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902 lines
25 KiB
C
902 lines
25 KiB
C
/*
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* The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public
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* License Version 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file
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* except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of
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* the License at http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
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*
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* Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS
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* IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or
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* implied. See the License for the specific language governing
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* rights and limitations under the License.
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*
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* The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries.
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*
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* The Initial Developer of the Original Code is Netscape
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* Communications Corporation. Portions created by Netscape are
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* Copyright (C) 1994-2000 Netscape Communications Corporation. All
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* Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Contributor(s):
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*
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* Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the
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* terms of the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the
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* "GPL"), in which case the provisions of the GPL are applicable
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* instead of those above. If you wish to allow use of your
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* version of this file only under the terms of the GPL and not to
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* allow others to use your version of this file under the MPL,
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* indicate your decision by deleting the provisions above and
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* replace them with the notice and other provisions required by
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* the GPL. If you do not delete the provisions above, a recipient
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* may use your version of this file under either the MPL or the
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* GPL.
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*/
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/*
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* Stuff specific to S/MIME policy and interoperability.
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* Depends on PKCS7, but there should be no dependency the other way around.
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*
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* $Id: secmime.c,v 1.2 2002/12/12 06:05:36 nelsonb%netscape.com Exp $
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*/
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#include "secmime.h"
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#include "secoid.h"
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#include "pk11func.h"
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#include "ciferfam.h" /* for CIPHER_FAMILY symbols */
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#include "secasn1.h"
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#include "secitem.h"
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#include "cert.h"
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#include "key.h"
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#include "secerr.h"
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typedef struct smime_cipher_map_struct {
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unsigned long cipher;
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SECOidTag algtag;
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SECItem *parms;
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} smime_cipher_map;
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/*
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* These are macros because I think some subsequent parameters,
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* like those for RC5, will want to use them, too, separately.
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*/
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#define SMIME_DER_INTVAL_16 SEC_ASN1_INTEGER, 0x01, 0x10
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#define SMIME_DER_INTVAL_40 SEC_ASN1_INTEGER, 0x01, 0x28
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#define SMIME_DER_INTVAL_64 SEC_ASN1_INTEGER, 0x01, 0x40
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#define SMIME_DER_INTVAL_128 SEC_ASN1_INTEGER, 0x02, 0x00, 0x80
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#ifdef SMIME_DOES_RC5 /* will be needed; quiet unused warning for now */
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static unsigned char smime_int16[] = { SMIME_DER_INTVAL_16 };
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#endif
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static unsigned char smime_int40[] = { SMIME_DER_INTVAL_40 };
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static unsigned char smime_int64[] = { SMIME_DER_INTVAL_64 };
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static unsigned char smime_int128[] = { SMIME_DER_INTVAL_128 };
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static SECItem smime_rc2p40 = { siBuffer, smime_int40, sizeof(smime_int40) };
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static SECItem smime_rc2p64 = { siBuffer, smime_int64, sizeof(smime_int64) };
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static SECItem smime_rc2p128 = { siBuffer, smime_int128, sizeof(smime_int128) };
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static smime_cipher_map smime_cipher_maps[] = {
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{ SMIME_RC2_CBC_40, SEC_OID_RC2_CBC, &smime_rc2p40 },
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{ SMIME_RC2_CBC_64, SEC_OID_RC2_CBC, &smime_rc2p64 },
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{ SMIME_RC2_CBC_128, SEC_OID_RC2_CBC, &smime_rc2p128 },
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#ifdef SMIME_DOES_RC5
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{ SMIME_RC5PAD_64_16_40, SEC_OID_RC5_CBC_PAD, &smime_rc5p40 },
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{ SMIME_RC5PAD_64_16_64, SEC_OID_RC5_CBC_PAD, &smime_rc5p64 },
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{ SMIME_RC5PAD_64_16_128, SEC_OID_RC5_CBC_PAD, &smime_rc5p128 },
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#endif
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{ SMIME_DES_CBC_56, SEC_OID_DES_CBC, NULL },
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{ SMIME_DES_EDE3_168, SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC, NULL },
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{ SMIME_FORTEZZA, SEC_OID_FORTEZZA_SKIPJACK, NULL}
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};
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/*
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* Note, the following value really just needs to be an upper bound
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* on the ciphers.
