gecko-dev/security/manager/ssl/nsKeygenHandler.cpp
Cykesiopka efe5b47ede Bug 1260644 - Use UniquePLArenaPool to manage PLArenaPools in PSM. r=keeler
MozReview-Commit-ID: HyLXbWoHMGz

--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 6164b7df51e11c4d3814a06bd41765d40be85a9d
2016-04-04 17:35:24 -07:00

793 lines
26 KiB
C++

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*-
*
* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "secdert.h"
#include "nspr.h"
#include "nsNSSComponent.h" // for PIPNSS string bundle calls.
#include "keyhi.h"
#include "secder.h"
#include "cryptohi.h"
#include "base64.h"
#include "secasn1.h"
#include "nsKeygenHandler.h"
#include "nsKeygenHandlerContent.h"
#include "nsIServiceManager.h"
#include "nsIDOMHTMLSelectElement.h"
#include "nsIContent.h"
#include "nsKeygenThread.h"
#include "nsNSSHelper.h"
#include "nsReadableUtils.h"
#include "nsUnicharUtils.h"
#include "nsCRT.h"
#include "nsITokenDialogs.h"
#include "nsIGenKeypairInfoDlg.h"
#include "nsNSSShutDown.h"
#include "nsXULAppAPI.h"
#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
//These defines are taken from the PKCS#11 spec
#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000000
#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000020
DERTemplate SECAlgorithmIDTemplate[] = {
{ DER_SEQUENCE,
0, nullptr, sizeof(SECAlgorithmID) },
{ DER_OBJECT_ID,
offsetof(SECAlgorithmID,algorithm), },
{ DER_OPTIONAL | DER_ANY,
offsetof(SECAlgorithmID,parameters), },
{ 0, }
};
DERTemplate CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfoTemplate[] = {
{ DER_SEQUENCE,
0, nullptr, sizeof(CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo) },
{ DER_INLINE,
offsetof(CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo,algorithm),
SECAlgorithmIDTemplate, },
{ DER_BIT_STRING,
offsetof(CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo,subjectPublicKey), },
{ 0, }
};
DERTemplate CERTPublicKeyAndChallengeTemplate[] =
{
{ DER_SEQUENCE, 0, nullptr, sizeof(CERTPublicKeyAndChallenge) },
{ DER_ANY, offsetof(CERTPublicKeyAndChallenge,spki), },
{ DER_IA5_STRING, offsetof(CERTPublicKeyAndChallenge,challenge), },
{ 0, }
};
typedef struct curveNameTagPairStr {
const char *curveName;
SECOidTag curveOidTag;
} CurveNameTagPair;
static CurveNameTagPair nameTagPair[] =
{
{ "prime192v1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V1 },
{ "prime192v2", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V2 },
{ "prime192v3", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V3 },
{ "prime239v1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME239V1 },
{ "prime239v2", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME239V2 },
{ "prime239v3", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME239V3 },
{ "prime256v1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME256V1 },
{ "secp112r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP112R1},
{ "secp112r2", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP112R2},
{ "secp128r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP128R1},
{ "secp128r2", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP128R2},
{ "secp160k1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160K1},
{ "secp160r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160R1},
{ "secp160r2", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160R2},
{ "secp192k1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP192K1},
{ "secp192r1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V1 },
{ "nistp192", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V1 },
{ "secp224k1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP224K1},
{ "secp224r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP224R1},
{ "nistp224", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP224R1},
{ "secp256k1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256K1},
{ "secp256r1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME256V1 },
{ "nistp256", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME256V1 },
{ "secp384r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1},
{ "nistp384", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1},
{ "secp521r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1},
{ "nistp521", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1},
{ "c2pnb163v1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V1 },
{ "c2pnb163v2", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V2 },
{ "c2pnb163v3", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V3 },
{ "c2pnb176v1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB176V1 },
{ "c2tnb191v1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB191V1 },
{ "c2tnb191v2", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB191V2 },
{ "c2tnb191v3", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB191V3 },
{ "c2onb191v4", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2ONB191V4 },
{ "c2onb191v5", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2ONB191V5 },
{ "c2pnb208w1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB208W1 },
{ "c2tnb239v1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB239V1 },
{ "c2tnb239v2", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB239V2 },
