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* feat(qwen-live): scaffold standalone live daemon package with ported host stack New workspace package @qwen-code/qwen-live (M1+M2 of the Live split, issue #10118). This commit adds the package skeleton and the verbatim ports that need no behavioral changes: - host/: Live Host protocol v6 types, LiveHostCoordinator, and the discovery-file writer, ported from packages/cli/src/serve/live/ together with their test suites (51 tests green) - realtime/socket.ts, realtime/sanitize.ts: the two helper symbols the realtime client depends on, extracted from cli ui utils - registered in scripts/build.js buildOrder and root vitest projects * feat(qwen-live): generalize the realtime client tool surface Port qwen-realtime-session.ts and adapt it for the orchestration model: tools and instructions come from config, every declared tool dispatches through onFunctionCall with the raw argument payload, and outputs are receipt-style via submitFunctionOutput. The single-handoff machinery (multiple_handoffs error, steering acknowledgement, open-call complete) is removed; transport, response arbitration, pendingCalls timing, barge-in, and defensive validation are unchanged from the port. capturesTranscript marks handoff-style tools that capture the live transcript tail at call time. Test suite adapted: 27 tests green. * feat(qwen-live): add the BackendAdaptor seam and the qwen serve adaptor BackendAdaptor is the capability-bit-driven port between the live orchestrator and a coding-agent backend. QwenCodeAdaptor drives a running qwen serve daemon through the @qwen-code/sdk DaemonClient: 202-admission prompts, SSE event normalization (chunks and tool calls live under session_update.data.update), reject-if-idle mid-turn steering with a plain-prompt fallback, nested permission votes with voter attribution, and attachment-backed image blocks. 23 unit tests against an injected fake client. * feat(qwen-live): orchestrator, tools, injector, permissions, and daemon entry The M1+M2 core: - seven receipt-style dispatch tools plus remain_silent, with a dispatcher that answers every call (timeout fallback included) and session_N/job_N/asset_N handle registries - LiveSession wires Host audio, the realtime connection, tool handlers (appshot via the Host capture channel, handoff with voice-context packing and image attachments, busy-session steering), backend event pumps, and a bounded graceful-stop drain - Injector: safe-insertion window (VAD + response-in-flight + playback estimate at 48 kB/s with a quiet gap), batch aggregation, per-job progress throttling, barge-in drops progress, spoken/detail split - PermissionBroker: allow_always stays a one-shot protocol vote backed by a local TTL rule; remote resolutions retract queued asks - LiveDaemon: Host WS endpoint (Bearer + Origin-reject), discovery publish with fail-fast mutual exclusion and dead-owner handoff, appshot channel marked ready (the in-process capture path needs no separate verification), SIGINT/SIGTERM shutdown - SessionLog: JSONL with synchronous rotation (rename-before-reopen) 116 new unit tests; package total 167 green. * feat(qwen-live): end-to-end test suites against a real qwen serve daemon Test stack: a real qwen serve (spawned CLI bundle, fake-openai model endpoint), a scriptable fake DashScope realtime WebSocket server, the qwen-live daemon as a child process, and a protocol-v6 FakeHost client — every boundary is the real wire. Scenarios (11 tests): discovery publish/remove and hello/welcome, toggle brings up the realtime session (tool schema + instructions asserted on session.update), two-way audio byte fidelity, the full handoff loop against real serve with [COMPLETE] injection and spoken summary, injection-window hold/batch semantics, permission ask/vote relay, and busy-session steering tiers. The suites caught a real bug the unit layer could not: per-session calls must echo the daemon-issued clientId from the create/attach response (a self-made id is rejected by the client registration guard and broke handoff admission and vote attribution). QwenCodeAdaptor now tracks and echoes the issued id per session. * chore(release): keep @qwen-code/qwen-live versioned independently Same treatment as sdk/mobile-mcp/node-repl: the incubating package stays at its own 0.x version instead of lock-stepping with the CLI release train. The verbatim guard in package-scripts.test.js is updated alongside. * fix(qwen-live): harden review findings across dispatcher, injector, and permission relay Self-review fixes bundled after the adversarial pass: - adaptor: classify snake_case permission option ids (proceed_once) — the word-boundary regex never matched through "_", so an allow vote silently degraded to a cancelled outcome and serve dropped the turn - adaptor: detect the pending-prompt limit by error name as well as status, and fall image-bearing steers back to a regular prompt - dispatcher: a timed-out tool now answers with a pending receipt that tells the model not to retry (the handler keeps running) - injector: permission items flush ahead of the size-capped context join; spoken lines merge whole-line greedily under the 280-char cap - live-session: resubscribe the event pump with backoff until session_closed; a rejected permission chain can no longer become an unhandled rejection; receipts are clamped and never empty - permission broker: a failed auto-approval falls back to the spoken ask instead of losing the request - daemon/config/index: appshot readiness is declared at construction, numeric config ports parse, stray rejections are logged not fatal - e2e harness: QWEN_LIVE_E2E_KEEP=1 keeps the temp dirs for post-mortem * fix(qwen-live): address review round 1 — permission voting, shutdown, discovery reclaim, and hardening Permission trust boundary: - classify options by the wire's structured kind enum (allow_once/ allow_always/reject_*) instead of word regexes over snake_case ids, and vote the least-escalating match — a spoken "allow" now lands on proceed_once, never proceed_always_project - respond_permission's note is no longer discarded: it is logged and relayed to the backend session as a follow-up user instruction - track own votes per session so byUs attribution works on adopted sessions; narrow allow_always standing rules to the exact normalized command instead of a two-token prefix Lifecycle: - daemon stop() no longer hangs when SIGINT lands before listen() or when a Host redials during shutdown (stopping gate + client terminate) - dead-owner discovery reclaim now follows the cli contract (no-op commitOwner during handoff, republish after) — previously it could never succeed and a crash left the daemon unable to start - stop drain settles on the input-commit ack instead of burning the full 30s budget; response.created during the drain no longer flips the call back to speaking; a host-initiated start can no longer race deactivate() Robustness: - a late ASR final for an already-consumed input item is ignored as stale_input instead of dropping the call - raise the Host frame cap to cover a conformant CJK accessibility dump (64KiB frame cap contradicted the 32k-char field cap) - bin entry works through npm's bin symlink (realpath + pathToFileURL) - steered handoffs that join a running turn reuse the existing job instead of orphaning it; over-long steers fall back to a queued prompt; session_list unions created cwds, requests a full page, and maps hasActivePrompt for untracked sessions; created-session labels are applied via session metadata - injector: jobless throttle keys use the full context, dedup is symmetric, and barge-in drops clear the throttle stamp; sentence shapers handle CJK punctuation and mid-token periods - config loader: ENOENT-only swallow, BOM strip, ~ expansion, typed port validation, source-accurate errors; session log close() is terminal; transcript retention is capped Tests and docs: new config/daemon/sanitize suites, win32 guards restored on discovery mode assertions, protocol parity test now checks both type copies, qwen-live e2e suites join the no-AK PR gate, fake model gating in the inject e2e matches only the current turn and is consumed on match, FakeHost answers capture requests, lockfile diff reduced to qwen-live-only entries, README states the installer gap. * test(qwen-live): pin injector size caps and steered-message delivery - injector: 6000-char combined-context cap, whole-line spoken join at the 280-char boundary, single-line ellipsis truncation - steering e2e: assert the joined instruction actually reached the model endpoint, not just the receipt wording * fix(sdk): raise daemon browser bundle budget Co-authored-by: Qwen-Coder <[email protected]> * feat(qwen-live): scaffold standalone live daemon package with ported host stack New workspace package @qwen-code/qwen-live (M1+M2 of the Live split, issue #10118). This commit adds the package skeleton and the verbatim ports that need no behavioral changes: - host/: Live Host protocol v6 types, LiveHostCoordinator, and the discovery-file writer, ported from packages/cli/src/serve/live/ together with their test suites (51 tests green) - realtime/socket.ts, realtime/sanitize.ts: the two helper symbols the realtime client depends on, extracted from cli ui utils - registered in scripts/build.js buildOrder and root vitest projects * feat(qwen-live): generalize the realtime client tool surface Port qwen-realtime-session.ts and adapt it for the orchestration model: tools and instructions come from config, every declared tool dispatches through onFunctionCall with the raw argument payload, and outputs are receipt-style via submitFunctionOutput. The single-handoff machinery (multiple_handoffs error, steering acknowledgement, open-call complete) is removed; transport, response arbitration, pendingCalls timing, barge-in, and defensive validation are unchanged from the port. capturesTranscript marks handoff-style tools that capture the live transcript tail at call time. Test suite adapted: 27 tests green. * feat(qwen-live): add the BackendAdaptor seam and the qwen serve adaptor BackendAdaptor is the capability-bit-driven port between the live orchestrator and a coding-agent backend. QwenCodeAdaptor drives a running qwen serve daemon through the @qwen-code/sdk DaemonClient: 202-admission prompts, SSE event normalization (chunks and tool calls live under session_update.data.update), reject-if-idle mid-turn steering with a plain-prompt fallback, nested permission votes with voter attribution, and attachment-backed image blocks. 