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*/
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static const int smime_symmetric_count = sizeof(smime_cipher_maps)
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/ sizeof(smime_cipher_map);
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static unsigned long *smime_prefs, *smime_newprefs;
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static int smime_current_pref_index = 0;
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static PRBool smime_prefs_complete = PR_FALSE;
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static PRBool smime_prefs_changed = PR_TRUE;
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static unsigned long smime_policy_bits = 0;
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static int
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smime_mapi_by_cipher (unsigned long cipher)
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{
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < smime_symmetric_count; i++) {
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if (smime_cipher_maps[i].cipher == cipher)
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break;
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}
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if (i == smime_symmetric_count)
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return -1;
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return i;
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}
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/*
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* this function locally records the user's preference
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*/
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SECStatus
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SECMIME_EnableCipher(long which, int on)
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{
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unsigned long mask;
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if (smime_newprefs == NULL || smime_prefs_complete) {
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/*
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* This is either the very first time, or we are starting over.
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*/
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smime_newprefs = (unsigned long*)PORT_ZAlloc (smime_symmetric_count
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* sizeof(*smime_newprefs));
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if (smime_newprefs == NULL)
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return SECFailure;
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smime_current_pref_index = 0;
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smime_prefs_complete = PR_FALSE;
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}
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mask = which & CIPHER_FAMILYID_MASK;
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if (mask == CIPHER_FAMILYID_MASK) {
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/*
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* This call signifies that all preferences have been set.
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* Move "newprefs" over, after checking first whether or
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* not the new ones are different from the old ones.
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*/
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if (smime_prefs != NULL) {
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if (PORT_Memcmp (smime_prefs, smime_newprefs,
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smime_symmetric_count * sizeof(*smime_prefs)) == 0)
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smime_prefs_changed = PR_FALSE;
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else
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smime_prefs_changed = PR_TRUE;
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PORT_Free (smime_prefs);
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}
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smime_prefs = smime_newprefs;
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smime_prefs_complete = PR_TRUE;
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return SECSuccess;
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}
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PORT_Assert (mask == CIPHER_FAMILYID_SMIME);
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if (mask != CIPHER_FAMILYID_SMIME) {
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/* XXX set an error! */
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return SECFailure;
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}
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if (on) {
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PORT_Assert (smime_current_pref_index < smime_symmetric_count);
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if (smime_current_pref_index >= smime_symmetric_count) {
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/* XXX set an error! */
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return SECFailure;
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}
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smime_newprefs[smime_current_pref_index++] = which;
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}
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return SECSuccess;
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}
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/*
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* this function locally records the export policy
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*/
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SECStatus
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SECMIME_SetPolicy(long which, int on)
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{
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unsigned long mask;
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PORT_Assert ((which & CIPHER_FAMILYID_MASK) == CIPHER_FAMILYID_SMIME);
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if ((which & CIPHER_FAMILYID_MASK) != CIPHER_FAMILYID_SMIME) {
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/* XXX set an error! */
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return SECFailure;
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}
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which &= ~CIPHER_FAMILYID_MASK;
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PORT_Assert (which < 32); /* bits in the long */
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if (which >= 32) {
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/* XXX set an error! */
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return SECFailure;
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}
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mask = 1UL << which;
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if (on) {
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smime_policy_bits |= mask;
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} else {
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smime_policy_bits &= ~mask;
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}
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return SECSuccess;
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}
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/*
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* Based on the given algorithm (including its parameters, in some cases!)
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* and the given key (may or may not be inspected, depending on the
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* algorithm), find the appropriate policy algorithm specification
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* and return it. If no match can be made, -1 is returned.
