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[analyzer] Fix taint sink rules for exec-like functions (#66358)
Variadic arguments were not considered as taint sink arguments. I also decided to extend the list of exec-like functions. (Juliet CWE78_OS_Command_Injection__char_connect_socket_execl)
This commit is contained in:
Balazs Benics
GitHub
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1d0b7b6c8a
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f90e063308
@ -744,12 +744,14 @@ void GenericTaintChecker::initTaintRules(CheckerContext &C) const {
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// Sinks
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{{{"system"}}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
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{{{"popen"}}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
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{{{"execl"}}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
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{{{"execle"}}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
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{{{"execlp"}}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
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{{{"execvp"}}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
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{{{"execvP"}}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
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{{{"execve"}}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
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{{{"execl"}}, TR::Sink({{}, {0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
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{{{"execle"}}, TR::Sink({{}, {0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
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{{{"execlp"}}, TR::Sink({{}, {0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
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{{{"execv"}}, TR::Sink({{0, 1}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
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{{{"execve"}}, TR::Sink({{0, 1, 2}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
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{{{"fexecve"}}, TR::Sink({{0, 1, 2}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
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{{{"execvp"}}, TR::Sink({{0, 1}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
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{{{"execvpe"}}, TR::Sink({{0, 1, 2}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
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{{{"dlopen"}}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
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{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {{"malloc"}}}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgTaintedBufferSize)},
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{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {{"calloc"}}}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgTaintedBufferSize)},
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@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ void clang_analyzer_isTainted_wchar(wchar_t);
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void clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp(char*);
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void clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(int);
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int coin();
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int scanf(const char *restrict format, ...);
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char *gets(char *str);
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char *gets_s(char *str, rsize_t n);
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@ -118,6 +120,41 @@ void *malloc(size_t);
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void *calloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size);
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void bcopy(void *s1, void *s2, size_t n);
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// function | pathname | filename | fd | arglist | argv[] | envp[]
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// ===============================================================
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// 1 execl | X | | | X | |
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// 2 execle | X | | | X | | X
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// 3 execlp | | X | | X | |
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// 4 execv | X | | | | X |
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// 5 execve | X | | | | X | X
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// 6 execvp | | X | | | X |
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// 7 execvpe | | X | | | X | X
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// 8 fexecve | | | X | | X | X
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// ===============================================================
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// letter | | p | f | l | v | e
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//
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// legend:
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// - pathname: rel/abs path to the binary
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// - filename: file name searched in PATH to execute the binary
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// - fd: accepts a file descriptor
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// - arglist: accepts variadic arguments
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// - argv: accepts a pointer to array, denoting the new argv
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// - envp: accepts a pointer to array, denoting the new envp
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int execl(const char *path, const char *arg, ...);
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int execle(const char *path, const char *arg, ...);
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int execlp(const char *file, const char *arg, ...);
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int execv(const char *path, char *const argv[]);
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int execve(const char *path, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]);
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int execvp(const char *file, char *const argv[]);
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int execvpe(const char *file, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]);
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int fexecve(int fd, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]);
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FILE *popen(const char *command, const char *type);
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int pclose(FILE *stream);
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int system(const char *command);
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typedef size_t socklen_t;
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struct sockaddr {
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@ -224,7 +261,6 @@ void testUncontrolledFormatString(char **p) {
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}
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int system(const char *command);
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void testTaintSystemCall(void) {
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char buffer[156];
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char addr[128];
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@ -287,7 +323,6 @@ void testTaintedBufferSize(void) {
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#define SOCK_STREAM 1
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int socket(int, int, int);
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size_t read(int, void *, size_t);
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int execl(const char *, const char *, ...);
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void testSocket(void) {
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int sock;
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@ -1129,6 +1164,128 @@ void testConfigurationSinks(void) {
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// expected-warning@-1 {{Untrusted data is passed to a user-defined sink}}
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}
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int test_exec_like_functions() {
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char buf[100] = {0};
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scanf("%99s", buf);
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clang_analyzer_isTainted_char(buf[0]); // expected-warning {{YES}}
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char *cleanArray[] = {"ENV1=V1", "ENV2=V2", NULL};
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char *taintedArray[] = {buf, "ENV2=V2", NULL};
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clang_analyzer_isTainted_char(taintedArray[0][0]); // expected-warning {{YES}}
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clang_analyzer_isTainted_char(*(char*)taintedArray[0]); // expected-warning {{YES}}
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clang_analyzer_isTainted_char(*(char*)taintedArray); // expected-warning {{NO}} We should have YES here.
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// FIXME: Above the triple pointer indirection will confuse the checker,
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// as we only check two levels. The results would be worse, if the tainted
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// subobject ("buf") would not be at the beginning of the enclosing object,
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// for the same reason.
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switch (coin()) {
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default: break;
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// Execute `path` with all arguments after `path` until a NULL pointer
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// and environment from `environ'.
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case 0: return execl("path", "arg0", "arg1", "arg2", NULL); // no-warning
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case 1: return execl(buf, "arg0", "arg1", "arg2", NULL); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
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case 2: return execl("path", buf, "arg1", "arg2", NULL); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
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case 3: return execl("path", "arg0", buf, "arg2", NULL); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
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case 4: return execl("path", "arg0", "arg1", buf, NULL); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
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}
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switch (coin()) {
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default: break;
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// Execute `path` with all arguments after `PATH` until a NULL pointer,
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// and the argument after that for environment.