23 unit tests against an injected fake client. * feat(qwen-live): orchestrator, tools, injector, permissions, and daemon entry The M1+M2 core: - seven receipt-style dispatch tools plus remain_silent, with a dispatcher that answers every call (timeout fallback included) and session_N/job_N/asset_N handle registries - LiveSession wires Host audio, the realtime connection, tool handlers (appshot via the Host capture channel, handoff with voice-context packing and image attachments, busy-session steering), backend event pumps, and a bounded graceful-stop drain - Injector: safe-insertion window (VAD + response-in-flight + playback estimate at 48 kB/s with a quiet gap), batch aggregation, per-job progress throttling, barge-in drops progress, spoken/detail split - PermissionBroker: allow_always stays a one-shot protocol vote backed by a local TTL rule; remote resolutions retract queued asks - LiveDaemon: Host WS endpoint (Bearer + Origin-reject), discovery publish with fail-fast mutual exclusion and dead-owner handoff, appshot channel marked ready (the in-process capture path needs no separate verification), SIGINT/SIGTERM shutdown - SessionLog: JSONL with synchronous rotation (rename-before-reopen) 116 new unit tests; package total 167 green. * feat(qwen-live): end-to-end test suites against a real qwen serve daemon Test stack: a real qwen serve (spawned CLI bundle, fake-openai model endpoint), a scriptable fake DashScope realtime WebSocket server, the qwen-live daemon as a child process, and a protocol-v6 FakeHost client — every boundary is the real wire. Scenarios (11 tests): discovery publish/remove and hello/welcome, toggle brings up the realtime session (tool schema + instructions asserted on session.update), two-way audio byte fidelity, the full handoff loop against real serve with [COMPLETE] injection and spoken summary, injection-window hold/batch semantics, permission ask/vote relay, and busy-session steering tiers. The suites caught a real bug the unit layer could not: per-session calls must echo the daemon-issued clientId from the create/attach response (a self-made id is rejected by the client registration guard and broke handoff admission and vote attribution). QwenCodeAdaptor now tracks and echoes the issued id per session. * chore(release): keep @qwen-code/qwen-live versioned independently Same treatment as sdk/mobile-mcp/node-repl: the incubating package stays at its own 0.x version instead of lock-stepping with the CLI release train. The verbatim guard in package-scripts.test.js is updated alongside. * fix(qwen-live): harden review findings across dispatcher, injector, and permission relay Self-review fixes bundled after the adversarial pass: - adaptor: classify snake_case permission option ids (proceed_once) — the word-boundary regex never matched through "_", so an allow vote silently degraded to a cancelled outcome and serve dropped the turn - adaptor: detect the pending-prompt limit by error name as well as status, and fall image-bearing steers back to a regular prompt - dispatcher: a timed-out tool now answers with a pending receipt that tells the model not to retry (the handler keeps running) - injector: permission items flush ahead of the size-capped context join; spoken lines merge whole-line greedily under the 280-char cap - live-session: resubscribe the event pump with backoff until session_closed; a rejected permission chain can no longer become an unhandled rejection; receipts are clamped and never empty - permission broker: a failed auto-approval falls back to the spoken ask instead of losing the request - daemon/config/index: appshot readiness is declared at construction, numeric config ports parse, stray rejections are logged not fatal - e2e harness: QWEN_LIVE_E2E_KEEP=1 keeps the temp dirs for post-mortem * fix(qwen-live): address review round 1 — permission voting, shutdown, discovery reclaim, and hardening Permission trust boundary: - classify options by the wire's structured kind enum (allow_once/ allow_always/reject_*) instead of word regexes over snake_case ids, and vote the least-escalating match — a spoken "allow" now lands on proceed_once, never proceed_always_project - respond_permission's note is no longer discarded: it is logged and relayed to the backend session as a follow-up user instruction - track own votes per session so byUs attribution works on adopted sessions; narrow allow_always standing rules to the exact normalized command instead of a two-token prefix Lifecycle: - daemon stop() no longer hangs when SIGINT lands before listen() or when a Host redials during shutdown (stopping gate + client terminate) - dead-owner discovery reclaim now follows the cli contract (no-op commitOwner during handoff, republish after) — previously it could never succeed and a crash left the daemon unable to start - stop drain settles on the input-commit ack instead of burning the full 30s budget; response.created during the drain no longer flips the call back to speaking; a host-initiated start can no longer race deactivate() Robustness: - a late ASR final for an already-consumed input item is ignored as stale_input instead of dropping the call - raise the Host frame cap to cover a conformant CJK accessibility dump (64KiB frame cap contradicted the 32k-char field cap) - bin entry works through npm's bin symlink (realpath + pathToFileURL) - steered handoffs that join a running turn reuse the existing job instead of orphaning it; over-long steers fall back to a queued prompt; session_list unions created cwds, requests a full page, and maps hasActivePrompt for untracked sessions; created-session labels are applied via session metadata - injector: jobless throttle keys use the full context, dedup is symmetric, and barge-in drops clear the throttle stamp; sentence shapers handle CJK punctuation and mid-token periods - config loader: ENOENT-only swallow, BOM strip, ~ expansion, typed port validation, source-accurate errors; session log close() is terminal; transcript retention is capped Tests and docs: new config/daemon/sanitize suites, win32 guards restored on discovery mode assertions, protocol parity test now checks both type copies, qwen-live e2e suites join the no-AK PR gate, fake model gating in the inject e2e matches only the current turn and is consumed on match, FakeHost answers capture requests, lockfile diff reduced to qwen-live-only entries, README states the installer gap. * test(qwen-live): pin injector size caps and steered-message delivery - injector: 6000-char combined-context cap, whole-line