{ "c2tnb239v3", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB239V3 },
{ "c2onb239v4", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2ONB239V4 },
{ "c2onb239v5", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2ONB239V5 },
{ "c2pnb272w1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB272W1 },
{ "c2pnb304w1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB304W1 },
{ "c2tnb359v1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB359V1 },
{ "c2pnb368w1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB368W1 },
{ "c2tnb431r1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB431R1 },
{ "sect113r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT113R1},
{ "sect113r2", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT113R2},
{ "sect131r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT131R1},
{ "sect131r2", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT131R2},
{ "sect163k1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163K1},
{ "nistk163", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163K1},
{ "sect163r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163R1},
{ "sect163r2", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163R2},
{ "nistb163", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163R2},
{ "sect193r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT193R1},
{ "sect193r2", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT193R2},
{ "sect233k1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT233K1},
{ "nistk233", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT233K1},
{ "sect233r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT233R1},
{ "nistb233", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT233R1},
{ "sect239k1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT239K1},
{ "sect283k1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT283K1},
{ "nistk283", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT283K1},
{ "sect283r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT283R1},
{ "nistb283", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT283R1},
{ "sect409k1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT409K1},
{ "nistk409", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT409K1},
{ "sect409r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT409R1},
{ "nistb409", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT409R1},
{ "sect571k1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT571K1},
{ "nistk571", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT571K1},
{ "sect571r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT571R1},
{ "nistb571", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT571R1},
};
SECKEYECParams *
decode_ec_params(const char *curve)
{
SECKEYECParams *ecparams;
SECOidData *oidData = nullptr;
SECOidTag curveOidTag = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; /* default */
int i, numCurves;
if (curve && *curve) {
numCurves = sizeof(nameTagPair)/sizeof(CurveNameTagPair);
for (i = 0; ((i < numCurves) && (curveOidTag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN));
i++) {
if (PL_strcmp(curve, nameTagPair[i].curveName) == 0)
curveOidTag = nameTagPair[i].curveOidTag;
}
}
/* Return nullptr if curve name is not recognized */
if ((curveOidTag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) ||
(oidData = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(curveOidTag)) == nullptr) {
return nullptr;
}
ecparams = SECITEM_AllocItem(nullptr, nullptr, (2 + oidData->oid.len));
if (!ecparams)
return nullptr;
/*
* ecparams->data needs to contain the ASN encoding of an object ID (OID)
* representing the named curve. The actual OID is in
* oidData->oid.data so we simply prepend 0x06 and OID length
*/
ecparams->data[0] = SEC_ASN1_OBJECT_ID;
ecparams->data[1] = oidData->oid.len;
memcpy(ecparams->data + 2, oidData->oid.data, oidData->oid.len);
return ecparams;
}
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsKeygenFormProcessor, nsIFormProcessor)
nsKeygenFormProcessor::nsKeygenFormProcessor()
{
m_ctx = new PipUIContext();
}
nsKeygenFormProcessor::~nsKeygenFormProcessor()
{
nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
if (isAlreadyShutDown()) {
return;
}
shutdown(calledFromObject);
}
nsresult
nsKeygenFormProcessor::Create(nsISupports* aOuter, const nsIID& aIID, void* *aResult)
{
if (GeckoProcessType_Content == XRE_GetProcessType()) {
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> contentProcessor = new nsKeygenFormProcessorContent();
return contentProcessor->QueryInterface(aIID, aResult);
}
nsresult rv;
NS_ENSURE_NO_AGGREGATION(aOuter);
nsKeygenFormProcessor* formProc = new nsKeygenFormProcessor();
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> stabilize = formProc;
rv = formProc->Init();
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
rv = formProc->QueryInterface(aIID, aResult);
}
return rv;
}
nsresult
nsKeygenFormProcessor::Init()
{
static NS_DEFINE_CID(kNSSComponentCID, NS_NSSCOMPONENT_CID);
nsresult rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsINSSComponent> nssComponent;
nssComponent = do_GetService(kNSSComponentCID, &rv);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return rv;
// Init possible key size choices.
