to the one in the parent.
     * For child processes the mirror is updated via messages
     * and ContentChild will hold the DomainPolicy by calling
     * ActivateDomainPolicyInternal directly. New consumer to this
     * function should not be addded.
     */
    [noscript] nsIDomainPolicy activateDomainPolicyInternal();

    /**
     * This function is for internal use only. Every time a child process is spawned, we
     * must clone any active domain policies in the parent to the new child.
     */
    [noscript, notxpcom] void cloneDomainPolicy(in DomainPolicyClonePtr aClone);

    /**
     * Query mechanism for the above policy.
     *
     * If domainPolicyEnabled is false, this simply returns the current value
     * of javascript.enabled. Otherwise, it returns the same value, but taking
     * the various blocklist/allowlist exceptions into account.
     */
    bool policyAllowsScript(in nsIURI aDomain);
};

%{C++
#define NS_SCRIPTSECURITYMANAGER_CONTRACTID "@mozilla.org/scriptsecuritymanager;1"
%}