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*/
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static long
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smime_policy_algorithm (SECAlgorithmID *algid, PK11SymKey *key)
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{
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SECOidTag algtag;
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algtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag (algid);
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switch (algtag) {
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case SEC_OID_RC2_CBC:
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{
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unsigned int keylen_bits;
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keylen_bits = PK11_GetKeyStrength (key, algid);
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switch (keylen_bits) {
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case 40:
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return SMIME_RC2_CBC_40;
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case 64:
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return SMIME_RC2_CBC_64;
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case 128:
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return SMIME_RC2_CBC_128;
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default:
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break;
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}
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}
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break;
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case SEC_OID_DES_CBC:
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return SMIME_DES_CBC_56;
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case SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC:
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return SMIME_DES_EDE3_168;
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case SEC_OID_FORTEZZA_SKIPJACK:
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return SMIME_FORTEZZA;
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#ifdef SMIME_DOES_RC5
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case SEC_OID_RC5_CBC_PAD:
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PORT_Assert (0); /* XXX need to pull out parameters and match */
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break;
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#endif
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default:
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break;
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}
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return -1;
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}
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static PRBool
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smime_cipher_allowed (unsigned long which)
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{
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unsigned long mask;
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which &= ~CIPHER_FAMILYID_MASK;
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PORT_Assert (which < 32); /* bits per long (min) */
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if (which >= 32)
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return PR_FALSE;
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mask = 1UL << which;
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if ((mask & smime_policy_bits) == 0)
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return PR_FALSE;
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return PR_TRUE;
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}
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PRBool
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SECMIME_DecryptionAllowed(SECAlgorithmID *algid, PK11SymKey *key)
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{
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long which;
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which = smime_policy_algorithm (algid, key);
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if (which < 0)
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return PR_FALSE;
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return smime_cipher_allowed ((unsigned long)which);
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}
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/*
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* Does the current policy allow *any* S/MIME encryption (or decryption)?
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*
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* This tells whether or not *any* S/MIME encryption can be done,
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* according to policy. Callers may use this to do nicer user interface
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* (say, greying out a checkbox so a user does not even try to encrypt
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* a message when they are not allowed to) or for any reason they want
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* to check whether S/MIME encryption (or decryption, for that matter)
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* may be done.
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*
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* It takes no arguments. The return value is a simple boolean:
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* PR_TRUE means encryption (or decryption) is *possible*
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* (but may still fail due to other reasons, like because we cannot
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* find all the necessary certs, etc.; PR_TRUE is *not* a guarantee)
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* PR_FALSE means encryption (or decryption) is not permitted
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*
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* There are no errors from this routine.
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*/
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PRBool
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SECMIME_EncryptionPossible (void)
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{
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if (smime_policy_bits != 0)
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return PR_TRUE;
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return PR_FALSE;
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}
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/*
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* XXX Would like the "parameters" field to be a SECItem *, but the
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* encoder is having trouble with optional pointers to an ANY. Maybe
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* once that is fixed, can change this back...
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*/
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typedef struct smime_capability_struct {
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unsigned long cipher; /* local; not part of encoding */
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SECOidTag capIDTag; /* local; not part of encoding */
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SECItem capabilityID;
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SECItem parameters;
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} smime_capability;
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static const SEC_ASN1Template smime_capability_template[] = {
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{ SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
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0, NULL, sizeof(smime_capability) },
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{ SEC_ASN1_OBJECT_ID,
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offsetof(smime_capability,capabilityID), },
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{ SEC_ASN1_OPTIONAL | SEC_ASN1_ANY,
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offsetof(smime_capability,parameters), },
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{ 0, }
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};
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static const SEC_ASN1Template smime_capabilities_template[] = {
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{ SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, smime_capability_template }
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};
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static void
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smime_fill_capability (smime_capability *cap)
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{
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unsigned long cipher;
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SECOidTag algtag;
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int i;
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algtag = SECOID_FindOIDTag (&(cap->capabilityID));
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for (i = 0; i < smime_symmetric_count; i++) {
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if (smime_cipher_maps[i].algtag != algtag)
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continue;
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/*
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* XXX If SECITEM_CompareItem allowed NULLs as arguments (comparing
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* 2 NULLs as equal and NULL and non-NULL as not equal), we could
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* use that here instead of all of the following comparison code.