nssComponent->GetPIPNSSBundleString("HighGrade", mSECKeySizeChoiceList[0].name);
mSECKeySizeChoiceList[0].size = 2048;
nssComponent->GetPIPNSSBundleString("MediumGrade", mSECKeySizeChoiceList[1].name);
mSECKeySizeChoiceList[1].size = 1024;
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
nsKeygenFormProcessor::GetSlot(uint32_t aMechanism, PK11SlotInfo** aSlot)
{
nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
if (isAlreadyShutDown()) {
return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
}
return GetSlotWithMechanism(aMechanism, m_ctx, aSlot, locker);
}
uint32_t MapGenMechToAlgoMech(uint32_t mechanism)
{
uint32_t searchMech;
/* We are interested in slots based on the ability to perform
a given algorithm, not on their ability to generate keys usable
by that algorithm. Therefore, map keygen-specific mechanism tags
to tags for the corresponding crypto algorithm. */
switch(mechanism)
{
case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
searchMech = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
break;
case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN:
searchMech = CKM_RC4;
break;
case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
searchMech = CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE; /* ### mwelch is this right? */
break;
case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
/* What do we do about DES keygen? Right now, we're just using
DES_KEY_GEN to look for tokens, because otherwise we'll have
to search the token list three times. */
case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
/* The default should also work for EC key pair generation. */
default:
searchMech = mechanism;
break;
}
return searchMech;
}
nsresult
GetSlotWithMechanism(uint32_t aMechanism, nsIInterfaceRequestor* m_ctx,
PK11SlotInfo** aSlot, nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock& /*proofOfLock*/)
{
PK11SlotList * slotList = nullptr;
char16_t** tokenNameList = nullptr;
nsITokenDialogs * dialogs;
char16_t *unicodeTokenChosen;
PK11SlotListElement *slotElement, *tmpSlot;
uint32_t numSlots = 0, i = 0;
bool canceled;
nsresult rv = NS_OK;
*aSlot = nullptr;
// Get the slot
slotList = PK11_GetAllTokens(MapGenMechToAlgoMech(aMechanism),
true, true, m_ctx);
if (!slotList || !slotList->head) {
rv = NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
goto loser;
}
if (!slotList->head->next) {
/* only one slot available, just return it */
*aSlot = slotList->head->slot;
} else {
// Gerenate a list of slots and ask the user to choose //
tmpSlot = slotList->head;
while (tmpSlot) {
numSlots++;
tmpSlot = tmpSlot->next;
}
// Allocate the slot name buffer //
tokenNameList = static_cast<char16_t**>(moz_xmalloc(sizeof(char16_t *) * numSlots));
if (!tokenNameList) {
rv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto loser;
}
i = 0;
slotElement = PK11_GetFirstSafe(slotList);
while (slotElement) {
tokenNameList[i] = UTF8ToNewUnicode(nsDependentCString(PK11_GetTokenName(slotElement->slot)));
slotElement = PK11_GetNextSafe(slotList, slotElement, false);
if (tokenNameList[i])
i++;
else {
// OOM. adjust numSlots so we don't free unallocated memory.