spoken join at the 280-char boundary, single-line ellipsis truncation - steering e2e: assert the joined instruction actually reached the model endpoint, not just the receipt wording * feat(qwen-live): port the Live Host installer — M1 gap closed `live-host-installer.ts` moves verbatim from packages/cli/src/serve/live/ (same OSS/GitHub dual-source manifest fetch, sha256 + codesign + team-identifier verification, staging + backup install with rollback, and the retryable status machine), with its 11-test suite. The daemon gains the matching HTTP surface: - GET /live/setup — installed Host state - POST /live/setup/install — download + verify + install the latest POST /live/setup/launch — open the installed app All three sit behind the daemon's existing Bearer wall (a browser context sending Origin is always refused, wrong token 401) — pinned by a new daemon test; unknown paths stay 404 and GET /healthz answers plain 200. Bootstrap no longer depends on the built-in qwen-code Live integration having installed the Host first. * fix(qwen-live): attach the appshot-timeout rejection handler before advancing fake timers The timeout rejects synchronously inside advanceTimersByTimeAsync; a handler attached only afterwards leaves an unhandled rejection for an instant, which vitest counts as a run-level error (CI fails the package with Errors: 1 even though all 250 tests pass). Attach the expectation first, await it after the clock advances. * test(qwen-live): sync the no-AK gate pin with the qwen-live suites The no-ak-integration-ci pin (added upstream after our branch point) asserts the gate's file list verbatim; add the four qwen-live suites the gate has been running since they joined it. * fix(qwen-live): address review round 2 — trust-boundary keys, backpressure, session lifecycle Criticals (all probed and reproduced before fixing): - broker titleKeyOf: split on the FIRST colon and keep the entire remainder (commands routinely contain colons — a truncated key auto-approved a different -m message), and stop case-folding (/a vs /A are different paths on Linux). The whitespace-collapse pin is preserved - broker deny: an explicit spoken refusal now revokes the standing rule that matched the same request — the silent auto-answer's fallback path could otherwise be overridden by the invisible rule on the next identical request - adaptor activeJobRef: a busy-session fallback (image steer, over- long text 400) no longer overwrites the running turn's ref with the queued prompt's id — later steer receipts report the right job - adaptor byUs attribution: the daemon's originator stamp is now authoritative when present; ownVotes only covers anonymous resolutions. Another client resolving during our vote round-trip no longer reads as our own answer (R1-2 regression, fixed test-first) - adaptor permission titles: control sequences stripped before the title reaches speech or keys a standing rule (whole command kept — no first-line cut, unlike the progress path) - live-session pushAudio: the provider's backpressure signal is propagated (the port source fails the call) and onAudioDropped is wired to failCall — a socket over its buffer cap no longer silently garbles the utterance; the deliberate true for stale/connecting frames is untouched - handles: closed sessions stop resolving entirely (registry-level), and session_closed clears the call's default handle so a session- less handoff rebuilds instead of retrying a dead target forever - handles: read-site reconciliation — session_list and session_monitor transition a session's stale non-terminal jobs to done when the backend itself reports idle (a turn_complete emitted while no pump was subscribed no longer reports a running active_job forever) Suggestions on this PR's new surfaces: - live-host.yml: packages/qwen-live/src/host/** joins the path filter so the parity-test lane runs on qwen-live-only PRs instead of first failing in the merge queue - installer: the install route passes force=true (the recovery path for a corrupted-but-present app, matching the CLI mirror), and launch() gains the non-darwin guard in BOTH copies so the byte parity pin stays green - index: directory-form invocation (node packages/qwen-live) now runs main() instead of exiting 0 silently - realtime: the dead lastHandoffEntryCount machinery is removed (truncate-and-reset replaced the cursor it pretended to track) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: 易良 <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: yiliang114 <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Qwen-Coder <[email protected]>
212 lines
7.1 KiB
TypeScript
212 lines
7.1 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* @license
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* Copyright 2026 Qwen
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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*/
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/**
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* qwen-live M2 — permission forwarding across the voice boundary:
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*
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* A real `qwen serve` session (approval mode `default`) hits a `write_file`
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* tool call, which raises a daemon permission_request. The qwen-live
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* orchestrator must inject a `[PERMISSION req_1]` context item plus a spoken
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* ask into the realtime conversation; the voice model's
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* `respond_permission {decision:"allow"}` call must be delivered back to