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*/
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if (cap->parameters.data != NULL) {
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if (smime_cipher_maps[i].parms == NULL)
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continue;
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if (cap->parameters.len != smime_cipher_maps[i].parms->len)
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continue;
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if (PORT_Memcmp (cap->parameters.data,
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smime_cipher_maps[i].parms->data,
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cap->parameters.len) == 0)
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break;
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} else if (smime_cipher_maps[i].parms == NULL) {
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break;
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}
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}
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if (i == smime_symmetric_count)
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cipher = 0;
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else
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cipher = smime_cipher_maps[i].cipher;
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cap->cipher = cipher;
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cap->capIDTag = algtag;
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}
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static long
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smime_choose_cipher (CERTCertificate *scert, CERTCertificate **rcerts)
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{
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PRArenaPool *poolp;
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long chosen_cipher;
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int *cipher_abilities;
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int *cipher_votes;
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int strong_mapi;
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int rcount, mapi, max, i;
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PRBool isFortezza = PK11_FortezzaHasKEA(scert);
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if (smime_policy_bits == 0) {
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PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_BAD_EXPORT_ALGORITHM);
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return -1;
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}
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chosen_cipher = SMIME_RC2_CBC_40; /* the default, LCD */
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poolp = PORT_NewArena (1024); /* XXX what is right value? */
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if (poolp == NULL)
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goto done;
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cipher_abilities = (int*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc (poolp,
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smime_symmetric_count * sizeof(int));
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if (cipher_abilities == NULL)
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goto done;
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cipher_votes = (int*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc (poolp,
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smime_symmetric_count * sizeof(int));
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if (cipher_votes == NULL)
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goto done;
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/*
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* XXX Should have a #define somewhere which specifies default
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* strong cipher. (Or better, a way to configure, which would
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* take Fortezza into account as well.)
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*/
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/* If the user has the Fortezza preference turned on, make
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* that the strong cipher. Otherwise, use triple-DES. */
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strong_mapi = -1;
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if (isFortezza) {
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for(i=0;i < smime_current_pref_index && strong_mapi < 0;i++)
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{
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if (smime_prefs[i] == SMIME_FORTEZZA)
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strong_mapi = smime_mapi_by_cipher(SMIME_FORTEZZA);
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}
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}
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if (strong_mapi == -1)
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strong_mapi = smime_mapi_by_cipher (SMIME_DES_EDE3_168);
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PORT_Assert (strong_mapi >= 0);
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for (rcount = 0; rcerts[rcount] != NULL; rcount++) {
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SECItem *profile;
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smime_capability **caps;
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int capi, pref;
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SECStatus dstat;
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pref = smime_symmetric_count;
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profile = CERT_FindSMimeProfile (rcerts[rcount]);
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if (profile != NULL && profile->data != NULL && profile->len > 0) {
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caps = NULL;
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dstat = SEC_ASN1DecodeItem (poolp, &caps,
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smime_capabilities_template,
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profile);
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if (dstat == SECSuccess && caps != NULL) {
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for (capi = 0; caps[capi] != NULL; capi++) {
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smime_fill_capability (caps[capi]);
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mapi = smime_mapi_by_cipher (caps[capi]->cipher);
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if (mapi >= 0) {
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cipher_abilities[mapi]++;
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cipher_votes[mapi] += pref;
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--pref;
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}
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}
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}
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} else {
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SECKEYPublicKey *key;
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unsigned int pklen_bits;
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/*
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* XXX This is probably only good for RSA keys. What I would
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* really like is a function to just say; Is the public key in
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* this cert an export-length key? Then I would not have to
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* know things like the value 512, or the kind of key, or what
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* a subjectPublicKeyInfo is, etc.
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*/
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key = CERT_ExtractPublicKey (rcerts[rcount]);
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if (key != NULL) {
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pklen_bits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength (key) * 8;
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SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey (key);
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if (pklen_bits > 512) {
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cipher_abilities[strong_mapi]++;
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cipher_votes[strong_mapi] += pref;
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}
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}
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}
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if (profile != NULL)
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SECITEM_FreeItem (profile, PR_TRUE);
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}
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max = 0;
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for (mapi = 0; mapi < smime_symmetric_count; mapi++) {
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if (cipher_abilities[mapi] != rcount)
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continue;
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if (! smime_cipher_allowed (smime_cipher_maps[mapi].cipher))
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continue;
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if (!isFortezza && (smime_cipher_maps[mapi].cipher == SMIME_FORTEZZA))
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continue;
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if (cipher_votes[mapi] > max) {
|
|
chosen_cipher = smime_cipher_maps[mapi].cipher;
|
|
max = cipher_votes[mapi];
|
|
} /* XXX else if a tie, let scert break it? */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
if (poolp != NULL)
|
|
PORT_FreeArena (poolp, PR_FALSE);
|
|
|
|
return chosen_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX This is a hack for now to satisfy our current interface.