numSlots = i;
PK11_FreeSlotListElement(slotList, slotElement);
rv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto loser;
}
}
/* Throw up the token list dialog and get back the token */
rv = getNSSDialogs((void**)&dialogs,
NS_GET_IID(nsITokenDialogs),
NS_TOKENDIALOGS_CONTRACTID);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) goto loser;
if (!tokenNameList || !*tokenNameList) {
rv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
} else {
rv = dialogs->ChooseToken(m_ctx, (const char16_t**)tokenNameList,
numSlots, &unicodeTokenChosen, &canceled);
}
NS_RELEASE(dialogs);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) goto loser;
if (canceled) { rv = NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE; goto loser; }
// Get the slot //
slotElement = PK11_GetFirstSafe(slotList);
nsAutoString tokenStr(unicodeTokenChosen);
while (slotElement) {
if (tokenStr.Equals(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(PK11_GetTokenName(slotElement->slot)))) {
*aSlot = slotElement->slot;
PK11_FreeSlotListElement(slotList, slotElement);
break;
}
slotElement = PK11_GetNextSafe(slotList, slotElement, false);
}
if(!(*aSlot)) {
rv = NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
goto loser;
}
}
// Get a reference to the slot //
PK11_ReferenceSlot(*aSlot);
loser:
if (slotList) {
PK11_FreeSlotList(slotList);
}
if (tokenNameList) {
NS_FREE_XPCOM_ALLOCATED_POINTER_ARRAY(numSlots, tokenNameList);
}
return rv;
}
void
GatherKeygenTelemetry(uint32_t keyGenMechanism, int keysize, char* curve)
{
if (keyGenMechanism == CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN) {
if (keysize > 8196 || keysize < 0) {
return;
}
nsCString telemetryValue("rsa");
telemetryValue.AppendPrintf("%d", keysize);
mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate(
mozilla::Telemetry::KEYGEN_GENERATED_KEY_TYPE, telemetryValue);
} else if (keyGenMechanism == CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN) {
nsCString secp384r1 = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("secp384r1");
nsCString secp256r1 = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("secp256r1");
SECKEYECParams* decoded = decode_ec_params(curve);
if (!decoded) {
switch (keysize) {
case 2048:
mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate(
mozilla::Telemetry::KEYGEN_GENERATED_KEY_TYPE, secp384r1);
break;
case 1024:
case 512:
mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate(
mozilla::Telemetry::KEYGEN_GENERATED_KEY_TYPE, secp256r1);
break;
}
} else {
SECITEM_FreeItem(decoded, true);
if (secp384r1.EqualsIgnoreCase(curve, secp384r1.Length())) {
mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate(
mozilla::Telemetry::KEYGEN_GENERATED_KEY_TYPE, secp384r1);
} else if (secp256r1.EqualsIgnoreCase(curve, secp256r1.Length())) {
mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate(
mozilla::Telemetry::KEYGEN_GENERATED_KEY_TYPE, secp256r1);
} else {
mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate(
mozilla::Telemetry::KEYGEN_GENERATED_KEY_TYPE, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("other_ec"));
}
}
} else {
MOZ_CRASH("Unknown keygen algorithm");
return;
}
}
nsresult
nsKeygenFormProcessor::GetPublicKey(const nsAString& aValue,
const nsAString& aChallenge,
const nsAFlatString& aKeyType,
nsAString& aOutPublicKey,
const nsAString& aKeyParams)
{
nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
if (isAlreadyShutDown()) {
return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
}
nsresult rv = NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
char *keystring = nullptr;
char *keyparamsString = nullptr;
uint32_t keyGenMechanism;
PK11SlotInfo *slot = nullptr;
PK11RSAGenParams rsaParams;
SECOidTag algTag;
int keysize = 0;
void *params = nullptr;
SECKEYPrivateKey *privateKey = nullptr;
SECKEYPublicKey *publicKey = nullptr;
CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spkInfo = nullptr;
SECStatus srv = SECFailure;
SECItem spkiItem;
SECItem pkacItem;
SECItem signedItem;
CERTPublicKeyAndChallenge pkac;
pkac.challenge.data = nullptr;
nsIGeneratingKeypairInfoDialogs * dialogs;
nsKeygenThread *KeygenRunnable = 0;
nsCOMPtr<nsIKeygenThread> runnable;
// permanent and sensitive flags for keygen
PK11AttrFlags attrFlags = PK11_ATTR_TOKEN | PK11_ATTR_SENSITIVE | PK11_ATTR_PRIVATE;
UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
goto loser;
}
// Get the key size //
for (size_t i = 0; i < number_of_key_size_choices; ++i) {
if (aValue.Equals(mSECKeySizeChoiceList[i].name)) {
keysize = mSECKeySizeChoiceList[i].size;
break;
}
}
if (!keysize) {
goto loser;
}
// Set the keygen mechanism
if (aKeyType.IsEmpty() || aKeyType.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("rsa")) {
keyGenMechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN;
} else if (aKeyType.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("ec")) {
keyparamsString = ToNewCString(aKeyParams);
if (!keyparamsString) {
rv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto loser;
}
keyGenMechanism = CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN;
/* ecParams are initialized later */
} else {
goto loser;
}
// Get the slot
rv = GetSlot(keyGenMechanism, &slot);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
goto loser;
}
switch (keyGenMechanism) {
case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
rsaParams.keySizeInBits = keysize;
rsaParams.pe = DEFAULT_RSA_KEYGEN_PE;
algTag = DEFAULT_RSA_KEYGEN_ALG;
params = &rsaParams;
break;
case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
/* XXX We ought to rethink how the KEYGEN tag is
* displayed. The pulldown selections presented
* to the user must depend on the keytype.
