gecko-dev/security/certverifier/OCSPCache.cpp
Brian Smith fe9fcc5bec Bug 1010634, Part 1: Fix compiler warnings in certverifier, r=cviecco
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : f8d925f042040368b038b62bc1d0c9d4d6d04618
2014-05-14 17:46:32 -07:00

312 lines
10 KiB
C++

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This code is made available to you under your choice of the following sets
* of licensing terms:
*/
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
*/
/* Copyright 2013 Mozilla Contributors
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include "OCSPCache.h"
#include <limits>
#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h"
#include "pk11pub.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#ifdef PR_LOGGING
extern PRLogModuleInfo* gCertVerifierLog;
#endif
namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
void
MozillaPKIX_PK11_DestroyContext_true(PK11Context* context)
{
PK11_DestroyContext(context, true);
}
typedef mozilla::pkix::ScopedPtr<PK11Context,
MozillaPKIX_PK11_DestroyContext_true>
ScopedPK11Context;
// Let derIssuer be the DER encoding of the issuer of aCert.
// Let derPublicKey be the DER encoding of the public key of aIssuerCert.
// Let serialNumber be the bytes of the serial number of aCert.
// The value calculated is SHA384(derIssuer || derPublicKey || serialNumber).
// Because the DER encodings include the length of the data encoded,
// there do not exist A(derIssuerA, derPublicKeyA, serialNumberA) and
// B(derIssuerB, derPublicKeyB, serialNumberB) such that the concatenation of
// each triplet results in the same string of bytes but where each part in A is
// not equal to its counterpart in B. This is important because as a result it
// is computationally infeasible to find collisions that would subvert this
// cache (given that SHA384 is a cryptographically-secure hash function).
static SECStatus
CertIDHash(SHA384Buffer& buf, const CERTCertificate* aCert,
const CERTCertificate* aIssuerCert)
{
ScopedPK11Context context(PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA384));
if (!context) {
return SECFailure;
}
SECStatus rv = PK11_DigestBegin(context.get());
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
rv = PK11_DigestOp(context.get(), aCert->derIssuer.data,
aCert->derIssuer.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
rv = PK11_DigestOp(context.get(), aIssuerCert->derPublicKey.data,
aIssuerCert->derPublicKey.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
rv = PK11_DigestOp(context.get(), aCert->serialNumber.data,
aCert->serialNumber.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
uint32_t outLen = 0;
rv = PK11_DigestFinal(context.get(), buf, &outLen, SHA384_LENGTH);
if (outLen != SHA384_LENGTH) {
return SECFailure;
}
return rv;
}
SECStatus
OCSPCache::Entry::Init(const CERTCertificate* aCert,
const CERTCertificate* aIssuerCert,
PRErrorCode aErrorCode,
PRTime aThisUpdate,
PRTime aValidThrough)
{
mErrorCode = aErrorCode;
mThisUpdate = aThisUpdate;
mValidThrough = aValidThrough;
return CertIDHash(mIDHash, aCert, aIssuerCert);
}
OCSPCache::OCSPCache()
: mMutex("OCSPCache-mutex")
{
}
OCSPCache::~OCSPCache()
{
Clear();
}
// Returns false with index in an undefined state if no matching entry was
// found.
bool
OCSPCache::FindInternal(const CERTCertificate* aCert,
const CERTCertificate* aIssuerCert,
/*out*/ size_t& index,
const MutexAutoLock& /* aProofOfLock */)
{
if (mEntries.length() == 0) {
return false;
}
SHA384Buffer idHash;
SECStatus rv = CertIDHash(idHash, aCert, aIssuerCert);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return false;
}
// mEntries is sorted with the most-recently-used entry at the end.
// Thus, searching from the end will often be fastest.
index = mEntries.length();
while (index > 0) {
--index;
if (memcmp(mEntries[index]->mIDHash, idHash, SHA384_LENGTH) == 0) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
void
OCSPCache::LogWithCerts(const char* aMessage, const CERTCertificate* aCert,
const CERTCertificate* aIssuerCert)
{
#ifdef PR_LOGGING
if (PR_LOG_TEST(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG)) {
mozilla::pkix::ScopedPtr<char, mozilla::psm::PORT_Free_string>
cn(CERT_GetCommonName(&aCert->subject));
mozilla::pkix::ScopedPtr<char, mozilla::psm::PORT_Free_string>
cnIssuer(CERT_GetCommonName(&aIssuerCert->subject));
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, (aMessage, cn.get(), cnIssuer.get()));
}
#endif
}
void
OCSPCache::MakeMostRecentlyUsed(size_t aIndex,
const MutexAutoLock& /* aProofOfLock */)
{
Entry* entry = mEntries[aIndex];
// Since mEntries is sorted with the most-recently-used entry at the end,
// aIndex is likely to be near the end, so this is likely to be fast.