|
|
* Eventually, with more parameters needing to be specified, just
|
|
* looking up the keysize is not going to be sufficient.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
smime_keysize_by_cipher (unsigned long which)
|
|
{
|
|
int keysize;
|
|
|
|
switch (which) {
|
|
case SMIME_RC2_CBC_40:
|
|
keysize = 40;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SMIME_RC2_CBC_64:
|
|
keysize = 64;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SMIME_RC2_CBC_128:
|
|
keysize = 128;
|
|
break;
|
|
#ifdef SMIME_DOES_RC5
|
|
case SMIME_RC5PAD_64_16_40:
|
|
case SMIME_RC5PAD_64_16_64:
|
|
case SMIME_RC5PAD_64_16_128:
|
|
/* XXX See comment above; keysize is not enough... */
|
|
PORT_Assert (0);
|
|
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
|
|
keysize = -1;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
case SMIME_DES_CBC_56:
|
|
case SMIME_DES_EDE3_168:
|
|
case SMIME_FORTEZZA:
|
|
/*
|
|
* These are special; since the key size is fixed, we actually
|
|
* want to *avoid* specifying a key size.
|
|
*/
|
|
keysize = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
keysize = -1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return keysize;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Start an S/MIME encrypting context.
|
|
*
|
|
* "scert" is the cert for the sender. It will be checked for validity.
|
|
* "rcerts" are the certs for the recipients. They will also be checked.
|
|
*
|
|
* "certdb" is the cert database to use for verifying the certs.
|
|
* It can be NULL if a default database is available (like in the client).
|
|
*
|
|
* This function already does all of the stuff specific to S/MIME protocol
|
|
* and local policy; the return value just needs to be passed to
|
|
* SEC_PKCS7Encode() or to SEC_PKCS7EncoderStart() to create the encoded data,
|
|
* and finally to SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo().
|
|
*
|
|
* An error results in a return value of NULL and an error set.
|
|
* (Retrieve specific errors via PORT_GetError()/XP_GetError().)
|
|
*/
|
|
SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
|
|
SECMIME_CreateEncrypted(CERTCertificate *scert,
|
|
CERTCertificate **rcerts,
|
|
CERTCertDBHandle *certdb,
|
|
SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn,
|
|
void *pwfn_arg)
|
|
{
|
|
SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
|
|
long cipher;
|
|
SECOidTag encalg;
|
|
int keysize;
|
|
int mapi, rci;
|
|
|
|
cipher = smime_choose_cipher (scert, rcerts);
|
|
if (cipher < 0)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
mapi = smime_mapi_by_cipher (cipher);
|
|
if (mapi < 0)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX This is stretching it -- CreateEnvelopedData should probably
|
|
* take a cipher itself of some sort, because we cannot know what the
|
|
* future will bring in terms of parameters for each type of algorithm.
|
|
* For example, just an algorithm and keysize is *not* sufficient to
|
|
* fully specify the usage of RC5 (which also needs to know rounds and
|
|
* block size). Work this out into a better API!
|
|
*/
|
|
encalg = smime_cipher_maps[mapi].algtag;
|
|
keysize = smime_keysize_by_cipher (cipher);
|
|
if (keysize < 0)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
cinfo = SEC_PKCS7CreateEnvelopedData (scert, certUsageEmailRecipient,
|
|
certdb, encalg, keysize,
|
|
pwfn, pwfn_arg);
|
|
if (cinfo == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (rci = 0; rcerts[rci] != NULL; rci++) {
|
|
if (rcerts[rci] == scert)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (SEC_PKCS7AddRecipient (cinfo, rcerts[rci], certUsageEmailRecipient,
|
|
NULL) != SECSuccess) {
|
|
SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo (cinfo);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return cinfo;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static smime_capability **smime_capabilities;
|
|
static SECItem *smime_encoded_caps;
|
|
static PRBool lastUsedFortezza;
|
|
|
|
|
|
static SECStatus
|
|
smime_init_caps (PRBool isFortezza)
|
|
{
|
|
smime_capability *cap;
|
|
smime_cipher_map *map;
|
|
SECOidData *oiddata;
|
|
SECStatus rv;
|
|
int i, capIndex;
|
|
|
|
if (smime_encoded_caps != NULL
|
|
&& (! smime_prefs_changed)
|
|
&& lastUsedFortezza == isFortezza)
|
|
return SECSuccess;
|
|
|
|
if (smime_encoded_caps != NULL) {
|
|
SECITEM_FreeItem (smime_encoded_caps, PR_TRUE);
|
|
smime_encoded_caps = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (smime_capabilities == NULL) {
|
|
smime_capabilities = (smime_capability**)PORT_ZAlloc (
|
|
(smime_symmetric_count + 1)
|
|
* sizeof(smime_capability *));
|
|
if (smime_capabilities == NULL)
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rv = SECFailure;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
The process of creating the encoded PKCS7 cipher capability list
|
|
involves two basic steps:
|
|
|
|
(a) Convert our internal representation of cipher preferences
|
|
(smime_prefs) into an array containing cipher OIDs and
|
|
parameter data (smime_capabilities). This step is
|
|
performed here.