* The displayed selection could be picked
* from the keyparams attribute (this is currently called
* the pqg attribute).
* For now, we pick ecparams from the keyparams field
* if it specifies a valid supported curve, or else
* we pick one of secp384r1, secp256r1 or secp192r1
* respectively depending on the user's selection
* (High, Medium, Low).
* (RSA uses RSA-2048, RSA-1024 and RSA-512 for historical
* reasons, while ECC choices represent a stronger mapping)
* NOTE: The user's selection
* is silently ignored when a valid curve is presented
* in keyparams.
*/
if ((params = decode_ec_params(keyparamsString)) == nullptr) {
/* The keyparams attribute did not specify a valid
* curve name so use a curve based on the keysize.
* NOTE: Here keysize is used only as an indication of
* High/Medium/Low strength; elliptic curve
* cryptography uses smaller keys than RSA to provide
* equivalent security.
*/
switch (keysize) {
case 2048:
params = decode_ec_params("secp384r1");
break;
case 1024:
case 512:
params = decode_ec_params("secp256r1");
break;
}
}
/* XXX The signature algorithm ought to choose the hashing
* algorithm based on key size once ECDSA variations based
* on SHA256 SHA384 and SHA512 are standardized.
*/
algTag = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA1_DIGEST;
break;
default:
goto loser;
}
/* Make sure token is initialized. */
rv = setPassword(slot, m_ctx, locker);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
goto loser;
srv = PK11_Authenticate(slot, true, m_ctx);
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
rv = getNSSDialogs((void**)&dialogs,
NS_GET_IID(nsIGeneratingKeypairInfoDialogs),
NS_GENERATINGKEYPAIRINFODIALOGS_CONTRACTID);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
KeygenRunnable = new nsKeygenThread();
NS_IF_ADDREF(KeygenRunnable);
}
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !KeygenRunnable) {
rv = NS_OK;
privateKey = PK11_GenerateKeyPairWithFlags(slot, keyGenMechanism, params,
&publicKey, attrFlags, m_ctx);
} else {
KeygenRunnable->SetParams( slot, attrFlags, nullptr, 0,
keyGenMechanism, params, m_ctx );
runnable = do_QueryInterface(KeygenRunnable);
if (runnable) {
rv = dialogs->DisplayGeneratingKeypairInfo(m_ctx, runnable);
// We call join on the thread so we can be sure that no
// simultaneous access to the passed parameters will happen.
KeygenRunnable->Join();
NS_RELEASE(dialogs);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
PK11SlotInfo *used_slot = nullptr;
rv = KeygenRunnable->ConsumeResult(&used_slot, &privateKey, &publicKey);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && used_slot) {
PK11_FreeSlot(used_slot);
}
}
}
}
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !privateKey) {
goto loser;
}
// just in case we'll need to authenticate to the db -jp //
privateKey->wincx = m_ctx;
/*
* Create a subject public key info from the public key.
*/
spkInfo = SECKEY_CreateSubjectPublicKeyInfo(publicKey);
if ( !spkInfo ) {
goto loser;
}
/*
* Now DER encode the whole subjectPublicKeyInfo.