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case 0: return execle("path", "arg0", "arg1", NULL, cleanArray); // no-warning
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case 1: return execle( buf, "arg0", "arg1", NULL, cleanArray); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
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case 2: return execle("path", buf, "arg1", NULL, cleanArray); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
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case 3: return execle("path", "arg0", buf, NULL, cleanArray); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
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case 4: return execle("path", "arg0", "arg1", NULL, buf); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
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case 5: return execle("path", "arg0", "arg1", NULL, taintedArray); // FIXME: We might wanna have a report here.
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}
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switch (coin()) {
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default: break;
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// Execute `file`, searching in the `PATH' environment variable if it
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// contains no slashes, with all arguments after `file` until a NULL
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// pointer and environment from `environ'.
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case 0: return execlp("file", "arg0", "arg1", "arg2", NULL); // no-warning
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case 1: return execlp( buf, "arg0", "arg1", "arg2", NULL); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
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case 2: return execlp("file", buf, "arg1", "arg2", NULL); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
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case 3: return execlp("file", "arg0", buf, "arg2", NULL); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
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case 4: return execlp("file", "arg0", "arg1", buf, NULL); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
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}
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switch (coin()) {
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default: break;
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// Execute `path` with arguments `ARGV` and environment from `environ'.
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case 0: return execv("path", /*argv=*/ cleanArray); // no-warning
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case 1: return execv( buf, /*argv=*/ cleanArray); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
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case 2: return execv("path", /*argv=*/taintedArray); // FIXME: We might wanna have a report here.
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}
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switch (coin()) {
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default: break;
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// Replace the current process, executing `path` with arguments `ARGV`
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// and environment `ENVP`. `ARGV` and `ENVP` are terminated by NULL pointers.
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case 0: return execve("path", /*argv=*/ cleanArray, /*envp=*/cleanArray); // no-warning
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case 1: return execve( buf, /*argv=*/ cleanArray, /*envp=*/cleanArray); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
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case 2: return execve("path", /*argv=*/taintedArray, /*envp=*/cleanArray); // FIXME: We might wanna have a report here.
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case 3: return execve("path", /*argv=*/cleanArray, /*envp=*/taintedArray); // FIXME: We might wanna have a report here.
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}
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switch (coin()) {
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default: break;
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// Execute `file`, searching in the `PATH' environment variable if it
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// contains no slashes, with arguments `ARGV` and environment from `environ'.
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case 0: return execvp("file", /*argv=*/ cleanArray); // no-warning
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case 1: return execvp( buf, /*argv=*/ cleanArray); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
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case 2: return execvp("file", /*argv=*/taintedArray); // FIXME: We might wanna have a report here.
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}
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// execvpe
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switch (coin()) {
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default: break;
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// Execute `file`, searching in the `PATH' environment variable if it
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// contains no slashes, with arguments `ARGV` and environment `ENVP`.
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// `ARGV` and `ENVP` are terminated by NULL pointers.
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case 0: return execvpe("file", /*argv=*/ cleanArray, /*envp=*/ cleanArray); // no-warning
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case 1: return execvpe( buf, /*argv=*/ cleanArray, /*envp=*/ cleanArray); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
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case 2: return execvpe("file", /*argv=*/taintedArray, /*envp=*/ cleanArray); // FIXME: We might wanna have a report here.
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case 3: return execvpe("file", /*argv=*/ cleanArray, /*envp=*/taintedArray); // FIXME: We might wanna have a report here.
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}
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int cleanFD = coin();
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int taintedFD;
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scanf("%d", &taintedFD);
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clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(taintedFD); // expected-warning {{YES}}
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switch (coin()) {
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default: break;
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// Execute the file `FD` refers to, overlaying the running program image.
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// `ARGV` and `ENVP` are passed to the new program, as for `execve'.
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case 0: return fexecve( cleanFD, /*argv=*/ cleanArray, /*envp=*/ cleanArray); // no-warning
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case 1: return fexecve(taintedFD, /*argv=*/ cleanArray, /*envp=*/ cleanArray); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
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case 2: return fexecve( cleanFD, /*argv=*/taintedArray, /*envp=*/ cleanArray); // FIXME: We might wanna have a report here.
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case 3: return fexecve( cleanFD, /*argv=*/ cleanArray, /*envp=*/taintedArray); // FIXME: We might wanna have a report here.
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}
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switch (coin()) {
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default: break;
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// Create a new stream connected to a pipe running the given `command`.
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case 0: return pclose(popen("command", /*mode=*/"r")); // no-warning
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case 1: return pclose(popen( buf, /*mode=*/"r")); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
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case 2: return pclose(popen("command", /*mode=*/buf)); // 'mode' is not a taint sink.
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}
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switch (coin()) {
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default: break;
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// Execute the given line as a shell command.
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case 0: return system("command"); // no-warning
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case 1: return system( buf); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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void testUnknownFunction(void (*foo)(void)) {
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foo(); // no-crash
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}
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