|
|
|
|
(b) Encode, using ASN.1, the cipher information in
|
|
smime_capabilities, leaving the encoded result in
|
|
smime_encoded_caps.
|
|
|
|
(In the process of performing (a), Lisa put in some optimizations
|
|
which allow us to avoid needlessly re-populating elements in
|
|
smime_capabilities as we walk through smime_prefs.)
|
|
|
|
We want to use separate loop variables for smime_prefs and
|
|
smime_capabilities because in the case where the Skipjack cipher
|
|
is turned on in the prefs, but where we don't want to include
|
|
Skipjack in the encoded capabilities (presumably due to using a
|
|
non-fortezza cert when sending a message), we want to avoid creating
|
|
an empty element in smime_capabilities. This would otherwise cause
|
|
the encoding step to produce an empty set, since Skipjack happens
|
|
to be the first cipher in smime_prefs, if it is turned on.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0, capIndex = 0; i < smime_current_pref_index; i++, capIndex++) {
|
|
int mapi;
|
|
|
|
/* Get the next cipher preference in smime_prefs. */
|
|
mapi = smime_mapi_by_cipher (smime_prefs[i]);
|
|
if (mapi < 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/* Find the corresponding entry in the cipher map. */
|
|
PORT_Assert (mapi < smime_symmetric_count);
|
|
map = &(smime_cipher_maps[mapi]);
|
|
|
|
/* If we're using a non-Fortezza cert, only advertise non-Fortezza
|
|
capabilities. (We advertise all capabilities if we have a
|
|
Fortezza cert.) */
|
|
if ((!isFortezza) && (map->cipher == SMIME_FORTEZZA))
|
|
{
|
|
capIndex--; /* we want to visit the same caps index entry next time */
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Convert the next preference found in smime_prefs into an
|
|
* smime_capability.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
cap = smime_capabilities[capIndex];
|
|
if (cap == NULL) {
|
|
cap = (smime_capability*)PORT_ZAlloc (sizeof(smime_capability));
|
|
if (cap == NULL)
|
|
break;
|
|
smime_capabilities[capIndex] = cap;
|
|
} else if (cap->cipher == smime_prefs[i]) {
|
|
continue; /* no change to this one */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cap->capIDTag = map->algtag;
|
|
oiddata = SECOID_FindOIDByTag (map->algtag);
|
|
if (oiddata == NULL)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (cap->capabilityID.data != NULL) {
|
|
SECITEM_FreeItem (&(cap->capabilityID), PR_FALSE);
|
|
cap->capabilityID.data = NULL;
|
|
cap->capabilityID.len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem (NULL, &(cap->capabilityID), &(oiddata->oid));
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (map->parms == NULL) {
|
|
cap->parameters.data = NULL;
|
|
cap->parameters.len = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
cap->parameters.data = map->parms->data;
|
|
cap->parameters.len = map->parms->len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cap->cipher = smime_prefs[i];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (i != smime_current_pref_index)
|
|
return rv;
|
|
|
|
while (capIndex < smime_symmetric_count) {
|
|
cap = smime_capabilities[capIndex];
|
|
if (cap != NULL) {
|
|
SECITEM_FreeItem (&(cap->capabilityID), PR_FALSE);
|
|
PORT_Free (cap);
|
|
}
|
|
smime_capabilities[capIndex] = NULL;
|
|
capIndex++;
|
|
}
|
|
smime_capabilities[capIndex] = NULL;
|
|
|
|
smime_encoded_caps = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem (NULL, NULL, &smime_capabilities,
|
|
smime_capabilities_template);
|
|
if (smime_encoded_caps == NULL)
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
|
|
lastUsedFortezza = isFortezza;
|
|
|
|
return SECSuccess;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static SECStatus
|
|
smime_add_profile (CERTCertificate *cert, SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
|
|
{
|
|
PRBool isFortezza = PR_FALSE;
|
|
|
|
PORT_Assert (smime_prefs_complete);
|
|
if (! smime_prefs_complete)
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
|
|
/* See if the sender's cert specifies Fortezza key exchange. */
|
|
if (cert != NULL)
|
|
isFortezza = PK11_FortezzaHasKEA(cert);
|
|
|
|
/* For that matter, if capabilities haven't been initialized yet,
|
|
do so now. */
|
|
if (isFortezza != lastUsedFortezza || smime_encoded_caps == NULL || smime_prefs_changed) {
|
|
SECStatus rv;
|
|
|
|
rv = smime_init_caps(isFortezza);
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
|
return rv;
|
|
|
|
PORT_Assert (smime_encoded_caps != NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return SEC_PKCS7AddSignedAttribute (cinfo, SEC_OID_PKCS9_SMIME_CAPABILITIES,
|
|
smime_encoded_caps);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Start an S/MIME signing context.