*/
srv = DER_Encode(arena.get(), &spkiItem, CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfoTemplate,
spkInfo);
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
/*
* set up the PublicKeyAndChallenge data structure, then DER encode it
*/
pkac.spki = spkiItem;
pkac.challenge.len = aChallenge.Length();
pkac.challenge.data = (unsigned char *)ToNewCString(aChallenge);
if (!pkac.challenge.data) {
rv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto loser;
}
srv = DER_Encode(arena.get(), &pkacItem, CERTPublicKeyAndChallengeTemplate,
&pkac);
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
/*
* now sign the DER encoded PublicKeyAndChallenge
*/
srv = SEC_DerSignData(arena.get(), &signedItem, pkacItem.data, pkacItem.len,
privateKey, algTag);
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
/*
* Convert the signed public key and challenge into base64/ascii.
*/
keystring = BTOA_DataToAscii(signedItem.data, signedItem.len);
if (!keystring) {
rv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto loser;
}
CopyASCIItoUTF16(keystring, aOutPublicKey);
free(keystring);
rv = NS_OK;
GatherKeygenTelemetry(keyGenMechanism, keysize, keyparamsString);
loser:
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
if ( privateKey ) {
PK11_DestroyTokenObject(privateKey->pkcs11Slot,privateKey->pkcs11ID);
}
if ( publicKey ) {
PK11_DestroyTokenObject(publicKey->pkcs11Slot,publicKey->pkcs11ID);
}
}
if ( spkInfo ) {
SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(spkInfo);
}
if ( publicKey ) {
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(publicKey);
}
if ( privateKey ) {
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privateKey);
}
if (slot) {
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
}
if (KeygenRunnable) {
NS_RELEASE(KeygenRunnable);
}
if (keyparamsString) {
free(keyparamsString);
}
if (pkac.challenge.data) {
free(pkac.challenge.data);
}
// If params is non-null and doesn't point to rsaParams, it was allocated
// in decode_ec_params. We have to free this memory.
if (params && params != &rsaParams) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(static_cast<SECItem*>(params), true);
params = nullptr;
}
return rv;
}
// static
void
nsKeygenFormProcessor::ExtractParams(nsIDOMHTMLElement* aElement,
nsAString& challengeValue,
nsAString& keyTypeValue,
nsAString& keyParamsValue)
{
aElement->GetAttribute(NS_LITERAL_STRING("keytype"), keyTypeValue);
if (keyTypeValue.IsEmpty()) {
// If this field is not present, we default to rsa.
keyTypeValue.AssignLiteral("rsa");
}
aElement->GetAttribute(NS_LITERAL_STRING("pqg"),
keyParamsValue);
/* XXX We can still support the pqg attribute in the keygen
* tag for backward compatibility while introducing a more
* general attribute named keyparams.
*/
if (keyParamsValue.IsEmpty()) {
aElement->GetAttribute(NS_LITERAL_STRING("keyparams"),
keyParamsValue);
}
aElement->GetAttribute(NS_LITERAL_STRING("challenge"), challengeValue);
}
nsresult
nsKeygenFormProcessor::ProcessValue(nsIDOMHTMLElement* aElement,
const nsAString& aName,
nsAString& aValue)
{
nsAutoString challengeValue;
nsAutoString keyTypeValue;
nsAutoString keyParamsValue;
ExtractParams(aElement, challengeValue, keyTypeValue, keyParamsValue);
return GetPublicKey(aValue, challengeValue, keyTypeValue,
aValue, keyParamsValue);
}
nsresult
nsKeygenFormProcessor::ProcessValueIPC(const nsAString& aOldValue,
const nsAString& aChallenge,
const nsAString& aKeyType,
const nsAString& aKeyParams,
nsAString& newValue)
{
return GetPublicKey(aOldValue, aChallenge, PromiseFlatString(aKeyType),
newValue, aKeyParams);
}
nsresult
nsKeygenFormProcessor::ProvideContent(const nsAString& aFormType,
nsTArray<nsString>& aContent,
nsAString& aAttribute)
{
if (Compare(aFormType, NS_LITERAL_STRING("SELECT"),
nsCaseInsensitiveStringComparator()) == 0) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < number_of_key_size_choices; ++i) {
aContent.AppendElement(mSECKeySizeChoiceList[i].name);
}
aAttribute.AssignLiteral("-mozilla-keygen");
}
return NS_OK;
}