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* serve as a vote, after which the tool runs and the turn completes.
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*
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* A warmup handoff first materializes the orchestrator's default session so
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* the test can pin its approval mode deterministically before the
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* permission-triggering turn.
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*/
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import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
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import * as path from 'node:path';
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import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
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import { fakeToolCall } from './fake-openai-server.js';
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import {
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contextTextOf,
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functionCallOutputOf,
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type FakeDashScopeConnection,
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} from './fake-dashscope-server.js';
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import {
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bootLiveStack,
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startLiveCall,
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type LiveStack,
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} from './qwen-live-harness.js';
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const SKIP =
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process.platform === 'win32' ||
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Boolean(
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process.env['QWEN_SANDBOX'] &&
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process.env['QWEN_SANDBOX'].toLowerCase() !== 'false',
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);
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const describeE2E = SKIP ? describe.skip : describe;
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const PERM_FILE_NAME = 'perm-e2e.txt';
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const PERM_FILE_CONTENT = 'permission-granted';
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describeE2E('qwen-live M2 — permission relay', () => {
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let stack: LiveStack;
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let conn: FakeDashScopeConnection;
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let permFilePath = '';
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beforeAll(async () => {
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stack = await bootLiveStack({
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makeOpenAIHandler: ({ workspaceDir }) => {
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permFilePath = path.join(workspaceDir, PERM_FILE_NAME);
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return ({ body }) => {
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const messages = JSON.stringify(body['messages'] ?? []);
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const hasToolResult =
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messages.includes('"role":"tool"') ||
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messages.includes('"tool_call_id"');
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if (messages.includes('perm-write-task')) {
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if (!hasToolResult) {
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return {
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toolCalls: [
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fakeToolCall('write_file', {
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file_path: permFilePath,
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content: PERM_FILE_CONTENT,
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}),
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],
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};
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}
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return { content: 'permission turn complete' };
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}
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if (messages.includes('perm-warmup')) {
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return { content: 'warmup done' };
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}
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return { content: 'ok' };
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};
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},
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});
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conn = (await startLiveCall(stack)).conn;
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}, 180_000);
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afterAll(async () => {
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await stack?.dispose();
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}, 60_000);
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it('relays the permission ask to voice and delivers the allow vote', async () => {
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// Warmup: materialize the orchestrator's default serve session.