|
|
*
|
|
* "scert" is the cert that will be used to sign the data. It will be
|
|
* checked for validity.
|
|
*
|
|
* "ecert" is the signer's encryption cert. If it is different from
|
|
* scert, then it will be included in the signed message so that the
|
|
* recipient can save it for future encryptions.
|
|
*
|
|
* "certdb" is the cert database to use for verifying the cert.
|
|
* It can be NULL if a default database is available (like in the client).
|
|
*
|
|
* "digestalg" names the digest algorithm (e.g. SEC_OID_SHA1).
|
|
* XXX There should be SECMIME functions for hashing, or the hashing should
|
|
* be built into this interface, which we would like because we would
|
|
* support more smartcards that way, and then this argument should go away.)
|
|
*
|
|
* "digest" is the actual digest of the data. It must be provided in
|
|
* the case of detached data or NULL if the content will be included.
|
|
*
|
|
* This function already does all of the stuff specific to S/MIME protocol
|
|
* and local policy; the return value just needs to be passed to
|
|
* SEC_PKCS7Encode() or to SEC_PKCS7EncoderStart() to create the encoded data,
|
|
* and finally to SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo().
|
|
*
|
|
* An error results in a return value of NULL and an error set.
|
|
* (Retrieve specific errors via PORT_GetError()/XP_GetError().)
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
|
|
SECMIME_CreateSigned (CERTCertificate *scert,
|
|
CERTCertificate *ecert,
|
|
CERTCertDBHandle *certdb,
|
|
SECOidTag digestalg,
|
|
SECItem *digest,
|
|
SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn,
|
|
void *pwfn_arg)
|
|
{
|
|
SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
|
|
SECStatus rv;
|
|
|
|
/* See note in header comment above about digestalg. */
|
|
/* Doesn't explain this. PORT_Assert (digestalg == SEC_OID_SHA1); */
|
|
|
|
cinfo = SEC_PKCS7CreateSignedData (scert, certUsageEmailSigner,
|
|
certdb, digestalg, digest,
|
|
pwfn, pwfn_arg);
|
|
if (cinfo == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (SEC_PKCS7IncludeCertChain (cinfo, NULL) != SECSuccess) {
|
|
SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo (cinfo);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* if the encryption cert and the signing cert differ, then include
|
|
* the encryption cert too.
|
|
*/
|
|
/* it is ok to compare the pointers since we ref count, and the same
|
|
* cert will always have the same pointer
|
|
*/
|
|
if ( ( ecert != NULL ) && ( ecert != scert ) ) {
|
|
rv = SEC_PKCS7AddCertificate(cinfo, ecert);
|
|
if ( rv != SECSuccess ) {
|
|
SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo (cinfo);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add the signing time. But if it fails for some reason,
|
|
* may as well not give up altogether -- just assert.
|
|
*/
|
|
rv = SEC_PKCS7AddSigningTime (cinfo);
|
|
PORT_Assert (rv == SECSuccess);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add the email profile. Again, if it fails for some reason,
|
|
* may as well not give up altogether -- just assert.
|
|
*/
|
|
rv = smime_add_profile (ecert, cinfo);
|
|
PORT_Assert (rv == SECSuccess);
|
|
|
|
return cinfo;
|
|
}
|