mEntries.erase(mEntries.begin() + aIndex);
mEntries.append(entry);
}
bool
OCSPCache::Get(const CERTCertificate* aCert,
const CERTCertificate* aIssuerCert,
PRErrorCode& aErrorCode,
PRTime& aValidThrough)
{
PR_ASSERT(aCert);
PR_ASSERT(aIssuerCert);
MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);
size_t index;
if (!FindInternal(aCert, aIssuerCert, index, lock)) {
LogWithCerts("OCSPCache::Get(%s, %s) not in cache", aCert, aIssuerCert);
return false;
}
LogWithCerts("OCSPCache::Get(%s, %s) in cache", aCert, aIssuerCert);
aErrorCode = mEntries[index]->mErrorCode;
aValidThrough = mEntries[index]->mValidThrough;
MakeMostRecentlyUsed(index, lock);
return true;
}
SECStatus
OCSPCache::Put(const CERTCertificate* aCert,
const CERTCertificate* aIssuerCert,
PRErrorCode aErrorCode,
PRTime aThisUpdate,
PRTime aValidThrough)
{
PR_ASSERT(aCert);
PR_ASSERT(aIssuerCert);
MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);
size_t index;
if (FindInternal(aCert, aIssuerCert, index, lock)) {
// Never replace an entry indicating a revoked certificate.
if (mEntries[index]->mErrorCode == SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) {
LogWithCerts("OCSPCache::Put(%s, %s) already in cache as revoked - "
"not replacing", aCert, aIssuerCert);
MakeMostRecentlyUsed(index, lock);
return SECSuccess;
}
// Never replace a newer entry with an older one unless the older entry
// indicates a revoked certificate, which we want to remember.
if (mEntries[index]->mThisUpdate > aThisUpdate &&
aErrorCode != SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) {
LogWithCerts("OCSPCache::Put(%s, %s) already in cache with more recent "
"validity - not replacing", aCert, aIssuerCert);
MakeMostRecentlyUsed(index, lock);
return SECSuccess;
}
// Only known good responses or responses indicating an unknown
// or revoked certificate should replace previously known responses.
if (aErrorCode != 0 && aErrorCode != SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT &&
aErrorCode != SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) {
LogWithCerts("OCSPCache::Put(%s, %s) already in cache - not replacing "
"with less important status", aCert, aIssuerCert);
MakeMostRecentlyUsed(index, lock);
return SECSuccess;
}
LogWithCerts("OCSPCache::Put(%s, %s) already in cache - replacing",
aCert, aIssuerCert);
mEntries[index]->mErrorCode = aErrorCode;
mEntries[index]->mThisUpdate = aThisUpdate;
mEntries[index]->mValidThrough = aValidThrough;
MakeMostRecentlyUsed(index, lock);
return SECSuccess;
}
if (mEntries.length() == MaxEntries) {
LogWithCerts("OCSPCache::Put(%s, %s) too full - evicting an entry", aCert,
aIssuerCert);
for (Entry** toEvict = mEntries.begin(); toEvict != mEntries.end();
toEvict++) {
// Never evict an entry that indicates a revoked or unknokwn certificate,
// because revoked responses are more security-critical to remember.
if ((*toEvict)->mErrorCode != SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE &&
(*toEvict)->mErrorCode != SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
delete *toEvict;
mEntries.erase(toEvict);
break;
}
}
// Well, we tried, but apparently everything is revoked or unknown.
// We don't want to remove a cached revoked or unknown response. If we're
// trying to insert a good response, we can just return "successfully"
// without doing so. This means we'll lose some speed, but it's not a
// security issue. If we're trying to insert a revoked or unknown response,
// we can't. We should return with an error that causes the current
// verification to fail.
if (mEntries.length() == MaxEntries) {
if (aErrorCode != 0) {
PR_SetError(aErrorCode, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
}
Entry* newEntry = new Entry();
// Normally we don't have to do this in Gecko, because OOM is fatal.
// However, if we want to embed this in another project, OOM might not
// be fatal, so handle this case.
if (!newEntry) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
SECStatus rv = newEntry->Init(aCert, aIssuerCert, aErrorCode, aThisUpdate,
aValidThrough);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
mEntries.append(newEntry);
LogWithCerts("OCSPCache::Put(%s, %s) added to cache", aCert, aIssuerCert);
return SECSuccess;
}
void
OCSPCache::Clear()
{
MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("OCSPCache::Clear: clearing cache"));
// First go through and delete the memory being pointed to by the pointers
// in the vector.
for (Entry** entry = mEntries.begin(); entry < mEntries.end();
entry++) {
delete *entry;
}
// Then remove the pointers themselves.
mEntries.clearAndFree();
}
} } // namespace mozilla::psm