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conn.functionCall({
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name: 'handoff',
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argumentsJson: JSON.stringify({ task: 'perm-warmup' }),
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callId: 'call-w',
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});
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const warmupReceiptMessage = await stack.fakeDash.waitForMessage(
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(message) => functionCallOutputOf(message)?.callId === 'call-w',
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{ timeoutMs: 30_000, description: 'the warmup handoff receipt' },
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);
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const warmupReceipt = JSON.parse(
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functionCallOutputOf(warmupReceiptMessage)!.output,
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) as Record<string, unknown>;
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expect(warmupReceipt['status']).toBe('accepted');
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const warmupJob = String(warmupReceipt['job']);
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await stack.fakeDash.waitForMessage(
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(message) =>
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contextTextOf(message)?.includes(`[COMPLETE ${warmupJob}]`) ?? false,
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{ timeoutMs: 30_000, description: 'the warmup [COMPLETE] injection' },
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);
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// Pin the approval mode of the orchestrator-created session so the
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// write below deterministically raises a permission_request.
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const sessions = await stack.serve.client.listWorkspaceSessions(
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stack.workspaceDir,
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);
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const target = sessions.find(
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(session) => session.sessionId !== stack.prewarmSessionId,
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);
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expect(target).toBeDefined();
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await stack.serve.client.setSessionApprovalMode(
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target!.sessionId,
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'default',
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);
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// The permission-triggering handoff.
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const inboxIndex = stack.fakeDash.inbox.length;
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conn.functionCall({
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name: 'handoff',
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argumentsJson: JSON.stringify({ task: 'perm-write-task' }),
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callId: 'call-p',
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});
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const receiptMessage = await stack.fakeDash.waitForMessage(
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(message) => functionCallOutputOf(message)?.callId === 'call-p',
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{
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timeoutMs: 30_000,
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fromIndex: inboxIndex,
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description: 'the perm-write-task handoff receipt',
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},
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);
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const receipt = JSON.parse(
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functionCallOutputOf(receiptMessage)!.output,
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) as Record<string, unknown>;
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expect(receipt['status']).toBe('accepted');
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const job = String(receipt['job']);
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// The ask reaches the voice model: silent [PERMISSION req_1] context…
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const permissionMessage = await stack.fakeDash.waitForMessage(
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(message) =>
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contextTextOf(message)?.includes('[PERMISSION req_1]') ?? false,
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{
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timeoutMs: 30_000,
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fromIndex: inboxIndex,
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description: 'the [PERMISSION req_1] context injection',
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},
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);
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const permissionText = contextTextOf(permissionMessage)!;
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expect(permissionText).toContain('respond_permission');
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expect(permissionText).toContain('wants to run');
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// …plus a spoken ask ([SPEAK_TO_USER] speech request).
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const speakMessage = await stack.fakeDash.waitForMessage(
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(message) => {
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const text = contextTextOf(message);
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return (
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text !== undefined &&
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text.startsWith('[SPEAK_TO_USER] ') &&
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text.includes('Should I allow it?')
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);
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},
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{
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timeoutMs: 15_000,
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fromIndex: inboxIndex,
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description: 'the spoken permission ask',
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},
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);
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expect(contextTextOf(speakMessage)).toBeDefined();
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// The user says yes: respond_permission must deliver the vote to serve.
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conn.functionCall({
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name: 'respond_permission',
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argumentsJson: '{"request_id":"req_1","decision":"allow"}',
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callId: 'call-2',
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});
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const voteReceiptMessage = await stack.fakeDash.waitForMessage(
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(message) => functionCallOutputOf(message)?.callId === 'call-2',
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{
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timeoutMs: 15_000,
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fromIndex: inboxIndex,
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description: 'the respond_permission receipt',
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
const voteReceipt = JSON.parse(
|
|
functionCallOutputOf(voteReceiptMessage)!.output,
|
|
) as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
expect(voteReceipt['status']).toBe('delivered');
|
|
|
|
// Serve accepted the vote: the tool ran and the turn completed.
|
|
const completeMessage = await stack.fakeDash.waitForMessage(
|
|
(message) =>
|
|
contextTextOf(message)?.includes(`[COMPLETE ${job}]`) ?? false,
|
|
{
|
|
timeoutMs: 60_000,
|
|
fromIndex: inboxIndex,
|
|
description: `[COMPLETE ${job}] after the allow vote`,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
expect(contextTextOf(completeMessage)).toContain(
|
|
'permission turn complete',
|
|
);
|
|
expect(readFileSync(permFilePath, 'utf8')).toBe(PERM_FILE_CONTENT);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|